Schooling, Nation Building and Industrialization: A Gellnerian Approach

Esther Hauk and Javier Ortega
Abstract
We model a two-region country where value is created through bilateral production between masses and elites (bourgeois and landowners). Industrialization requires the elites to finance schools and the masses to attend them. Schooling raises productivity, particularly for matches between masses and bourgeois. At the same time, only country-wide education ("unified schooling") renders the masses mobile across regions. Alternatively, schools can be implemented in one region alone ("regional education") or the regionally dominant group can choose to implement schooling in its own region but refuse to share the costs/proceeds within the wider country-level group (secession). We show that schools are more likely to be set-up when the bourgeoisie dominates, but that this is not necessarily socially efficient. Unified schooling is always chosen if the identity of the dominant elite at the regional and country level is the same and/or the industrialization shock is sufficiently high. If instead the bourgeoisie is dominant in one region and landowners are dominant countrywise, the bourgeoisie of that region may promote the secession of the region, and this can be socially efficient. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence for 19th century France and Spain.

Key words: Nation-building, education, industrialization
JEL codes: D02; I2; N00; O14

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1 Introduction

Political scientists, historians, sociologists and anthropologists have extensively discussed the issue of the historical genesis of nations and nationalism (see e.g. Smith, 2000, for a summary of the debate). While “perennialists” argue that national identities have existed for a long period of time (see e.g. Armstrong, 1982, or Hastings, 1997), “modernists” situate the birth of nations and nationalism during industrialization.

In particular, Gellner (1964, 1983) has been very influential in arguing that both Nations and Nationalism result from the implementation of mass educational systems to get workers ready for industrialization. As stated by Breuilly (2006, p. xxxiv), “Gellner insisted that industrialization required or entailed cultural homogenization based on literacy in a standardized vernacular language conveyed by means of state supported mass education”. According to Gellner, industrialization requires a diffuse, universal culture, linking the inhabitants of a territory to the state. Because workers through schooling acquire a common national identity that enables them to communicate with each other, they also become mobile. In addition, as mass education is expensive, Gellner (1983) argues that the minimum size for a viable modern political unit is determined by the ability to finance such an educational system. More recently, Breuilly (1993) has criticized Gellner’s theory and other theories of nationalism because they failed to stress that nationalism is about power and state control, and has argued that “the central task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power” (Breuilly, 1993, p. 1). In addition, Roeder (2007) and Kronesberg and Wimmer (2012) argue that nation building should be understood as resulting from the interaction between central and peripheral elites.\(^1\)

We contribute to the literature by developing a theoretical model that relates nation building, schooling and industrialization à la Gellner, and aims at the same time at presenting nation-building as resulting from the interaction of social groups holding power.

To this purpose, we model a two-region economy populated by masses and by two elite groups (landowners and bourgeoisie, as in Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2009). Regions are heterogeneous in the size of their bourgeoisie. Political power is in the hands of one of the elite groups, referred to as the “dominant group”, which is not necessarily the same at the regional and at the country level. Value is created through bilateral production between the

\(^{1}\)The importance of the power interaction among groups in the genesis of institutions has been extensively studied in the literature, see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).
members of the elites and the members of the masses. Initially, the country is a rural society, and production takes place only within each region.

The economy is hit by a productivity shock representing an industrialization opportunity which can raise the productivity of the masses, and does so to a larger extent in the matches with bourgeois than with landowners.\footnote{The same hypothesis is made in Galor et al. (2009). Empirically, Lindert (2004) refers to examples of resistance of landlords to education in 19th century England and Germany, and Ager (2013) shows that counties with richer planters before the Civil War invested less in human capital and were less productive in the 20th century.} In order to be more productive, mass members need however to attend school.\footnote{There is a debate on whether industrialisation caused mass schooling or the other way round. What matters for our model is that these phenomena go hand in hand. Becker, Hornung and Woesmann (2011) reveal the importance of formal education for the technological catch-up of Prussia. Galor and Moav (2006) give historical evidence for the industrial base for education reforms in the 19th century and reveals the importance of schooling for at least the second phase of the industrial revolution. At the same time, Allen (2003) argues that the impact of literacy on growth was limited and Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2014) show that knowledge of the elites (and not literacy) predicts growth in France between 1750 and 1850. For an alternative hypothesis for the implementation of mass education systems based on military rivalry see Aghion, Jaravel, Persson, and Rouzet (2013).} In addition, schooling is used to create a common identity.\footnote{For a formal model of schooling as an instrument for language uniformisation, see Ortega and Tangerä (2008).} The set-up of the schooling system can only be financed by the elites, but mass members decide whether to attend school or not.

The politically dominant elite group decides if and how to implement schooling and how the costs of schooling are shared within the elite. In particular, the politically dominant country-level elite can choose to implement schooling in one region only (“regional education”) in which case only within-region production is possible. Alternatively, it can choose to implement schools in both regions (“unified schooling”), which creates a common national identity and makes it possible for the masses of one region to produce with the other region’s bourgeois. Finally, we consider the possibility that the dominant region-level elite implements schooling in its own region but refuses to share the associated costs and benefits within the wider country-level group (“secession”).

Under all three systems, equilibrium education is shown to be weakly higher when the bourgeoisie dominates, which simply stems from the higher payoffs of bourgeois relative to landowners.

However, we next show that the identity of the dominant group does not matter instead in the choice of educational system whenever the dominant
group is the same at the country and regional level. Indeed, in that case, unified schooling is always chosen given its assumed technological advantage. Specifically, a dominant bourgeoisie prefers this system because it can directly benefit from the increase in the pool of matches, while dominant landowners also favor it because the bourgeois are willing to pay a larger share of the cost under this system.

However, despite this technological advantage, unified schooling can still be dominated by secession if the dominant elite is not the same regionally and countrywide. In particular, if the bourgeoisie is regionally-dominant and countrywide dominated, the size of the cake is larger for them under unified schooling but at the same time landowners can impose a large share of the costs on them. In that case, the bourgeoisie chooses secession for intermediate values of the shock: indeed, if the shock is small enough, no schooling is implemented under secession, and, in the other extreme, if the shock is large, the size-of-the-cake effect under unified schooling always dominates.

As for welfare, unified schooling leads to underprovision of education whenever the gains from setting up schools for the dominant group are small relative to the gains for the masses, and particularly so when landowners are dominant, as they benefit less from education than the bourgeois. Interestingly, however, overeducation can also arise if the bourgeoisie is dominant, as this group chooses in some cases to fully finance education even if this makes the landowners worse-off. Across systems, while a social planner always prefers unified schooling over secession whenever implementing education is socially optimal, secession can be socially optimal if landowners choose not to implement schooling under the unified system.

We also discuss other forms of heterogeneity across regions and their effects on nation building and secession. Our results are robust to differences in sizes across the landowners and masses. However, if productivity shocks are unequally distributed across regions - a case that seems to be historically relevant - secession becomes more likely. Transfers from the more advanced region to the less advanced region are too costly to offset the savings in educational costs.

Finally, we show that our model can be used to interpret the divergent evolution of France and Spain in the 19th century. Indeed, despite their common features in terms of income levels and language heterogeneity at the beginning of the 19th century, France was successful in its joint nation building/industrialization process through the implementation of a big investment in education. Instead, both industrialization and nation-building remained weak in Spain, and peripheral nationalisms developed in Catalonia and the Basque Country. As predicted by our model, the divergent evolution
of these two countries could be related to the different balance of power between landowners and bourgeoisie at the regional and country level: while in France the bourgeoisie was dominant both in the industrializing regions and at the country level, in Spain the Catalan bourgeoisie was unable to have a lot of influence in Spanish politics due to the dominance of the landowning elites at the country level.

This paper relates to a growing literature that uses modelling and econometric techniques to study the origin of nations or nation-states. Specifically, Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008) and Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) underline the importance of education for nation-building. Alternative mechanisms proposed in the literature as driving forces for nation-building include the consolidation of a previously existing “segment-state” (Roeder, 2007), political centralization prior to modernization (Kroneberg and Wimmer, 2012), or the homogenization of preferences on public goods (Alesina and Reich, 2013). Empirically, Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) argues that the origin of nation-states lie on local and regional factors.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the basic model and describe when regional and unified schooling are implementable. In turn, these two systems are compared in Section 3. After introducing secession as a possible outcome in Section 4, Section 5 studies when secession will be chosen over unified schooling. Next, we study welfare (Section 6) and extend the model to alternative forms of heterogeneity (Section 7). Finally, in section 8 we confront the predictions of our model with the cases of 19th century France and Spain. Most proofs are relegated to the appendix.

2 The Model

We study a country with two regions $i = 1, 2$. In each region, there are three social groups, namely the masses $M = M_1 + M_2$ and the elite which is split into the landowners $N = N_1 + N_2$ and the bourgeoisie $B = B_1 + B_2$. Political power is in the hands of one of the elite groups, which is referred to as the “dominant” group. The dominant group holds power for historical reasons and is not necessarily the majority elite group. Moreover, while there is one dominant group at the country level, this group is not necessarily dominant in both regions. Let $M > N + B$. We normalize the total size of the elite in the country to $N + B = 1$. For simplicity, we assume that in both regions both the landowners and the masses have the same size, i.e. $N_1 = N_2 = \frac{N}{2}$ and $M_1 = M_2 = \frac{M}{2}$. Instead, one region is characterised by
a larger bourgeoisie than the other, and this region is assumed to be region 1, without loss of generality (i.e., $B_1 > B_2$).

