Thursday 04 December 2025 13:00 - 15:00

MAR 6.33, 6th floor, The Marshall Building, 44 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3LY

About this event

We study nepotism as both a form of favoritism and a tool for political bargaining leveraging rich population data that link family ties, electoral candidates, and employment records in Brazil. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, we show that the relatives of narrowly elected mayors and councilors experience sizable labor market premiums. Relatives of mayors are 16 percent more likely to secure public employment relative to the control group mean, while relatives of councilors are 9 percent more likely. These effects are concentrated in public jobs, fade once the political term ends, and are strongest for less educated relatives, consistent with favoritism rather than improved screening. We then provide evidence that nepotism operates as a bargaining device: mayors appoint the relatives of councilors, including those in the opposition, with the effects strongest when the mayor lacks a majority in the municipal council. Exploiting a second regression discontinuity design at the municipality level, we show that the premium for opposition councilors’ relatives increases when the opposition narrowly secures an additional seat, reinforcing the interpretation that appointments serve as political currency. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that stricter regulation can help curb these nepotistic appointments.

Participants are expected to adhere to the CEP Events Code of Conduct.

Directions

This event will take place in MAR 6.33, 6th floor, The Marshall Building, 44 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3LY.

Labour Markets Workshops are part of the CEP's Labour Markets programme.