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## **Do Public Sector CEOs Make a Difference? Results From a Pilot Survey of Headteachers**

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September 2006<sup>1</sup>

### *Abstract*

Economists have learnt a great deal about the influence of leaders of corporate firms but very little work exists on public sector chiefs. In this project we aim to collect our own data on leadership practices in schools using a school survey instrument, covering target setting and monitoring as well as the use of financial incentives to motivate teachers. With this data we aim to document variation in practices and relate this to variation in school performance. We also seek to uncover variation in practices *within* schools. Finally we ask what use leaders make of the, admittedly limited, incentivisation tools at their disposal. The aim of this pilot study is more narrow: to test our survey instrument. We find that interviewees are responsive and that answers to our questionnaire can be successfully coded up to rank interviewees on the various management practices. Weak evidence of a positive correlation between the management scores and inspection judgements suggests that our readings are valid. We also report on the more substantive findings from our small sample.

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<sup>1</sup> The authors would like to acknowledge support for this project from the Economic and Social Research Council, award number RES-153-25-0032.

## 1 Introduction

Economists have made considerable headway in recent years in documenting the relationship between corporate leaders and the performance of their firms. This body of work has demonstrated that CEOs and managers of private sector firms certainly do make a difference, that pay and performance are tied together, and that the structure of corporate governance matters for performance (see for example, Murphy 1999, Hall and Leibman 1998, Bertrand and Schoar 2003 and Bloom and Van Reenen 2006).

In contrast, there is very little empirical evidence on the part played by leaders in public sector entities. We aim to start bridging this gap by focusing on leadership practices in schools. A better understanding of schools is valuable in itself, but schools are especially attractive for such an analysis because performance data (student exam results) are readily available. In a related study Besley and Machin (2006) bring together school performance data and administrative salary data to show that school performance and pay of the headteacher *are* linked, a striking finding given the widely held perception that performance pay is little used in the public sector.

In this project we aim to collect our own data on management practices in schools. Specifically, we seek to gauge leadership practices in English schools in three areas: (1) setting targets, monitoring and evaluating performance at the *school* and *department* level; (2) setting targets for and monitoring and evaluating performance of *individual teachers*; and (3) the use of financial incentives to motivate teachers. We use an interview survey instrument to measure these practices across schools, seeking to score or rank leaders on these measures. A relatively novel aspect of our questionnaire design is to ask open ended questions rather than requiring box checking. This strategy has been tried and tested in a private sector context by Bloom and Van Reenen (2006). In our schools questionnaire many of the broad management categories we score correspond closely to those for firms used in Bloom and Van Reenen (2006).

Armed with these data we seek to address a number of important issues. First, we account for heterogeneity in management practices across schools, and ask whether it can help ‘explain’ variation in school performance. In the economics of education literature there is a running debate on the impact of resources, such as class size reduction, but very

little on how the school is actually run and whether this makes any difference to student outcomes.<sup>2,3</sup> With the data we collect we are in a position to address this issue.

Second, we seek to identify variation in practices *within* schools by interviewing heads of departments as well as the headteacher. Linking this information to performance of the school at the department level will shed light on the importance of individual managers. Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005) find that teacher quality is a key driver of student performance. A natural extension of this finding would be that performance at the department level is driven, to some extent at least, by the quality of the leader of that department.

Third, we ask whether pay incentives offered by headteachers to staff vary across schools. Although most leaders in English schools are highly constrained in their hiring and firing decisions, they nevertheless have a certain amount of flexibility in setting pay and awarding recruitment and retention allowances. The questions we seek to address are to what extent do heads make use of these incentivising tools and whether their use is related to school performance. Of special interest will be (i) inner city schools, which have been targeted with extra government funding, potentially giving leaders increased flexibility in setting salaries and (ii) City Academies, a new type of public (state) school where leaders have greater flexibility in hiring and firing.

The goals of this pilot study are more limited, namely to test our survey instrument.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, even with the very small sample, the results themselves are quite revealing and we report on these. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines relevant accountability and management issues in the English school system, section 3 furnishes details of the survey instrument, section 4 provides details of the pilot sample area and schools, section 5 reports results and section 6 concludes.

