Results

Journal article

American Economic Review:

Relational knowledge transfers

We study how relational contracts mitigate Becker's classic problem of providing general human capital when training contracts are incomplete. The firm's profit-maximizing agreement is a multiperiod apprenticeship in whi...Read more...

CEP discussion paper

Relational knowledge transfers

An expert with general knowledge trains a cash-constrained novice. Faster training increases the novice?s productivity and his ability to compensate the expert; it also shrinks the stock of knowledge yet to be transferre...Read more...

CEP discussion paper

Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge

We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge-intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting. The resulting market for advice is plag...Read more...

CEP discussion paper

Relational Knowledge Transfers

An expert must train a novice. The novice initially has no cash, so he can only pay the expert with the accumulated surplus from his production. At any time, the novice can leave the relationship with his acquired knowle...Read more...