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Commuting, Migration and Local Employment Elasticities

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Abstract
Many changes in the economic environment are local, including policy changes and infrastructure investments. The effect of these changes depends crucially on the ability of factors to move in response. Therefore a key object of interest for policy evaluation and design is the elasticity of local employment to these changes in the economic environment. We develop a quantitative general equilibrium model that incorporates spatial linkages between locations in goods markets (trade) and factor markets (commuting and migration). We find substantial heterogeneity across locations in local employment elasticities. We show that this heterogeneity can be well explained with theoretically motivated measures of commuting flows. Without taking into account this dependence, estimates of the local employment elasticity for one location are not generalizable to other locations. We also find that commuting flows and their importance cannot be accounted for with standard measures of size or wages at the county or commuting zone levels.

Keywords: Commuting, migration and local employment elasticities
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Introduction

Agents spend about 8% of their workday commuting to and from work. They make this significant daily investment, to live and work in different locations, so as to balance their living costs and residential amenities with the wage they can obtain at their place of employment. The ability of firms in a location to attract workers depends, therefore, not only on the ability to attract local residents through migration, but also on the ability to attract commuters from other, nearby, locations. Together, the response of migration and commuting to any local shock, including regulatory changes and infrastructure investments, determine the local employment elasticity. This elasticity is of great policy interest since it determines the effectiveness of local policy. Estimating its magnitude as a response to a variety of shocks (such as aggregate industry shocks, the discovery of natural resources, financial crises and regression discontinuities associated with state policy interventions) has been the main concern of a large empirical literature. In this paper we explore its determinants and characteristics using a detailed quantitative spatial equilibrium theory.

We develop a quantitative spatial general equilibrium model that incorporates spatial linkages between locations in both goods markets (trade) and factor markets (commuting and migration). We show that there is no single local employment elasticity. Instead the local employment elasticity is an endogenous variable that differs across locations depending on their linkages to one another in goods and factor markets. Calibrating our model to county-level data for the United States, we find that the elasticity of local employment with respect to local productivity shocks varies from close to zero to more than three. Therefore an average local employment elasticity estimated from cross-section data can be quite misleading when used to predict the impact of a local shock on any individual county and can lead to substantial under or overprediction of the effect of the shock. We use our quantitative model to understand the systematic determinants of the local employment elasticity and argue that a large part of the variation results from differences in commuting links between a location and its neighbors. This allows us to propose variables that can be included in reduced-form regressions to improve their ability to predict the heterogeneity in local employment responses. Of course, the full general equilibrium model is required to quantify the total impact of a shock and its implications for welfare. These counterfactuals can be undertaken within the model using only the observed values of variables in an initial equilibrium.

Our theoretical framework allows for an arbitrary number of locations that can differ in productivity, amenities and geographical relationship to one another. The spatial distribution of economic activity is driven by a tension between productivity differences and home market effects (forces for the concentration of economic activity) and an inelastic supply of land and commuting costs (dispersion forces). Commuting allows workers to access high productivity employment locations without having to live there and hence alleviates the congestion effect in such high productivity locations. We show that the resulting commuting flows between locations exhibit a gravity equation relationship with a much higher distance elasticity than for goods flows, suggesting that moving people is more costly than moving goods across

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1See Redding and Turner (2015).
geographic space. We discipline our quantitative spatial model to match these observed gravity equation relationships for goods and commuting flows as well as the observed cross-section distributions of employment, residents and wages across U.S. counties. Given observed data on wages, employment by workplace, commuting flows and land area, and a parameterization of trade and commuting costs, we show that the model can be used to recover unique values of the unobserved location fundamentals (productivity and amenities) that exactly rationalize the observed data as an equilibrium of the model.

We use our model to undertake three quantitative exercises that shed light on spatial linkages in goods and factor markets. First, we provide evidence on the distribution of local employment elasticities across counties. We do so by calculating 3,111 counterfactual exercises, each shocking one county in the U.S. with a 5 percent productivity shock. We find substantial heterogeneity in local employment elasticities across counties. This heterogeneity remains even when we aggregate counties into Commuting Zones (CZ’s), that are intended to better approximate local labor market areas. We show that the main determinant of this large heterogeneity is the observed patterns of commuting in the equilibrium prior to the productivity shock. That is, the response of a county to a local shock depends crucially on its observed commuting ties to other counties. Local employment elasticities estimated in a particular location, that do not account for this dependence, will in general not apply in another region or context. Taken together, these results highlight that locations within countries are not independent units in cross-section regression relationships but are rather systematically linked to one another in goods and factor markets in a quantitatively significant way.

Given that the heterogeneity in local employment elasticity depends crucially on commuting links, our next step is to explore these links more thoroughly. We find that commuting intensities cannot easily be accounted for by standard measures of the size of economic activity in a county or its neighbors. Therefore, to explore further the importance and determination of commuting, we undertake a second exercise, in which we use our quantitative model to evaluate the welfare gains from commuting by considering a counterfactual with prohibitive commuting costs. The commuting technology facilitates a separation of workplace and residence, enabling people to work in relatively high productivity locations and live in relatively high amenity locations. Therefore eliminating commuting leads to a dispersal of employment from locations that were net importers of commuters in the initial equilibrium (e.g. Manhattan) towards those locations that were initially net exporters (e.g. Brooklyn and parts of New Jersey). We find that these reallocations are substantial, with Manhattan experiencing a decline in employment of over 70 percent, while Brooklyn experiences an increase of more than 100%.

The above logic seems to suggest that commuting might be important only for areas that encompass the larger cities in the U.S. This is, however, not the case. Although the changes in employment as a result of eliminating commuting are well explained by initial commuting intensity, this intensity is not well accounted for by either county or commuting zone size. The results underscore again the relevant information embedded in commuting links. Overall, we find a welfare cost of eliminating commuting of around 7.2 percent of real GDP, which is comparable to standard estimates of the welfare gains from
international trade for a country of a similar size to the United States.

The previous literature in trade and economic geography has mostly abstracted from commuting when analyzing reductions in the costs of trading goods between locations. However, given the importance of commuting links in shaping the distribution of economic activity across counties, it is natural to expect that these links also determine the magnitude of the impact of reductions in trade costs. Hence, in a third exercise we investigate the interaction between trade and commuting costs. We compare the counterfactual effects of a 20 percent reduction of trade costs in the actual world with commuting to the effects in a hypothetical world without commuting.

We find that the impact of a reduction in goods trade costs on the spatial distribution of economic activity is sensitive to the costs of commuting. In a world without commuting, the ability of high productivity locations to increase employment is limited by their ability to attract residents in the face of congestion costs from an inelastic supply of land. In a world with commuting, these locations can increase employment by attracting residents to neighboring locations, thereby alleviating congestion costs. In general, reductions in trade costs lead to a more dispersed spatial distribution of economic activity in the model. However, this dispersal is smaller with commuting than without commuting. Commuting increases the ability of the most productive locations to serve the national market by drawing workers from a suburban hinterland, without bidding up land prices as much as would otherwise occur. These results demonstrate how abstracting from commuting can lead to distorted conclusions for the impact of trade cost reductions and highlight the richness of the spatial linkages between locations.


Unlike most of the above studies, we develop a quantitative general equilibrium spatial model that incorporates both costly trade in goods and costly mobility and commuting of people between locations. Through incorporating these spatial linkages in both goods and factor markets, our theoretical and empirical framework unifies research on systems of cities (with trade and migration between cities) and the
internal organization of economic activity within cities (with commuting within cities). We discipline our quantitative model to match the observed gravity equation relationships for goods trade and commuting flows and to rationalize the observed cross-section distribution of employment, residents and wages across U.S. counties. The result is a quantitative framework that can be used to evaluate both local effects of shocks and their spillovers to other counties through general equilibrium linkages in goods and factor markets.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the quantification of the model using U.S. data and reports summary statistics on commuting between counties. Section 4 uses the model to undertake three sets of counterfactuals that highlight the importance of spatial linkages in goods and factor markets. We examine the local incidence of productivity shocks (local labor demand shocks), the effects of changes in commuting technology, and the interaction between changes in trade and commuting costs. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions. Appendix A contains the detailed derivations of theoretical results and the proofs of propositions, and Appendix B a description of data sources and manipulations.

2 The Model

We consider an economy that consists of a set of locations $n, i \in N$. These locations are linked in goods markets through costly trade and in factor markets through migration and costly commuting. The economy as a whole is populated by a measure $L$ of workers who are endowed with one unit of labor that is supplied inelastically. Each location $n$ is endowed with an inelastic supply of land ($H_n$).

2.1 Preferences and Endowments

Workers are geographical mobile and have heterogeneous preferences for locations. Each worker chooses a pair of residence and workplace locations to maximize their utility taking as given the choices of other firms and workers. The preferences of a worker $\omega$ who lives and consumes in region $n$ and works in region $i$ are defined over final goods consumption ($C_{n\omega}$), residential land use ($H_{n\omega}$), an idiosyncratic amenities shock ($b_{ni\omega}$) and commuting costs ($\kappa_{ni}$), according to the Cobb-Douglas form,

$$U_{ni\omega} = \frac{b_{ni\omega}}{\kappa_{ni}} \left( \frac{C_{n\omega}}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{H_{n\omega}}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha},$$

(1)

where $\kappa_{ni} \in [1, \infty)$ is an iceberg commuting cost in terms of utility. The idiosyncratic amenities shock ($b_{ni\omega}$) captures the idea that individual workers can have idiosyncratic reasons for living and working in different locations. We model this heterogeneity in amenities following McFadden (1974) and Eaton and

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Footnotes:

2 Throughout the following we use $n$ to denote a worker’s location of residence and consumption and $i$ to denote a worker’s location of employment and production, unless otherwise indicated.

3 For empirical evidence using U.S. data in support of the constant housing expenditure share implied by the Cobb-Douglas functional form, see Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011).
For each worker $\omega$ living in location $n$ and working in location $i$, idiosyncratic amenities $(b_{ni\omega})$ are drawn from an independent Fréchet distribution,

$$G_{ni}(b) = e^{-B_{ni}b^{-\epsilon}}, \quad B_{ni} > 0, \epsilon > 1,$$

where the scale parameter $B_{ni}$ determines the average amenities from living in location $n$ and working in location $i$, and the shape parameter $\epsilon > 1$ controls the dispersion of amenities. This idiosyncratic amenities shock implies that different workers make different choices about their workplace and residence locations when faced with the same prices and wages. All workers $\omega$ residing in region $n$ and working in region $i$ receive the same wage and make the same consumption and residential land choices. Hence we suppress the implicit dependence on $\omega$ except where important.

The goods consumption index in location $n$ takes the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) or Dixit-Stiglitz form and is defined over a continuum of varieties sourced from each location $i$,

$$C_n = \left[ \sum \int_0^{M_i} c_{ni}(j)^{\rho}dj \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}, \quad \sigma = \frac{1}{1-\rho} > 1.$$

Equilibrium consumption in location $n$ of each variety sourced from location $i$ is

$$c_{ni}(j) = \alpha X_n P_n^{\sigma-1} p_{ni}(j)^{-\sigma},$$

where $X_n$ is aggregate expenditure in location $n$; $P_n$ is the price index dual to (3), and $p_{ni}(j)$ is the “cost inclusive of freight” price of a variety produced in location $i$ and consumed in location $n$.

We assume that land is owned by landlords, who receive income from residents’ expenditure on land, and consume goods where they live. Therefore total expenditure on consumption goods equals the fraction $\alpha$ of the total income of residents plus the entire income of landlords (which equals the fraction $(1 - \alpha)$ of the total income of residents):

$$P_n C_n = \alpha \bar{v}_n L_{Rn} + (1 - \alpha) \bar{v}_n L_{Rn} = \bar{v}_n L_{Rn}$$

where $P_n$ is the dual price index for consumption goods; $\bar{v}_n$ is the average income of residents across employment locations; and $L_{Rn}$ is the measure of residents. Land market clearing determines the equilibrium land price ($Q_n$):

$$Q_n = (1 - \alpha) \frac{\bar{v}_n L_{Rn}}{H_n},$$

where $H_n$ is the inelastic supply of land.

### 2.2 Production

Production is modelled as in the new economic geography literature following Krugman (1991) and Helpman (1998). Varieties are produced under conditions of monopolistic competition. To produce a
variety, a firm must incur a fixed cost of \( F \) units of labor and a constant variable cost in terms of labor that depends on a region’s productivity \( A_i \).\(^5\) Therefore the total amount of labor \( (l_i(j)) \) required to produce \( x_i(j) \) units of a variety \( j \) in region \( i \) is

\[
l_i(j) = F + \frac{x_i(j)}{A_i}.
\] (6)

Profit maximization implies that equilibrium prices are a constant mark-up over marginal cost, namely,

\[
p_{ni}(j) = \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right) \frac{d_{ni}w_i}{A_i},
\] (7)

where \( w_i \) is the wage in region \( i \). Profit maximization and zero profits imply that equilibrium output of each variety is equal to

\[
x_i(j) = A_i F (\sigma - 1).
\] (8)

A constant equilibrium output of each variety and labor market clearing then imply that the total measure of produced varieties \( (M_i) \) is proportional to the measure of employed workers \( (L_{Mi}) \),

\[
M_i = \frac{L_{Mi}}{\sigma F}.
\] (9)

### 2.3 Goods Trade

The model implies a gravity equation for bilateral trade between regions. Using the CES expenditure function, equilibrium prices (7) and the measure of firms in (9), the share of region \( n \)'s expenditure on goods produced in region \( i \) is

\[
\pi_{ni} = \frac{M_i p_{ni}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k \in N} M_k p_{nk}^{1-\sigma}} = \frac{L_{Mi} (d_{ni} w_i / A_i)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k \in N} L_{Mk} (d_{nk} w_k / A_k)^{1-\sigma}}.
\] (10)

Therefore trade between regions \( n \) and \( i \) depends on bilateral trade costs \( (d_{ni}) \) in the numerator (“bilateral resistance”) and on trade costs to all possible sources of supply \( k \) in the denominator (“multilateral resistance”). Trade balance then implies that total workplace income in each location equals total expenditure on goods produced in that location, namely,\(^7\)

\[
w_i L_{Mi} = \sum_{n \in N} \pi_{ni} \bar{e}_{n} L_{Rn}.
\] (11)

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\(^5\)We assume a representative firm within each location. However, it is straightforward to generalize the analysis to introduce firm heterogeneity following Melitz (2003), where all firms entering in location \( i \) draw a productivity \( \varphi \) from an untruncated Pareto distribution \( g(\varphi) \) that can be used to produce varieties in location \( i \).

\(^6\)We abstract from commercial land use, although it is straightforward to extend the model to consider the case where land is used both for residential and commercial purposes.

\(^7\)Although we refer to trade balance as total workplace income equals total expenditure on goods produced in a location, total residential income need not equal total workplace income (because of commuting). Therefore total workplace income need not equal total residential expenditure, which implies that total exports need not equal total imports. When we take the model to the data, we also allow for the possibility that total residential expenditure need not equal total residential income. Within the model, these two variables can diverge if landlords own land in different locations from where they commute. This is how we interpret deficits in the empirical section.
Using equilibrium prices (7) and labor market clearing (9), the price index dual to the consumption index (3) can be expressed as

\[ P_n = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma F} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left[ \sum_{i \in N} L_{Mi} \left( d_{ni w_i} / A_i \right)^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \left( \frac{L_{Mn}}{\sigma F \pi_m} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} d_{mn w_n} / A_n. \]  

(12)

where the second equality uses (10) to write the price index (12) as in the class of models considered by Arkolakis and Allen (2014b). This class of models includes increasing returns models such as Krugman (1991) and constant returns models such as versions of Armington (1969) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).

One difference between the increasing returns model of new economic geography considered here and the constant returns versions of Armington (1969) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) is that here the measure of employed workers in each region \( L_{Mi} \) enters the trade share \( \pi_{ni} \) and price index \( P_n \). This role for the measure of employed workers reflects consumer love of variety and the endogenous measure of varieties. As more agents choose to work in a region, this increases the measure of varieties produced in that region, which increases the share of consumer expenditure allocated to that region and reduces the consumer price index (this is the pecuniary externality highlighted by the New Economic Geography Literature). A similar role for the measure of employed workers arises in versions of Armington (1969) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) augmented to include external economies of scale, as considered further below.

### 2.4 Labor Mobility and Commuting

Workers are geographically mobile and choose their pair of residence and workplace locations to maximize their utility. Given our specification of preferences (1), the indirect utility function for a worker \( \omega \) residing in region \( n \) and working in region \( i \) is

\[ U_{ni \omega} = \frac{b_{niw_i} w_i}{\kappa_{ni} P_n Q_n^{1-\alpha}}. \]  

(13)

Indirect utility is a monotonic function of idiosyncratic amenities \( b_{niw_i} \) and these amenities have a Fréchet distribution. Therefore, the indirect utility for a worker living in region \( n \) and working in region \( i \) also has a Fréchet distribution given by

\[ G_{ni}(U) = e^{-\Psi_{ni} U^{-\epsilon}}, \quad \Psi_{ni} = B_{ni} \left( \kappa_{ni} P_n Q_n^{1-\alpha} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_i^\epsilon. \]  

(14)

Each worker selects the bilateral commute that offers her the maximum utility, where the maximum of Fréchet distributed random variables is itself Fréchet distributed. Using these distributions of utility, the probability that a worker chooses to live in location \( n \) and work in location \( i \) is

\[ \lambda_{ni} = \frac{B_{ni} \left( \kappa_{ni} P_n Q_n^{1-\alpha} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_i^\epsilon}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_r Q_r^{1-\alpha} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_s^\epsilon} = \frac{\Phi_{ni}}{\Phi}. \]  

(15)
The idiosyncratic shock to preferences $b_{ni}$, implies that individual workers choose different bilateral commutes when faced with the same prices $(P_{n}, Q_{n}, w_{i})$, commuting costs $(\kappa_{ni})$ and location characteristics $(B_{ni})$. Other things equal, workers are more likely to live in location $n$ and work in location $i$, the lower the consumption goods price index $(P_{n})$ and land prices $(Q_{n})$ in $n$, the higher the wages $(w_{i})$ in $i$, the more attractive the average amenities for this bilateral commute $(B_{ni})$, and the lower the commuting costs $(\kappa_{ni})$.

Summing these probabilities across workplaces $i$ for a given residence $n$, we obtain the overall probability that a worker resides in location $n$ ($\lambda_{Rn}$). Similarly, summing across residences $n$ for a given workplace $i$, we obtain the overall probability that a worker works in location $i$ ($\lambda_{Mi}$). So,

$$ \lambda_{Rn} = \frac{L_{Rn}}{L} = \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{ni} = \sum_{i \in N} \frac{\Phi_{ni}}{\Phi}, \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_{Mi} = \frac{L_{Mi}}{L} = \sum_{n \in N} \lambda_{ni} = \sum_{n \in N} \frac{\Phi_{ni}}{\Phi}, \quad (16)$$

where labor market clearing corresponds to $\sum_{n} \lambda_{Rn} = \sum_{i} \lambda_{Mi} = 1$.

