CEP Research:
Recent Academic Study Confirms Passing Through the Revolving Door Pays Off
17 September 2010
Using data from the Center for Responsive Politics, LegiStorm.com and Lobbyists.info, researchers Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Rosen analyzed the employment histories and salaries of 1,100 ex-Congressional staffers turned federal lobbyists.
Their study concluded that these lobbyists experienced a sizable drop in earnings when their old bosses left Congress.
Overall, the researchers found that lobbyists' earnings dropped by 24 percent upon the departure of one of their former employers in either the Senate or a senior position within the House.
This decline represents about $177,000 per year for the lobbyist's overall "practice" at a firm -- and the decrease in revenue persists for at least three years after the politician's exit, they observed.
"When a politician leaves, a lobbyist's connection to that politician becomes obsolete," said study co-author Draca. "The politician is no longer a potential target for lobbying."
Measuring the significance of the revolving door between K Street and Capitol Hill is a difficult task. The study's attempt to measure it by examining earnings is the first of its kind.
"There is plenty of discussion of the idea that former staffers are able to 'cash in' on the connections that they gained from working in Congress," Draca said. "But formal evidence on what these connections are worth in dollar terms is thin on the ground."
"Lobbyists argue that their earnings reflect expertise on policy issues generally", co-author Blanes i Vidal continued, "Our study tests whether former congressional staffers would be high-earners regardless of their privileged access to a powerful politician."
With their analysis showing a correlation between salaries and political connections, the authors beg to differ with the assessment that lobbyists bring only skills to the table when earning hundreds of thousands of dollars.
"Our estimates can be interpreted as the price of accessing or influencing politicians," Blanes i Vidal said. "Access or influence can be systematically bought and sold. This means that if you have the money, you can hire a lobbyist with political connections and improve your chances of affecting policy."
For more information, please email Jordi Blanes i Vidal at j.blanes-i-vidal@lse.ac.uk or Mirko Draca at m.draca@lse.ac.uk
Watch Washington's Revolving Door on You Tube.
Related publications:
CEP Discussion Paper 993: Revolving Door Lobbyists by Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, Christian Fons-Rosen, August 2010.