## **2 The Context: Accountability and Management in English Schools**

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<sup>2</sup> One exception is Wossmann (2003) who uses cross-country data to investigate the part played by factors such as school autonomy in hiring staff and setting the curriculum.

<sup>3</sup> On the school inputs debate see the exchange between Hanushek (2003) and Krueger (2003).

<sup>4</sup> For the pilot survey interviews are restricted to headteachers.

The overall responsibility for the school lies with the governing board, which is composed of parent and lay governors, governors appointed – usually one or two – by the Local Education Authority plus the headteacher. The legal responsibilities across different functions are delineated in Appendix 1. This makes it clear that the headteacher has quite extensive powers in the running of the school - there are very few areas where the headteacher does not at the very least provide advice to the governing board. In fact the only area where the head has no input is in the appointment of a new head deputies.

The school and headteacher, ultimately answerable to parents and the local community, are made accountable through a number of formal mechanisms. First, via an annual report from the school to parents as well as more regular parent-teacher meetings. Second, the publication of exam performance (or league) tables allows parents and others to compare schools against each other. Third, inspections undertaken by OFSTED, the Office for Standards in Education, are meant to provide external scrutiny on the quality of education provided by the school.

The statutory requirement to set and publish student achievement targets (the last item in the table in Appendix 1) sets a minimum level of performance tracking at the level of the school. Annual self-evaluation of the school is also the norm across all schools. This has in part grown alongside the culture of external evaluation instilled via OFSTED.

Performance of individual teachers is assessed annually. Pay increases over strictly defined pay scales, with automatic annual increments for those on the lower pay scale unless performance is deemed ‘unsatisfactory’. If the school has the flexibility in its budget, managers may award additional pay increments for exceptional performance. They may also make use of recruitment and retention incentives.<sup>5</sup> Similarly for the head and other leaders, whose salaries will reflect the size of the school they manage, governors have the ability to increase salaries beyond the usual single increment along their respective pay scales.

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<sup>5</sup> For example, talented newly qualified teachers on the leadership fast track programme may receive a £2,000 retention incentive each year.

### 3 The School Survey Instrument

#### 3.1 The Open, Conversational Questionnaire Design

We use telephone interviews to collect information on management practices in schools. Specifically, we use open ended questions to elicit evidence of actual practices. Although much more expensive than postal questionnaires, by asking open, non-leading questions and requesting concrete examples by way of evidence we hope to uncover practices actually in place in the school.

The telephone interview lasts half an hour and in order to ensure information collected is of a high enough quality most of the dialogue is limited to just three areas. These are (i) setting targets and monitoring performance at the school level; (ii) setting targets and monitoring performance at the teacher level; and (iii) pay and performance incentives offered to teachers. The interviewee is then graded on three further criteria in each of these three broad areas, yielding nine graded items in total. In order to score the school fairly on each of these nine criteria the interviewer attempts to root out evidence so as to do full justice to the management practices in place at the school and hence determine where each school sits within a spectrum of different school management styles. The scores run from 1, reflecting the lowest levels of monitoring, evaluating or incentivisation, up to 5, reflecting the highest levels.

The interviews are double blind in the sense that the interviewer does not know the performance or characteristics of the school, whilst the respondent does not know that they are being scored.<sup>6</sup> This helps reduce, first, preconceptions about the school the interviewer might bring and, second, the desire on the part of the interviewer to present an artificially favourable picture of management at the school.

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<sup>6</sup> The respondents are, however, informed of the distribution of scores across all schools after all the interviews have been completed. They are not informed of their individual scores.