Value is created through bilateral production between members of the elites and members of the masses. Initially, the country is a "rural" society. Production takes place only within each region and the surplus from each match is normalized to 1. The bargaining power of the masses is given by $\beta$, which simply implies in our framework that a member of the masses who is matched to a member of the elite keeps $\beta$ of the surplus generated from the match.

This rural society is now hit by a productivity shock representing the industrial revolution. If the new technology is implemented, the match productivity in the agrarian sector (landowner-masses) increases to $1 + \sigma$ while the match productivity in the industrial sector representing a match between a bourgeois and the masses increases to $1 + \mu \sigma$ where $\mu > 1$. However, the increase in productivity only occurs if the member of the masses attends school. Otherwise, the productivity of the match remains equal to 1. In other words, the implementation of the new technology requires schooling of the masses.

The set-up of a schooling system can only be financed by the elites, but the masses decide whether to attend school or not.

There are two periods in our model: in the first period the productivity shock is observed and the schooling decision is made. If schooling is implemented, production takes place only in the second period. If schooling is not implemented, production takes place in both periods but the match productivity stays equal to one. All agents have a discount factor of $\delta$.

### 2.1 Payoffs if schools are not implemented

Let $\Psi_j$ ($j = B, N, M_i$) denote the payoff for group $j$ members when schooling is not implemented. In this case, any member of the elite produces an output of 1 with each of the $M/2$ members of the masses living in his region, and gets a proportion $1 - \beta$ of the output. As a result, the payoff of a landowner is the same as that of a bourgeois and is given by

$$\Psi_N = \Psi_B = (1 - \beta)(1 + \delta)\frac{M}{2}. \quad (1)$$

For a member of the masses in region $i$, the pay-off is:

$$\Psi_{M_i} = (1 + \delta)\beta \left(\frac{N}{2} + B_i\right) \quad (2)$$
i.e. the member of the masses receives β from each match with one of
the N/2 landowners in the region as well as from each match with the Bi
bourgeois living in region i.

2.2 Schools

The dominant group chooses whether or not schooling is implemented and
how to split the schooling costs among the elite. We assume that the dom-
ninant group cannot force the dominated group to pay for schooling if with
this payment the dominated group would be made worse-off than under no
schooling. This implies that the maximum schooling costs that can be im-
posed on the dominated elite group leave this group indifferent between the
implementation of schooling and the absence of schools.

We also assume that each of the elite groups acts as a single group at
the country level, i.e. each group equally shares across regions the benefits
from production and the costs from schooling.

Schools can be implemented either in both regions, or in one region only.
The implementation of schools in both regions creates a common identity
across regions, which enables the masses of each region to produce with
the bourgeois from both regions. This is referred to as nation building or
a "unified" schooling system, and denoted by U. Instead, if schooling is
implemented only in one region, no common identity is created, and thus
the masses of each region can only produce with the bourgeois of the same
region. This is referred to as a "regional" schooling system, and denoted
by Ri (i = 1, 2). In both cases, the masses can only produce with the
landowners of their region of origin.

2.2.1 Payoffs from schooling

Let Πj denote the payoffs from schooling for group j = B, N, M, under
organizational system k = U, Ri. Similarly, denote by Ik the cost of setting
up schooling system k for a member of the elite group e = N, B. We can
next calculate the benefits from schooling for each group under the different
systems.

When attending school in a unified system, any member of the masses
foregoes production in the first period and appropriates in the second period
(discounted by δ) a fraction β of the amount 1 + σ produced with each of the
N/2 landowners in his region and the same fraction of the amount 1 + μσ
produced with each of the \( B \) bourgeois in the country:

\[
\Pi^U_{M} = \beta \delta \left( (1 + \sigma) \frac{N}{2} + (1 + \mu \sigma) B \right) \quad i = 1, 2.
\]  

(3)

Similarly, any bourgeois pays \( I^U_B \) schooling set-up costs, and appropriates a fraction \( 1 - \beta \) of the amount \( 1 + \mu \sigma \) produced with the \( M \) members of the mass in period 2, i.e.,

\[
\Pi^U_B = -I^U_B + (1 - \beta)(1 + \mu \sigma)\delta M,
\]  

(4)

while the landowner’s payoff depends on its own investment \( I^U_N \) and is associated to a lower match productivity \( 1 + \sigma \) and to a smaller pool of mass members than for the bourgeois, namely the \( M/2 \) mass members living in the landowner’s region:

\[
\Pi^U_N = -I^U_N + (1 - \beta)(1 + \sigma)\delta \frac{M}{2}.
\]  

(5)

Under region-\( i \) schooling, the payoff of any member of the masses in region \( i \) is

\[
\Pi^{R_i}_{M_i} = \beta \delta \left( (1 + \sigma) \frac{N}{2} + (1 + \mu \sigma) B_i \right) \quad i = 1, 2.
\]  

(6)

where the only difference with (3) is that only within region-\( i \) production is possible.

In turn, each of the \( B_i \) region-\( i \) bourgeois gets \( (1 - \beta)(1 + \mu \sigma) \) in the second period with each of the \( M/2 \) educated members of the masses in that region, while each of the \( B_{-i} \) bourgeois in region \( -i \) gets \( (1 + \delta) \) with the \( M/2 \) uneducated masses of region \( -i \). Then, given cross-subsidization across regions within the countrywide bourgeoisie, the payoff of a bourgeois is given by the weighted average of these two terms minus the setting-up cost \( I^R_{B_i} \), i.e.

\[
\Pi^{R_i}_{B_i} = -I^R_{B_i} + (1 - \beta)(\delta(1 + \mu \sigma)B_i + (1 + \delta)B_{-i}) \frac{M}{2B} \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2.
\]  

(7)

Finally, each of the \( N/2 \) region-\( i \) landowners gets \( \delta(1 - \beta)(1 + \sigma) \) with each of the \( M/2 \) educated masses of that region, while each of the \( N/2 \) landowners in region \( -i \) gets \( (1 + \delta)(1 - \beta) \) with each of the \( M/2 \) uneducated masses of region \( -i \), which leads to the following payoff for each landowner

\[
\Pi^{R_i}_{N_i} = -I^R_{N_i} + (1 - \beta)(\delta \sigma + 1 + 2 \delta) \frac{M}{4} \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2.
\]  

(8)
2.3 Education thresholds for the elites

In this subsection we study the minimum size of the productivity shock that makes the elite willing to provide schooling under the assumption that the masses have to get schooled when schools are built.\(^5\)

The minimum productivity shock that makes the elite indifferent between implementing uniform schools or not is such that \(\Psi_e = \Pi^U_e\) with \(e = N, B\). From (1), (4), and (5), the thresholds for the bourgeoisie and the landowners are:

\[
\sigma^U_B = \frac{I^U_B + (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)M}{\mu M (1 - \beta) \delta} \quad (9)
\]
\[
\sigma^U_N = \frac{2I^U_N + (1 - \beta)M}{(1 - \beta) \delta M} \quad (10)
\]

Similarly, from (1), (7), and (8), the thresholds under region-\(i\) schooling are

\[
\sigma^R_i = \frac{2R_i B_i I^R_i + (1 - \beta)M}{(1 - \beta) \delta \mu M} \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2 \quad (11)
\]
\[
\sigma^R_i = \frac{4R_i N_i I^R_i + (1 - \beta)M}{\delta (1 - \beta) M} \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2 \quad (12)
\]

All these thresholds depend on how much the elite has to pay for setting up the schools. We assume that the cost of each schooling system is proportional to the number of students attending schools and for expositional purposes set marginal schooling costs equal to 1.

The dominant elite group \(e\) determines how the costs of education are split within the elite under education system \(k\). However, the dominant group \(e\) cannot oblige the dominated group \(-e\) to pay for education if this payment makes the dominated group worse-off than under no schooling. In other words, the dominant group will always try to make the dominant group pay the maximum amount possible for education. When the dominant group chooses to implement schooling, the following cases are possible:

1. Education is sufficiently beneficial for the dominated group to be willing to pay the entire cost of education. In that case, the dominant group gets education for free.

\(^5\)If the masses have a choice whether or not to get schooled, we will additionally get a minimum productivity shock that makes the masses willing to get schooled. In this case schooling is implemented only if the productivity shock lies above the maximum of the minimum thresholds by the masses and the elites.
2. The dominant group has to cofinance education and pay $\hat{I}_e^k$ after forcing the dominated group to pay the maximum acceptable amount $\tilde{I}_e^k$, leaving the dominated group indifferent between schooling and no schooling.

3. The dominated group is unwilling to pay anything for education but the dominant group is better-off with education even if it pays all the cost.

Which cases will result clearly depends on the productivity shocks. The higher these shocks, the higher the potential benefits from schooling and the higher the potential willingness to pay for schooling by the dominated group. The following cutoffs will be relevant for the analysis:

**Notation 1** We denote by

- $\tilde{\sigma}_e^k$ the minimum productivity shock making elite group $e$ willing to pay the entire cost of schooling.
- $\tilde{\sigma}_e^k$ the minimum productivity shock making elite group $e$ willing to cofinance education paying $\hat{I}_e^k$ when group $-e$ is paying its maximum willingness $\tilde{I}_e^k$.
- $\sigma_e^k$ the minimum productivity shock making elite group $e$ willing to implement education without paying.

The exact values for these shocks and payments under the different educational systems can be found in Table 1 in Appendix A. Lemma 1 shows that two different rankings of the thresholds are possible depending on the attractiveness of schooling for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners.