The average income of a worker living in $n$ depends on the wages in all the nearby employment locations. To construct this average income of residents, note first that the probability that a worker commutes to location $i$ conditional on living in location $n$ is

$$ \lambda_{ni|n} = \frac{B_{ni} (w_{i} / \kappa_{ni})^{\epsilon}}{\sum_{s \in N} B_{ns} (w_{s} / \kappa_{ns})^{\epsilon}}. \quad (17)$$

Note that equation (17) implies that, as with trade flows, commuting flows exhibit a gravity equation with an elasticity of commuting flows with respect to commuting cost $(\kappa_{ni})$ given by $-\epsilon$. The probability of commuting to location $i$ conditional on living in location $n$ depends on the wage $(w_{i})$, amenities $(B_{ni})$ and commuting costs for workplace $i$ in the numerator ("bilateral resistance") as well as the wage $(w_{s})$, amenities $(B_{ns})$ and commuting costs $(\kappa_{ns})$ for all other possible workplaces $s$ in the denominator ("multilateral resistance").

Using these conditional commuting probabilities, we obtain the following labor market clearing condition that equates the measure of workers employed in location $i$ ($L_{Mi}$) with the measure of workers choosing to commute to location $i$, namely,

$$ L_{Mi} = \sum_{n \in N} \lambda_{ni|n} L_{Rn}, \quad (18)$$

where $L_{Rn}$ is the measure of residents in location $n$. Expected worker income conditional on living in location $n$ is then equal to the wages in all possible workplaces weighted by the probabilities of commuting to those workplaces conditional on living in $n$, or

$$ \bar{v}_{n} = \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{ni|n} w_{i}. \quad (19)$$

Expected worker income ($\bar{v}_{n}$) is high in locations that have low commuting costs (low $\kappa_{ni}$) to high-wage employment locations.
Finally, population mobility implies that expected utility is the same for all pairs of residence and workplace and equal to expected utility for the economy as a whole. That is,

$$\bar{U} = \mathbb{E}[U_{niw}] = \Gamma \left( \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \right) \left[ \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} \left( k_{rs} P_r^{\alpha} Q_r^{1-\alpha} \right)^{-\epsilon} \epsilon w_{rs} \right]^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \text{ all } n, i \in N, \quad (20)$$

where $\mathbb{E}$ is the expectations operator and the expectation is taken over the distribution for the idiosyncratic component of utility and $\Gamma(\cdot)$ is the Gamma function.

Although expected utility is equalized across all pairs of residence and workplace locations, real wages differ as a result of preference heterogeneity. Workplaces and residences face upward-sloping supply functions for workers and residents respectively (the choice probabilities (16)). Each workplace must pay higher wages to increase commuters’ real income and attract additional workers with lower idiosyncratic amenities for that workplace. Similarly, each residential location must offer a lower cost of living to increase commuters’ real income and attract additional residents with lower idiosyncratic amenities for that residence. Bilateral commutes with attractive characteristics (high workplace wages and low residence cost of living) attract additional commuters with lower idiosyncratic amenities until expected utility (taking into account idiosyncratic amenities) is the same across all bilateral commutes.

Our quantitative framework yields a simple expression for counterfactual changes in welfare in terms of observable sufficient statistics, including each location’s domestic trade and commuting shares. From expected utility (20) and commuting probabilities (15), welfare in any given location $n$ can be expressed as

$$\bar{U} = \Gamma \left( \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \right) \frac{\bar{w}_n}{k_{nn}} \cdot \frac{\bar{P}_n^{\alpha}}{\bar{Q}_n^{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{\bar{B}_{nn}}{\bar{\lambda}_{nn}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}. \quad (21)$$

Hence, the relative change in this common level of expected utility following a counterfactual change in the model’s exogenous variables is given by

$$\hat{\bar{U}} = \frac{1}{k_{nn}} \left( \frac{\hat{A}_n}{\hat{d}_{nn}} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{\hat{B}_{nn}}{\hat{\lambda}_{nn}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \left( \frac{1}{\hat{\pi}_{nn}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \left( \frac{\bar{w}_n}{\bar{\pi}_n} \right)^{1-\alpha} \frac{\hat{L}_{Mn}^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}}{\hat{L}_{Rn}^{1-\alpha}}. \quad (22)$$

This equation identifies the mechanisms through which welfare can change in spatial equilibrium through linkages in goods and factor markets.

### 2.5 General Equilibrium

The general equilibrium of the model can be referenced by the following vector of six variables \(\{w_n, \bar{v}_n, Q_n, L_{Mn}, L_{Rn}, P_{ni}\}_{n=1}^{N}\) and a scalar $\bar{U}$. Given this equilibrium vector and scalar, all other endogenous variables of the model can be determined. This equilibrium vector solves the following six sets of equations: trade balance in each location (11), average residential income (19), land market clearing (9), workplace choice probabilities ((16) for $L_{Mn}$), residence choice probabilities ((16) for $L_{Rn}$), and price indices (12). The last condition needed to determine the scalar $\bar{U}$ is the labor market clearing condition,

$$\bar{L} = \sum_{n \in N} L_{Rn} = \sum_{n \in N} L_{Mn}.$$
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness) If
\[
\frac{1 + \epsilon}{1 + (1 - \alpha) \epsilon} < \sigma
\]
there exists a unique general equilibrium of this economy.

Proof. See appendix. ■

The condition for the existence of a unique general equilibrium in Proposition 1 is a generalization of the condition in the Helpman (1998) model to incorporate commuting and heterogeneity in worker preferences over locations. Defining \( \tilde{\alpha} = \alpha / (1 + 1/\epsilon) \), this condition for a unique general equilibrium can be written as \( \sigma(1 - \tilde{\alpha}) > 1 \). Assuming prohibitive commuting costs (\( \kappa_{ni} \to \infty \) for \( n \neq i \)) and taking the limit of no heterogeneity in worker preference over locations (\( \epsilon \to \infty \)), this reduces to the Helpman (1998) condition for a unique general equilibrium of \( \sigma(1 - \alpha) > 1 \).

We follow the new economic geography literature in modeling agglomeration forces through love of variety and increasing returns to scale. But the system of equations for general equilibrium in our new economic geography model is isomorphic to a version of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Redding (2012) with commuting and external economies of scale or a version of Armington (1969) model with commuting and external economies of scale (as in Arkolakis and Allen 2014a and Arkolakis, Allen and Li 2015), as summarized in the following proposition.

Proposition 2 (Isomorphisms) The system of equations for general equilibrium in our new economic geography model with commuting and agglomeration forces through love of variety and increasing returns to scale is isomorphic to that in a version of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model with commuting and external economies of scale or that in a version of the Armington (1969) model with commuting and external economies of scale.

Proof. See appendix. ■

Following a long line of research in spatial economics, we focus on versions of these models that capture congestion forces through residential land use and an inelastic supply of land. But the same system of equations for general equilibrium can be generated by models that instead directly assume a congestion force (e.g., by assuming that utility in each location depends negatively on the measure of residents in that location).

2.6 Computing Counterfactuals

We use our quantitative framework to solve for the counterfactual effects of changes in the exogenous variables of the model (productivity \( A_n \), amenities \( B_{ni} \), commuting costs \( \kappa_{ni} \), and trade costs \( d_{ni} \)) without having to necessarily determine the unobserved values of these exogenous variables. Instead in the Appendix we show that the system of equations for the counterfactual changes in the endogenous variables of the model can be written solely in terms of the observed values of variables in an initial equilibrium.
(employment $L_{Mi}$, residents $L_{Ri}$, workplace wages $w_n$, average residential income $\bar{v}_n$, trade shares $\pi_{ni}$, and commuting probabilities $\lambda_{ni}$). This approach uses observed bilateral commuting probabilities to capture unobserved bilateral commuting costs and amenities. Similarly, if bilateral trade shares between locations are available, they can be used to capture unobserved bilateral trade frictions (as in Dekle, Eaton and Kortum 2007). However, since bilateral trade data are only available at a higher level of aggregation than the counties we consider in our data, we make some additional parametric assumptions to solve for implied bilateral trade shares between counties, as discussed below.

In the model, we assume that trade is balanced so income equals expenditure. However, when taking the model to the data, we allow for intertemporal trade deficits that are treated as exogenous in our counterfactuals, as in Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2007) and Caliendo and Parro (2015).

3 Data and Measurement

Our empirical analysis combines data from a number of different sources for the United States. From the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS), we use data on bilateral trade and distances shipped for 123 CFS regions. From the American Community Survey (ACS), we use data on commuting probabilities between counties. From the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we use data on employment and wages by workplace. We combine these data sources with a variety of other Geographical Information Systems (GIS) data.

We use our data on employment and commuting to calculate the implied number of residents and their average income by county. First, from commuting market clearing (18), we obtain the number of residents ($L_{Ri}$) using data on the number of workers ($L_{Mi}$) and commuting probabilities conditional on living in each location ($\lambda_{ni}$). Second, we use these conditional commuting probabilities, together with county wages, to obtain average residential income ($\bar{v}_n$) as defined in (19).

3.1 Gravity in Goods Trade

One of the key predictions of the model is a gravity equation for goods trade. We observe bilateral trade between 123 CFS regions but not bilateral trade between counties.\footnote{Other recent studies using the CFS data include Caliendo et. al (2014), Duranton, Morrow and Turner (2014) and Dingel (2015). The CFS is a random sample of plant shipments within the United States (foreign trade shipments are not included). CFS regions are the smallest geographical units for which this random sample is representative, which precludes constructing bilateral trade flows between smaller geographical units using the sampled shipments.} To implement the model quantitatively at the county level, we use the trade balance condition (11),

$$w_iL_{Mi} - \sum_{n \in N} \frac{L_{Mi}}{\sum_{k \in N} L_{Mk}} \left( \frac{d_{ni}w_i}{A_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} \bar{v}_nL_{Ri} = 0,$$

where we observe (or have solved for) wages ($w_i$), employment ($L_{Mi}$), average residential income ($\bar{v}_n$) and residents ($L_{Ri}$).
Given the elasticity of substitution ($\sigma$), the observed data ($w_i$, $L_{Mi}$, $v_i$, $L_{Ri}$) and a parameterization of trade costs ($d_{ni}^{1-\sigma}$), equation (23) provides a system of $N$ equations that can be solved for a unique vector of $N$ unobserved productivities ($A_i$). We prove this formally in the next proposition.

**Proposition 3 (Productivity Inversion)** Given the elasticity of substitution ($\sigma$), the observed data on wages, employment, average residential income and residents ($w_i$, $L_{Mi}$, $v_i$, $L_{Ri}$), and a parameterization of trade costs ($d_{ni}^{1-\sigma}$), there exist unique values of the unobserved productivities ($A_i$) for each location $i$ that are consistent with the data being an equilibrium of the model.

**Proof.** See the appendix. ■

The resulting solutions for productivities ($A_i$) capture unobserved factors (e.g. natural resources) that make a location more or less attractive for employment conditional on the observed distribution of wages, residents and average residential income and the parameterized values of trade costs. Having recovered these unique unobserved productivities ($A_i$), the model generates predictions for bilateral trade between counties from (10), which we use in our counterfactuals for changes in the model’s exogenous variables as discussed above. Aggregating trade between counties within pairs of CFS regions, we can compare the model’s predictions for trade between CFS to the observed trade between CFS regions in the data. We undertake this comparison below.

To parameterize trade costs ($d_{ni}^{1-\sigma}$), we use a central estimate for the elasticity of substitution from the existing empirical literature: we assume $\sigma = 4$ based on the estimates using U.S. data in Bernard, et al. (2003). We model bilateral trade costs as a function of distance. For bilateral pairs with positive trade, we assume that bilateral trade costs are a constant elasticity function of distance and a stochastic error ($d_{ni} = dist_{ni}^{\psi} \tilde{e}_{ni}$). For bilateral pairs with zero trade, the model implies prohibitive trade costs ($d_{ni} \rightarrow \infty$). Taking logarithms in the trade share (10) for pairs with positive trade, we obtain that the value of bilateral trade between source $i$ and destination $n$ ($X_{ni}$) is given by

$$\log X_{ni} = \zeta_n + \chi - (\sigma - 1) \psi \log dist_{ni} + \log e_{ni},$$

where the source fixed effect ($\chi$) controls for employment, wages and productivity ($L_{Mi}$, $w_i$, $A_i$) in the source location $i$; the destination fixed effect ($\zeta_n$) controls for average income, $v_n$, residents, $L_{Rn}$, and multilateral resistance (as captured in the denominator of equation (10)) in the destination location $n$; and $\log e_{ni} = (1 - \sigma) \log \tilde{e}_{ni}$.

Estimating the gravity equation (24) for all bilateral pairs with positive trade using OLS, we find a regression R-squared of 0.83. In Figure 1, we display the conditional relationship between the log value of trade and log distance, after removing source and destination fixed effects from both log trade and log distance. We find that the log linear functional form provides a good approximation to the data, with a tight and approximately linear relationship between the two variables. We estimate a coefficient on log distance of $-(\sigma - 1) \psi = -1.29$. For our assumed value of $\sigma = 4$, this implies an elasticity of trade costs with respect to distance of $\psi = 0.43$. The tight linear relationship in Figure 1, makes us confident in this
parametrization of trade costs as $d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} = dist_{ni}^{-1.29}$ as a way of solving the trade balance condition (23) for unobserved productivities ($A_i$).

As an alternative check on our specification, Figure 2 displays the model’s predictions for bilateral trade between CFS regions against the corresponding values in the data. The only way in which we used the data on trade between CFS regions was to estimate the distance elasticity $- (\sigma - 1) \psi = -1.29$. Given this distance elasticity, we use the goods market clearing condition (23) to solve for productivities and generate the model’s predictions for bilateral trade between countries and hence CFS regions. Therefore, the model’s predictions and the data can differ from one another. Nonetheless, we find a strong and approximately log linear relationship between the model’s predictions and the data, which is tighter for the larger trade values that account for most of aggregate trade.

3.2 The Magnitude and Gravity of Commuting Flows

We start by providing evidence on the quantitative relevance of commuting as a source of spatial linkages between counties and CZ’s. To do so, we use data from the American Community Survey (ACS), which reports county-to-county worker flows for 2006-2010. To abstract from business trips that are not between a worker’s usual place of residence and workplace, we define commuting flows as those of less than 120 kilometers in each direction (a round trip of 240 kilometers).\(^9\) Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for these commuting flows.

---

\(^9\)The majority of commutes are less than 45 minutes in each direction (Duranton and Turner 2011), with commutes of 120 minutes in each direction rare. In our analysis, we measure distance between counties’ centroids. We choose the 120 kilometers threshold based on a change in slope of the relationship between log commuters and log distance at this distance threshold. See the web appendix for further discussion.
We find that commuting beyond county boundaries is substantial and varies in importance across locations. For the median county, around 27 percent of its residents work outside the county (first row, third column) and around 20 percent of its workers live outside the county (second row, third column). For the county at the 90th percentile, these two figures rise to 53 and 37 percent respectively (fifth column, first and second rows respectively).

One might think that using commuting zones circumvents the need to incorporate commuting in the analysis since these areas are designed to encompass most commuting flows between counties. Nevertheless, we find that CZ’s provide an imperfect measure of local labor markets, with substantial commuting beyond CZ boundaries that again varies in importance across locations. For the median county, around 33 percent of the workers who commute outside their county of residence also commute outside their CZ of residence (third row, third column), while around 37 percent of the workers who commute outside their county of workplace also commute outside their CZ of workplace (fourth row, third column). For the CZ at the 90th percentile, these two figures rise to 79 and 73 percent respectively (fifth column). Taken together, these results highlight the quantitative relevance of commuting as a source of spatial linkages between counties and CZ’s within the United States.

A key prediction of the model is a gravity equation for commuting. Using land market clearing (5) and the price index (12), the commuting probability (15) can be written as

$$
\lambda_{ni} - \frac{B_{ni}k_{ni}^{-\epsilon} \left( \frac{L_{ni}}{\sigma_{ni}} \right)^{-\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} A_{ni}^{\alpha} w_{ni}^{-\alpha \sigma_{ni}^{-1}} \left( \frac{L_{ni}}{\sigma_{ni}} \right)^{-\epsilon(1-\alpha)} \frac{\bar{w}}{w_i}}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs}k_{rs}^{-\epsilon} \left( \frac{L_{rs}}{\sigma_{rs}} \right)^{-\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} A_{rs}^{\alpha} w_{rs}^{-\alpha \sigma_{rs}^{-1}} \left( \frac{L_{rs}}{\sigma_{rs}} \right)^{-\epsilon(1-\alpha)} \frac{\bar{w}}{w_s}} = 0.
$$

(25)

The commuting probabilities (25) provide a system of $N \times N$ equations that can be solved for a unique
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>p10</th>
<th>p25</th>
<th>p50</th>
<th>p75</th>
<th>p90</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside CZ</td>
<td>Total (Work)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Tabulations on 3,111 counties and 709 commuting zones; minimum is 0 for all. The first row shows fraction of residents that work outside county. The second row shows fraction of workers who live outside county. The third row shows the fraction of residents that work outside county who also work outside the county’s commuting zone. The fourth row shows the fraction of workers that live outside county who also live outside the county’s commuting zone. p10, p25 etc refer to the 10th, 25th etc percentiles of the distribution.

Table 1: Commuting Across Counties and Commuting Zones

matrix of $N \times N$ unobserved amenities ($B_{ni}$). The next proposition shows this formally.

**Proposition 4 (Amenities Inversion)** Given the share of consumption goods in expenditure ($\alpha$), the heterogeneity in location preferences ($\epsilon$), the observed data on wages, employment, trade shares, average residential income, residents and land area ($w_i, L_{Mi}, \pi_n, \bar{d}_i, L_{Ri}, H_i$), and a parameterization of commuting costs ($\kappa_{ni, \epsilon}$), there exist unique values of the unobserved amenities ($B_{ni}$) for each pair of locations $n$ and $i$ that are consistent with the data being an equilibrium of the model.

**Proof.** See the appendix. ■

The resulting solutions for amenities ($B_{ni}$) capture unobserved factors that make a pair of residence and workplace locations more or less attractive conditional on the observed wages, employment, trade shares, average residential income, residents, and land area, as well as the parameterized commuting costs (e.g. attractive scenery and differences in transport infrastructure that are not captured in the parameterized commuting costs). Together unobserved productivity ($A_i$) and amenities ($B_{ni}$) correspond to structural residuals that ensure that the model exactly replicates the observed data given the parameters and our assumptions for trade and commuting costs.

We model bilateral commuting costs as a function of distance. For bilateral pairs with positive commuting, we assume that bilateral commuting costs depend on distance with elasticity $\phi$ and a stochastic error ($\kappa_{ni} \sim dist_{ni}^{\phi} \tilde{g}_{ni}$). For bilateral pairs with zero commuting, the model implies negligible amenities ($B_{ni} \rightarrow 0$) and/or prohibitive commuting costs ($\kappa_{ni} \rightarrow \infty$). Taking logarithms in the commuting probability (15) for pairs with positive commuting, we obtain:

$$\log \lambda_{ni} = g_0 + \eta_n + \mu_i - \phi \epsilon \log dist_{ni} + \log g_{ni, \epsilon}$$

(26)
where the constant $g_0$ captures the denominator of $\lambda_{ni}$; the origin fixed effect ($\eta_n$) controls for residence characteristics ($P_n, Q_n$); the destination fixed effect ($\mu_i$) controls for workplace characteristics ($w_i$); and $
 ln g_{ni} = \n \log B_{ni} - \epsilon \log g_{ni}$.

