This paper studies the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. Using data for Italy spanning more than three decades on a sample of almost one million individuals plus data on the universe of individuals holding political office, we show that politicians extract significant rents, in terms of private sector jobs, for their family members. We present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that this phenomenon is a form of corruption, i.e., a quid pro quo exchange between firms and politicians, although arguably an inferior substitute for easier-to-detect modes of rent appropriation on the part of politicians.

---

1 April 2020

---

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 12(2) , pp.67?95, 2020

---

DOI: 10.1257/app.20170778

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20170778

This Journal article is published under the centre's Labour programme.