This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995?2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. ? 2016 Elsevier B.V.

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1 March 2017

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Journal of International Economics 105, pp.57-76, 2017

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DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129881

This Journal article is published under the centre's Trade programme.