### 3.2 Costs and Benefits of the Open Questionnaire Design

As a result of the greater burden on interviewers in terms of time as well as levels of interviewer ability and motivation an open questionnaire design is relatively expensive. The hope is that these higher costs over a closed question design are recouped via greater accuracy of responses. There are two key problems with the closed question approach that the open question style can overcome. First, a classic problem with the closed questions approach is that it leads to ‘social desirability bias’, i.e. responses may simply reflect socially desirable outcomes and attitudes, rather than the reality.<sup>7</sup> A second problem with this approach is that it may be hard to keep responders fully engaged or sufficiently interested so that they put in the required effort to answer questions accurately. In this case respondents do not give the most accurate answer, but rather settle for one they know will satisfy the interviewer. Cognitive psychologists term this phenomenon ‘satisficing’ (e.g. Krosnick 1999).

The advantage of the open questions approach over the box checking exercise is that the responder is expected to produce some evidence for each assertion that is made, thereby reducing social desirability bias. By probing and seeking examples the interviewer should be able to ascertain whether the responses reflect actual practices in the school.

The reliability of information collected with the open style questionnaire depends critically on how receptive the interviewee is to the survey exercise. If the interviewee is bored or disengaged then it may become very difficult to obtain an objective score. It is hoped that both the content of the survey, which relates to issues key to the interviewees job function, as well as the style of the questionnaire keeps the interest level of the responder up. Since this may turn out to be key to the accuracy of information gathered the interviewer is asked to judge the level of responsiveness and engagement of the responder after the close of the interview. This interviewer judgement relates to the issue of ‘satisficing’ raised above (recall this is where the interview is treated as a nuisance and the responder furnishes the interviewer with answers requiring the minimum effort).

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<sup>7</sup> The phenomenon of ‘social desirability bias’ has been highlighted in the context of surveys of attitudes, see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001).

Given the conversational style of the interview, the questioner should be in a good position to make a judgment on this issue.

Despite these potential benefits there are still some remaining threats to the validity and reliability of the management scores from the open question style:<sup>8</sup>

- (1) Scores may not be valid if an upward bias is introduced because interviewees wish to present their school in a favourable light and hence ‘talk up’ their management achievements, achievements which are not reflective of facts on the ground. We counter this ‘talking up’ hypothesis in a number of ways. First, it is emphasised to respondents at first contact (via email) and at the interview stage that responses will remain anonymous and no school or interviewee will be identified in any report. This reduces the incentive to appear better than the reality. Second, during the interview the responder is continuously asked to back up claims with concrete evidence and examples. [Third, we collect multiple scores for some schools by interviewing not just the headteacher, but also department heads. These can then be used to corroborate statements made by the headteacher, as well as adding to the overall assessment of management in the school.]
- (2) It might be argued that the conversational, open style of interviewing we propose might lead to lower data reliability. One supposed advantage of closed questions is that *exactly* the same question is asked of all respondents, which supposedly reduces interviewer bias and increases survey reliability and validity. But research shows that a rigid question style may actually compromise data quality rather than enhance it. By straight-jacketing the interviewer the inherent ambiguity in questions relating to complex situations cannot be resolved (see, for example, Suchman and Jordan 1990). It has been shown that when interviewers are free to clarify the true meaning of the question the validity of the responses increases substantially (Schober and Conrad 1997). [In our case we propose a test of interviewer reliability by having different interviewers undertake interviews with different members of the leadership team in the same school.]

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<sup>8</sup> The management scores are said to be *valid* if they reflect actual management practices. They are said to be *reliable* if different interviewers arrive at similar scores.

### 3.3 The Questionnaire

The full survey is reproduced in Appendix 2. The core of the questionnaire, school and teacher level tracking and evaluation (sections A and B) and incentives (section C), is the focus of the dialogue and takes up the vast majority of the interview time. The remainder is spent on short rapid-fire sections on quality and turnover of staff, the school roll, opinions on the local authority, parents and governors, and the background of the interviewee.

In section A the interviewee is scored on three school level measures: setting targets; tracking school performance; and evaluating performance. Section B scores relate to practices set in place for each individual teacher: setting targets; monitoring performance; and evaluating performance. Section C scores are for staff pay and incentives; methods and sanctions used to check poor performing staff; and appraisal of the head.

