Monopsony and the wage effects of migration
Michael Amior and Alan Manning
If labour markets are competitive, migration can only affect native wages via marginal products. But under imperfect competition, migration may also increase wage mark-downs ? if firms have greater monopsony power over migrants than natives, but cannot perfectly wage-discriminate. While marginal products depend on relative labor supplies across skill cells, mark-downs depend on migrant concentration within them. This insight can help rationalise empirical violations of canonical migration models. Using US data, we conclude that mark-downs grow: this increases aggregate native income, but redistributes it from workers to firms. Policies which constrain monopsony power over migrants can mitigate these adverse wage effects.
8 July 2025
The Economic Journal 136(674) , pp.402?439, 2025
DOI: doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaf053
https://academic.oup.com/ej/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ej/ueaf053/8193684
This Journal article is published under the centre's Community Wellbeing programme.