**Lemma 1** For $k = U, R_i$,

1. $\sigma_B^k < \sigma_N^k < \tilde{\sigma}_B^k = \tilde{\sigma}_N^k < \sigma_B^k, \sigma_N^k$ if $2 > H^k$
2. $\sigma_B^k < \sigma_B^k < \sigma_N^k < \tilde{\sigma}_N^k, \tilde{\sigma}_B^k$ if $2 < H^k$

where $H^k$ is given by

$$H_U^k = (1 - \beta)B(2\mu - 1 + \delta)$$  (13)
$$H_{R_i}^k = 2(1 - \beta)(\mu - 1)B_i$$  (14)
Proof. By simple algebra. ■

For a given investment in education, the gain from schooling for the bourgeoisie is larger than for the landowners because the bourgeoisie experiences a larger productivity increase than landowners and because it is the only group that might gain production partners with schooling. This explains why $\sigma_B^k < \sigma_N^k$ always holds.

The attractiveness of schooling for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners is particularly high when (i) $\mu$ is very high, i.e. the bourgeoisie has a big productivity advantage over landowners, (ii) the agents discount the future to a small extent, as the future gains for schooling are higher for the bourgeoisie than for the landowners, and (iii) the size of the bourgeoisie is large, as the per capita burden from education for a bourgeois is reduced. For this reason, when $H^k > 2$ is satisfied, the thresholds of the landowners are systematically larger than the thresholds of the bourgeoisie, and, in particular, $\sigma_B^k < \sigma_N^k$ holds, i.e. a bourgeoisie bearing the full cost of education is more willing to set up schools than a landowner that does not have to pay any cost. Instead, for $H^k < 2$, the attractiveness of education is more similar for both groups, and $\sigma_B^k > \sigma_N^k$. In this case the threshold for paying fully for education of the bourgeoisie $\sigma_B^k$ might be bigger than that of the landowners $\sigma_N^k$, despite the extra gains from schooling for the bourgeoisie. This happens in particular if the bourgeoisie is small relative to the landowners, as in that case the per bourgeois cost of education is high.

Within groups, the payoff from schooling for a given elite group in a given schooling system $k$ is decreasing in the amount paid by the group.

2.4 Provision of education by the elite

We are now in a position to represent the decision on education provision by the elite under the assumption that the masses have to follow suit\(^6\) in a given organizational form $k$.\(^7\)

\(^6\)Whether or not the masses want to follow suit will be analyzed in Subsection 2.5.

\(^7\)We will see later on that this analysis also applies to secession (Section 4)
2.4.1 Bourgeoisie dominant

Figure 1 represents the decision on education provision by the elites when the bourgeoisie is dominant and $H^k < 2$. For $\sigma > \sigma_N^k$, the landowners are willing to pay the full cost of education, and thus the bourgeoisie puts the full burden on them. For $\sigma_N^k = \sigma_B^k < \sigma < \sigma_N^k$, the bourgeoisie can only impose part of the investment on the landowners, namely $T_N^k \geq 0$ and has to finance the rest of the payment $\tilde{T}_B^k$. Instead, for $\sigma < \sigma_N^k = \sigma_B^k$, education is not provided by the elites.

In turn, Figure 2 represents the outcome for $H^k > 2$, a situation in which the payoffs from education for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners are particularly high. In this case, the elite is willing to provide education if and only if $\sigma > \sigma_B^k$. The main difference with the preceding case is that for $\sigma_B^k < \sigma < \sigma_N^k$, the bourgeoisie is willing to provide education even if it has
the bear the full burden. In addition, in this area, the landowners become actually worse-off after the implementation of education.

2.4.2 Landowners dominant

Figure 3 represents the case where the landowners are dominant and $H^k < 2$. In this case, the elite is willing to provide education if and only if $\sigma > \sigma_N^k$. This provision is fully financed by the bourgeoisie if $\sigma > \sigma_B^k$ and partially financed by each group otherwise $(\bar{I}_N^k, \bar{I}_B^k)$.
For $H^k > 2$, education is provided if and only if $\sigma > \alpha_{\text{N}}^k$ and always fully funded by the bourgeoisie.
A simple look at the figures reveals that for $H^k < 2$ the elite agrees when to provide education (Figures 1 and 3). However, for $H^k > 2$ (Figures 2 and 4), the bourgeoisie is willing to fully finance education when the landowners do not even want education ($\sigma_B^k < \sigma_N^k$), hence the bourgeoisie will provide education earlier than the landowners if the masses had to follow suit. We next study whether the masses want to follow suit and get schooled voluntarily.

### 2.5 School attendance by the masses

The masses of region $i$ are willing to get educated whenever the payoffs from schooling are higher than the payoffs from no-schooling, i.e. $\Pi_M^i \geq \Psi_M^i$. This leads to a minimum threshold on the size of the productivity shock for the masses to be willing to get educated. Equalizing (2) and (3), the threshold for unified schooling is:

$$
\sigma_{M_i}^U = \frac{1}{\delta} - \frac{2(\mu B - B_i + \delta B_{-i})}{\delta (N + 2\mu B)} \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2.
$$

Similarly, from (2) and (6), the threshold for region-$i$ schooling is:
Due to the increased match pool, the masses from the any given region are willing to get schooled earlier under unified than under regional schooling ($\sigma_{M_i}^{R_i} > \sigma_{M_i}^{U_i}$ for $i = 1, 2$).

Even under the same system the masses of the two regions have a different willingness to get schooled. Specifically, the masses of the region with a larger bourgeoisie have a higher productivity cutoff under unified schooling and instead a lower cutoff under regional schooling ($\sigma_{M_1}^{U_1} > \sigma_{M_2}^{U_2} \iff \sigma_{M_1}^{R_1} < \sigma_{M_2}^{R_2} \iff B_1 > B_2$). The underlying intuition is as follows. Under unified schooling, the masses can get matched to the bourgeoisie of both regions, hence the increase in the match pool is larger for the masses belonging to the region with a smaller bourgeoisie, which explains why they are willing to get schooled sooner. Instead, under regional schooling, the match pool is unchanged after education and thus the productivity gain stemming from schooling is larger for those masses which have already access to a larger bourgeoisie.

Since unified schooling requires the masses of both regions to be willing to get educated, the cutoff of the masses that are less willing to get schooled, namely the masses of region 1, $\sigma_{M_1}^{U_1}$ determines when unified schooling is possible for the masses. In addition, given that $\sigma_{M_1}^{U_1} < \sigma_{M_2}^{R_2}$, regional education of the masses is never possible before unified schooling.

2.6 Equilibrium education

Lemma 2 shows that the incentives of the masses are irrelevant for the implementation of schooling:

**Lemma 2** Education always pays off for the masses when it does for the elite.

**Proof.** See appendix B.

Therefore, the incentives of the elites alone determine the implementation of schooling.

**Proposition 1** For $H^k < 2$ schooling is implemented for $\sigma > \sigma_{k}^{L}$ independently of the identity of the dominant group. For $H^k > 2$ schooling is implemented earlier (specifically, for $\sigma > \sigma_{B}^{L}$) when the bourgeoisie is dominant than when landowners are dominant (implemented for $\sigma > \sigma_{B}^{L}$).

\[
\sigma_{M_i}^{R_i} = \frac{1}{\delta} - \frac{2B_i (\mu - 1)}{\delta (N + 2\mu B_i)} \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2. \tag{16}
\]
For $H^k > 2$ the implementation of schooling depends on the identity of the dominant group when $\sigma_N^k > \sigma > \sigma_B^k$. Landowners do not benefit from schooling and will not implement schools if dominant while the bourgeoisie benefits that much that it is willing to fully finance schools if it is in a position to do so.

So far we have taken the potential educational system as given. However, the dominant elite will not only decide whether or not to choose unified schooling.

3 Unified vs. Region-$i$ education

Under regional education, either region-1 or region-2 might become educated. The thresholds of all groups to get educated are weakly lower under regional education in region 1 than in region 2. Moreover, $H^{B_1} > H^{B_2}$. Therefore

Lemma 3 The dominant elite always prefer region−1 schooling to region−2 schooling.

Proof. See appendix C. ■

The intuition for this is simple: as the size of the nobility is the same in both regions, the productivity gains are larger when the masses with the larger bourgeoisie get educated. The bourgeoisie prefers this option as the return will be larger and dominant landowners because they will be able to extract a larger payment from the bourgeois.

However unified schooling is even better: the cost-savings by sending only one region to school do not outweigh the benefits from higher productivity in both regions and the increased match pool, as shown in the following lemma:

Lemma 4 The dominant elite always prefers unified schooling to region−$i$ schooling.

Proof. See appendix C. ■

It is easy to see that regional schooling in both regions is also dominated by unified schooling. Schooling both regions costs the same than unified schooling, but there is no regional mobility and hence the bourgeoisie loses out on the increased match pool across regions.
4 Secession

So far, we have assumed the existence of inter-regional transfers within elite groups leading to a perfect equalization of payoffs across regions within elite groups. In this section, we study whether the region-\(i\) dominant elite has actually incentives to avoid such redistribution by accompanying the implementation of schooling in region \(i\) by the political secession of this region. We assume that after region-\(i\) secession, no cross-border production can take place.