As explained earlier a score of 1 indicates that there is only minimal monitoring, evaluating or provision of incentives, whilst a 5 indicates the highest levels. For each metric scored the interviewer keeps in mind its precise definition. As an example consider the first item to be scored: setting targets for the school. This is further broken down into three categories: target breadth, target origin and dialogue. For the category target breadth the interviewer needs to establish whether there are a broad range of targets in place for the school. The questionnaire lists *example* questions the interviewer can ask in the course of the dialogue. In this case these are:

*What types of long-term and short-term targets or priorities are set for the school?*

*Can you give me examples of quantitative and qualitative targets?*

In the case of the second category, target origin, the interviewer requires evidence to ascertain whether there is a clear rationale for the targets. As listed in the questionnaire typical questions here might include:

*Why did you pick these particular targets? Where do your targets come from?*

*Which targets receive the most emphasis? Can you tell me why?*

For the third category, dialogue, the interviewer must determine whether there is a constructive discussion in setting targets. Typical questions for this case are:

*What tools do you use to set your quantitative targets? Who is involved in setting these targets? Does everyone know the school's targets? How is this achieved?*

### 3.4 Scoring headteacher interviews

In order to provide some more detail on how scores were derived, we illustrate with example responses and scores for the three school level practices, namely, setting targets, tracking performance and performance evaluation. The dialogue between the interviewer and a respondent revealed the following, earning the school a score of 4 on target setting:

*Examples of qualitative targets include development of the school curriculum and improving the school's self-evaluation framework. Quantitative targets include interim student achievement targets, over and above the statutory Key Stage targets, student behaviour targets (number of unauthorised student absences, number of exclusions) and staff absences. Targets are derived from the school's self-assessment and improvement plans as well as inspection findings. They are also partly driven by the local authority and central government targets. The school also seeks input from parents and students via surveys and questionnaires. Students' prior attainment (e.g. primary school results for secondary school entrants) as well as other test data are used to set targets for individual students, classes, teachers and departments. In addition to targets set for their students and classes, teachers are also aware of targets for their department as well as those for the whole school.*

The next example yields a score of 4 for performance tracking:

*Every half term students are tested and student-level performance data and teacher reports are updated. The latter may include teacher's evaluation on the student's effort, quality of homework and whether the student is on or off-target. Heads of departments alternately make formal presentations to the governing body on a regular basis. Tracking is enhanced by disseminating plethora of data*

*back to teachers in an easily digestible form. Teachers can access information on their own students at the click of a button. Tracking helps ensure that students are not falling through the cracks. The systems in place enable teachers and heads of departments to spot problem cases quickly and put corrective measures in place. Head uses the data to give direction and motivate school leaders and teachers.*

If in addition to the above the interviewer learns the following, then the score is increased to 5:

*Each week a primary head receives from every teacher a plan and objectives for their class. The teacher reports which children met targets and which did not. 'Red ink' highlights problems which will have to be addressed.*

Finally, for school performance evaluation the following leads to a score of 4:

*School performance evaluation meetings are held in June and again at the beginning of the autumn term. These are preceded by initial self-evaluations at the department level; follow up review meetings are held with the leadership team. Results are collated at the cohort as well as department level. Results are disseminated back to teachers. All staff are involved. Head presents overall performance report to the governors. School report on targets and performance is distributed to parents. If targets are not met management tries to root out the underlying cause: look at tests where performance was below expectations, going down to individual questions if necessary; also look into teacher level data.*

#### **4 The Pilot Survey Sample**

For the pilot survey the sample consisted of secondary and primary school headteachers in Wales, representing schools in a broad cross-section of communities. The advantages of using Wales as the pilot study area are that it does not affect the population once the survey is rolled out in England and that the education system is very similar to that in place in England. However, one disadvantage is that Welsh school performance data are not made publicly available. Since the main purpose of the pilot is to test the survey instrument in 'field conditions' this is not a major drawback.

25 schools were initially approached, 12 schools (eight secondaries and four primaries) declined to participate, yielding results from 13 schools, 11 secondary schools and two primary schools agreed to participate. On observable characteristics such as percentage of students receiving free school meals, size and inspection judgements participants and non-participants did not look especially different from each other.