Estimating the gravity equation (26) for all bilateral pairs with positive commuters using OLS, we find a regression R-squared of 0.80. In Figure 3, we display the conditional relationship between log commuters and log distance, after removing residence and workplace fixed effects from both log commuters and log distance. We find that the log linear functional form provides a good approximation to the data, with a tight and approximately linear relationship between the two variables, with an estimated coefficient on log distance of $-\phi \epsilon = -4.43$. To separately identify $\phi$ and $\epsilon$, we use additional structure from the model, which implies that the destination fixed effects $\mu_i$ capture variation in workplace wages:

\[
\log \lambda_{ni} = g_0 + \eta_n + \epsilon \log w_i - \phi \epsilon \log dist_{ni} + \log g_{ni}
\]

We estimate the gravity equation (27) imposing $\phi \epsilon = 4.43$ from our estimates above and identify $\epsilon$ from the coefficient on wages. Estimating (27) using OLS is potentially problematic, because workplace wages ($w_i$) depend on the supply of commuters, which in turn depends on amenities ($B_{ni}$) that appear in the error term $g_{ni}$. Therefore we instrument log $w_i$ with the log productivities log $A_i$ that we recovered from the trade balance condition above, using the fact that the model implies that productivity satisfies the exclusion restriction of only affecting commuting flows through wages. Our Two-Stage-Least-Squares estimate of the Fréchet shape parameter for the heterogeneity of worker preferences is $\epsilon = 3.30$, which implies an elasticity of commuting costs with respect to distance of $\phi = 4.43 / \epsilon = 1.34$.\footnote{We find that the Two-Stage-Least-Squares estimates are larger than the OLS estimates, consistent with the idea that bilateral}
These results are consistent with the view that transporting people is considerably more costly than transporting goods ($\phi = 1.34$ compared to $\psi = 0.43$ above), in line with the substantial opportunity cost of time spent commuting. The tight fit shown in Figure 3, makes us confident that our parametrization of commuting costs and amenities in terms of distance fits the data quite well.\(^{11}\)

### 3.3 House Prices

We assume a central value for the share of housing in consumer expenditure from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of $1 - \alpha = 0.40$ percent. As discussed above, we calibrate productivities ($A_i$) and amenities ($B_{ni}$) such that the model exactly replicates the observed data on commuting flows, wages, employment and land area and the implied values of residents, and average residential income for the assumed parameters. As a check on our use of the Cobb-Douglas functional form to model residential land use, Figure 4 displays the model’s predictions for land prices against median house prices in the data.\(^{12}\) Although the model is necessarily an abstraction, and there are a number of potential sources of differences between land prices and house prices, we find a strong and approximately log linear relationship across counties between the model’s predictions and the data. The slope of the relationship is 2.04 and the R-squared is 0.26, which is quite large given the simplicity of equation (5).

### 4 Quantitative Exercises

We have now quantified the model to be consistent with gravity in goods trade, gravity in commuting flows and the observed cross-section distribution of employment and wages. We next use the model to undertake three quantitative exercises that shed light on spatial linkages in goods and factor markets. First, we provide evidence on the local employment elasticity and demonstrate its heterogeneity across counties. We show that commuting links are essential to explain this heterogeneity, so in a second exercise we set out to explain the role of commuting in determining the spatial distribution of economic activity and welfare by considering a counterfactual with prohibitive commuting costs. Given the importance of commuting links, in a third exercise we investigate their interaction with trade costs. We compare the counterfactual effects of a reduction in trade costs in the actual world with commuting to

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\(^{11}\)Alternatively, we could use the commuting probability (15), to measure a composite of relative commuting costs and bilateral amenities with the Head and Ries (2001) index:

\[
\left( \frac{\lambda_{ni}}{\lambda_{ii}} \right)^\frac{1}{2} = \left( \frac{B_{ni}k_{ni}^e B_{in}k_{in}^{-e}}{B_{ni}k_{ni}^e B_{in}k_{in}^{-e}} \right)^\frac{1}{2}.
\]

\(^{12}\)To measure house prices in the data, we use the county median housing value from the ACS (2010). To generate predicted land prices in the model, we use total expenditure (income plus the trade deficit).
the effects in a hypothetical world without commuting.

4.1 Local Employment Elasticities

To provide evidence on local employment elasticities, we compute 3,111 counterfactual exercises where we shock each county with a 5 percent productivity shock (holding productivity in all other counties and holding all other exogenous variables constant). Figure 5 shows the estimated kernel density for the distribution of the general equilibrium elasticity of employment with respect to the productivity shock across these treated counties (black line). We also show the 95 percent confidence intervals around this estimated kernel density (gray shading).

The mean estimated local employment elasticity of around 1.52 is greater than one because of the home market effects in the model. Around this mean, we find substantial heterogeneity in the predicted effects of the productivity shock, which vary from close to 0.5 to almost 2.5. This variation is surprisingly large. It implies that taking a local employment elasticity estimated for one group of counties and applying that elasticity to another group of counties can lead to substantial discrepancies between the true and predicted impacts of a productivity shock.

To provide a point of comparison, Figure 6 also includes the general equilibrium elasticity of residents in a county with respect to the same 5 percent productivity shock in that county (again holding other parameters constant). Again we show the estimated kernel density across the 3,111 treated counties (black line) and the 95 percent confidence intervals (gray shading). We find far more heterogeneity across counties in the employment elasticity than in the residents elasticity (which ranges from around 0.2 to

---

We have experimented with shocks of 1% and 10% as well, with essentially unchanged results.
1.2). Since employment and residents can only differ through commuting, this by itself suggests that the heterogeneity in the local employment elasticity in response to the productivity shock is largely driven by commuting links between counties. In Figures 18-22 in Appendix A.8, we show that we continue to find substantial heterogeneity in local employment elasticities if we undertake the same analysis using commuting zones (CZs) rather than counties, or if we shock counties with patterns of spatially correlated shocks reproducing the industrial composition of the U.S. economy.

4.1.1 Explaining the Heterogeneity in Local Employment Elasticities

We use the model to provide intuition on the determinants of the general equilibrium local employment elasticities, $\frac{dL_M}{dA_n} \frac{A_k}{L_{Mn}}$. We also use the structure of the model to determine a set of variables that can be used empirically to account for the estimated heterogeneity in the distribution of local employment elasticities. To do so, we compute partial equilibrium elasticities of own wages and own employment with respect to the productivity shock. These partial equilibrium elasticities capture the direct effect of a productivity shock on wages, employment and residents in the treated location, holding constant all other endogenous variables at their values in the initial equilibrium.\textsuperscript{14} Hence, although potentially useful to provide intuition, or as empirical controls, they do not account for all the rich set of interactions

\textsuperscript{14}See Section A.7 in the appendix for the derivation of these partial equilibrium elasticities.
Figure 6: Kernel density for the distribution of employment and residents elasticities in response to a productivity shock across counties in the model captured by the general equilibrium elasticities presented in Figures 5.

If we hold constant all variables except for $w_n$, $L_{Mn}$, and $L_{Rn}$ in the treated county $n$, the local employment elasticity as a result of a productivity shock is

$$ \frac{\partial L_{Mn}}{\partial A_n} \frac{A_n}{L_{Mn}} = \frac{\partial L_{Mn}}{\partial w_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{Mn}} \cdot \frac{\partial w_n}{\partial A_n} \frac{A_n}{w_n}.$$\hspace{1cm} (28)

From the trade balance condition (11), the partial elasticity of wages with respect to the productivity shock is given by

$$ \frac{\partial w_n}{\partial A_n} \frac{A_n}{w_n} = \frac{(\sigma - 1) \sum_{i \in N} (1 - \pi_{in}) \xi_{in}}{[1 + (\sigma - 1) \sum_{i \in N} (1 - \pi_{in}) \xi_{in}] + [1 - \sum_{i \in N} (1 - \pi_{in}) \xi_{in}]} \frac{\partial L_{Mn}}{\partial w_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{Mn}} - \xi_{nn} \frac{\partial L_{Rn}}{\partial w_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{Rn}}.$$\hspace{1cm} (29)

where $\xi_{in} = \pi_{in} \hat{\alpha}_{it} L_{Ri} / w_n L_n$ is the share of expenditure from market $i$ in location $n$'s income. The intuition for this expression can be seen most clearly by evaluating it for small changes in employment and residents ($\frac{\partial L_{Mn}}{\partial w_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{Mn}} = \frac{\partial L_{Rn}}{\partial w_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{Rn}} = 0$). From the remaining terms in $(\sigma - 1) \sum_{i \in N} (1 - \pi_{in}) \xi_{in}$, the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity is high when location $n$ accounts for a small share of expenditure (small $\pi_{in}$) in markets $i$ that account for a large share of its income (high $\xi_{in}$). In these circumstances, the productivity shock reduces the prices of location $n$'s goods and results in only a

\textsuperscript{15}Note that we use the partial derivative symbol, $\frac{\partial A_n}{\partial L_{Mn}}$, to denote the partial equilibrium elasticity when we allow $w_n$, $L_{Mn}$, and $L_{Rn}$ to change but keep other variables in all other counties fixed.
small reduction in the goods price indices (small \(\pi_{in}\)) in its main markets (high \(\xi_{in}\)).\(^{16}\) Therefore the productivity shock leads to a large increase in the demand for location \(n^\prime\)’s goods and hence in its wages. Thus \(\sum_{i\in N} (1 - \pi_{in}) \xi_{in}\) provides a measure of location \(n^\prime\)’s linkages to other locations in goods markets.

From the commuting market clearing condition (18), the partial elasticity of employment respect to wages is

\[
\frac{\partial L_{Mn}}{\partial w_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{Mn}} = \epsilon \sum_{i\in N} (1 - \lambda_{in|i}) \theta_{in} + \kappa_{mn} \left( \frac{\partial L_{Rn}}{\partial w_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{Rn}} \right),
\]

(30)

where \(\theta_{in} = \lambda_{in|i} L_{Ri}/L_{Mn}\) is the share of commuters from source \(i\) in location \(n\)’s employment. The intuition for this expression again can be seen most clearly by evaluating it for small changes in residents (\(\frac{\partial L_{Rn}}{\partial w_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{Rn}} = 0\)). From the remaining term in \(\epsilon \sum_{i\in N} (1 - \lambda_{in|i}) \theta_{in}\), the elasticity of employment with respect to wages is high when location \(n\) accounts for a small share of commuters (small \(\lambda_{in|i}\)) from sources \(i\) that supply a large fraction of its employment (high \(\theta_{in}\)). In these circumstances, location \(n\)’s wage increase makes it a more attractive workplace and results in only a small increase in commuting market access (small \(\lambda_{in|i}\)) in its main sources of commuters (high \(\theta_{in}\)).\(^{17}\) Therefore the increase in wages leads to a large increase in commuters to location \(n\) and hence in its employment. Thus \(\sum_{i\in N} (1 - \lambda_{in|i}) \theta_{in}\) provides a measure of location \(n^\prime\)’s linkages to other locations through commuting markets.

From the residential choice probabilities (16), the partial elasticity of residents with respect to wages is

\[
\frac{\partial L_{Rn}}{\partial w_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{Rn}} = \epsilon \left( \frac{\lambda_{nn}}{\lambda_{Rn}} - \lambda_{Mn} \right),
\]

(31)

which also has an intuitive interpretation. A higher wage in location \(n\) makes it a more attractive workplace and increases its employment. Whether this increase in location \(n\)’s employment leads to an increase in its share of residents depends on the fraction of residents who work locally (\(\lambda_{nn}/\lambda_{Rn}\)) relative to location \(n^\prime\)’s overall share of employment (\(\lambda_{Mn}\)). Thus \(\lambda_{nn}/\lambda_{Rn} - \lambda_{Mn}\) provides a measure of location \(n^\prime\)’s linkages to other locations through migration.

Using (31) in (30), and substituting the result into (29), we obtain closed-form solutions for the partial equilibrium elasticities of wages, employment and residents to a productivity shock. These partial equilibrium elasticities depend solely on the observed values of variables in the initial equilibrium: residential employment shares (\(\lambda_{Rn}\)), conditional commuting probabilities (\(\lambda_{in|i}\)), employment shares (\(\theta_{in}\)), trade shares (\(\pi_{in}\)) and income shares (\(\xi_{in}\)).

When we undertake our counterfactuals, we solve for the full general equilibrium effect of the productivity shock to each county. But these partial equilibrium elasticities in terms of observed variables have substantial explanatory power in predicting the impact of the productivity shock across locations. In Table 2, we examine the determinants of the heterogeneity in the elasticity of employment with respect to the productivity shock across the treated counties. In Column (1) we regress these elasticities on

\(^{16}\)These price indices summarize the price of competing varieties in each market. Note that the elasticity of the price index (12) in location \(i\) with respect to wages in location \(n\) is \((\partial P_i/\partial w_n) (w_n/P_i) = \pi_{in}\).

\(^{17}\)Commuting market access appears in the numerator of the residential choice probabilities (\(\lambda_{Ri}\) in (16)) and summarizes access to employment opportunities: \(W_i = \left[ \sum_{i\in N} B_{is} (w_s/k_{is})^{\epsilon}/\epsilon \right]^{1/\epsilon}\). Note that the elasticity of commuting market access in location \(i\) with respect to wages in location \(n\) is \((\partial W_i/\partial w_n) (w_n/W_i) = \lambda_{inn}\).
a constant, which captures the mean employment elasticity across the 3,111 treated counties. In Columns (2) through (4) we attempt to explain the heterogeneity in local employment elasticities using standard county controls. In Column (2) we include log county employment as a control for the size of economic activity in a county. In Column (3) we also include log county wages and log county land area. In Column (4) we also include the average wage and total employment in neighboring counties. Although these controls are all typically statistically significant, we find that they are not particularly successful in explaining the variation in employment elasticities. Adding a constant and all these controls yields an R-squared of only about 0.5 in Column (4). Clearly, there is substantial variation not captured by these controls.

In the remaining columns of the table we attempt to explain the heterogeneity in local employment elasticities using the partial equilibrium elasticities derived above. In Column (5) we first use the intuition (obtained by comparing the distributions in Figure 6) that commuting is essential to explain this elasticity. As a summary statistic of the lack of commuting links of a county we use \( \lambda_{nn|in} \), namely, the probability that a worker lives and works in \( n \). The weaker the commuting links of a county the higher \( \lambda_{nn|in} \), which should reduce the local employment elasticity of that county. This is exactly what we find in Column (5). Furthermore, this variable alone yields an R-squared of 0.89, nearly double the R-squared in the regression where we include all the standard controls.\(^{18}\) This result underscores the importance of commuting links in explaining local employment elasticities.

The partial equilibrium local elasticities computed above allow us to do better than just adding a summary measure of commuting links as the explanatory variable. In Column (6) we relate the variation in local employment elasticities to the measure of commuting linkages suggested by the model, \( \sum_{i \in N} (1 - \lambda_{ii|ij}) \theta_{in} \). We also add the measures of migration and trade linkages suggested by the model, \( (\lambda_{nn} / \lambda_{Rn} - \lambda_{Mn}) \) and \( \partial w_n / \partial A_n \). Including these partial equilibrium measures of linkages further increases the R-squared to around 93 percent of the variation in the general equilibrium elasticity. Counties that account for a small share of commuters (small \( \lambda_{ijn|i} \)) from their main suppliers of commuters (high \( \theta_{in} \)) have higher employment elasticities. In Column (7), we use the product of \( \partial w_n / \partial A_n \) and the first two terms rather than each term separately. This restriction yields similar results and confirms the importance of commuting linkages and, to a lesser extent, the interaction between migration and goods linkages. Finally, in the last two columns we combine these partial equilibrium elasticities with the standard controls we used in the first four columns. Clearly, although all variables are significant, these standard controls add little once we control for the partial equilibrium elasticities.

In sum, Table 2 shows that the heterogeneity in partial equilibrium elasticities is not well explained by standard county controls. In contrast, adding a summary statistic of commuting, or the partial equilibrium elasticities we propose above, can go a long way in explaining the heterogeneous response of counties to productivity shocks. The next subsection connects these results more tightly with the preva-

\(^{18}\)To provide further evidence on the magnitude of these effects, Table 4 in Appendix A.8 reports the same regressions as in Table 2 but using standardized coefficients. We find that a one standard deviation change in commuting \( (\lambda_{nn|in}) \) leads to around a one standard deviation change in the local employment elasticity.
lent estimation of treatment effects in the empirical literature.

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<th>Elasticity of Employment</th>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{nn</td>
<td>n}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sum_{r \in N} \left(1 - \lambda_{rn</td>
<td>r}\right) \theta_{rn}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_{nn} \left(\frac{\bar{w}<em>n}{\lambda</em>{Mn}} - \lambda_{Mn}\right)$</td>
<td>0.915**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\partial \bar{w}_n \partial A_n \bar{w}_n$</td>
<td>-1.009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sum_{r \in N} \left(1 - \lambda_{rn</td>
<td>r}\right) \theta_{rn}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_{nn} \lambda_{Rn}$</td>
<td>-0.818**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>1.515**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>3,111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this table, $L_{M-n} \equiv \sum_{r|d_{rn} \leq 120, r \neq n} L_{Mr}$ is the total employment in $n$ neighbors whose centroid is no more than 120km away; $\bar{w}_{-n} \equiv \sum_{r|d_{rn} \leq 120, r \neq n} \frac{L_{Mr} \bar{w}_r}{L_{M-n}}$ is the weighted average of their workplace wage. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Explaining the general equilibrium local employment elasticities to a 5 percent productivity shock

4.1.2 Measuring the Incidence of Local Labor Demand Shocks

A large empirical literature is concerned with estimating the elasticity of local employment with respect to local demand shocks. The central specification in this empirical literature is a “differences-in-differences” specification across locations $i$ and time $t$ given by

$$\Delta \ln Y_{it} = a_0 + a_1 I_{it} + a_2 X_{it} + u_{it}, \quad (32)$$

where $Y_{it}$ is the outcome of interest (e.g. employment by workplace); $I_{it}$ is a measure of the local demand shock (treatment); $X_{it}$ are controls; and $u_{it}$ is a stochastic error. The coefficient on the treatment $a_1$ corresponds to the log change in the outcome of interest with respect to the local demand shock.
This specification has a differences-in-differences interpretation, because the first difference is over time (before and after the shock), and the second difference is between treated and control counties.

This literature considers many sources of local labor demand shocks. Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Bound and Holzer (2000) directly measure labor demand shocks using innovations in employment and total hours worked respectively. To address the endogeneity of local labor input, many papers follow Bartik (1991) and use instruments based on interactions between changes in aggregate industry composition and the importance of industries in local employment. For example, Notowidigdo (2013) examines the impact of such local labor demand shocks across metropolitan areas in the United States. In related research, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010) exploit regression discontinuities between winning and runner-up locations for million-dollar plants, while Michaels (2011) uses the discovery of oil in the Southern United States. Although both of these papers use county-level data, a number of other studies have used Commuting Zones (CZ’s), which are aggregations of counties that are intended to better approximate local labor markets. For example, Autor and Dorn (2013) examines the automation of routine tasks and the polarization of U.S. employment and wages; Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) investigate rising Chinese import competition; and Yagan (2014) considers migration as insurance for idiosyncratic shocks during the Great Recession. Moretti (2011) reviews this burgeoning literature on local labor markets.

This empirical literature has discussed a number of potential concerns faced by the reduced-form specification (32). First, to address endogenous assignment to the treatment, recent research has sought exogenous variation in local labor demand. Second, emphasis has been placed on measurement of the local labor demand shock (to interpret the magnitude of the treatment effect). Third, a widely-discussed limitation of the regression specification (32) is that it abstracts from general equilibrium effects, because it focuses on relative comparisons between the treatment and control group. More generally, the interpretation of the coefficient on the treatment is complicated if the control group is affected by the treatment through spatial linkages in goods and factor markets. Finally, the treatment effect can be heterogeneous across locations, because of different linkages in goods and factor markets. In this case, the estimates have an interpretation as a local average treatment effect (LATE), and a coefficient estimated for one group of counties need not apply for another group of counties.

