Skip to main content

Capabilities, Competition and Innovation Seminars

Incentives and the Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats

Andrea Prat (Columbia University)


Thursday 24 May 2018 13:45 - 15:00

CKK 3.21, 3rd Floor, Cheng Kin Ku Building, LSE, 54 Lincoln's Inn Fields, WC2A 3LJ

About this event

Waste in public spending is an obstacle to the provision of government services, especially in developing countries. We report the results of a year-long randomized control trial among 500+ public bodies in Pakistan. Inspired by some key elements of the debate on the reform of procurement processes and by a model of monitoring with a self-interested agent and a self-interested monitor, we performed two treatments: introducing substantial financial incentives for the purchasing managers of the randomized bodies and granting purchasing managers a greater degree of autonomy in procurement decisions. The incentive treatment has no overall effect, but it decreases prices when the agent is subject to less monitoring and increases them when monitoring is stronger. The autonomy treatment significantly reduces purchasing prices.


Participants are expected to adhere to the CEP Events Code of Conduct.


Directions

This event will take place in CKK 3.21, 3rd Floor, Cheng Kin Ku Building, LSE, 54 Lincoln's Inn Fields, WC2A 3LJ.

The building is labelled CKK on the LSE campus map. You can also find us on Google Maps. For further information, go to contact us.

This series is part of the CEP's Growth programme.