Since there are no interregional matches after secession, the cutoffs for the masses to be willing to go to school under region-\(i\) secession (denoted by \(S_i\)) are the same than under regional education, i.e. \(\sigma_{S_i}^{R_1} = \sigma_{M_1}^{R_1} < \sigma_{S_2}^{M_2} = \sigma_{M_2}^{R_2}\). Instead, the payoff of region-\(i\) bourgeoisie associated to implementing schooling through secession are:

\[
\Pi_{B_i}^{S_i} = -I_{B_i}^{S_i} + \delta(1 - \beta)(1 + \mu \sigma)\frac{M}{2}
\]  

i.e., the region-\(i\)-bourgeoisie invests \(I_{B_i}^{S_i}\) in the set-up of schools in its region and gets the proceeds from the future high-productivity matches with region-\(i\) masses. Similarly, the payoff from region-\(i\) secession for region-\(i\) landowners is:

\[
\Pi_{N_i}^{S_i} = -I_{N_i}^{S_i} + \delta(1 - \beta)(1 + \sigma)\frac{M}{2}
\]  

Equalizing (17) and (18) respectively to (1), the productivity thresholds for the implementation of schooling with region-\(i\) secession are:

\[
\sigma_{B_i}^{S_i} = \frac{2I_{B_i}^{S_i}}{\delta \mu(1 - \beta)M} + \frac{1}{\mu \delta}
\]  

\[
\sigma_{N_i}^{S_i} = \frac{2I_{N_i}^{S_i}}{\delta (1 - \beta)M} + \frac{1}{\delta}
\]  

Following the same steps as in section 2.3 and taking into account that educational costs are only paid by the regional elite, Table 1 in appendix A displays the cutoffs for free education, full payment and partial payment and the corresponding educational costs under \(S_i\). It turns out that while educational costs differ, the cutoffs are the same as under regional schooling. Therefore Lemma 1 extends also to \(k = S_i\) with \(H_{S_i} = H_{R_i}\) and again we have two possible regimes depending on the profitability of schooling for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners.
5 Secession versus unified schooling

We next study the choice between secession and unified schooling. As landowners do not benefit by the extra cross-regional matches generated under unified schooling, from (5) and (18), we have that

\[ \Pi_{N_i}^{S_i} \geq \Pi_{N_i}^{U_i} \iff I_{N_i}^{S_i} \leq I_{N_i}^{U_i} \]  

(21)

i.e. landowners will prefer the system with the lowest educational cost. This implies in particular that if they are to fully finance education under both systems, they will be indifferent between the two schooling systems as secession halves the number of mass members to be educated but also the number of landowners financing education, i.e. \( I_{N_i}^{S_i} = \frac{M/2}{N/2} = I_{N_i}^{U_i} = \frac{M}{N} \).

Instead, secession compared to unified schooling restricts the number of matches for the bourgeois, which implies that secession will be preferred by the bourgeois only if it generates a sufficiently large reduction in costs. Note however that, as for landowners, the relevant cost is not the total expenditure in schooling, but the expenditure per member of the bourgeoisie: when going from unified schooling to region-\( i \) secession, the number of bourgeois financing education falls from \( B \) to \( B_i \), which implies that the cost per bourgeois will not fall a lot unless \( B_i \) is very big. Mathematically, from (4) and (17), the condition under which secession is preferred is given by:

\[ \Pi_{B_i}^{S_i} \geq \Pi_{B}^{U} \iff I_{B_i}^{U} - I_{B_i}^{S_i} \geq (1 + \mu \sigma)(1 - \beta)\delta \frac{M}{2} \]  

(22)

Clearly, as the costs of education are crucial in the secession decision and these costs partly depend on the identity of the dominant group, the choice between these two systems is likely to depend on the identity of the dominant group at the country and regional level. Subsections 5.1 and 5.2 study the equilibrium when respectively the bourgeois and landowners are dominant both at the country and regional level, while subsections 5.3 and 5.4 consider in turn the two cases in which the identity of the dominant group at the country and regional level is not the same.

5.1 Bourgeoisie always dominant

Proposition 2 shows that for a bourgeoisie dominant both at the regional and country level, cost saving from secession is never sufficient to offset the associated forgone productive matches.

**Proposition 2** A regionally and countrywide dominant bourgeoisie always prefers unified schooling to secession.
Proof. See Appendix D.1 □

In order to provide intuition for this result, Figure 5 compares for one of the three possible parameter configurations ($2 < H^S_i < H^U$) the payoffs from schooling under unified education (dashed line) and secession (continuous line) for the bourgeois and the landowners. For high enough productivity levels ($\sigma > \sigma^U_N$), the landowners are willing to pay for the entire cost of education under both systems, and thus the bourgeois choose unified schooling as the additional matches under unified schooling can be obtained at no extra cost. In turn, for $\sigma^k_N < \sigma < \sigma^l_N$, the landowners are willing to pay the same amount of cost (per mass member) under both systems, and the rest needs to be paid for by the bourgeois. Then, as unified schooling is characterized by a larger set of matches for the bourgeois, the bourgeois’ payoffs after the payment of these costs is higher under unified schooling. For lower productivity values ($\sigma^l_B < \sigma < \sigma^k_N$), landowners are any more willing to contribute to education as this would make them worse-off, but bourgeois still implement schooling under both systems paying the full cost. Unified schooling is always preferred as the potential saving in terms of set-up cost stemming from secession —occurring only when the seceding region has a large bourgeoisie— is never sufficient to compensate for the loss of matches. Finally, for $\sigma^l_B < \sigma < \sigma^l_B$ schools are set up only under unified schooling, and so the bourgeoisie favours this system.8

8The two other parameter specifications are similar, except that there is no parameter area in which full payment by the bourgeoisie simultaneously arises as an equilibrium under both systems, and there is instead a situation in which partial payment by the bourgeoisie under unified schooling arises at the same time as no schooling under secession.
5.2 Landowners dominant always

As the payoff from schooling to landowners is the same under both systems, dominant landowners will simply choose the system that allows them to transfer a larger share of the cost of schooling to the bourgeoisie. As the bourgeoisie benefits more from schooling under unified education, the bourgeoisie will be willing to pay a larger share of the cost under this system, and landowners will always weakly prefer unified schooling to secession:

**Proposition 3** Regionally and countrywide dominant landowners always weakly prefer unified schooling to secession.

**Proof.** See Appendix D.1. ■

Specifically, for high enough productivity levels, the bourgeoisie will be willing to fully finance education under both systems, in which case landowners are indifferent between them. However, for intermediate productivity lev-
els, full or even partial financing will only be possible under unified schooling, and landowners will choose unified schooling for that reason.

5.3 Landowners are dominant at country level, bourgeoisie is dominant in region $i$

If the landowners are dominant at the country level but the bourgeoisie is dominant in region $i$, the bourgeoisie might want region $i$ to separate. Specifically, the trade-off facing the bourgeoisie is as follows: on the one hand, if unified schooling can be implemented, secession leads to the loss of valuable match partners in region $-i$ (a loss that is increasing in $\mu \sigma$). On the other, the bourgeoisie can shift educational costs to the landowners under secession while it bears most of the costs under unified schooling as it is dominated by the landowners under that system. Hence if secession stands a chance against unified schooling, it has to be for relatively low productivity shocks – otherwise, the loss of potential partners would be too costly- but still high enough for education under secession to be profitable for the bourgeoisie. This intuition is confirmed in Proposition 4 which characterizes the equilibrium outcome since the masses are willing to get educated whenever the elite is willing to implement education.

**Proposition 4** A region-$i$ dominant but country-level-dominated bourgeoisie chooses region-$i$ secession if and only if (i) schooling is implemented under secession but not under unified schooling, or (ii) the productivity shock $\sigma$ takes intermediate values and some further conditions are satisfied (see Appendix D.2.1 for the specific values and conditions).

**Proof.** See Appendix D.2.1

Part (i) in the proposition applies when schooling under secession is so beneficial for the regionally dominant bourgeoisie that it is profitable for them to implement it even paying the full cost schooling. Instead, the landowners are made worse off by schooling and for this reason choose not to implement school if they dominate under unified schooling.\(^9\) However, once unified schooling becomes implementable, the bourgeoisie prefers being dominated under unified schooling over being dominant under secession due to the increased match pool under unified schooling.

As for Part (ii), Figure 6 illustrates one case where there exists a range of intermediate productivity shocks for which region-$i$ bourgeoisie favours

\(^9\)This happens for $2 < H^N$ when $\sigma_{H_1}^{N} < \sigma < \sigma_{N}$. 

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secession.\textsuperscript{10} Indeed for low enough productivity levels, unified schooling is preferred either because schooling is simply not profitable under secession (for $\overline{\sigma}_B < \sigma < \overline{\sigma}_B^{U}$) or because landowners’ willingness to pay under secession is limited (for $\overline{\sigma}_B^{S_i} < \sigma < \sigma_{au2}$). Symmetrically, for high enough productivity levels ($\sigma > \sigma_a$), unified schooling dominates as the gain associated to having additional production partners is very high. Instead, for intermediate values ($\sigma_{au2} < \sigma < \sigma_a$), region-$i$ bourgeoisie chooses to secede because it has to pay little for education under secession compared to unified schooling ($I_B^U = I_B^U$ while $I_B^{S_i}$ is either small or zero) and this actually outweighs the higher production under unified schooling.

More generally, the specific range of intermediate productivity shocks for which secession is chosen depends on the size of region-$i$ bourgeoisie. Indeed, while only half of the masses get educated under secession, the associated \textit{per bourgeois} cost is smaller the larger the bourgeoisie of the seceding region. Other parameters which make the results case specific are the regional size

\textsuperscript{10}This case holds when $2 > H^{S_i} > H^{U}$, $B_i < \frac{N}{2N}$ and $\overline{\sigma}_B^{U} < \overline{\sigma}_B^{S_i}$ are simultaneously verified.
of the bourgeoisie compared to the landowners—since the bourgeoisie shifts educational costs to the landowners—and the productivity advantage of the bourgeoisie.

While the bourgeoisie might prefer secession, the landowners never prefer to be dominated under secession to being dominant under unified education. This happens because from their viewpoint the only difference between the two systems are the educational costs and these are always higher under secession.