We now compare the general equilibrium elasticities of employment with respect to the productivity shock in the model to the results of this type of reduced-form “differences-in-differences” estimates of the local average treatment effects of the productivity shock. In particular, we construct a regression sample including both treated and untreated countries from our 3,111 counterfactuals in which we shock each county in turn with a 5 percent productivity shock ($3,111^2 = 9,678,321$ observations). We use these data to estimate a “differences-in-differences” specification of a similar form to (32):

$$\Delta \ln Y_{it} = a_0 + a_1 I_{it} + a_2 X_{it} + a_3 (I_{it} \times X_{it}) + u_{it},$$

where $i$ denotes the 3,111 counties and $t$ indexes the 3,111 counterfactuals; $\Delta \ln Y_{it}$ is the change in log employment between the counterfactual and actual equilibria; $I_{it}$ is a $(0,1)$ indicator for whether a county
is treated with a productivity shock; and \( X_{it} \) are controls. We again consider two sets of controls \( (X_{it}) \): the model-suggested measures of linkages in goods and factor markets and more standard econometric controls (log employment, log wages and land area). We include both the main effects of these controls (captured by \( a_2 \)) and their interactions with the treatment indicator to capture heterogeneity in the treatment effects (captured by \( a_3 \)).

The key difference between this regression specification and the above results for the general equilibrium elasticities for the treated counties is that this regression specification differences relative to the untreated counties. The empirical literature has argued for the need to difference relative to untreated counties given the likely presence of other shocks or events, beyond the treatment, that can affect the treated counties simultaneously and can confound the true treatment effect. Of course, our synthetic dataset was generated without including any of these alternative shocks and so differencing is not needed in order to calculate the correct treatment effects.

In a specification without the controls \( (a_2 = a_3 = 0) \), the average effect of the productivity shock on the untreated counties is captured in the regression constant \( (a_0) \), and the local average treatment effect \( (a_1) \) corresponds to the difference in means between the treated and untreated counties. We compare estimating this regression specification including (i) a random untreated county in the control group, (ii) only the nearest untreated county in the control group, (iii) only neighboring counties within 120 kilometers of the treated county in the control group, (iv) only non-neighboring counties located from 120-240 kilometers from the treated county, and (v) all untreated counties in the control group.

We compare the predicted treatment effect from the “differences-in-differences” specification to the general equilibrium employment elasticity in the model by computing the following deviation term for the treated county:

\[
\beta_i = \frac{a_1 + a_3X_{it}}{0.05} - \frac{dL_{Mi}A_i}{dA_i L_{Mi}},
\]

which corresponds to the difference between the predicted treatment effect, scaled by the size of the productivity shock, and the general equilibrium employment elasticity in the model. In Figure 7 we show kernel densities of the distribution of this deviation term across the 3,111 counterfactuals for productivity shocks to each county. We show the deviation term term using model-suggested controls (solid lines) and reduced-form controls (dashed lines). We display these results for each of the alternative control groups considered above ((i) to (v)).
As shown in the figure, none of the "differences-in-differences" specifications completely captures the general equilibrium employment elasticity, as reflected in the substantial mass away from zero in these distributions. However, taking into account commuting linkages with the model-suggested controls substantially increases the predictive power of the "differences-in-differences" specification, as shown by substantial reduction in the mass away from zero using model-suggested rather than reduced-form controls. In general, we find similar results across the different control groups, with the results using random counties ((i) above) and non-neighbors ((iv) above) visually indistinguishable in the right-hand panel. However, we find a substantially larger deviation term using the nearest county as a control, because employment in the nearest untreated county is typically negatively affected by the increase in productivity in the treated county. While the use of contiguous locations as controls is often motivated based on similar unobservables (as in regression discontinuity designs), this pattern of results highlights that contiguous locations are also likely to be the most severely affected by spatial equilibrium linkages in goods and factor markets.

Figure 8 shows that the deviation term for the "difference-in-differences" specification is systematically related to the size of the general equilibrium employment elasticity in the model. For the specifications using reduced-form controls (left panel) and model-generated controls (right panel), we display the results of locally-linear weighted least squares regressions of the deviation term $\beta_i$ against the general equilibrium employment elasticity $\frac{dL_i}{dA_i} \frac{A_i}{L_i}$, along with 95% confidence intervals. In each panel, we show the results of these regressions for each group of control counties, where the results using random county ((i) above), non-neighbors ((iv) above) and all counties ((v) above) are visually indistinguishable.

Using reduced-form controls (left panel) and all definitions of the control group except for the closest county (red line), we find that low elasticities are substantially over-estimated, while high elasticities are substantially under-estimated. This pattern of results is intuitive: low and high elasticities occur...
where commuting linkages are weak and strong respectively. A reduced-form specification that ignores commuting linkages cannot capture this variation and hence tends to overpredict for low elasticities and underpredict for high elasticities. This effect is still present for the closest county control group (red line), as reflected in the downward-sloping relationship between the deviation term and the general equilibrium elasticity. However, the closest county tends to be negatively affected by the productivity shock, which shifts the distribution of predicted treatment effects (and hence the distribution of the deviation term) upwards.

![Figure 8: Average deviation term \( \beta_i \) vs. actual Employment Elasticity](image)

Using model-suggested controls (right panel) and all definitions of the control group except for the closest county (red line), we find that the deviation term for the “differences-in-differences” predictions is close to zero and has a much weaker downward-sloping relationship with the general equilibrium elasticity in the model. The exception is the deviation term using the closest-county as a control, which has an upward-sloping relationship with the general equilibrium elasticity in the model and becomes large for high values of this elasticity. The reason is that the productivity shock to treated counties has larger negative effects on the closest county for higher values of the general equilibrium elasticity in the model, which leads to a larger upward shift in the distribution of the deviation term. This pattern of results again highlights the potentially large discrepancies from the general equilibrium elasticity from using contiguous locations as controls in the presence of spatial linkages in goods and factor markets.

Taken together, the results of this section show that our quantitative spatial general equilibrium model implies substantial heterogeneity in local employment elasticities across counties; we find this heterogeneity whether we use independent productivity shocks to each county (Figures 5-8) or spatially correlated shocks reproducing the industrial composition of the U.S. economy (Figures 19-22 in Appendix A.8); while the model incorporates several forms of spatial linkages (including trade and migration).
we find that this heterogeneity in local employment elasticities is primarily explained by commuting linkages; hence empirical measures of commuting linkages are successful in capturing the heterogeneity in the general equilibrium local employment elasticities; and these measures of commuting linkages substantially outperform more standard econometric controls. While capturing the full general equilibrium effects of the productivity shocks requires solving the model-based counterfactuals, we find that augmenting “difference-in-difference” regressions with measures of commuting linkages substantially improves their ability to predict the heterogeneity in the estimated treatment effects. Finally, comparing the results for counties in Figures 5-8 with the results for commuting zones (CZs) in Figure 18, we find that including these measures of commuting linkages at the county level is more successful in capturing the heterogeneity in the general equilibrium local employment elasticities than simply undertaking the analysis at the CZ level.

4.2 The Role of Commuting Costs

The results in the previous section underscore the importance of commuting links to explain the measured heterogeneity in local employment elasticities. They also highlight that commuting patterns have information about these links that cannot be accounted for with other county measures like employment, wages, number of residents, or even measures of employment and wages in surrounding counties. To provide further evidence on the quantitative relevance of commuting as a source of spatial linkages and understand better its role in the spatial distribution of economic activity, we next undertake a counterfactual for prohibitive commuting costs to other locations. That is, we let $\kappa_{ni} \to \infty$ for $n \neq i$ and leave $\kappa_{nn}$ and all other exogenous parameters unchanged.

Commuting enables workers to access high productivity locations without having to pay the high cost of living in those locations. Removing this technology restricts the opportunity set available to firms and workers and hence reduces welfare. Locations that were previously net exporters of commuters in the initial equilibrium become less attractive residences, while locations that were previously net importers of commuters in the initial equilibrium become less attractive workplaces. The result is a decline in the specialization of counties as residential or business locations. As the menu of potential pairs of workplace and employment locations changes, agents relocate.

In the equilibrium with commuting, expected utility conditional on choosing a pair of workplace and residence locations is the same across all bilateral pairs with positive commuting. In the equilibrium without commuting, only those bilateral pairs in which workers live and work in the same location are feasible, and expected utility is equalized across these feasible pairs. From (22), the change in the common level of expected utility as a result of increasing commuting costs to prohibitive levels can be decomposed into the contributions of changes in the domestic commuting share (which equals one without commuting) and real residential income, where the latter change can be further decomposed into the contributions of changes in the domestic trade share, wages, expected residential income, residents and
workers. Namely,

\[
\tilde{U} = \left( \frac{1}{\kappa_{nn}} \right)^\frac{\epsilon}{\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{R_{nn}} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{\tilde{w}_n}{\tilde{v}_n} \right)^{1-\alpha} \frac{\tilde{L}_{Mn}}{L_{Rn}}^{\frac{\epsilon}{1-\alpha}},
\]

where we have used the fact that \( \{\kappa_{nn}, \hat{B}_{nn}, A_n, d_{nn}\} \) are unchanged. Although the contributions of these individual components of welfare can differ across locations, their net effect must be such as to deliver the same common change in expected utility for the economy as a whole.

We find that increasing commuting costs to prohibitive levels reduces aggregate welfare by around 7.2 percent. This effect is comparable in magnitude to benchmark estimates of the welfare gains from international trade for an economy of the size of the United States (as for example in Eaton and Kortum 2002 and Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare 2012). These results suggest that observed commuting flows are not only large and relevant for understanding the local effects of labor demand shocks, as shown above, but also have important implications for aggregate welfare. Smaller values for the Fréchet shape parameter (\( \epsilon \)) imply more heterogeneity in preferences for pairs of residence and workplace locations and hence greater welfare losses from eliminating commuting conditional on the same observed initial equilibrium in the data. For example, in a world with a 50% lower value of \( \epsilon \) the welfare loses from eliminating commuting amount to 10.93 percent.\(^{19}\)

We also find substantial effects of commuting on the spatial distribution of economic activity. With commuting, workers can live in suburban counties close to high productivity locations. In contrast, without commuting, workers must either live in those high productivity locations or disperse to other locations. As an illustration, Figures 9-12 show the impact of prohibitive commuting costs on economic activity in the New York area. In each figure, deeper green colors show lower values, while deeper

\(^{19}\)As shown in Section 3.2, commuting flows decline much more rapidly with distance than trade flows. Consequently, we find that reductions in commuting costs generate substantial increases in welfare. Reducing commuting costs by 10%, 30%, and 50%, for example, implies welfare gains of 2.7%, 12.5%, and 36.7%, respectively.
brown colors indicate higher values. To provide some context, Figure 9 shows the ratio of employment to residents in the initial equilibrium in the observed data. Locations with ratios higher than one are net importers of commuters, while locations with ratios lower than one are net exporters of commuters. As apparent from the figure, Manhattan is initially the largest net importer, whereas other parts of the tri-state area are initially large net exporters.

Figures 10, 11 and 12 show the counterfactual changes in employment, residents and real income, respectively, from prohibitive commuting costs. Unsurprisingly, Manhattan experiences a substantial reduction in employment in Figure 10, as it can no longer attract commuters from the surrounding tri-
Figure 12: Counterfactual relative change in real income from prohibitive commuting costs

Figure 13: Counterfactual relative change in county employment ($\hat{L}_M$) from prohibitive commuting costs against initial employment to residents ratio ($L_M / L_R$)

state area. More notably, Manhattan also experiences a reduction in residents in Figure 11, and the tri-state area as a whole experiences a reduction in real income in Figure 12. This part of the country is one of the most intensive users of the commuting technology in the initial equilibrium. Therefore, the loss of access to this technology reduces its attractiveness as a location of workplace and residence, and leads to a dispersion of economic activity towards other locations that were less intensive users of the commuting technology in the initial equilibrium.
In Figure 13, we show the counterfactual change in employment from increasing commuting costs to prohibitive levels for each county in our data. We display these counterfactual changes against each county’s ratio of employment to residents in the initial equilibrium in the observed data. As employment and residents converge towards one another, locations that were large importers of commuters (greater than one on the horizontal axis) experience reductions in employment, while locations that were large exporters of commuters (less than one on the horizontal axis) experience increases in employment. We find that the relationship with initial patterns of importing and exporting of commuters is stronger for changes in employment than for changes in residents, which suggests that most of the adjustment happens through employment changes rather than migration and changes in residence.

Figure 13 shows that the implications of the model for the change in employment as a result of shutting down commuting are well explained by the commuting intensity $L_{Mn}/L_{Rn}$. Commuting intensity is, however, not easy to explain with standard county-based measures of employment, residents, wages, or surrounding county characteristics. Table 3 presents the results of regressions that try to account for the cross-section of employment, residents, and the employment to residents ratio (a measure of county commuting intensity). The first column shows that one can account for most of the variation in county employment using the number of residents and wages. Column (2) shows a similar result for the number of residents and Columns (3) and (4) show that the results are not affected when we add employment and wages in surrounding counties. So the first four columns show that it is relatively easy to explain the variation in employment and residents with standard variables. The following four columns demonstrate that this is not the case for commuting intensity. The level of residents, measures of wages, and measures employment, residents and wages in surrounding counties do a poor job in accounting for the variation in commuting intensity. None of the R-squareds in the last four columns of Table 3 amounts to more than 0.3. Once again, we confirm that the variation in commuting patterns provides information that cannot be easily replicated by other more standard variables. The commuting links revealed by this information are, to a large extent, responsible for the impact of changes in commuting costs, as well as for the heterogeneity in local employment elasticities discussed above.

Even though Table 3 shows that commuting intensity is not closely related to county size, the results for the New York area described above together with those in Figure 13, suggest that maybe commuting is particularly important in large cities (or large commuting zones). Thus, eliminating commuting might affect particularly commuting zones with a large number of employees. In Figures 14-15, we examine the implications of this counterfactual change in commuting technology for economic outcomes at the commuting zone (CZ) level. We aggregate our county data in both the initial equilibrium and the counterfactual equilibrium to the CZ level and compute counterfactual changes for each CZ in our data. In Figure 14, we show the counterfactual change in CZ employment from prohibitive commuting costs against a measure of CZ dependence on commuting. This measure is the average share of workers in a county within the CZ that live in the same county in which they work, which provides an inverse measure of dependence on commuting.
In this table, \( L_{Mn} \) is the total employment in \( n \) neighbors whose centroid is no more than 120km away; \( \bar{w}_n \) is the weighted average of their workplace wage. Analogous definitions apply to \( L_{Rn} \) and \( \bar{v}_n \).

* \( p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 

Table 3: Explaining employment levels and commuting intensity

We find that aggregating up to the CZ level does not eliminate the effects of the change in commuting technology. Rather we find substantial changes in relative CZ employment from prohibitive commuting costs, ranging from declines of around 0.2 log points to rises of around 0.4 log points. Consistent with our earlier results for counties, we find that CZs that are more intensive users of commuting (smaller values on the horizontal axis) experience larger declines in employment, whereas CZs that are less intensive users of commuting (larger values on the horizontal axis) experience larger rises in employment.

Even though eliminating commuting affects the CZs that use commuting intensively, perhaps surprisingly, the change in employment has only a weak relationship with the initial employment size of the CZ. Figure 15 displays the same change in employment from prohibitive commuting costs (same vertical axis) against initial CZ employment size (different horizontal axis). In line with our earlier findings for local employment elasticities, we find that employment size is an imperfect measure for commuting linkages in factor markets. We find little relationship between relative changes in employment and initial employment size in the CZ in Figure 15. Hence, the importance of commuting is by no means restricted to large cities. This explains why commuting could not be simply approximated by measures of county (or surrounding area) employment size in the previous section.
Taken together, the results in this section have shown that commuting linkages in factor markets are not only important for understanding the incidence of local labor demand shocks but also matter for the spatial distribution of economic activity and aggregate welfare. Increasing commuting costs to prohibitive levels involves a deterioration in the technology for organizing the spatial distribution of economic activity. This deterioration in technology implies less specialization across locations (in residents versus employment) and hence a less efficient sorting of workers and residents across locations in response to spatial variation in productivity and amenities. Furthermore, commuting links are not easily explained by measures of employment size either at the county or the commuting zone level. These results highlight further the importance of incorporating commuting data into regional analysis.

4.3 Interaction Between Trade and Commuting Costs

Most equilibrium models that feature geography, trade, and migration abstract from commuting (e.g. Allen and Arkolakis, 2014a, Caliendo et al., 2014, or Redding, 2014). Given the demonstrated importance of commuting for the determination of employment levels across regions, it is natural to expect that the effects of reductions in transport costs are affected by commuting as well. To provide evidence on the interaction of spatial linkages in goods and factor markets, we compare the effects of reductions in trade costs, both with and without commuting. We first undertake a counterfactual for a 20 percent reduction in trade costs between locations ($d_{ni} = 0.8$ for $n \neq i$ and $d_{nn} = 1$) starting from the observed initial equilibrium with commuting (using the observed bilateral commuting shares to implicitly reveal the magnitude of bilateral commuting costs). We next undertake a counterfactual for the same 20 per-
cent reduction in trade costs between locations from a counterfactual equilibrium with no commuting (starting from the observed equilibrium, we first undertake a counterfactual for no commuting, before then undertaking the counterfactual for the reduction in trade costs).

Population mobility again implies that expected utility is equalized across locations. From (22), the change in the common level of expected utility from the trade cost reduction can be decomposed as before into the contributions of changes in the domestic commuting share and real residential income, where the latter change can be further decomposed into the contributions of changes in the domestic trade share, wages, expected residential income, residents and workers:

\[
\tilde{U} = \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_{nn}} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \left( \frac{1}{\hat{r}_{nn}} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \left( \frac{\hat{w}_n}{\hat{v}_n} \right)^{1-\alpha} \frac{\hat{L}_{Mn}}{\hat{L}_{Rn}} (34)
\]

where we have used the fact that \( \kappa_{nn}, B_{nn}, A_n, d_{nn} \) are unchanged.

We find that trade and commuting are weak complements in terms of aggregate welfare, in the sense that the welfare gains from reductions in trade costs are larger in the presence of commuting. Starting from the observed equilibrium, we find aggregate welfare gains from the trade cost reduction of 11.66 percent. In contrast, starting from the counterfactual equilibrium without commuting, we find aggregate welfare gains from the same trade cost reduction of 11.56 percent. Therefore the welfare gains from reducing the friction in goods markets (trade costs) are larger for lower values of the friction in factor markets (lower commuting costs).

We find substantially different effects of reductions in trade costs on the spatial distribution of economic activity with and without commuting. Figure 16 shows the relative change in employment from
a 20 percent reduction in trade costs in the New York region (without commuting in the left panel and with commuting in the right panel). In general, reductions in trade costs lead to a more dispersed spatial distribution of economic activity in the model. But this dispersal is smaller with commuting than without commuting. As trade costs fall, commuting increases the ability of the most productive locations to serve the national market by drawing workers from a suburban hinterland, without bidding up land prices as much as would otherwise occur.