All but one were from South Wales, and seven (five secondary and both primary schools) were situated in the Cardiff local authority. The interviews took place in March 2006.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Management scores

Figure 1 shows the overall picture for the pilot schools: the mean scores over all nine management practices for each school lie between about 2 and 3.5. There appear to be no schools scoring extremely poorly or well on *all* measures in our pilot of 13 schools.

Before delving into the details of the management scores we note here that scores on the post-interview judgement on levels of interviewee responsiveness and engagement were very high (nine heads scored 4, i.e. were highly responsive, and another four scored 3).<sup>9</sup> These results suggest that headteacher interest was high and allows us to take some comfort on the reliability of the scores collected.

The panels in Figure 2 show the distribution of scores for the nine management practices. The overall picture on *setting targets*, *tracking performance* and *performance evaluation* at the *school* level shows that schools generally scored well, around 3 or 4 (Figure 2a). In most schools there was a balance of qualitative and quantitative targets, good monitoring systems in place and regular evaluations, with teachers at all levels

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<sup>9</sup> The interviewer rates the interviewee as follows: 1 = Was never fully engaged; 2 = Was bored and disengaged at certain points, perhaps as the interview progressed; 3 = Moderately responsive and engaged all the way through; 4 = Highly responsive and engaged all the way through.

involved. In the best schools underlying causes for missing important targets were rooted out.

On *setting targets, tracking performance* and *performance evaluation* at the *teacher* level (Figure 2b), schools perform significantly worse: the modal score is 2. Although professional development targets were usually set, there tended to be little in the way of quantitative targets for individual teachers (despite the teachers' performance management framework, which calls for targets on students' performance). Headteachers often acknowledged that school targets were not linked to individual teacher targets and more than one head said that systems to rectify the situation were 'under development'.

As for *incentives*, scores for staff pay and incentives generated far and away the biggest variation in scores across all nine practices (first panel of Figure 2c). Although scope for incentivising their staff is very limited, headteachers hold highly divergent views on its use to drive performance. As discussed in section 2, tools available to heads include faster progression up the main pay scale, progression on to the 'upper pay scale', allowances for management duties and recruitment and retention incentives and benefits. Some heads *never* made use of any of these as a way to link pay and performance (scoring 1), others regarded these as essential and actively used tools at their disposal (scoring 5).<sup>10</sup>

It is useful to compare these results for schools with those reported in Bloom and Van Reenen (2006) for private sector firms. Schools look respectable next to firms when focusing on the school- or firm-level management scores (setting targets, tracking performance and performance evaluation, Figure 2a) but compare much less favourably on the other six measures. In particular on incentivising work, the best schools compare badly even with the worst firms.

## 5.2 Relating management scores to school characteristics and inspection grades

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<sup>10</sup> Many felt that new pay arrangements (called Teaching and Learning Responsibilities) will take away a lot of the flexibility they might have had in the past.

Figure 3 shows a plot of mean scores for each school against the percentage of students receiving free school meals. Although our pilot sample size is far too small to obtain any meaningful correlation estimates, the figure appears to suggest that there is no relationship between the two variables.

The scatter plot of scores against inspection grades suggests there might be a positive relationship between these two variables, though once again the strong caveat of small sample size applies. Interestingly, the two primary schools in our sample received the highest inspection grades also scored very highly on the school-level management scores.<sup>11</sup> These positive correlations provide some evidence of validity of our management scores data since the inspection judgements incorporate information on the past performance of the school.

Note that we cannot correlate management scores with school performance as the Welsh school performance tables are not publicly available.

## **6 Conclusion**

The primary lesson from this pilot study is that our survey instrument ‘works’ in the narrow sense that interviewees were responsive and the answers to questions were successfully coded up so that interviewees could be ranked on the various management practices. Weak evidence of a positive correlation between the management scores and inspection judgements suggests that our readings are valid.

