Labour and Education Seminars
Profit-Sharing, Wages, and Worker Compensation: Evidence from Mexico
Agustina Colonna (University of Zurich)
01 December 2026 13:30 - 14:45
This event is both online and in person.
SAL 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, Sir Arthur Lewis Building, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PHOnline participants are welcome:
Please contact Lia Bergin (Communications and Events Assistant) l.bergin@lse.ac.uk to receive event updates and a link to the seminar online.
About this event
Policies that encourage or mandate profit-sharing between firms and workers are widespread. Yet their effect on total worker compensation remains unclear when firms can offset profit-sharing benefits by adjusting wages. This paper studies firms' incentives to adopt profit-sharing and pro vides new evidence on how firms adjust wages and employment in response to mandatory profit sharing in Mexico. Leveraging longitudinal establishment data and employer-employee data, we observe that many firms circumvented mandated profit-sharing through outsourcing schemes, de spite having the option to offer lower real wages. We then show that a reform that enforced profit-sharing caused newly complying establishments to only partially offset the cost of profit sharing through real wage reductions, resulting in a 2.8% increase in average total compensation (wages + profit-sharing), with no effect on employment. These findings are consistent with a model in which labor supply is less responsive to profit-sharing than to wages: on average, one additional peso in wages attracts as many workers as three pesos in profit-sharing. Risk aversion to profit sharing explains only 17% of workers' limited responsiveness to this benefit. Instead, it is largely explained by information frictions that prevent workers from fully incorporating profit-sharing into their labor supply decisions. Our results shed light on the mechanisms shaping the incidence of profit-sharing and, more generally, of policies mandating non-wage compensation.
Participants are expected to adhere to the CEP Events Code of Conduct.
Directions
This event will take place in SAL 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, Sir Arthur Lewis Building, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH.
Online participants are welcome:
Please contact Lia Bergin (Communications and Events Assistant) l.bergin@lse.ac.uk to receive event updates and a link to the seminar online.
The building is labelled SAL on the LSE campus map. You can also find us on Google Maps. For further information, go to contact us.
Labour and Education seminars are part of the CEP's Labour Markets programme.