In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is either too tough or too lenient, from the viewpoint of the foreign country. We calibrate the model to match industry-level data in the USA and Canada. Our results suggest that, at present levels of trade costs, merger policy is too tough in the vast majority of sectors. We also quantify the resulting externalities and study the impact of different regimes of co-ordinating merger policies at varying levels of trade costs. ? 2020 2019 Royal Economic Society. Published by Oxford University Press.

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1 February 2020

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The Economic Journal 130(626) , pp.393-421, 2020

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DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez061

https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-abstract/130/626/393/5614493?redirectedFrom=fulltext

This Journal article is published under the centre's Trade programme.