Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Abstract for:

Revolving Door Lobbyists

Jordi  Blanes i Vidal,  Mirko  Draca,  Christian  Fons-Rosen,  August 2010
Paper No' CEPDP0993: Full paper (pdf)
Save Reference as: BibTeX BibTeX File | Endote EndNote Import File
Keywords: Lobbying; revolving door, US Congress, political connections, political elites

JEL Classification: H11; J24; J45

Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.
This Paper is published under the following series: CEP Discussion Papers
Share: Google Bookmarks Google Bookmarks | Facebook Facebook | Twitter Twitter


Washington's 'revolving door' - the movement from government service into the lobbying industry- is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.