In the model lower trade costs and higher commuting costs are both forces for the dispersion of economic activity. On the one hand, lower trade costs weaken agglomeration forces by reducing the incentive for firms and workers to locate close to one another. On the other hand, higher commuting costs increase congestion forces by forcing workers to live where they work, thereby bidding up land prices in congested locations. However, these two sets of forces interact with one another, so that the impact of a reduction in trade costs depends on the level of commuting costs. While lower trade costs necessarily redistribute employment away from the most congested locations, this redistribution is smaller with commuting than without commuting.

Figure 16: Relative change in employment ($\hat{L}_M$) from a 20 percent reduction in trade costs (with and without commuting) in the New York area

This exercise also illustrates more generally the role of commuting linkages in shaping the consequences of a reduction in trade costs. Figure 17 shows changes in county employment and real income following a reduction in trade costs in an economy without commuting (vertical axis) and with commuting (horizontal axis), alongside a 45-degree line. We find a relatively low correlation between changes in employment with and without commuting. In particular, commuting and trade tend to be complements in expanding areas: whenever employment increases with the reduction in trade costs, the commuting technology allows a larger expansion because it alleviates the increase in congestion (employment changes are below the diagonal in the left panel of Figure 17). But trade and commuting tend to be local
substitutes from the perspective of real income: whenever real income increases with trade, the increase is larger without commuting because production is more spatially dispersed without commuting (real income changes are above the diagonal in the right panel of Figure 17). These results further underscore the prominence of commuting linkages in shaping the equilibrium spatial distribution of economic activity, and the necessity of incorporating them in models of economic geography.

Figure 17: Relative change in employment \( (\hat{L}_M) \) and real income \( (\hat{b}_n / (\hat{P}^a \hat{Q}^{1-a})) \) from a 20 percent reduction in trade costs (with and without commuting) across all counties

5 Conclusions

Local technology, regulation, or infrastructure shocks can have far reaching economic effects through spatial linkages between locations. We have developed a spatial general equilibrium model that quantifies these spatial linkages in both goods markets (trade) and factor markets (commuting and migration). Our quantitative model uses the observed gravity equation relationships for goods and commuting flows to estimate the two key parameters of the model and matches exactly the observed cross-section distributions of employment, residents and incomes across U.S. counties.

We show that commuting flows are large and heterogeneous across counties and that commuting zones are imperfect in capturing these flows. The resulting differences in patterns of commuting lead to substantial variation across locations in elasticities of employment to productivity shocks, which have a mean of 1.52, but range from close to 0.5 to almost 2.5. These results question the generalizability of estimates of this elasticity that do not account for its large spatial heterogeneity. Furthermore, as our theoretical model incorporates multiple spatial linkages between locations (trade in goods and migration as well as commuting), it becomes an empirical question which of these linkages is more important given the observed patterns in the data in the initial equilibrium. We show that simple measures of commuting,
or partial equilibrium measures of the spatial linkages derived from the model, are empirically successful in accounting for this variation in general equilibrium local employment elasticities.

We hope that our results are used to motivate the inclusion of these measures of commuting, and the other partial equilibrium elasticities, in future empirical estimations of local employment elasticities. Their inclusion is simple, as these measures depend only on observables in the initial equilibrium. Furthermore, these terms are not well accounted for by the inclusion of other variables like measures of employment or wages in the treated or neighboring locations. So including observed measures of these linkages is essential. Our results also question the use of empirical difference-in-differences strategies that use contiguous locations as the control group to measure the treatment effect of a policy or shock. In our counterfactual exercises, the closest untreated locations tend to be significantly affected by the shocks to the treated locations.

We find that commuting matters not only for the incidence of local shocks but also for aggregate welfare and the spatial distribution of economic activity. Increasing commuting costs to prohibitive levels reduces aggregate welfare by around 7.2 percent, which is comparable in magnitude to some estimates of the welfare gains from international trade. Commuting enables workers to live close to high productivity locations without having to pay the high land prices in those locations. Therefore increasing commuting costs to prohibitive levels redistributes economic activity away from areas that use commuting intensively (e.g. the New York region) towards areas that use commuting less intensively. At the commuting zone level, these reallocations can lead to decreases and increases in employment of up to 0.2 and 0.4 log points respectively.

The theory we propose in this paper is, we believe, quite ambitious and rich. We view this theory as a reasonable framework to quantify the heterogeneity in local employment elasticities, because it is able to account for key observed relationships in the data (gravity in goods trade and commuting flows) and rationalizes the observed cross-section distribution of employment, wages, commuting and international trade flows in the initial equilibrium. In principle, the response to the economy to subsequent shocks could be different from its behavior in the initial equilibrium to which we calibrate. But since this initial equilibrium is itself the result of the accumulation of past shocks, we believe that it provides a reasonable benchmark against which to calibrate the model. Furthermore, our approach enables us to use bilateral patterns of goods trade and commuting flows in the initial equilibrium to capture the rich unobserved patterns of trade and commuting costs between locations.

Finally, we have extended quantitative general equilibrium models of economic geography to incorporate an additional margin that is empirically relevant (commuting between locations). But we acknowledge that there remain other margins that can also matter for local employment elasticities in response to shocks (e.g. labor force participation and unemployment). We view the incorporation of these additional margins into spatial general equilibrium models as an important part of the future research agenda. However, given the quantitative magnitudes of commuting flows in the data, we believe that commuting will continue to play an important role in shaping local employment elasticities even in
such future models incorporating a wider range of adjustment margins.

**A Appendix**

**A.1 Commuting Decisions**

**A.1.1 Distribution of Utility**

From all possible pairs of residence and employment locations, each worker chooses the bilateral commute that offers the maximum utility. Since the maximum of a sequence of Fréchet distributed random variables is itself Fréchet distributed, the distribution of utility across all possible pairs of residence and employment locations is:

$$1 - G(u) = 1 - \prod_{r=1}^{S} \prod_{s=1}^{S} e^{-\Psi_{rs} u^{-\epsilon}},$$

where the left-hand side is the probability that a worker has a utility greater than $u$, and the right-hand side is one minus the probability that the worker has a utility less than $u$ for all possible pairs of residence and employment locations. Therefore we have:

$$G(u) = e^{-\Phi u^{-\epsilon}}, \quad \Psi = \sum_{r=1}^{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} \Psi_{rs}. \quad (35)$$

Given this Fréchet distribution for utility, expected utility is:

$$\mathbb{E}[u] = \int_{0}^{\infty} e^\Psi u^{-\epsilon} e^{-\Psi u^{-\epsilon}} du. \quad (36)$$

Now define the following change of variables:

$$y = \Phi u^{-\epsilon}, \quad dy = -e^\Psi u^{-(\epsilon+1)} du. \quad (37)$$

Using this change of variables, expected utility can be written as:

$$\mathbb{E}[u] = \int_{0}^{\infty} \Psi^{1/\epsilon} y^{-1/\epsilon} e^{-y} dy, \quad (38)$$

which can be in turn written as:

$$\mathbb{E}[u] = \delta \Psi^{1/\epsilon}, \quad \delta = \Gamma \left( \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \right), \quad (39)$$

where $\Gamma(\cdot)$ is the Gamma function. Therefore we have the expression in the main text above:

$$\mathbb{E}[u] = \delta \Psi^{1/\epsilon} = \delta \left[ \sum_{r=1}^{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_{r}^{a} Q_{r}^{1-a} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_{s}^{\epsilon} \right]^{1/\epsilon}. \quad (40)$$
A.1.2 Residence and Workplace Choices

Using the distribution of utility for pairs of residence and employment locations \((14)\), the probability that a worker chooses the bilateral commute from \(n\) to \(i\) out of all possible bilateral commutes is:

\[
\pi_{ni} = \Pr [u_{ni} \geq \max \{u_{rs}; \forall r, s\}],
\]

\[
= \int_0^{\infty} \prod_{s \neq i} G_{rs}(u) \left[ \prod_{r \neq n} G_{rs}(u) \right] g_{ni}(u) du,
\]

\[
= \int_0^{\infty} \prod_{r=1}^{\infty} \prod_{s=1}^{\infty} e^{\Psi_{ni} u^{-(e+1)} e^{-\Psi_{rs} u^{-e}}} du.
\]

\[
= \int_0^{\infty} e^{\Psi_{ni} u^{-(e+1)} e^{-\Psi_{ni} u^{-e}}} du.
\]

Note that:

\[
\frac{d}{du} \left[ -\frac{1}{\Psi} e^{-\Psi u^{-e}} \right] = e u^{-(e+1)} e^{-\Psi u^{-e}}. \quad (41)
\]

Using this result to evaluate the integral above, the probability that the worker chooses to live in location \(n\) and commute to work in location \(i\) is:

\[
\lambda_{ni} = \frac{\Psi_{ni}}{\Psi} = \frac{B_{ni} \left( \kappa_n p_n Q_n^{1-a} \right)^{-e} (w_i)^e}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} \sum_{r=1}^{S} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_s p_s Q_s^{1-a} \right)^{-e} (w_s)^e}. \quad (42)
\]

Summing across all possible workplaces \(s\), we obtain the probability that a worker chooses to live in location \(n\) out of all possible locations is:

\[
\lambda_n = \frac{L_{Rn}}{L} = \frac{\Psi_n}{\Psi} = \frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} B_{ns} \left( \kappa_s p_s Q_s^{1-a} \right)^{-e} (w_s)^e}{\sum_{r=1}^{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_s p_s Q_s^{1-a} \right)^{-e} (w_s)^e}. \quad (43)
\]

Similarly, summing across all possible residence locations \(r\), we obtain the probability that a worker chooses to work in location \(i\) out of all possible locations is:

\[
\lambda_i = \frac{L_{Mi}}{L} = \frac{\Psi_i}{\Psi} = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^{S} B_{ri} \left( \kappa_r p_r Q_r^{1-a} \right)^{-e} (w_i)^e}{\sum_{r=1}^{S} \sum_{s=1}^{S} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_s p_s Q_s^{1-a} \right)^{-e} (w_s)^e}. \quad (44)
\]

For the measure of workers in location \(i\) \((L_{Mi})\), we can evaluate the conditional probability that they commute from location \(n\) (conditional on having chosen to work in location \(i\)):

\[
\lambda_{n|i} = \Pr [u_{ni} \geq \max \{u_{ri}; \forall r\}],
\]

\[
= \int_0^{\infty} \prod_{r \neq i} G_{ri}(u) g_{ni}(u) du,
\]

\[
= \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\Psi_{ni} u^{-e}} e^{\Psi_{ni} u^{-(e+1)}} du.
\]

Using the result \((41)\) to evaluate the integral above, the probability that a worker commutes from location \(n\) conditional on having chosen to work in location \(i\) is:

\[
\lambda_{n|i} = \frac{\Psi_{ni}}{\Psi_i} = \frac{B_{ni} \left( \kappa_n p_n Q_n^{1-a} \right)^{-e} (w_i)^e}{\sum_{r=1}^{S} B_{ri} \left( \kappa_r p_r Q_r^{1-a} \right)^{-e} (w_i)^e},
\]
which simplifies to:

\[
\lambda_{ni} = \frac{B_{ni} \left( \kappa_{ni}^a P_n^{1-a} \right)^{-\epsilon}}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} B_{ri} \left( \kappa_{ri}^a P_r^{1-a} \right)^{-\epsilon}}.
\] (45)

For the measure of residents of location \( n \) \((L_{Rn})\), we can evaluate the conditional probability that they commute to location \( i \) (conditional on having chosen to live in location \( n \)):

\[
\lambda_{ni|n} = \Pr [ u_{ni} \geq \max \{ u_{ns} \}, \forall s],
\]

\[
= \int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq i} G_{ns}(u) g_{ni}(u) du,
\]

\[
= \int_0^\infty e^{-\Psi_n u^{-\epsilon}} \psi_{ni} u^{-(\epsilon+1)} du.
\]

Using the result (41) to evaluate the integral above, the probability that a worker commutes to location \( i \) conditional on having chosen to live in location \( n \) is:

\[
\lambda_{ni|n} = \frac{\Psi_{ni}}{\Psi_n} = \frac{B_{ni} \left( \kappa_{ni}^a P_n^{1-a} \right)^{-\epsilon} (w_i)^\epsilon}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} B_{ns} \left( \kappa_{ns}^a P_n^{1-a} \right)^{-\epsilon} (w_s)^\epsilon},
\]

which simplifies to:

\[
\lambda_{ni|n} = \frac{B_{ni} (w_i / \kappa_{ni})^\epsilon}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} B_{ns} (w_s / \kappa_{ns})^\epsilon}.
\] (46)

These conditional commuting probabilities provide microeconomic foundations for the reduced-form gravity equations estimated in the empirical literature on commuting patterns.\(^{20}\) The probability that a resident of location \( n \) commutes to location \( i \) depends on the wage at \( i \) and the amenities and commuting costs from living in \( n \) and working in \( i \) in the numerator (“bilateral resistance”). But it also depends on the wage at all other workplaces \( s \) and the amenities and commuting costs from living in \( n \) and commuting to all other workplaces \( s \) in the denominator (“multilateral resistance”).

Labor market clearing requires that the measure of workers employed in each location \( i \) \((L_{Mi})\) equals the sum across all locations \( n \) of their measures of residents \((L_{Rn})\) times their conditional probabilities of commuting to \( i \) \((\lambda_{ni})\):

\[
L_{Mi} = \sum_{n=1}^{S} \lambda_{ni|n} L_{Rn}
\]

\[
= \sum_{n=1}^{S} \frac{B_{ni} (w_i / \kappa_{ni})^\epsilon}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} B_{ns} (w_s / \kappa_{ns})^\epsilon} L_{Rn},
\]

where, since there is a continuous measure of workers residing in each location, there is no uncertainty in the supply of workers to each employment location.

Expected worker income conditional on living in location \( n \) is equal to the wages in all possible workplace locations weighted by the probabilities of commuting to those locations conditional on living

\(^{20}\)See also McFadden (1975). For reduced-form evidence of the explanatory power of a gravity equation for commuting flows, see for example Erlander and Stewart (1990) and Sen and Smith (1995).
in \( n \):

\[
\tilde{v}_n = \mathbb{E} [w | n] = \sum_{i=1}^{S} \lambda_{ni} w_i,
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{S} \frac{B_{ni} (w_i / \kappa_{ni})^\epsilon}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} B_{ns} (w_s / \kappa_{ns})^\epsilon} \tilde{w}_i,
\]

where \( \mathbb{E} \) denotes the expectations operator and the expectation is taken over the distribution for idiosyncratic amenities. Intuitively, expected worker income is high in locations that have low commuting costs (low \( \kappa_{ns} \)) to high-wage employment locations.

Finally, another implication of the Fréchet distribution of utility is that the distribution of utility conditional on residing in location \( n \) and commuting to location \( i \) is the same across all bilateral pairs of locations with positive residents and employment, and is equal to the distribution of utility for the economy as a whole. To establish this result, note that the distribution of utility conditional on residing in location \( n \) and commuting to location \( i \) is given by:

\[
= \frac{1}{\lambda_{ni}} \int_{0}^{u} \prod_{s \neq i} G_{ns}(u) \left[ \prod_{r \neq n} \prod_{s} G_{rs}(u) \right] g_{ni}(u) du,
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\lambda_{ni}} \int_{0}^{u} \left[ \prod_{r=1}^{S} \prod_{s=1}^{S} e^{-\Psi_{rs}u^{-\epsilon}} \right] e^{\Psi_{ni}u^{-(\epsilon+1)}} du,
\]

\[
= \Psi \int_{0}^{u} e^{-\Psi u^{-\epsilon}} e^{\Psi_{ni}u^{-(\epsilon+1)}} du,
\]

\[
= e^{-\Psi u^\epsilon}.
\]

On the one hand, lower land prices in location \( n \) or a higher wage in location \( i \) raise the utility of a worker with a given realization of idiosyncratic amenities \( b \), and hence increase the expected utility of residing in \( n \) and working in \( i \). On the other hand, lower land prices or a higher wage induce workers with lower realizations of idiosyncratic amenities \( b \) to reside in \( n \) and work in \( i \), which reduces the expected utility of residing in \( n \) and working in \( i \). With a Fréchet distribution of utility, these two effects exactly offset one another. Pairs of residence and employment locations with more attractive characteristics attract more commuters on the extensive margin until expected utility is the same across all pairs of residence and employment locations within the economy.

### A.2 Computing Counterfactuals Using Changes

We denote the value of variables in the counterfactual equilibrium by a prime \((x')\) and the relative change of a variable between the initial and the counterfactual equilibrium by a hat \((\hat{x} = x' / x)\). Given the model’s parameters \( \{ \alpha, \sigma, \epsilon, \delta, \kappa \} \) and counterfactual changes in the model’s exogenous variables \( \{ \hat{A}_n, \hat{B}_n, \kappa_{ni}, \hat{d}_{ni} \} \), we can solve for the counterfactual changes in the model’s endogenous variables \( \{ \hat{w}_n, \hat{\delta}_n, \)
\(Q_n, \pi_{ni}, \lambda_{ni}, \hat{\theta}_n, \hat{L}_{Rn}, \hat{L}_{Mi}\) from the following system of eight equations (using the iterative algorithm outlined below):

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{w}_iL_{Mi}\hat{w}_iL_{Mi} &= \sum_{n \in N} \pi_{ni}\tau_{ni}\hat{\theta}_nL_{Rn}\hat{\theta}_nL_{Rn}, \\
\hat{\theta}_n\hat{\theta}_n &= \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{ni}\hat{\theta}_n\left(\hat{w}_i/\hat{k}_{ni}\right)^{\epsilon}\hat{w}_i\hat{w}_i, \\
\hat{Q}_n &= \hat{\theta}_nL_{Rn}, \\
\hat{\pi}_{ni}\tau_{ni} &= \frac{\pi_{ni}\hat{\theta}_n\left(\hat{d}_{ni}\hat{w}_i/\hat{A}_i\right)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k \in N} \pi_{nk}\hat{\theta}_L\hat{B}_k\left(\hat{d}_{nk}\hat{w}_k/\hat{A}_k\right)^{1-\sigma}}, \\
\hat{\lambda}_{ni}\lambda_{ni} &= \frac{\lambda_{ni}\hat{\theta}_n\left(\hat{\theta}_nQ_n^{1-\alpha}\right)^{-\epsilon}\left(\hat{w}_i/\hat{k}_{ni}\right)^{\epsilon}}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} \lambda_{rs}\hat{B}_s\left(\hat{\theta}_rQ_r^{1-\alpha}\right)^{-\epsilon}\left(\hat{w}_s/\hat{k}_{rs}\right)^{\epsilon}}, \\
\hat{B}_n &= \left(\frac{\hat{L}_{Mi}}{\hat{\pi}_{ni}}\right)^{1-\sigma}\hat{d}_{nn}\hat{w}_n/\hat{A}_n, \\
\hat{L}_{Rn} &= \frac{L}{L_{Rn}}\sum_i \lambda_{ni}\hat{\lambda}_{ni}, \\
\hat{L}_{Mi} &= \frac{L}{L_{Mi}}\sum_n \lambda_{ni}\hat{\lambda}_{ni},
\end{align*}
\]

where these equations correspond to trade balance (50), expected worker income (51), the land market clearing condition (52), trade shares (53), commuting probabilities (54), price indices (55), residential choice probabilities (56) and workplace choice probabilities (57).