A secondary lesson is that even with the very small sample, the pilot survey throws up some interesting findings. First, the relatively high scores on school level targets, monitoring and evaluation suggest that the drive towards increased accountability and public scrutiny in the 1990s which spurred the publication of exam performance data and the schools’ inspection regime has had a significant impact on management practices. But most schools, in our small survey at least, do not seem to have made the connection

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<sup>11</sup> The data on management we collect may help determine whether judgements arrived at by school inspection teams are valid. Ofsted have been criticised for not having established that their inspection judgements (grades) are reliable, in the sense that two different inspection teams arrive at the same grade for a given school at one point in time. See for example Fitz-Gibbon (1996).

between setting targets at the level of the school to those set for teachers. This may be related to the second major finding from the pilot: even with our small and relatively geographically homogenous sample there appears to be a great deal of heterogeneity in the use of pay incentive tools available to head teachers. Heads range from those who are averse to using such incentivising schemes to those who believe these are vital to boosting performance at their school.

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## Appendix 1: Legal Responsibilities of Headteachers and Governors

Key:

Level 1: Decisions made by governing body

Level 2: Decisions made by governing body with advice from the head

Level 3: Decisions delegated to the head

Level 4: Decisions made by the head

Column blank: Action could be undertaken at this level.

Column blocked off: Function cannot be legally carried out at this level.

Key Function	Tasks	Decision Level			
		1	2	3	4
<b>Budgets</b>	To approve the first formal budget plan each financial year				
	To monitor monthly expenditure.				
<b>Staffing</b>	Headteacher appointments (selection panel)				
	Deputy appointments (selection panel)				
	Appoint other teachers				
	Appoint non teaching staff				
	Agree a pay policy				
	Pay discretions				
	Dismissal of headteacher				
<b>Curriculum</b>	Dismissal of other staff				
	Ensure National Curriculum (NC) taught to all pupils and to consider any disapplication for pupil(s)				
	To establish a curriculum policy				
	To implement curriculum policy				
	To agree or reject and monitor curriculum policy				
<b>Performance Management</b>	Responsible for standards of teaching				
	To formulate a performance management policy				
	To establish a performance management policy				
	To implement the performance management policy				
	To review annually the performance management policy				
<b>Target Setting</b>	To set and publish targets for pupil achievement				

Source: Governing Body Decision Planner, Department for Education and Skills

## Appendix 2: The Questionnaire

Headteacher.....  
School.....  
LEA.....

Interviewer name.....  
Date of interview.....  
Time interview start.....  
Time interview end.....

### Post-interview judgements:

How *engaged* was the interviewee?

1. Was never fully engaged.
2. Was bored and disengaged at certain points, perhaps as the interview progressed
3. Moderately responsive and engaged all the way through.
4. Highly responsive and engaged all the way through.

How *revealing* was the interviewee?

1. Interviewee was evasive and hard to pin down.
2. Moderately frank and revealing.
3. Highly, perhaps even surprisingly revealing.

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I'm going to ask you some questions on targets and priorities set for your school. These will be followed by a similar set of questions relating to targets and priorities for your staff.

### **A Setting targets, monitoring and evaluating (school)**

#### **A(i) Setting targets (school)**

{ 1. Target breadth }

- a) What types of long-term and short-term targets or priorities are set for the school?
- b) Can you give me examples of quantitative and qualitative targets?

{ 2. Target origin }

- a) Why did you pick these particular targets? Where do your targets come from?
- b) What tools do you use to set your quantitative targets?
- c) Which targets receive the most emphasis? Can you tell me why?

{3. Dialogue}

- a) Who is involved in setting these targets? What is the forum for this?
- b) Does everyone know the school's targets? How is this achieved?

A(ii) Tracking pupils' performance (school)

{1. Tracking performance - data and dialogue}

- a) Do you continuously track the overall performance of the pupils? Can you tell me how?
- b) What kind of data are used for tracking performance? How frequently are these measured?

{2. Tracking performance – motivation}

- a) What use do you make of this tracking data? [what is the motivation behind this monitoring and tracking?]
- b) What happens if you find that you are going off track?
- c) Where do you place most emphasis in your monitoring and tracking? Can you tell me why?

