Capabilities, Competition and Innovation Seminars
Selling diversity
Vasiliki Skreta (University of Texas at Austin), joint with Suraj Malladi
Thursday 10 October 2024 13:45 - 15:00
MAR 6.33, 6th floor, The Marshall Building, 44 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3LY
About this event
We provide a general yet tractable model to derive revenue-optimal mechanisms in settings with allocation-dependent externalities. Such externalities are present in settings ranging from concerts and parties to fashion items and software to college and workplace experiences. Our framework allows for transfers and for screening through ordeals like waiting in line, joining a fan club, or completing lengthy applications. We elucidate when and how such seemingly wasteful actions enhance price discrimination in the presence of externalities. Ordeals effectively filter out undesirable customers or members in some settings. In other settings, ordeals can be leveraged to allocate to desirable consumers who may have low purchasing power. We find conditions under which optimal mechanisms create two classes of customers: those who pay with money and those who pay with effort (effort discrimination).
Participants are expected to adhere to the CEP Events Code of Conduct.
Directions
This event will take place in MAR 6.33, 6th floor, The Marshall Building, 44 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3LY.
The building is labelled MAR on the LSE campus map. You can also find us on Google Maps. For further information, go to contact us.This series is part of the CEP's Growth programme.