We solve this system of equations using the following iterative algorithm for the counterfactual equilibrium. Given the model’s parameters \(\{a, \sigma, \epsilon, \delta, \kappa\}\) and changes in the exogenous variables of the model \(\{\hat{A}_n, \hat{B}_n, \hat{k}_{ni}, \hat{d}_{ni}\}\), we can solve for the resulting counterfactual changes in the endogenous variables of the model \(\{\hat{\theta}_n, \hat{\theta}_n, \hat{Q}_n, \hat{\pi}_{ni}, \hat{\lambda}_{ni}, \hat{B}_n, \hat{L}_{Rn}, \hat{L}_{Mi}\}\) from the system of eight equations (50)-(57). We solve this system of equations using the following iterative algorithm. We first conjecture changes in workplace wages and commuting probabilities at iteration \(t\), \(\hat{\theta}_n^{(t)}\) and \(\hat{\lambda}_{ni}^{(t)}\). We next update these conjectures to \(\hat{\theta}_n^{(t+1)}\) and \(\hat{\lambda}_{ni}^{(t+1)}\) using the current guesses and data. We start by computing:

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{\theta}_n^{(t)} &= \frac{1}{\hat{\theta}_n}\sum_{i \in N} \frac{\hat{\theta}_n\lambda_{ni}\left(\hat{w}_i^{(t)}/\hat{k}_{ni}\right)^{\epsilon}\hat{w}_i^{(t)}\hat{w}_i}{\sum_{s \in N} \hat{\theta}_n\lambda_{ns}\left(\hat{w}_s^{(t)}/\hat{k}_{ns}\right)^{\epsilon}\hat{w}_s^{(t)}\hat{w}_s}, \\
\hat{\lambda}_{ni}^{(t)} &= \frac{L}{L_{Mi}}\sum_n \lambda_{ni}\hat{\lambda}_{ni}^{(t)}, \\
\hat{L}_{Rn}^{(t)} &= \frac{L}{L_{Rn}}\sum_i \lambda_{ni}\hat{\lambda}_{ni}^{(t)}.
\end{align*}
\]
which are only a function of data and current guesses. We use (58) and (60) in (52) to compute:

\[ \tilde{Q}_n^{(t)} = \tilde{v}_n^{(t)} \tilde{L}_{Rn}^{(t)}. \]  

(61)

We use (59) and (53) to compute:

\[ \tilde{\tau}_{ni}^{(t)} = \frac{\tilde{\tau}_{Mi}^{(t)} \left( \tilde{d}_{ni}^{(t)} / \tilde{A}_i \right)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k \in N} \pi_{nk} \tilde{L}_{Mk}^{(t)} \left( \tilde{d}_{nk}^{(t)} / \tilde{A}_k \right)^{1-\sigma}}. \]  

(62)

We use (59), (62) and (55) to compute:

\[ \tilde{\tau}_n^{(t)} = \left( \frac{\tilde{\tau}_{Mi}^{(t)}}{\tilde{\tau}_{Mn}^{(t)}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \tilde{v}_n^{(t)} \tilde{A}_n. \]  

(63)

We use (58)-(63) to rewrite (50) and (54) as:

\[ \tilde{\omega}_i^{(t+1)} = \frac{1}{\gamma_i \tilde{L}_{Mi}^{(t)}} \sum_{n \in N} \pi_{ni} \tilde{\tau}_{ni}^{(t)} \tilde{v}_n^{(t)} \tilde{L}_{Rn} Y_n, \]  

(64)

\[ \tilde{\lambda}_{ni}^{(t+1)} = \frac{\tilde{B}_{ni} \left( \tilde{P}_n^{(t)} \tilde{Q}_n^{(t)} \right)^1 - \epsilon}{\sum_{r \in N} \tilde{B}_{rs} \left( \tilde{P}_r^{(t)} \tilde{Q}_r^{(t)} \right)^1 - \epsilon} \frac{\tilde{w}_i^{(t)} / \tilde{K}_{ni}}{\tilde{w}_i^{(t)} / \tilde{K}_{rs}}. \]  

(65)

Finally, we update our conjectures for wages and commuting probabilities using:

\[ \tilde{\omega}_i^{(t+1)} = \tilde{\omega}_i^{(t)} + (1 - \zeta) \tilde{\omega}_i^{(t+1)}, \]  

(66)

\[ \tilde{\lambda}_i^{(t+1)} = \tilde{\lambda}_i^{(t)} + (1 - \zeta) \tilde{\lambda}_i^{(t+1)}, \]  

(67)

where \( \zeta \in (0, 1) \) is an adjustment factor.

In Proposition 1, we provide conditions under which there exists a unique equilibrium in the model. Under these conditions, the above algorithm converges rapidly to the unique counterfactual equilibrium.

### A.3 Proof of Proposition 1

Assume balanced trade so \( w_i L_{Mi} = \sum_{n \in N} X_{ni} \), and so

\[ w_i L_{Mi} = \sum_{n \in N} \frac{L_{Mi}}{\sigma F} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{d_{wi}}{A_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} \tilde{v}_n L_{Rn}. \]  

(68)

Using (12) to substitute for the price index, this balanced trade condition can be written as

\[ w_i \sigma A_i^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{n \in N} \pi_{nn} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} \frac{L_{Rn}}{L_{Mn}} w_n^{\sigma-1} A_n^{1-\sigma} \tilde{v}_n. \]  

(69)

Note that balanced trade (68) also can be written as

\[ w_i \sigma A_i^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{n \in N} \frac{1}{\sigma F} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} d_{ni}^{1-\sigma} P_n^{\sigma-1} \tilde{v}_n L_{Rn}. \]  

(70)
Note that the residential choice probabilities (16) can be written as

\[
\frac{L_{Rn}}{L} = \frac{\bar{\omega}_n^e}{\bar{\omega}_n} \left( \frac{\bar{U}/\delta}{P_n^e} \right)^{(1-a)e} Q_n^{(1-a)e},
\]

where \( \bar{\omega}_n \) is a measure of commuting market access

\[
\bar{\omega}_n = \left[ \sum_{s \in N} B_{ns} \left( \frac{w_s}{\kappa_{ns}} \right)^e \right]^{1/\sigma}.
\]

Rearranging the residential choice probabilities (71), we obtain the following expression for the price index

\[
P_{n}^{1-e} = \left( \frac{\bar{\omega}_n}{\bar{\omega}_n} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{\bar{\omega}_n^e}{\bar{\omega}_n} \frac{\bar{U}/\delta}{P_n^e} \left( \frac{L_{Rn}}{L} \right)^{(1-a)e} Q_n^{(1-a)e} \frac{L_{Rn}}{L}.
\]

Using land market clearing (5), this expression for the price index can be re-written as

\[
P_{n}^{1-e} = \frac{\bar{\omega}_n^e}{\bar{\omega}_n} \left( \frac{\bar{U}/\delta}{P_n^e} \right)^{(1-a)e} \left( \frac{L_{Rn}}{L} \right)^{(1-a)e}.
\]

Substituting price index expression (74) into (12), we obtain the following expression for the domestic trade share

\[
\pi_{nm} = \bar{W}^{1-e} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{\bar{\omega}_n^e}{\bar{\omega}_n} \frac{\bar{U}/\delta}{P_n^e} \left( \frac{L_{Rn}}{L} \right)^{(1-a)e} \left( \frac{L_{Rn}}{L} \right)^{(1-a)e} A_{n}^{(1-a)e} d_{n}^{1-\sigma}.
\]

Now substitute this expression for the domestic trade share in the wage equation (69) to obtain

\[
\omega_{n}^{e} A_{n}^{1-\sigma} = \bar{W}^{1-e} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left[ \sum_{k \in N} \omega_{k}^{e} L_{Rk}^{(1-e)(1/\sigma)} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} d_{kn}^{1-\sigma} \right].
\]

Now return to the price index (74) and use the definition of the price index from (12) and commuting market clearing (18)

\[
\omega_{n}^{e} A_{n}^{1-\sigma} = \bar{W}^{1-e} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left[ \sum_{k \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{ns} \left( \frac{w_s}{\kappa_{ns}} \right)^e L_{Rn} \right] \left( \frac{d_{nk} \bar{\omega}_k}{A_k} \right)^{1-\sigma}.
\]

Together (76) and (77) provide systems of 2N equations that determine the 2N unknown values of \( \{ w, L_R \} \). Consider first the system (76). Define the \( n^{th} \) element of the operator \( T_w \) by

\[
T_w (w; L_R)_{n} \equiv \left( \frac{-\bar{W}^{1-e} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left[ \sum_{k \in N} \omega_{k}^{e} L_{Rk}^{(1-e)(1/\sigma)} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} d_{kn}^{1-\sigma} \right]^{1/\sigma} \right)}{A_{n}^{(1-a)e}}.
\]

Note that \( T_w (w; L_R) \) satisfies the following properties:
1. Homogeneity in $L_R$. For any $w$, we have

$$T_w(w; \lambda L_R) = \lambda \left[1 - (\sigma - 1)\left(\frac{1}{\omega} + \frac{1}{\omega^*}\right)\right]^\frac{1}{\sigma} T_w(w; L_R)$$

2. Homogeneity in $w$. For any $\lambda \geq 0$, we have

$$T_w(\lambda w; L_R) = \lambda \left[\frac{1}{\omega} + 1 - (\sigma - 1)\left(\frac{1}{\omega} + \frac{1}{\omega^*}\right)\right]^\frac{1}{\sigma} T_w(w; L_R).$$

For this result, simply note that $\bar{w}_n(\lambda w_n) = \lambda \bar{w}_n(w_n)$ and $\bar{v}_n(\lambda w_n) = \lambda \bar{v}_n(w_n)$.

Note also that $\left[\frac{1}{\omega} + 1 - (\sigma - 1)\left(\frac{1}{\omega} + \frac{1}{\omega^*}\right)\right]^\frac{1}{\sigma} = 1$.

3. $T_w(w; L_R)$ is monotone increasing in $w$, namely, that for $w, w' \in B(X)$, $w \leq w'$ implies $T(w) \leq T(w')$. In fact:

$$\frac{d\bar{w}_n}{\bar{w}_n} = \sum_{s \in N} \frac{B_{ns}(w_s/\kappa_{ns})^\epsilon}{\sum_{k \in N} B_{nk}(w_k/\kappa_{nk})^\epsilon} \frac{dw_s}{w_s} > 0,$$

which establishes that $\bar{w}$ is monotonic in $w$. Now note that $\bar{v}_n$ can be written as:

$$\bar{v}_n = \sum_{s \in N} B_{ns}\kappa_{ns}^{-\epsilon} w_s^{1+\epsilon} \bar{w}_n^{-\epsilon},$$

so that:

$$d\bar{v}_n = (1 + \epsilon) \sum_{s \in N} B_{ns}\kappa_{ns}^{-\epsilon} w_s^{1+\epsilon} \bar{w}_n^{-\epsilon} d\bar{w}_n - \epsilon \sum_{s \in N} B_{ns}\kappa_{ns}^{-\epsilon} w_s^{1+\epsilon} \bar{w}_n^{-\epsilon} \sum_{k \in N} \left(\frac{d\bar{w}_n}{dw_k} w_k\right) \frac{dw_k}{\bar{w}_n} > 0.$$

Using $dw_s/w_s = d \ln w_s$, this expression can be re-written as:

$$d\bar{v}_n = (1 + \epsilon) \sum_{s \in N} K_{ns} \ln w_s - \epsilon \sum_{s \in N} K_{ns} \sum_{k \in N} \xi_{nk} \ln w_k,$$

where

$$K_{ns} = B_{ns}\kappa_{ns}^{-\epsilon} w_s^{1+\epsilon} \bar{w}_n^{-\epsilon},$$

$$\ln w_s = d \ln w_s = \lim_{h \to 0} \ln(\omega_s + h) - \ln(\omega_s) = \ln((\omega_s + h)/\omega_s),$$

$$\xi_{nk} = \frac{B_{nk}(w_k/\kappa_{nk})^\epsilon}{\sum_{s \in N} B_{ns}(w_s/\kappa_{ns})^\epsilon},$$

$$\sum_{k \in N} \xi_{nk} = 1.$$ 

Since $\ln w_s$ is concave in $w_s$, it follows that:

$$\sum_{s \in N} K_{ns} \ln w_s > \sum_{s \in N} K_{ns} \sum_{k \in N} \xi_{nk} \ln w_k,$$

Given Properties 2 and 3, the results in Fujimoto and Krause (1985) guarantee that there exists a unique fixed point for $w$, up to a normalization, conditional on $L_R$,

$$w = T_w(w; L_R).$$

Denote this fixed point by $w_{FP}(L_R)$. 

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4. Using the results from 1-3. above, note that we can set \( w^{F,P}(\lambda L_R) = w^{F,P}(L_R) \) for any \( \lambda \) with an appropriate change in \( \bar{U} \); in fact, given the Property 1, and since \( \bar{U} \) shifts \( T_w(w;L_R) \) proportionally by \( \bar{U}^{1/\alpha} \), we can always find an appropriate \( \bar{U}' \), namely \( \bar{U}'^{1/\alpha} \lambda \left[ 1 - (\sigma - 1) \left( \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right) \right]^{1/\beta} = 1 \). We show that there is a \( \bar{U} \) that clears the market at the end of the proof.

Now consider the system (77). Define the \( n^{th} \) element of an operator \( \bar{T}_L \) by

\[
\bar{T}_L(L_R;w)_n = \left( W \left[ \sum_{k \in N} \left[ \sum_{\epsilon \in N} \sum_{\epsilon \in N} \frac{R_{\epsilon}(w_R;\lambda \epsilon)}{R_{\epsilon}(w_R;\lambda \epsilon)^2} L_{\epsilon} \right] \left( \frac{dL_{\epsilon}w_R}{A_{\epsilon}} \right)^{1-\epsilon} \right] \times \left( \frac{1}{1-\epsilon} \right) \right) \times \lambda^{-(1-\sigma)\left( \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)}.
\]

Note that \( \bar{T}_L(L_R;w) \) satisfies the following properties:

- Homogeneity in \( L_R \):
  \[
  \bar{T}_L(\lambda L_R;w) = \lambda^{-\left(1-\sigma\right)\left( \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)} \bar{T}_L(L_R;w)
  \]

- Monotonicity in \( L_R \), immediate by inspection.

Define \( T_L(L_R) \equiv \bar{T}_L(L_R,w^{F,P}(L_R)) \). Note that this operator satisfies the following properties:

5. Homogeneity:

\[
T_L(\lambda L_R) = \bar{T}_L(\lambda L_R, w^{F,P}(\lambda L_R)) = \lambda^{-\left(1-\sigma\right)\left( \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)} \bar{T}_L(L_R, w^{F,P}(\lambda L_R)) = \lambda^{-\left(1-\sigma\right)\left( \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)} \bar{T}_L(L_R; w^{F,P}(L_R))
\]

where the first equality follows from the expression for \( \bar{T}_L(L_R;w) \) and the second equality from setting \( w^{F,P}(\lambda L_R) = w^{F,P}(L_R) \), as implied by Property 4 of \( w^{F,P}(L_R) = T_w(w^{F,P};L_R) \) above;

6. Monotonicity in \( L_R \) : note that \( \bar{T}_L(L_R;w) \) is homogeneous of degree 0 in \( w \), since \( 1 - \sigma - \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} + (1-\sigma) \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right) = 0 \). Hence, given any vector \( dL_R \), the total differential in \( \bar{T}_L(L_R, w^{F,P}(L_R)) \) induced through changes in \( w^{F,P}(L_R) \) sums to zero by Euler’s theorem. \( \bar{T}_L(L_R, w^{F,P}(L_R)) \) is then monotone in \( L_R \) by inspection of the expression of \( \bar{T}_L(L_R;w) \).

Then, if \( \frac{1}{-\left(1-\sigma\right)\left( \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)} \in (0,1] \), the results in Fujimoto and Krause (1985) guarantee then that there is a unique fixed point \( L_R^{FP} \) such that

\[
L_R^{FP} = T_L(L_R^{FP}).
\]

Since \( -\left(1-\sigma\right) \left( \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right) > 0 \) by assumption, the binding constraint is that

\[
-\left(1-\sigma\right) \left( \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right) > 1,
\]

or

\[
\sigma > \frac{1 + \epsilon}{1 + \epsilon - \alpha \epsilon}.
\]
Hence, under the condition imposed in the statement of the proposition, there exists a unique solution to the system of equations (76) and (77).

The only remaining task is to use the labor market clearing condition to guarantee that there exists a unique scalar $\bar{U}$ such that $\sum_{n \in N} L_{Rn} = \bar{L}$. First note that the above result and the definition of the operator $T_L (L_R)$ guarantees that for any $\lambda > 0$ and any $\bar{U}$

$$L_{R,\bar{U}} = T_L (L_{R,\bar{U}}; \bar{U}) = T_L (L_{R,\bar{U}}; \bar{U}) \lambda^{- \frac{\log x}{(1-\sigma)(\frac{1}{\alpha x} + \frac{1-a}{\alpha})}} = T_L (L_{R,\bar{U}}; \bar{U}) \lambda^{- \frac{\log x}{(1-\sigma)(\frac{1}{\alpha x} + \frac{1-a}{\alpha})}},$$

where we have used the definition of $\bar{W}$. Then,

$$\Gamma L_{R,\bar{U}} = T_L (\Gamma L_{R,\bar{U}}; \bar{U}) \Gamma^{- \frac{\log x}{(1-\sigma)(\frac{1}{\alpha x} + \frac{1-a}{\alpha})}} = T_L (\Gamma L_{R,\bar{U}}; \bar{U}) \Gamma^{- \frac{\log x}{(1-\sigma)(\frac{1}{\alpha x} + \frac{1-a}{\alpha})}} \lambda^{- \frac{\log x}{(1-\sigma)(\frac{1}{\alpha x} + \frac{1-a}{\alpha})} + \alpha \epsilon}$$

and so $L_{R,\Omega} = \Gamma L_{R,\bar{U}}$ if

$$\Gamma = \lambda^{- \frac{\log x}{(1-\sigma)(\frac{1}{\alpha x} + \frac{1-a}{\alpha})}} (1 - (\sigma - 1)(\frac{1}{\alpha x} + \frac{1-a}{\alpha})).$$

Note that since $1 - (\sigma - 1)(\frac{1}{\alpha x} + \frac{1-a}{\alpha}) < 0$, $L_{R,\Omega}$ is monotone decreasing in $\bar{U}$ through this power function. Hence, there exists a unique $\bar{U}$ such that $\sum_{n \in N} L_{Rn} = \bar{L}$.

### A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
#### A.4.1 New Economic Geography Model

We begin by considering our new economic geography model with agglomeration forces through love of variety and increasing returns to scale. The general equilibrium vector $\{w_n, \bar{\sigma}_n, Q_n, L_{Mn}, L_{Rn}, P_n\}$ and scalar $\bar{U}$ solve the following system of equations. First, income equals expenditure on goods produced in each location:

$$w_i L_{Mi} = \sum_{n \in N} L_{Mi} (d_{ni} w_i / A_i)^{1-\sigma} \bar{\sigma}_n L_{Rn}. \quad (79)$$

Second, expected worker income depends on wages:

$$\bar{\sigma}_n = \sum_{i \in N} \frac{B_{ni} (w_i / \kappa_{ni})^\epsilon}{\sum_{s \in N} B_{ns} (w_s / \kappa_{ns})^\epsilon} w_i. \quad (80)$$

Third, land prices depend on expected worker income and the measure of residents:

$$Q_n = (1 - \alpha) \frac{\bar{\sigma}_n L_{Rn}}{H_n}. \quad (81)$$

Fourth, workplace choice probabilities solve:

$$\frac{L_{Mn}}{L} = \frac{\sum_{r \in N} B_{rn} (\kappa_{rn} P_r^a Q_r^{1-a})^{-\epsilon} w_n^\epsilon}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} (\kappa_{rs} P_r^a Q_r^{1-a})^{-\epsilon} w_s^\epsilon}. \quad (82)$$

Fifth, residential choice probabilities solve:

$$\frac{L_{Rn}}{L} = \frac{\sum_{s \in N} B_{ns} (\kappa_{ns} P_n^a Q_n^{1-a})^{-\epsilon} w_s^\epsilon}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} (\kappa_{rs} P_r^a Q_r^{1-a})^{-\epsilon} w_s^\epsilon}. \quad (83)$$
Sixth, price indices solve:

\[
P_n = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma F} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} \left[ \sum_{i \in N} L_{Mi} \left( d_{ni} w_i / A_i \right)^{1 - \sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}.
\] (84)

Seventh, expected utility satisfies:

\[
\bar{U} = \delta \left[ \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_r^a Q_{r}^{1 - \alpha} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_s^e \right]^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}},
\] (85)

where \(\delta = \Gamma \left( \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} \right)\) and \(\Gamma(\cdot)\) is the Gamma function.