5.4 Bourgeoisie is dominant at country level, landowners are dominant in region $i$

Since the landowners do not benefit from regional mobility, they prefer secession whenever their educational costs under secession are lower than under unified education. This indeed happens if landowners are dominated at the state level but dominant in region $i$.

Proposition 5 Landowners who are dominant at the region $i$ level but dominated at the state level, always prefer secession of region $i$ whenever education is implementable under secession. Hence only for productivity shocks for which unified education is implementable but education under secession is not, do we observe unified education.

Proof. See Appendix D.2.2. □

The landowners prefer secession because they are the dominant group under secession and therefore can shift (part of) the educational costs to the bourgeoisie and hence implement schooling paying less than under the unified system when more people get schooled and they are the main bearers of the educational cost.\footnote{The bourgeoisie never prefers being dominated under secession to being dominant under the unitary system: it loses valuable match partners and is the main bearer of educational costs.}

We are now in a position to summarize our results. Secession can only be an equilibrium outcome if it implies a change in the dominant group. It will always result when education under secession is implementable when the landowners are dominant under secession but dominated at the country level. If it is the bourgeoisie that is dominant under secession but dominated at the country level, secession might occur only for intermediate productivity shocks. In the latter case it will also occur when schooling under secession is implementable and fully financed by the dominant bourgeoisie while unified schooling does not occur since the landowners are worse off under schooling.
We next study how our equilibria do in terms of welfare.

6 Welfare

The value of welfare in our model is obtained by adding up individual utility levels. In the absence of schooling welfare is given by

\[
W^{\text{NS}} = \frac{M}{2} \Psi_M + \frac{M}{2} \Psi_{M-i} + B \Psi_B + N \Psi_N,
\]

which using (1), and (2) simplifies to:

\[
W^{\text{NS}} = \frac{M}{2} (1 + \delta),
\]

i.e. in every period elite members are matched to the masses of their region and produce one unit of output. How the production is split is a simple transfer from one group to the other and does not enter the expression.

Under unified schooling, welfare becomes:

\[
W^{\text{U}} = \frac{M}{2} \Pi_{M_i} + \frac{M}{2} \Pi_{M_{-i}} + B \Pi_B + N \Pi_N,
\]

which simplifies to

\[
W^{\text{U}} = -M + \left( (1 + \sigma) \frac{N}{2} + (1 + \mu \sigma) B \right) \delta M
\]

using (3), (4), and (5). The direct cost of unified schooling is $-M$, as the cost of schooling is proportional to the number of mass members taking education, all mass members attend school under this system and the per person cost is normalized to 1. In addition, the opportunity cost from schooling is reflected in the fact that there is no first period production and all production is thus discounted. As for the benefits, productivity is now higher ($1 + \sigma$ and $1 + \mu \sigma$ in the matches with respectively landowners and bourgeois) and the masses can now produce with the entire bourgeoisie.

The social planner prefers unified schooling to no schooling if and only if $W^U > W^{\text{NS}}$ or equivalently when

\[
\sigma > \sigma^U_W = \frac{2 - B (2 \mu + \delta - 1)}{\delta (N + 2B\mu)} + \frac{1}{\delta}
\]

This cutoff (25) decreases in $\delta$, $B$ and $\mu$ as schooling is more beneficial the more the future matters, the bigger the bourgeoisie, and the higher the productivity gains.
Next, we check when the planner prefers regional schooling or secession to no schooling. Clearly, as the planner maximises utilitarian welfare and the payoffs of the agents are linear, distributional issues are irrelevant, and the implementation of schooling in one region and secession of that region are indistinguishable from a welfare viewpoint. If region $i$ is the only region that gets educated, welfare under secession or regional schooling is given by

$$W^{R_iS} = \frac{M}{2} \Pi_{M_i} + \frac{M}{2} \Psi_{M-i} + B_i \Pi_B^R + N \Pi_N^R$$

which simplifies to

$$W^{R_iS} = -\frac{M}{2} + \frac{M}{2} (1 + \delta) \left( B_{-i} + \frac{N}{2} \right) + \delta \frac{M}{2} \left( \frac{N}{2} (1 + \sigma) + B_i (1 + \sigma \mu) \right)$$

(26)

The direct cost of education is now given by $\frac{M}{2}$, while one unit of the good is produced in each period by each of the $\frac{N}{2}$ members of the masses in region $-i$ with the regional elite $B_{-i} + \frac{N}{2}$ and production in region $i$ is confined to the second period but with a higher productivity ($1 + \sigma$ with the landowners and $1 + \sigma \mu$ with the bourgeois).

Subtracting (23) from (26), the planner prefers education in one region to no education if and only if:

$$\sigma > \sigma_{W}^{R_iS} = \frac{1 + B_i + \frac{N}{2}}{\delta (\mu B_i + \frac{N}{2})}$$

(27)

Comparing $W^{R_1S}$ and $W^{R_2S}$, one gets also that the planner prefers the implementation of schooling in the region with the larger bourgeoisie (region 1); indeed, while the cost of schooling is the same in both regions given that the size of the masses is identical, the larger productivity gains of the masses in their matches with bourgeois imply it is socially better to educated the masses in the region with a larger bourgeoisie.\(^{12}\)

In the first best, i.e. when the planner is able to enforce the welfare maximising schooling under each system, the following proposition holds:\(^{13}\)

**Proposition 6** Under centralisation, unified schooling yields higher welfare than regional schooling and secession.

\(^{12}\) Mathematically, $W^{R_1S} > W^{R_2S}$ holds if $\sigma > \frac{1 + B_i + \frac{N}{2}}{\delta (\mu B_i + \frac{N}{2})}$, which is always satisfied.

\(^{13}\) As it is easy to show that $\sigma_{M_2}^V < \sigma_{M_1}^V$ and $\sigma_{M_i} = \sigma_{W}^{R_iS} + \sigma_{M_i}^V$, for $i = 1, 2$, the masses are always willing to attend school whenever the central planner wants this to be the case.
Proof. See appendix E.1 ■

This result simply comes from our assumption that unified schooling leads to an increased match pool as it renders inter-regional production among masses and bourgeois possible.

However, in the general, the central planner will not be able to control the school set-up investments made by landowners and bourgeois. If the elites are willing to finance unified schooling, this system will still be chosen by the central planner. However, if the elites are not willing to implement that system and they are instead willing to implement regional schooling or secession, the central planner may prefer this option if for the corresponding parameter area education in one region is socially better than no education.

In order to determine the second best educational system for different productivity levels, we thus need first to compare the

This result also implies that secession is never socially optimal if unified education is implementable. The social planner does not care about transfers among groups, but values the increased match pool and therefore the additional productivity gains due to nation building. Therefore whenever secession displaces nation building due to a change in dominant group under secession the result is harmful from a social point of view. However, if the country-level-dominant landowners do not implement education and the regionally dominant bourgeois prefers secession, secession might be socially better than no education. This requires that the cutoff for which it is beneficial to the social planner to implement education in one region only, namely \( \sigma_W^{R,S} \), is lower than \( \sigma_N = \frac{1}{2} \).

Next, Proposition 7 checks whether the implementation of unified schooling in the decentralized equilibrium is socially efficient:

**Proposition 7** The equilibrium education level under unified schooling can be socially inefficient. Undereducation arises under a wide set of parameters, while overeducation can arise only if the bourgeoisie is dominant, the payoffs from schooling for the bourgeoisie are high relative to the payoffs of the landowners and the productivity takes intermediate values as specified in Appendix E.2.

**Proof.** See Appendix E.2 ■

The main intuition behind the inefficient provision of unified schooling is simply that the politically dominant elite does not internalize the benefits from schooling for the other elite and for the masses. More specifically, the solid line in Figure 7 represents the socially efficient productivity threshold \( \sigma_W^{U'} \) for the provision of education for different values of the productivity
advantage in matches involving the bourgeoisie ($\mu$) while the dashed (resp. dotted) line represents the equilibrium threshold under unified schooling when the bourgeoisie (resp. landowners) are the dominant group.$^{14}$

Equilibrium education under the unified system is efficient decision no matter the identity of the dominant group in area I (no education) and area V (education), while in area IV the efficient choice is made only if the bourgeoisie is the dominant group. In area II, education is efficient, but is never implemented because the bourgeois do not take into account the gains education generates for landowners. Instead, in area III there is actually overeducation under unified schooling if the bourgeoisie dominates; specifically, the bourgeois fully finance education and make landowners worse-off than under no education as the productivity gain for landowners is too low to cover for the loss of first period production while the masses take education. As this loss is not internalised by the bourgeois, the equilibrium is

$^{14}$We have assumed that $\beta = 0.1$, $\delta = 0.95$, $B_h = 0.25$, $B = 0.4$, and $M = 2$. The threshold for a dominant bourgeoisie (dashed line) is given by $\sigma^U_B$ for $H^U < 2$ and by $\sigma^U_B$ for $H^U > 2$ and the threshold for landowners (dotted line) by $\sigma^U_B$ for $H^U < 2$ and by $\sigma^U_B$ for $H^U > 2$ (see figures 1 to 4).
characterized by excess education.

The same type of argument holds regarding the efficiency of decentralised education under region-\(i\) schooling or secession, but overeducation arises only for higher values of the bourgeoisie’s productivity advantage (\(\mu\)) than under unified schooling given that the bourgeoisie does not gain production partners under these systems. Figure A1 in the appendix provides an example of the different cases arising.