A(iii) Performance evaluation (school)

{1. Annual evaluation}

In what setting does the school's annual performance evaluation take place? What is the framework for the evaluation?

{2. Consequence management}

Do you ever miss targets? What happens if important targets are not met?

**B Setting targets, monitoring and evaluating (teachers)**

B(i) Setting targets (teachers)

{1. Target breadth}

- a) What types of long-term and short-term targets or priorities are set for teachers?
- b) Can you give me examples of quantitative and qualitative targets?

{2. Target origin}

- a) How do they pick their targets? Where do targets come from?
- b) Which targets receive the most emphasis? Can you tell me why?

{3. Dialogue}

- a) What tools do you use to set quantitative targets for teachers?
- b) Who is involved in setting these targets?
- c) Do teachers know each others targets?

### B(ii) Monitoring performance (teachers)

#### { 1. Monitoring performance }

- a) Do you continuously monitor each teacher's performance? Can you tell me how?
- b) What kind of data are used for monitoring performance?
- c) How frequently are these measured?
- d) If I were to walk through your school right now could I tell how each teacher is doing against your expectations?
- e) What is the motivation behind this monitoring?

### B(iii) Performance evaluation (teachers)

#### { 1. Performance evaluation }

- a) In what setting does the teacher's annual performance evaluation take place? Can you tell me about this?
- b) Do people know about their own performance compared to other people's performance? How is this achieved?

#### { 2. Consequence management }

What happens if important targets are not met? What happens if there is a teacher consistently failing to meet key targets?

## C Incentives

#### { 1. Staff pay + retaining and attracting high quality staff }

- a) Do you have any flexibility in your budget to reward high quality performance? What happens if a member of staff is performing exceptionally well?
- b) Do you ever make use of financial inducements to retain or hire high quality staff? If you had a star teacher who wanted to leave what could the school do? Can you give me one or two recent examples?
- c) Do the governors play a big role in this? If yes, how? [any evidence governors sensitive to pay and performance?]

#### { 2. Poor performers }

What would you do if you had a staff member who was not performing well at his or her job?

#### { 3. Head appraisal }

Can you tell me about the framework that is in place to appraise you, the head of the school? How is your pay related to your performance?

### **D Staff turnover and quality of staff**

1. What is your usual annual staff turnover?
2. I'm going to go through some factors and I want you to tell me whether they help or hinder you in retaining and hiring high quality staff, bearing in mind competition you face from other schools in your area.

So, **relative to other schools in your area**, would you say that [a, b, c, d] affects your ability to retain and hire high quality staff:

adversely / or affects you about the same as other schools / or helps you

- a. the social background of your pupils
  - b. the level of pupils' achievement
  - c. proportion of ethnic minority students
  - d. your ability to pay a premium for high quality teachers
3. When you advertise for a vacancy what kind of response do you get? [very hard to fill with the right candidate , .. , big response]
  4. In your opinion, what proportion of staff perform at lower than acceptable standards?

### **E School roll**

1. Has your school roll been contracting or expanding in recent years? By how much?
2. What has been the impact of this on your budget? And the consequences of these cuts / increases?
3. What has been the cause of these changes?  
[competition, parental choice, demographics]  
Would you say parents are very active in exercising choice in deciding which school their child attends?

### **F Rating for LEA / parents / governors**

In addition, how would you rate the following:

Outstanding / Good / Satisfactory / Inadequate

1. Support from your LEA
2. Support and involvement from parents
3. Leadership from governors

### **G Background information**

Are you a permanent or temporary head?

How many years experience do you have as a head?


Including your time as a head, how many years of experience do you have in teaching?

How many years have you been head at this school?


What was your position before becoming head of this school?

Was this at your current school?


**Figure 1: Mean scores over all practices**




**Figure 2: Distribution of scores**  
**2a: School-level management**




**2b: Teacher-level management**



## 2c: Incentives



**Figure 3: : Scatter plot of mean scores and percentage of pupils receiving free school meals**



**Figure 4: Scatter plot of mean scores and inspection grades**