A.4.2 Eaton and Kortum (2002) with External Economies of Scale

We consider an Eaton and Kortum (2002) with external economies of scale augmented to incorporate heterogeneity in worker preferences over workplace and residence locations. Utility remains as specified in (1), except that the consumption index \((C_n)\) is defined over a fixed interval of goods \(j \in [0, 1]::

\[
C_n = \left[ \int_{0}^{1} c_n (j)^{\theta} dj \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}.
\]

Productivity for each good \(j\) in each location \(i\) is drawn from an independent Fréchet distribution:

\[
F_i (z) = e^{-A_i z^{-\theta}}, \quad A_i = \tilde{A}_i L_{Mi}^\eta, \quad \theta > 1,
\]

where the scale parameter of this distribution \((A_i)\) depends on the measure of workers \((L_{Mi})\) and \(\eta\) parameterizes the strength of external economies of scale. The general equilibrium vector \([\bar{w}_n, \bar{v}_n, Q_n, L_{Mn}, L_{Rn}, P_n]\) and scalar \(\bar{U}\) solve the following system of equations. First, income equals expenditure on goods produced in each location:

\[
\bar{w}_i L_{Mi} = \sum_{n \in N} \frac{\tilde{A}_i L_{Mi}^\eta (d_{ni} w_i)^{-\theta}}{\sum_{k \in N} \tilde{A}_k L_{Mk}^\eta (d_{nk} w_k)^{-\theta}} \bar{v}_n L_{Rn}.
\] (86)

Second, expected worker income depends on wages:

\[
\bar{v}_n = \sum_{i \in N} \frac{B_{ni} (w_i / \kappa_{ni})^\epsilon}{\sum_{s \in N} B_{ns} \left( w_s / \kappa_{ns} \right)^\epsilon} w_i.
\] (87)

Third, land prices depend on expected worker income and the measure of residents:

\[
Q_n = (1 - \alpha) \frac{\bar{v}_n L_{Rn}}{H_n}.
\] (88)

Fourth, workplace choice probabilities solve:

\[
\frac{L_{Mn}}{L} = \frac{\sum_{r \in N} B_{rn} \left( \kappa_{rn} P_r^a Q_{r}^{1 - \alpha} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_n^e}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_r^a Q_{r}^{1 - \alpha} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_s^e}.
\] (89)
Fifth, residential choice probabilities solve:

$$\frac{L_{RN}}{L} = \frac{\sum_{s \in \mathcal{N}} B_{Ns} \left( \kappa_{ns} P_n^r Q_n^{1-a} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_s^e}{\sum_{r \in \mathcal{N}} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{N}} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_n^r Q_r^{1-a} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_s^e}. \quad (90)$$

Sixth, price indices solve:

$$P_n = \gamma \left[ \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} A_i \left( d_{ni} w_i \right)^{-\theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}, \quad (91)$$

where $\gamma = \left[ \Gamma \left( \frac{\theta - (\sigma - 1)}{\theta} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$ and $\Gamma (\cdot)$ denotes the Gamma function. Seventh, expected utility satisfies:

$$\bar{U} = \delta \left[ \sum_{r \in \mathcal{N}} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{N}} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_n^r Q_r^{1-a} \right)^{-\epsilon} w_s^e \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}. \quad (92)$$

The system of equations (86)-(92) is isomorphic to the system of equations (79)-(85) under the following restrictions:

$$\theta^{EK} = \sigma^{NEG} - 1,$$
$$\eta^{EK} = 1,$$
$$A_i^{EK} = \left( A_i^{NEG} \right)^{\sigma^{NEG} - 1},$$
$$\gamma^{EK} = \frac{\sigma^{NEG}}{\sigma^{NEG} - 1} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^{NEG}} \right)^{1-\epsilon^{NEG}}.$$

Under these parameter restrictions, both models generate the same general equilibrium vector \(\{w_n, v_n, Q_n, L_{Mn}, L_{RN}, P_n\}\) and scalar \(\bar{U}\).

A.4.3 Armington (1969) with External Economies of Scale

We consider an Armington (1969) model with external economies of scale augmented to incorporate heterogeneity in worker preferences over workplace and residence locations. Utility remains as specified in (1), except that the consumption index \((C_n)\) is defined over goods that are horizontally differentiated by location of origin:

$$C_n = \left[ \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} C_i^\rho \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}.$$

The goods supplied by each location are produced under conditions of perfect competition and external economies of scale such that the “cost inclusive of freight” (cif) price of good produced in location \(i\) and consumed in location \(n\) is:

$$p_{ni} = \frac{d_{ni} w_i}{A_i}, \quad A_i = \bar{A}_i L_{Mi}^{\eta}.$$

The general equilibrium vector \(\{w_n, v_n, Q_n, L_{Mn}, L_{RN}, P_n\}\) and scalar \(\bar{U}\) solve the following system of equations. First, income equals expenditure on goods produced in each location:

$$w_i L_{Mi} = \sum_{n \in \mathcal{N}} A_i^{\sigma - 1} L_{Mi}^{\eta (\sigma - 1)} (d_{ni} w_i)^{1-\sigma} v_n L_{RN}, \quad (93)$$

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Second, expected worker income depends on wages:

\[ \bar{v}_n = \sum_{i \in N} \frac{B_{ni}}{\sum_{s \in N} B_{ns}} \left( \frac{w_i}{\kappa_{ni}} \right) \bar{v}_i. \] (94)

Third, land prices depend on expected worker income and the measure of residents:

\[ Q_n = (1 - \alpha) \frac{\bar{v}_n L_{Rn}}{H_n}. \] (95)

Fourth, workplace choice probabilities solve:

\[ \frac{L_{Mn}}{L} = \frac{\sum_{r \in N} B_{rn} \left( \kappa_{rn} P_{r}^a Q_{r}^{1-a} \right)^{-\varepsilon} w_i^{\varepsilon}}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_{r}^a Q_{r}^{1-a} \right)^{-\varepsilon} w_s^{\varepsilon}}. \] (96)

Fifth, residential choice probabilities solve:

\[ \frac{L_{Rn}}{L} = \frac{\sum_{s \in N} B_{ns} \left( \kappa_{ns} P_{s}^a Q_{s}^{1-a} \right)^{-\varepsilon} w_s^{\varepsilon}}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_{r}^a Q_{r}^{1-a} \right)^{-\varepsilon} w_s^{\varepsilon}}. \] (97)

Sixth, price indices solve:

\[ P_n = \left[ \frac{\sum_{i \in N} A_i^{\sigma-1} L_{Mi}^{\sigma(\sigma-1)} (d_{ni} w_i)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_{r}^a Q_{r}^{1-a} \right)^{-\varepsilon} w_s^{\varepsilon}} \right]^{1/\sigma}. \] (98)

Seventh, expected utility satisfies:

\[ \bar{U} = \delta \left[ \frac{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} \left( \kappa_{rs} P_{r}^a Q_{r}^{1-a} \right)^{-\varepsilon} w_s^{\varepsilon}}{\sum_{n \in N} B_{ns} \left( \kappa_{ns} P_{s}^a Q_{s}^{1-a} \right)^{-\varepsilon} w_s^{\varepsilon}} \right]^{1/2}. \] (99)

The system of equations (93)-(99) is isomorphic to the system of equations (79)-(85) under the following restrictions:

\[ \sigma^{AR} = \sigma^{NEG}, \]
\[ \eta^{EK} = \frac{1}{\sigma^{NEG} - 1}, \]
\[ A_i^{AR} = A_i^{NEG}, \]
\[ 1 = \frac{\sigma^{NEG}}{\sigma^{NEG} - 1} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma^{NEG}^{\sigma^{NEG}}} \right)^{1/\sigma^{NEG}}. \]

Under these parameter restrictions, both models generate the same general equilibrium vector \{w_n, \bar{v}_n, Q_n, L_{Mn}, L_{Rn}, P_n\} and scalar \bar{U}.

**A.5 Proof of Proposition 3**

Note that the goods market clearing condition (23) can be written as the following excess demand system:

\[ D_i(\bar{A}) = w_i L_{Mi} - \sum_{n \in N} \frac{\tilde{A}_i L_{Mi} (d_{ni} w_i)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k \in N} \tilde{A}_k L_{Mk} (d_{nk} w_k)^{1-\sigma}} \bar{v}_n L_{Rn} = 0, \] (100)
where \( \tilde{A}_i = A_i^{\sigma - 1} \) and \( \{ w_i, L_{Mi}, \sigma_n, L_{Rn}, d_{ni} \} \) have already been determined from the observed data or our parameterization of trade costs. This excess demand system exhibits the following properties in \( \tilde{A}_i \):

**Property (i):** \( D(\tilde{A}) \) is continuous, as follows immediately from inspection of (100).

**Property (ii):** \( D(\tilde{A}) \) is homogenous of degree zero, as follows immediately from inspection of (100).

**Property (iii):** \( \sum_{i \in N} D_i(\tilde{A}) = 0 \) for all \( \tilde{A} \in \mathbb{R}_+^N \). This property can be established by noting:

\[
\sum_{i \in N} D_i(\tilde{A}) = \sum_{i \in N} w_i L_{Mi} - \sum_{n \in N} \sum_{k \in N} \tilde{A}_i L_{Mi} (d_{nl} w_i)^{1-\sigma} \sigma_n L_{Rn},
\]

\[
= \sum_{i \in N} w_i L_{Mi} - \sum_{n \in N} \tilde{v}_n L_{Rn},
\]

\[
= 0.
\]

**Property (iv):** \( D(\tilde{A}) \) exhibits gross substitution:

\[
\frac{\partial D_i(\tilde{A})}{\partial \tilde{A}_r} > 0 \quad \text{for all } i, r \neq i, \quad \text{for all } \tilde{A} \in \mathbb{R}_+^N, \quad \text{for all } i, \quad \text{for all } \tilde{A} \in \mathbb{R}_+^N.
\]

This property can be established by noting:

\[
\frac{\partial D_i(\tilde{A})}{\partial \tilde{A}_r} = \sum_{n \in N} L_{Mr} (d_{nr} w_r)^{1-\sigma} \tilde{A}_i L_{Mi} (d_{nl} w_i)^{1-\sigma} \sigma_n L_{Rn} > 0.
\]

and using homogeneity of degree zero, which implies:

\[
\nabla D(\tilde{A}) \tilde{A} = 0,
\]

and hence:

\[
\frac{\partial D_i(\tilde{A})}{\partial \tilde{A}_i} < 0 \quad \text{for all } \tilde{A} \in \mathbb{R}_+^N.
\]

Therefore we have established gross substitution. We now use these five properties to establish that the system of equations (100) has at most one (normalized) solution. Gross substitution implies that \( D(\tilde{A}) = D(\tilde{A}') \) cannot occur whenever \( \tilde{A} \) and \( \tilde{A}' \) are two technology vectors that are not colinear. By homogeneity of degree zero, we can assume \( \tilde{A}' \geq \tilde{A} \) and \( \tilde{A}_i = \tilde{A}'_i \) for some \( i \). Now consider altering the productivity vector \( \tilde{A}' \) to obtain the productivity vector \( \tilde{A} \) in \( N - 1 \) steps, lowering (or keeping unaltered) the productivity of all the other \( N - 1 \) locations \( n \neq i \) one at a time. By gross substitution, the excess demand in location \( i \) cannot decrease in any step, and because \( \tilde{A} \neq \tilde{A}' \), it will actually increase in at least one step. Hence \( D(\tilde{A}) > D(\tilde{A}') \) and we have a contradiction.

We next establish that there exists a productivity vector \( \tilde{A}^+ \in \mathbb{R}_+^N \) such that \( D(\tilde{A}^+) = 0 \). By homogeneity of degree zero, we can restrict our search for this productivity vector to the unit simplex \( \Delta = \{ \tilde{A} \in \mathbb{R}_+^N : \sum_{i \in N} \tilde{A}_i = 1 \} \). Define on \( \Delta \) the function \( D^+(\cdot) \) by \( D^+_i(\tilde{A}) = \max \{ D_i(\tilde{A}), 0 \} \). Note that \( D^+(\cdot) \) is continuous. Denote \( a(\tilde{A}) = \sum_{i \in N} [\tilde{A}_i + D^+_i(\tilde{A})] \). We have \( a(\tilde{A}) \geq 1 \) for all \( \tilde{A} \).
Define a continuous function \( f (\cdot) \) from the closed convex set \( \Delta \) into itself by:

\[
f (\bar{A}) = \left[ \frac{1}{a (\bar{A})} \right] \left[ \bar{A} + D^+ (\bar{A}) \right].
\]

Note that this fixed-point function tends to increase the productivities of locations with excess demand. By Brouwer’s Fixed-point Theorem, there exists \( \bar{A}^* \in \Delta \) such that \( \bar{A}^* = f (\bar{A}^*) \).

Since \( \sum_{i \in N} D_i (\bar{A}) = 0 \), it cannot be the case that \( D_i (\bar{A}) > 0 \) for all \( i \in N \) or \( D_i (\bar{A}) < 0 \) for all \( i \in N \). Additionally, if \( D_i (\bar{A}) > 0 \) for some \( i \) and \( D_r (\bar{A}) < 0 \) for some \( r \neq i \), \( \bar{A} \neq f (\bar{A}) \). It follows that at the fixed point for productivity, \( \bar{A}^* = f (\bar{A}^*) \), and \( D_i (\bar{A}^*) = 0 \) for all \( i \). It follows that there exists a unique vector of unobserved productivities (\( \bar{A} \)) that solves the excess demand system (100).

### A.6 Proof of Proposition 4

Note that the commuting probability (25) can be written as the following excess demand system:

\[
D_i (B) = \lambda_{ni} - \frac{B_{ni} \kappa_{ni} \left( \frac{L_{Mn}}{\pi_{mn}} \right)}{\sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} B_{rs} \kappa_{rs} \left( \frac{L_{Ms}}{\pi_{mr}} \right)} \left( \frac{\pi_{mn}}{\pi_{mr}} \right) A_{n} \sigma_{r} \alpha \left( 1 - \alpha \right) \frac{w_{i}}{w_{r}} = 0, \tag{101}
\]

where \( \{ w_r, L_{Mn}, \sigma_{r}, L_{Rn}, \kappa_{ni}, \pi_{mn}, A_{n}, H_{n} \} \) have already been determined from the observed data or our parameterization of commuting costs. Note that the excess demand system (101) exhibits the same properties in \( B \) as the excess demand system (100) exhibits in \( \bar{A} \). It follows that there exists a unique vector of unobserved productivities (\( \bar{A} \)) that solves the excess demand system (100).

### A.7 Partial Equilibrium Elasticities

**Wage Elasticity:** Totally differentiating the goods market clearing condition (11), we have:

\[
\frac{dw_n}{w_n} L_{Mn} + \frac{dL_{Mn}}{L_{Mn}} w_n L_{Mn} = \sum_{r \in N} \left( 1 - \pi_{rn} \right) \pi_{rn} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dL_{Mn}}{L_{Mn}} - \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} \pi_{rs} \pi_{rn} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dL_{Ms}}{L_{Ms}} - \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} \pi_{rs} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dL_{Ms}}{L_{Ms}} + \left( \sigma - 1 \right) \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} \pi_{rs} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dA_n}{A_n} - \left( \sigma - 1 \right) \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} \pi_{rs} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dA_n}{A_n} + \sum_{r \in N} \pi_{rn} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dA_n}{A_n} + \pi_{mn} \partial_n L_{Rn} \frac{dL_{Ru}}{L_{Ru}}.
\]

To consider the direct effect of a productivity shock in location \( n \) on wages, employment and residents in that location, holding constant all other endogenous variables at their values in the initial equilibrium, we set \( dA_s = dw_s = dL_{Ms} = dL_{Rs} = 0 \) for \( s \neq n \) and \( d\sigma_r = 0 \) for all \( r \), which yields:

\[
\frac{dw_n}{w_n} L_{Mn} + \frac{dL_{Mn}}{L_{Mn}} w_n L_{Mn} = \sum_{r \in N} \left( 1 - \pi_{rn} \right) \pi_{rn} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dL_{Mn}}{L_{Mn}} - \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} \pi_{rs} \pi_{rn} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dL_{Ms}}{L_{Ms}} + \left( \sigma - 1 \right) \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} \pi_{rs} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dA_n}{A_n} + \pi_{mn} \partial_n L_{Rn} \frac{dL_{Ru}}{L_{Ru}}.
\]

This implies:

\[
\frac{dw_n}{dA_n} L_{Mn} \frac{dL_{Mn}}{dA_n} L_{Mn} = - \sum_{r \in N} \left( 1 - \pi_{rn} \right) \pi_{rn} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dL_{Mn}}{L_{Mn}} - \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} \pi_{rs} \pi_{rn} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dL_{Ms}}{L_{Ms}} + \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \in N} \pi_{rs} \partial_r L_{Rr} \frac{dA_n}{A_n} + \pi_{mn} \partial_n L_{Rn} \frac{dL_{Ru}}{L_{Ru}}.
\]
Totally differentiating the residential choice probability (Residents Elasticity: use the partial derivative symbol to clarify that this derivative is not the full general equilibrium one. For residents in the initial equilibrium, we set through a higher wage in that location, holding constant all other endogenous variables at their values in the initial equilibrium, we set to the extent that wages change as a result of the productivity shock. Rearranging this expression, we obtain the partial equilibrium elasticity in the main text above:

\[
\frac{\partial w_n}{\partial A_n} = \frac{(\sigma - 1) \sum_{r \in N} (1 - \pi_{rn}) \bar{\xi}_{rn}}{1 + (\sigma - 1) \sum_{r \in N} (1 - \pi_{rn}) \bar{\xi}_{rn}} \left( \frac{1}{\sum_{r \in N} (1 - \pi_{rn}) \bar{\xi}_{rn}} \right) \frac{dA}{dw_n} A_n \frac{w_n}{L_{mn}} \frac{\sum_{r \in N} (1 - \pi_{rn}) \bar{\xi}_{rn}}{L_{mn}} - \bar{\xi}_{nn} \frac{dL_{rn}}{dw_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{rn}},
\]

where \( \bar{\xi}_{rn} = \pi_{rn} \frac{\partial \lambda_{rr}}{\partial r} / w_n \). is the share of expenditure from location \( r \) in location \( n \)'s income and we use the partial derivative symbol to clarify that this derivative is not the full general equilibrium one.