This result also implies that secession is never socially optimal if unified education is implementable. The social planner does not care about transfers among groups, but values the increased match pool and therefore the additional productivity gains due to nation building. Therefore whenever secession displaces nation building due to a change in dominant group under secession the result is harmful from a social point of view. However, if the country-level-dominant landowners do not implement education and the regionally dominant bourgeoisie prefers secession, secession might be socially better than no education. This requires that the cutoff for which it is beneficial to the social planner to implement education in one region only, namely \(\sigma_{W}^{S} \), is lower than \(\sigma_{N} = \frac{1}{b}\).

**Proposition 8** Secession is never socially optimal if unified schooling can be implemented. When unified schooling cannot be implemented (because landowners are dominant and do not want to implement nation building) but a regionally dominant bourgeoisie implements secession (i.e. for \(H^{S} > 2\) and \(\sigma_{B}^{S} < \sigma < \sigma_{N}\)), secession is a second best for \(\max[\sigma_{W}^{R}, \sigma_{B}^{S}] < \sigma < \sigma_{N}\).

**Proof.** See Appendix E.4

However, for \(H^{S} > 2\) secession will be implemented whenever the nationwide dominant landowners suffer from education but the regionally dominant bourgeoisie benefits so much that they are willing to self-finance regional schooling, hence for all productivity shocks such that \(\sigma_{B}^{S} < \sigma < \sigma_{N}\). This can lead to over- or underprovision of secession.\(^{15}\) If the losses of the landowners do not outweigh the gains of the bourgeoisie and the masses from regional education, the equilibrium outcome leads to too much secession. If the trade-off is resolved the other way round, secession does not occur often enough. In Appendix E.5 we provide numerical examples for both cases.

\(^{15}\)If \(\sigma_{W}^{R} < \sigma_{B}^{S}\), then there is too little secession for \(\sigma_{W}^{R} < \sigma < \sigma_{B}^{S}\), while there is socially too much secession for \(\sigma_{B}^{S} < \sigma < \sigma_{W}^{R}\) if \(\sigma_{W}^{R} > \sigma_{B}^{S}\).
The above analysis shows that equilibrium secession can be a second-best when education is particularly beneficial for the bourgeoisie which is dominated at the state level but dominant in one region. But even in this case, secession might occur too often or not often enough. However, when secession is implemented by regionally dominant landowners who are dominated at the state level it is never socially desirable.

7 Robustness

The above results are derived assuming one dimension of heterogeneity, namely the size of the bourgeoisie was bigger in region 1 than in region 2. In this section we briefly discuss other forms of heterogeneity. As before we will assume that the regions are identical except in one dimension. The dimensions we look at are the size of the masses / landowners and the size of the productivity shock that hits the two regions representing different arrival rates of industrialization.

If the heterogeneity stems from the size of the masses across regions, the minimum productivity shock necessary for the masses to be willing to get region$−i$ schooling or unified schooling respectively does not vary across regions. As before the masses will be willing to attend unified schooling whenever they are willing to attend regional schooling. Under region$−i$ education the elite of the bigger $M_i$ region benefits more from education, but educating this region is also more costly since more individuals have to be schooled. Unified schooling will lead to less than double education costs and big benefits due to the mobility of the masses. This leads to stable nation building for sufficiently high productivity shocks and makes secession less likely than in our benchmark setting.

It is easy to see that our results are robust to the case when it is the size of the landowners that differs across regions. The main difference to the benchmark model is that now the cutoffs for education under secession do not differ across regions for the elite. The masses in the region with the smaller group of landowners are willing to get educated earlier in each system and they are still willing to get education in the unified system before they are willing to get educated regionally or under secession. Also, as before, the masses are still willing to get educated whenever the elite is willing to implement education.

Finally, asymmetric industrialization shocks across regions hinder nation building and originate an additional channel leading to secession at equilib-
Specifically, we assume that intra-regional match productivity is determined by the regional productivity shock, while across-regional match productivity is determined by the lower productivity shock, either because the available production technology of the bourgeoisie is determined by the lower productivity shock or because the masses were trained for the lower productivity shock only. In that set-up, regional schooling in the high-productivity region is more attractive for all groups than regional schooling in the low-productivity region. Moreover, the bigger the relative difference across region, the more likely it is that regional education dominates unified schooling. In addition, since transfers to the less efficient region can be avoided by secession, a very unequal speed of industrialization makes nation building across both regions impossible and is likely to lead to secession.

8 Case Study: Spain versus France

In this section, we relate our model to the cases of 19th century France and Spain. At the beginning of the 19th century, both countries were similar at least along some characteristics relevant to our model.

Specifically, both countries had a very similar per capita GDP at the beginning of the century\(^{17}\) and were characterized by a heterogeneous language composition. Indeed, in 1794 only about 40\% of the French population were native French speakers\(^{18}\) (Calvet 2002, p. 218), while an important proportion of the Spanish population had a language other than Spanish/Castilian (i.e. Catalan, Galician, Basque, or Bable) as their mother tongue in 1787.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{16}\)In the model this could be represented by different \(\sigma_i\) or by different \(k_i\).

\(^{17}\)According to Tortella (1994, p. 2) Spain’s per capita GDP was 2\% higher than France’s in 1800, and 7\% lower in 1820. According to Maddison (2003, pp. 58-67), France’s GDP was higher by 11\% in 1820.

\(^{18}\)Among the other language groups, the largest was Occitan and next came Breton and Alsacian. Additionally, small minorities were speaking Franco-provençal, Basque, Catalan, Corsican, or Flemish.

\(^{19}\)There are no available data on the language composition of Spain at the end of the 18th century. However, one can do a back of the envelope computation to get an upper bound for the proportion of non-Spanish speakers. According to Linz (1975), historically Spanish has also been spoken by part of the population in those regions where Catalan, Galician, or Basque were also spoken. Instead, these three languages were geographically concentrated in certain provinces (Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida, Girona, Valencia, Castellon, Alicante, and the Balearic Islands, for Catalan; A Coruna, Lugo, Ourense, and Pontevedra, for Galician; and Gipuzkoa, Bizkaia, Araba, and Navarre for Basque). Using data on the population of provinces in the 1787 Census (INE, 1991), an upper bound for the proportion of Catalan, Galician, Basque, and Bable speakers is respectively 18\%, 13\%, 5\%, and 3\%, and thus a lower bound for the proportion of Spanish speakers is 61\%.
Another common characteristic is that the first industries were geographically concentrated. In France, the first industries were mostly concentrated in the North-East (Crayen and Baten, 2010), and in the case of Spain they were mostly concentrated in Catalonia and in the Basque Country (Tortella, 2000).

Despite these common features, France and Spain ended up having very different outcomes in terms of industrialization, with France’s per capita GDP becoming 1.7 times that of Spain in 1930. The outcomes were also very different in terms of nation-building, as in the historical literature, France is often used as a benchmark of successful nation-building (see e.g. Kroneberg and Wimmer, 2012) while Spain is seen as an example of unaccomplished nation-building process accompanied with the emergence of peripheral nationalisms (see e.g. Linz, 1974, 1975; Keating, 1993). When elections were held, peripheral nationalist parties were systematically represented in the Spanish Parliament since the end of the 19th century. Instead, the success (or even the existence) of regionalist/nationalist parties in Alsace, Brittany, Corsica, or the French parts of the Basque Country or Catalonia has been extremely limited. For instance, in the June 1931 Spanish legislative elections, the Catalan nationalist parties obtained almost three fourths of the Catalan constituencies, and their Galician regionalist and Basque nationalist counterparts respectively 40 per cent and one third of the Galician and Basque constituencies (see Tusell, 1982). In contrast, in the first round of the April 1928 French legislative elections, regionalist candidates were only present in Alsace and obtained 4 seats with 15.9% of the votes: overall, the French Parliament consisted of 4 regionalist deputies out of 612 (see Lachapelle, 1928).

In terms of our model, we can consider that the two regions characterizing France are the industrializing North-East and the agricultural South-West, as defined for instance by the “St-Malo-Geneva line” identified by some Historians (see e.g. Weber, 1976). In addition, it is safe to assume that the bourgeoisie was the dominant elite both in the North-East and

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20Measured in 1970 U.S. dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity, the GDP per capita of France in 1930 was 1,337 and that of Spain 798 (Tortella, 1994, p.2). Similar results are found in Maddison (2003, pp. 62 & 68): measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, France’s per capita GDP was 4,532 and Spain’s 2,620.

21In Catalonia, out of 53 seats, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya obtained 31 seats, the Lliga Regionalista 3, the Unió Socialista de Catalunya 2, the Partit Català Republicà 1, and the Esquerra Catalana Radical-Socialista 2. In Galicia, out of 47 seats, the Federación Republicana Gallega obtained 14, the Galleguistas 2, and the Regionalistas 1. In the Basque Country (excluding Navarre), out of 24 seats, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco obtained 8 seats.
at the French level as a whole. Indeed, Price (2004) argues that while the landowners retained an important amount of power at least until 1870, “‘New’ wealth was represented by a grande bourgeoisie, which had, since 1830, achieved dominance not only in commerce, industry, and the professions but also in government” (Price, 2004, p. 37). Then, as the bourgeoisie is dominant both at the regional and at the country level, from Proposition 2 we expect the bourgeoisie to choose unified schooling, which in turn results in the creation of a common French identity.

The implementation of schooling throughout the country and the creation of a strong common French identity were actually observed. According to Nuhoğlu Soysal and Strang (1989), while France introduced compulsory education only in 1882, the primary enrollment ratio was already 75 percent in 1870 (p. 278), the highest amongst developed countries. However, there were big cross-regional differences in school attendance (Weber, 1976). In the 1880s, schooling became free, French was made the only language of instruction (Chervel, 1992) and “village teachers, trained to greater competence and new self-respect, became the licensed representatives of the Republic” (Weber, 1976, p. 318). Parallel to this, parents started to perceive that numeracy and literacy were actually useful (as e.g. they were required to get jobs both in the public and the private sector), attendance increased, and differences in attendance across regions started to decline (Weber, 1976). At the same time, as argued by Weber (1976, p. 332), “the greater function of the modern school (is) to teach not so much useful skills as a new patriotism beyond the limits naturally acknowledged by its charges. The revolutionaries of 1789 had replaced old terms like schoolmaster, regent, and rector, with instituteur, because the teacher was intended to institute the nation”. The successful implementation of the schooling system throughout the country constituted a “wide-ranging process of standardization that helped create and reinforce French unity, while contributing to the disintegration of rival allegiances” (Weber, p. 338).

In the case of Spain, two regions can be identified as the industrializing periphery (Catalonia and the Basque Country) and the agricultural “centre” comprises the rest of the country. According to historians, the bourgeoisie

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22 Weber (1976, p. 336) also argues that “Teachers taught or were expected to teach ‘not just for the love of art or science...but for the love of France – a France whose creed had to be inculcated in all unbelievers. A Catholic God, particularist and only identified with the fatherland by revisionists after the turn of the century was replaced by a secular God: the fatherland and its living symbols, the army and the flag. Catechism was replaced by civics lessons. Biblical history, proscribed in secular schools, was replaced by the sainted history of France”.

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was dominant in the periphery, while the landowning elite from the centre dominated Spanish politics (see e.g. Linz, 1974; Solé Tura, 1989; or Harrison, 1990). In our model, the case where the landowners are dominant at the country level and the bourgeoisie is dominant at the regional level is studied in Proposition 4. In this Proposition, secession arises as an equilibrium outcome when the industrialization shock is weak and is more likely to arise when the overall size of the bourgeoisie is small. While we cannot directly observe the size of the industrialization shock, Keating (1993) and Balfour (1995) argue that the Catalan textile industry was uncompetitive by European standards, and required for this reason a protected market its goods (Spain) and a protected source of raw materials (cotton from Cuba). Assuming that the overall size of the bourgeoisie is small at the Spanish level seems reasonable, given the very limited development of industries in the rest of the country, as underlined by the literature on the failure of the industrial revolution in Spain during the 19th century (see Nadal, 1973).

As predicted by the model, the development of the education system was weak in Spain and peripheral nationalisms developed, although secession was not observed. Indeed, while education became compulsory already in 1838, primary enrollment ratio in 1870 was only of 42 percent (Nuhoglu Soysal and Strang, 1989, p. 278) and “central government funding for primary education remained minimal: between 1850 and 1875 education never accounted for more than 1.13 of percent of the budget and by the 1870s it had fallen to 0.55 percent” (Shubert, 1990, p. 182). The illiteracy rate was 71 percent in 1870 and still 50 percent in 1910, against respectively 32 and 13 percent in France in the same dates (Tortella, 2000, p. 13). In addition, Shubert (1990, p. 183) argues that “the war against non-official languages in Spain was much less successful in Spain than in France (...) One reason for this was that the Spanish state was much less effective in creating the basic agent of linguistic uniformity, the schools”.

As for the development of Catalan nationalism, Linz (1974) argues that a regionalist movement started in Catalonia in the mid 19th century and turned into a nationalist movement at the end of the century. In addition to the cultural and literary revival of the Catalan language, “it was the defense of the interests of the national bourgeoisie that activated manufacturers to create interest groups, organize meetings, write petitions, and contribute decisively to the founding of the *Lliga de Catalunya* in 1887” (p. 62) one

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23Harrison (1976, p. 902) argues for instance that “the agrarian and financial interests of central and southern Spain [who] made up the political oligarchy”.

24Observe that secession is possible in more cases when \(2 > H^B = (1 - \beta)(2k - 1 + \delta)B\) which is easier to satify the smaller \(B\).
of the first Catalanist parties. However, the “minority character of the industrial bourgeoisie of Catalonia, and later the Basque country, in the total Spanish social structure, and the impossibility for it to gain power at the center within the oligarchic liberal democracy of the Restoration [1870-1931], turned it away from the struggle for power in the Spanish state. Instead it aimed to secure power at the local and regional level and to build up support on the basis of cultural nationalism to bargain more effectively with the central government on economic issues particularly protectionism” (Linz, 1975, pp. 384-386). Two examples of conflicts between the Catalan bourgeoisie and the centre’s landowning elite are the fight over tariffs after Cuba’s independence in 1898—with the Catalan bourgeoisie defending the elimination of tariffs on foreign grain and the imposition of tariffs on foreign textiles (see Harrison, 1990, or Díez Medrano, 1994)—and over the taxation of industrial profits during World War I (see e.g. Carr, 1980 or Enrlich, 1998). However, the programme of the Catalan employers’ group Fomento del Trabajo Nacional set up following Cuba’s independence stressed the implementation of technical education as one four main demands (Harrison, 1974).

A Calculation of cutoffs and educational costs for the elite

Let $e$ refer to the dominant elite group and $-e$ to the dominated elite group. Then educational costs are split as follows:

- For very high productivity shocks, $\sigma > \max \left[ \sigma^k_e, \sigma^k_{-e} \right]$, $I^k_e = 0$, schooling is entirely financed by the dominated group: under universal education each group member of the dominated group with size $-E$ will have to pay $\frac{M}{E}$ since the masses of both regions get educated. Under regional education if only one region gets educated this cost reduces to $\frac{M}{M-E}$.

- If $\max \left[ \sigma^k_e, \sigma^k_{-e} \right] = \sigma^k_{-e}$,
  - then for $\sigma > \sigma^k_{-e}$, the dominant group has to cofinance education paying $\tilde{I}^k_e$ while the dominated group pays $\tilde{I}^k_{-e}$. The value of $\tilde{I}^k_e$ for the different political regimes is $\tilde{I}^U_e = \frac{M-I^U_{ee}(-E)}{E}$ and $\tilde{I}^R_i = \frac{M-I^R_{ei}(-E)}{E}$ if only region $i$ gets educated.
where \( E \) is the size of the dominant elite group and \(-E\) is the size of the dominated elite group.

- if \( \max \left[ \sigma^k_e, \sigma^k_{-e} \right] = \sigma^k_e \) and \( \max \left[ \sigma^k_{-e}, \sigma^k_e \right] = \sigma^k_{-e} \), then for \( \sigma < \sigma^k_e \), the dominant group wants education, but the dominated group is made worse off with education, so the dominant group fully pays the educational costs, namely \( \frac{M}{E} \) under universal education and \( \frac{M}{2E} \) under regional education if only one region gets educated.

- In all other cases the dominant elite group has no interest in implementing schooling.

Table 1 reports the values of the productivity thresholds and associated payments under unified schooling, region-\( i \) education and region-\( i \) secession. In order to calculate the thresholds under secession we take into account that under secession educational costs are only paid by the elites in the region where secession is implemented.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \sigma^k_N )</th>
<th>Unified education</th>
<th>Region-( i ) education</th>
<th>Region-( i ) secession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \frac{1-a}{2\mu} )</td>
<td>( \frac{2}{\delta} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{5\mu} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma^k_B )</td>
<td>( \frac{2-(1-\beta)B(2\mu-1+\delta)}{2\mu(1-\beta)\delta B} + \frac{1}{\delta} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1-(1-\beta)B(\mu-1)}{\mu(1-\beta)B} + \frac{1}{\delta} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma^k_e )</td>
<td>( \frac{2-(1-\beta)B(2\mu-1+\delta)}{(1-\beta)\mu N + 2(2\mu)\mu_1} + \frac{1}{\delta} )</td>
<td>( \frac{2-(1-\beta)2B(\mu-1)}{\beta(1-\beta)N + 2(2\mu)\mu_1} + \frac{1}{\delta} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I^k_N )</td>
<td>( \frac{(\sigma-1)(1-\beta)M}{\delta} )</td>
<td>( \frac{(\sigma-1)(1-\beta)M}{\delta} )</td>
<td>( \frac{(1-\beta)(\delta-1)M}{\delta} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I^k_B )</td>
<td>( \frac{(1-\beta)2\mu_1\sigma-1+\delta)M}{\delta} )</td>
<td>( \frac{(\mu\sigma-1)(1-\beta)B_1 M}{\delta} )</td>
<td>( \frac{(1-\beta)(\mu\sigma-1)M}{\delta} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I^k_e )</td>
<td>( \frac{2-B(1-\beta)(2\mu_1\sigma-1+\delta)}{2M} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1-(\mu\sigma-1)(1-\beta)B_1 M}{\delta} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1-B_1(1-\beta)(\mu\sigma-1)M}{\delta} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I^k_{-e} )</td>
<td>( \frac{2-N(1-\beta)(\sigma-1)}{2M} )</td>
<td>( \frac{2-(\sigma-1)(1-\beta)N M}{B} )</td>
<td>( \frac{2-N(1-\beta)(\delta-1)M}{B} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( ^{25} \) For the time being we ignore nonnegativity constraints on \( \tilde{I}^k_x \) when calculating \( \tilde{I}^k_x \) and \( \tilde{\sigma}_x^k \). This approach has the advantage that \( \tilde{\sigma}_x^k = \tilde{\sigma}_x^k = \tilde{\sigma}_x^k \) for all political regimes \( k \), but, as we will see below it might lead to unnatural rankings of the cutoffs, in particular to \( \tilde{\sigma}_x^k < \tilde{\sigma}_x^k < \tilde{\sigma}_x^k \) (Lemma 1 part 1). This is of no importance, since \( \tilde{\sigma}_x^k \) is irrelevant in these cases.
B School attendance by the masses