**Employment Elasticity:** Totally differentiating the commuting market clearing condition (18), we have:

\[
\frac{dL_{L_{mn}}}{L_{mn}} = e \sum_{r \in N} (1 - \lambda_{rn}) \frac{w_n}{L_{mn}} \lambda_{rn} \frac{L_{rr}}{L_{mn}} - e \sum_{r \in N} \sum_{s \neq n} \lambda_{rs} \frac{dL_{rs}}{L_{mn}} \frac{L_{rn}}{L_{mn}} + \sum_{r} \frac{dL_{rr}}{L_{rn}} \frac{L_{rn}}{L_{mn}}.
\]

To consider the direct effect of a productivity shock in location \( n \) on its employment and residents through a higher wage in that location, holding constant all other endogenous variables at their values in the initial equilibrium, we set \( d\omega_s = dL_{ms} = dL_{rs} = 0 \) for \( s \neq n \), which yields:

\[
\frac{dL_{mn}}{L_{mn}} = e \sum_{r \in N} (1 - \lambda_{rn}) \frac{L_{rr}}{L_{mn}} \frac{d\omega_n}{w_n} + \lambda_{rn} \frac{L_{rn}}{L_{mn}} \frac{dL_{rn}}{L_{rn}}.
\]

Rearranging this expression, we obtain the partial equilibrium elasticity in the main text above:

\[
\frac{\partial L_{mn}}{\partial \omega_n} L_{mn} = e \sum_{r \in N} (1 - \lambda_{rn}) \theta_{rn} + \theta_{nn} \left( \frac{dL_{rn}}{d\omega_n} \frac{w_n}{L_{rn}} \right),
\]

where \( \theta_{rn} = \lambda_{rn} \frac{L_{rr}}{L_{mn}} \) is the share of commuters from source \( r \) in location \( n \)'s employment and we use the partial derivative symbol to clarify that this derivative is not the full general equilibrium one.

**Residents Elasticity:** Totally differentiating the residential choice probability (\( \lambda_{rn} \) in (16)), we have:

\[
\frac{dL_{rn}}{L_{rn}} = -e \alpha (1 - \lambda_{rn}) \frac{dP_r}{P_n} + e \alpha \sum_{r \neq n} \lambda_{rn} \frac{dP_r}{P_r} - e (1 - \alpha) \sum_{r \neq n} \lambda_{rn} \frac{dQ_r}{Q_n} + e \lambda_{nn} \frac{d\omega_n}{w_n} - e \lambda_{mn} \lambda_{rn} \frac{d\omega_s}{w_s} - e \sum_{s \neq n} \lambda_{ms} \lambda_{rn} \frac{d\omega_s}{w_s}.
\]
To consider the direct effect of a productivity shock in location \( n \) on its residents through a higher wage in that location, holding constant all other endogenous variables at their values in the initial equilibrium, we set \( dP_r = dQ_r = 0 \) for all \( r \) and \( dw_s = 0 \) for \( s \neq n \), which yields:

\[
\frac{dL_{Rn}}{L_{Rn}} = \epsilon \left( \lambda_{nn} - \lambda_{Mn} \lambda_{Rn} \right) \frac{d\lambda_{Rn}}{w_n}.
\]

This implies:

\[
\frac{\partial L_{Rn}}{\partial w_n} = \epsilon \left( \frac{\lambda_{nn}}{\lambda_{nn} - \lambda_{Mn}} \right), \tag{104}
\]

which corresponds to the expression in the main text above and we use the partial derivative symbol to clarify that this derivative is not the full general equilibrium elasticity. Using the residents elasticity (104) in the employment elasticity (103), and using the residents and employment elasticities ((104) and (103) respectively) in the wage elasticity (102), we obtain the following partial equilibrium elasticities for the productivity shock,

\[
\frac{\partial L_{Rn}}{\partial w_n} = \epsilon \left( \frac{\lambda_{nn}}{\lambda_{nn} - \lambda_{Mn}} \right),
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L_{Mn}}{\partial w_n} = \sigma \sum_{r \in N} \left( 1 - \lambda_{rn} / \lambda_{Rn} \right) \theta_n + \sigma \sum_{r \in N} \left( 1 - \lambda_{rn} / \lambda_{Rn} \right) \theta_n \epsilon \left( \frac{\lambda_{nn}}{\lambda_{nn} - \lambda_{Mn}} \right),
\]

\[
\frac{\partial w_n}{\partial \pi} = \left[ 1 + \sigma \sum_{r \in N} \left( 1 - \lambda_{rn} / \lambda_{Rn} \right) \theta_n + \sigma \sum_{r \in N} \left( 1 - \lambda_{rn} / \lambda_{Rn} \right) \theta_n \right] - \sigma \pi \epsilon \left( \frac{\lambda_{nn}}{\lambda_{nn} - \lambda_{Mn}} \right).
\]

### A.8 Robustness

#### A.8.1 Commuting Zones

In Figure 18, we show that we continue to find heterogeneity in local employment elasticities if we use commuting zones (CZs) rather than counties. We compute 709 counterfactual exercises where we shock each CZ with a 5 percent productivity shock (holding productivity in all other CZs and holding all other exogenous variables constant). We display the estimated kernel density for the distribution of the general equilibrium elasticity of employment with respect to the productivity shock across these treated CZs (black line). We also show the 95 percent confidence intervals around this estimated kernel density (gray shading). Again we find substantial heterogeneity in the predicted effects of the productivity shock, although less than for counties. Furthermore, this heterogeneity in predicted effects is markedly larger for employment than residents. Since employment and residents can only differ through commuting, this suggests that the use of CZs is an imperfect control for commuting patterns between locations.

#### A.8.2 Spatially Correlated Productivity Shocks

In Figures 19 to 22 we show that the heterogeneity in local employment elasticities persists if we simulate productivity shocks with a degree of spatial correlation based on observed industry composition. We construct spatially correlated shocks using aggregate productivity growth in manufacturing and non-manufacturing and the observed shares of these sectors within each county’s employment. In particular, we proceed as follows. Data from BLS shows that between 2004 and 2010 TFP grew 6.2% for
Density

Elasticity of C.Z. Employment and Residents to Productivity

Employment Residents

Eliminating bottom and top 0.5%; gray area: 95% bootstrapped CI

Figure 18: Kernel density for the distribution of employment and residents elasticities in response to a productivity shock across commuting zones

the manufacturing sector and 3.4% for the overall private business sector. Given a U.S. employment share in manufacturing of about 11% in 2007 (computed from the County Business Pattern, see Data Appendix below), we infer a growth in the non-manufacturing sector’s TFP of 3.1%. We use the County Business Pattern 2007 to also compute the share of each county’s manufacturing employment over total employment. Figure 19 shows a map of these shares across the United States.

We first show the consequences of a spatially correlated shock to manufacturing. We compute the equilibrium change in employment and residents in a single counterfactual exercise where each county’s productivity is changed by 6.1% times the share of manufacturing employment in that county: hence, the spatial correlation in manufacturing shares induces a spatial correlation in productivity shocks. Figure 20 shows the resulting distribution of elasticities of employment and residents.

Figure 21 shows an analogous exercise for a shock to the non-manufacturing sector. Finally, Figure 22 shows the same elasticities when both sectors are shocked: in this case, each county’s shock is a weighted average of the national increase in TFP in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, where the weights are the corresponding employment shares in the county.
A.8.3 Standardized Regression on Employment Elasticities

Figure 19: U.S. counties’ share of employment in manufacturing, 2007.

Figure 20: Kernel density for the distribution of employment and residents elasticities in response to a spatially correlated productivity shock in the manufacturing sector

B Data processing and details on figures and tables

B.1 Data sources and definition

In what follows we list the sources and the variable definitions that we use. We consider them understood in the following section on data processing.

Earnings by Place of Work. This data is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) website,
Figure 21: Kernel density for the distribution of employment and residents elasticities in response to a spatially correlated productivity shock in the non-manufacturing sector

under Regional Data, Economic Profiles for all U.S. counties. The BEA defines this variable as "the sum of Wages and Salaries, supplements to wages and salaries and proprietors’ income. [...] Proprietor’s income [...] is the current-production income (including income in kind) of sole proprietorships and partnerships and of tax-exempt cooperatives. Corporate directors’ fees are included in proprietors’ income, but the imputed net rental income of owner-occupants of all dwellings is included in rental income of persons. Proprietors’ income excludes dividends and monetary interest received by nonfinancial business and rental incomes received by persons not primarily engaged in the real estate business." The BEA states that earnings by place of work "can be used in the analyses of regional economies as a proxy for the income that is generated from participation in current production". We use the year 2007.

Total Full-Time and Part-Time Employment (Number of Jobs). This data is taken from the BEA website, under Regional Data, Economic Profiles for all U.S. counties. The BEA defines this series as an estimate "of the number of jobs, full-time plus part-time, by place of work. Full-time and part-time jobs are counted at equal weight. Employees, sole proprietors, and active partners are included, but unpaid family workers and volunteers are not included. Proprietors employment consists of the number of sole proprietorships and the number of partners in partnerships. [...] The proprietors employment portion of the series [...] is more nearly by place of residence because, for nonfarm sole proprietorships, the estimates are based on IRS tax data that reflect the address from which the proprietor’s individual tax
Figure 22: Kernel density for the distribution of employment and residents elasticities in response to a spatially correlated shock in the both sectors

return is filed, which is usually the proprietor’s residence. The nonfarm partnership portion of the proprietors employment series reflects the tax-filing address of the partnership, which may be either the residence of one of the partners or the business address of the partnership.” We use the year 2007.

**County-to-County Worker Flows.** This data contains county-level tabulations of the workforce "residence-to-workplace" commuting flows from the American Community Survey (ACS) 2006-2010 5-year file. The ACS asks respondents in the workforce about their principal workplace location during the reference week. People who worked at more than one location are asked to report the location at which they worked the greatest number of hours. We use data for all the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

**County Land Area, County Centroids.** This data comes from the 2010 Census Gazetteer Files. When we need to aggregate counties (see below), the land area is the total land area of the aggregated counties, and the centroid of the new county is computed using spatial analysis software.

**County Median Housing Values.** This data reports the county’s median value of owner-occupied housing units from the American Community Survey 2009-2013 5-year file.

**Commodity Flows among CFS Area.** We use the 2007 Origin-Destination Files of the Commodity Flow Survey for internal trade flows of all merchandise among the 123 Commodity Flow Survey areas in the United States.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Elasticity of Employment</th>
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<tr>
<td>(\log L_{Mn})</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\log w_n)</td>
<td>-0.126**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\log H_n)</td>
<td>-0.621**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\log L_{M-\bar{w}})</td>
<td>0.429**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\bar{w}_{-n})</td>
<td>0.090**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\lambda_{nn})</td>
<td>-0.945**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sum_{r\in N} (1 - \lambda_{rn}) \vartheta_{rn})</td>
<td>1.462**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\vartheta_{nn} \left( \frac{\lambda_{wx}}{\lambda_{wx} - \lambda_{Mn}} \right))</td>
<td>0.487**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\frac{\partial \vartheta_{wx}}{\partial \lambda_{wx}} \frac{\Lambda_{wx}}{\lambda_{wx}} \cdot \sum_{r\in N} (1 - \lambda_{rn}) \vartheta_{rn})</td>
<td>0.544**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\frac{\partial \vartheta_{wx}}{\partial \lambda_{wx}} \frac{\Lambda_{wx}}{\lambda_{wx}} \cdot \vartheta_{nn} \left( \frac{\lambda_{wx}}{\lambda_{wx} - \lambda_{Mn}} \right))</td>
<td>-0.428**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>3,111</td>
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</table>

In this table, \(L_{M-\bar{w}}\) is the total employment in all neighbors whose centroid is no more than 120 km away; \(\bar{w}_{-n}\) is the weighted average of their workplace wage. All variables are standardized. * \(p < 0.05\); ** \(p < 0.01\).

Table 4: Explaining the general equilibrium local employment elasticities to a 5 percent productivity shock

**Share of counties’ manufacturing employment.** We use the County Business Pattern file for the year 2007. We use the information on total employment, and employment in manufacturing only. For some counties, employment is suppressed to preserve non-disclosure of individual information, and employment is only reported as a range. In those cases, we proceed as follow. We first use the information on the firm-size distribution, reported for all cases, to narrow the plausible employment range in the cell. We run these regressions separately for employment in manufacturing and total employment. We then use this estimated relation to predict the employment level where the data only reports information on the firm size-distribution. Whenever the predicted employment lies outside the range identified above, we use the employment at the relevant corner of the range.
B.2 Initial data processing

We start by assigning to each workplace county in the County-to-County Worker Flows data, information on the Earnings by Place of Work and the Number of Jobs. Note that the commuting data contains 3,143 counties while the BEA data contains 3,111 counties. This happens because, for example, some independent cities in Virginia for which we have separate data on commuting are included in the surrounding county in the BEA data. We make the two sources consistent by aggregating the relevant commuting flows by origin-destination, and so we always work with 3,111 counties.

The ACS data reports some unrealistically long commutes, which arise for example for itinerant professions. We call these flows "business trips" and we remove them as follow. We measure the distance between counties as the distance between their centroids computed using the Haversine formula. We start by assuming that no commute can be longer than 120km: hence, flows with distances longer than 120km are assumed to only be business trips, while flows with distances less than or equal to 120km are a mix business trips and actual commuting. We choose the 120km threshold based on a change in slope of the relationship between log commuters and log distance at this distance threshold. To split total travellers into commuters and business travellers, we write the identity $\tilde{\lambda}_{ij} = \psi_{ij}^B \tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^B$, where $\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}$ is total travellers, $\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^B$ is business travellers, $\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^C$ is commuters, and $\psi_{ij}$ is defined as an identity as the ratio of total travellers to business travellers:

$$\psi_{ij} = \frac{\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^C + \tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^B}{\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^B}.$$

We assume that business travel follows the gravity equation $\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^B = S_i M_j \text{dist}_{ij}^B u_{ij}$, where $S_i$ is a residence fixed effect, $M_j$ is a workplace fixed effect, $\text{dist}_{ij}$ is bilateral distance, and $u_{ij}$ is a stochastic error. We assume that $\psi_{ij}$ takes the following form:

$$\psi_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{dist}_{ij} > \bar{d} \\ \gamma \text{dist}_{ij}^C & \text{dist}_{ij} \leq \bar{d} \end{cases},$$

where we expect $\gamma > 1$ and $\delta_C < 0$. Therefore we have the following gravity equation for total travellers:

$$\ln \tilde{\lambda}_{ij} = \ln S_i + \ln M_j + \gamma \mathbb{I}_{ij} + (\delta_B + \delta_C \mathbb{I}_{ij}) \ln \text{dist}_{ij} + u_{ij}, \quad (105)$$

where $\mathbb{I}_{ij}$ is an indicator variable that is one if $\text{dist}_{ij} \leq \bar{d}$ and zero otherwise. Estimating the above equation for total travellers, we can generate the predicted share of commuters as:

$$\hat{s}_{ij}^C = 1 - \frac{\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^B}{\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}} = 1 - \frac{S_i M_j \text{dist}_{ij}^B}{\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}},$$

where $\tilde{\lambda}_{ij} = \exp \left( \ln \tilde{\lambda}_{ij} \right)$ are the fitted values from gravity (105). Note that this predicted share satisfies the requirements that (a) commuters are zero beyond the threshold $\bar{d}$, (b) the predicted share of commuters always lies in between zero and one, (c) commuters, business travellers and total travellers all satisfy gravity. Note also that since the regression cannot be run on flows internal to a county $\tilde{\lambda}_{ii}$, we set
\( s_{ij}^C = 1 \) (i.e., flows of agents who live and work in the same county are assumed to contain no business trips). Therefore we can construct commuting flows as:
\[
\tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^C = s_{ij}^C \tilde{\lambda}_{ij}.
\]
The total business trips originating from residence \( i \) are then \( \sum_j \left(1 - s_{ij}^C\right) \tilde{\lambda}_{ij} \). For any residence \( i \), we reimpute these business trips across destinations \( j \) in proportion to the estimated workplace composition of the residence \( i \), \( \tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^C / \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_{ij}^C \). The total employment (and average wage) in a county in the initial equilibrium is taken from the BEA, while total residents (and average residential income) in a county are reconstructed using the estimated residence composition of each workplace. Table 1, Figure 3, and all the results in the paper are based on these “cleaned” commuting flows and initial equilibrium values.

Whenever necessary, we allow for expenditure imbalances across counties. We compute these imbalances as follows. We start from the CFS trade flows. The total sales of a CFS area anywhere must correspond, in a model with only labor (such as the one in this paper), to total payments to workers employed in the area. We rescale the total sales from a CFS area to the value of the total wage bill from the BEA data.\(^{21}\) For any origin CFS, we keep the destination composition of sales as implied by the CFS bilateral flows. This procedure gives us, for any CFS, total expenditures and total sales consistent with the total labor payments in the economy. We compute the deficit of any CFS area by subtracting total sales from total expenditure. We apportion this deficit across all the counties in the CFS in proportion to the total residential income of the county, as computed above. The total expenditure of the county in the initial equilibrium is always total residential income plus deficit. In any counterfactual equilibrium, the dollar value of the deficit is kept fixed.

### B.3 Further information on figures and tables

For some figures in the paper, the main text does not report some technical details related to data manipulation. We report those details here.

**Table 1.** The table reports statistics on the out-degree distribution (first and third row) and in-degree distribution of the fraction of commuters across counties. Commuting flows are cleaned with the procedure described above. The correspondence between counties and commuting zones is taken from the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture.\(^{22}\)

**Figure 1.** This figure reports a scatterplot of the log trade flows among CFS areas against log distance between these areas, after removing origin and destination fixed effects. The distance between CFS areas is the average distance travelled by shipments, computed dividing the total ton-miles travelled by the total tons shipped, as reported in the CFS data. Whenever this distance cannot be computed (in about 1/3 of the flows) we supplement it with an estimated distance as follows. We compute the centroids of CFS areas using the Freight Analysis Framework Regions shape-files provided by the Bureau

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\(^{21}\)For this step, we need a correspondence between CFS areas and counties that is provided by the Census at [http://www.census.gov/econ/census/help/geography/cfs_areas.html](http://www.census.gov/econ/census/help/geography/cfs_areas.html).

of Transportation Statistics\textsuperscript{23} and bilateral distances among these centroids using the Haversine formula. We then regress the actual distance shipped on these centroid-based distances, in logs, and find strong predictive power (slope of 1.012, $R^2 = 0.95$). We use the predicted distances from this regression for flows where the average distance shipped cannot be computed. If we restrict our sample to only flows for which the distance can be computed directly, we find a slope of -1.23, and $R^2$ of 0.82 (similar to the ones used in the main text of -1.29 and 0.83, respectively).

**Figure 2.** This figure reports a scatterplot of expenditure shares across CFS areas in the data and the model-implied expenditure shares after recovering the productivity of each county, with the procedure described in the main text. Both the estimated productivities and the implied trade shares are calculated using the expenditure of a county allowing for deficits computed as above.

**Figure 3.** This figure reports a scatterplot of log commuting flows against log distance between county’s centroids after removing origin and destination fixed effects. The commuting flows used in the regression are cleaned of the business trips as described above.

**Figure 4.** This figure reports a scatterplot of log of land price, as computed from the model, and the County Median Housing Value from the ACS. To compute the price of land in the model we use residents’ expenditure allowing for trade deficits. For counties that are aggregated at the BEA level (see above), we compute the population weighted average of the median values.

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