Proof of Lemma 2 The relevant cutoffs for the elite are \( \sigma_e^k \) when \( H^k < 2 \) and \( \sigma_M^k \) for the landowners and \( \sigma_B^k \) for the bourgeoisie when \( H^k > 2 \). Equalizing (2) and (3), the cutoff for the masses under unified schooling is given by \( \sigma_M^U = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{2(\mu_B-B_i+\delta_M^i)}{\delta_a(1+2\mu_a)} \), and from (2) and (6), the threshold for region-\( i \) schooling is \( \sigma_{M_i}^R = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{2B_i(1-\mu_i)}{3(N+4\mu_i)} \). We now show that in all cases these cutoffs are bigger than the cutoff of the masses to be willing to get schooled. In particular: (i) \( \sigma_M^U < \sigma_M^L \) always holds given that \( \sigma_{M_i}^R < \sigma_{M_i}^L \) (trivial); (v) \( \sigma_{M_i}^R < \sigma_{M_i}^U \) always holds given that \( \sigma_{M_i}^U < \sigma_{M_i}^B \) (trivial); (i) \( \sigma_{M_i}^U < \sigma_{M_i}^B \) holds (trivial). (iv) \( \sigma_{M_i}^R < \sigma_{M_i}^L \) (trivial); (v) \( \sigma_{M_i}^R < \sigma_{M_i}^L \) holds (trivial); (vi) \( \sigma_{M_i}^R < \sigma_{M_i}^L \) always holds as \( \sigma_{M_i}^L < \sigma_{M_i}^B \equiv 0 < \frac{2N}{(1-\mu_i)} + 2\mu_i \left[ \frac{1}{1-\beta} - 1 + 2(1+\delta)B_2 \right] + (1-\delta)N \) which always holds. (ii) \( \sigma_{M_i}^U < \sigma_{M_i}^B \) always holds given that \( \sigma_{M_i}^U < \sigma_{M_i}^B \) (trivial). For \( \delta = 1 \), i.e., \( \sigma_{M_i}^L \equiv \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{2B_i(1-\mu_i)}{3(N+4\mu_i)} \), we have \( I_B^{R_2} = I_B^{R_1} = 0 \) and \( R^1 \) is preferred if \( \sigma > \frac{1}{\mu_B} \) which always holds. The same condition holds for co-payment under both systems since \( I_B^{R_1} = I_B^{R_2} \). If \( 2 > H^{R_2} \) these are the only relevant comparisons. For \( H^{R_2} > 2 \) the bourgeoisie fully finances education in each region when \( \sigma_B^{R_2} = \sigma_B^{R_1} \) but the cost is the same in each region and \( R^1 \) is preferred as \( \sigma > \frac{1}{\mu_B} \) (always). For \( \sigma_B^{R_1} < \sigma < \sigma_B^{R_2} \) again \( R_1 \) is preferred since \( I_B^{R_1} < I_B^{R_2} = \frac{M}{2B} \).

Now we look at landowners being dominant. A dominant landowner prefers \( R_1 \) to \( R_2 \) whenever \( I_B^{R_2} > I_B^{R_1} \). Since \( H^{R_1} > H^{R_2} \) the following schooling costs are possible when schooling is implementable in both regions:

- for \( \sigma > \sigma_B^{R_2} \) schooling is free under both systems since \( \sigma_B^{R_1} < \sigma_B^{R_2} \), and thus landowners are indifferent.

C Unified versus regional schooling

Proof of Lemma 3 We next turn to dominant landowners. A dominant bourgeoisie prefers \( R_1 \) to \( R_2 \) whenever \( \Pi_B > \Pi_B^{R_2} \), i.e.,

\[
I_B^{R_2} - I_B^{R_1} > (1-\beta)((1-\delta\mu\sigma})(B_1 - B_2)) \frac{M}{2B}
\]

For \( \sigma > \sigma_B^{R_1} = \sigma_B^{R_2} \), we have \( I_B^{R_2} = I_B^{R_1} = 0 \) and \( R^1 \) is preferred if \( \sigma > \frac{1}{\mu_B} \) which always holds. The same condition holds for co-payment under both systems since \( I_B^{R_1} = I_B^{R_2} \). If \( 2 > H^{R_2} \) these are the only relevant comparisons. For \( H^{R_2} > 2 \) the bourgeoisie fully finances education in each region when \( \sigma_B^{R_2} = \sigma_B^{R_1} \) but the cost is the same in each region and \( R^1 \) is preferred as \( \sigma > \frac{1}{\mu_B} \) (always). For \( \sigma_B^{R_1} < \sigma < \sigma_B^{R_2} \) again \( R_1 \) is preferred since \( I_B^{R_1} < I_B^{R_2} = \frac{M}{2B} \).

Now we look at landowners being dominant. A dominant landowner prefers \( R_1 \) to \( R_2 \) whenever \( I_B^{R_2} > I_B^{R_1} \). Since \( H^{R_1} > H^{R_2} \) the following schooling costs are possible when schooling is implementable in both regions:
• $I_N^{R_1} = 0$ and $I_N^{R_2}$ for $\sigma < \sigma_B^{R_2}$ hence $R_1$ is preferred
• $\tilde{I}_N^{R_1}$ and $\tilde{I}_N^{R_2}$ for $\sigma < \sigma_B^{R_2}$ and $\tilde{I}_N^{R_1} < \tilde{I}_N^{R_2}$ so $R_1$ is always preferred.

Proof of Lemma 4  Dominant landowners prefer unified schooling whenever $\Pi_N^U > \Pi_N^{R_1}$, i.e.,

$$(1 - \beta) (\delta \sigma - 1) \frac{M}{4} > I_N^U - I_N^{R_1} \quad (28)$$

The LHS is always positive since the minimum productivity shock for which the landowners are willing to implement unified schooling if they do not have to pay for it is $\sigma_N^U = \frac{1}{4}$. So for free education under unified schooling (i.e. $\sigma > \sigma_B^U$) unified schooling is preferred as $(1 - \beta) (\delta \sigma - 1) \frac{M}{4} > -I_N^{R_1}$ always holds. Since $\sigma_B^U < \sigma_B^{R_1}$ always holds, and it only remains to check whether (28) is also true under co-payment under both systems, i.e. for $I_N^U$ and $I_N^{R_1}$ which can only occur if $H_N^U < 2$. Then (28) becomes

$$\sigma > \sigma_g = \frac{2 + (1 - \beta) (N + 2B (1 - \delta) - 2B_i)}{(1 - \beta) (N + 4B \mu - 2\mu B_i)}$$

Since $\sigma_B^U < \sigma_B^{R_1}$ is always satisfied, co-payment in both systems is only possible for $\sigma > \sigma_B^{R_1}$. As it is easy to show that $\sigma_B^{R_1} > \sigma_g$, $\sigma > \sigma_g$ always holds in this case and thus $\Pi_N^U > \Pi_N^{R_1}$ holds also in the case of co-payment.

A dominant bourgeoisie prefers unified schooling whenever $\Pi_B^U > \Pi_B^{R_1}$, i.e.,

$$(1 - \beta) (B \delta - B - \mu \sigma \delta (2B - B_i)) \frac{M}{2B} > I_B^U - I_B^{R_1} \quad (29)$$

The LHS is positive for $\sigma > \frac{B - \mu \sigma \delta (2B - B_i)}{\mu \delta (2B - B_i)}$ which is clearly smaller than $\sigma_B^{R_1} = \frac{1}{2\mu \delta}$. Hence when education is free for the bourgeoisie under both systems, namely for $\sigma > \sigma_N^U = \sigma_B^{R_1}$, unified schooling is preferred. It remains to check what happens under co-payment by the bourgeoisie. In this case, unified schooling is preferred for $\Pi_B^U(I_B^U) > \Pi_B^{R_1}(I_B^{R_1})$ or equivalently for

$$\sigma > \sigma_{gg} = \frac{2 + (1 - \beta) (N - 2 (B \delta - B - \mu \sigma \delta (2B - B_i)))}{(1 - \beta) \delta (N + 2\mu (2B - B_i))}$$

$^26$ Observe that $H_B^{R_2} < H_B^{R_1} < H_B^U$. This give rise to three cases: (i) $H_B^U < 2$, (ii) $H_B^{R_1} < 2 < H_B^U$ and (iii) $H_B^{R_2} < 2 < H_B^{R_1}$.
with \( \sigma_{gg} < \sigma_U^U \) since \( \frac{2 + (1 - \beta)(N - 2(B\delta - B_{-i}))}{(1 - \beta)[N + 2g(2B - B_i)]} < \frac{2 + (1 - \beta)(1 - B\delta)}{(1 - \beta)[N + 2B\mu]} \) given that the LHS has a smaller numerator and a bigger denominator than the RHS. As \( \sigma_U^U \) is smaller than \( \sigma^{R_b} \), unified schooling with copayment is always preferred to regional education with copayment by a dominant bourgeoisie. Now if \( H^{R_i} > 2 \) the bourgeoisie fully finances education in both systems when \( \sigma_{B_i}^R \) is smaller than \( \sigma_{B_i}^U \). Then condition (29) becomes

\[
\sigma > \frac{1 - (1 - \beta) (B\delta - B_{-i})}{(1 - \beta)\mu (2B - B_i)}
\]

which is smaller than \( \sigma_{B_i}^R \) since \( -(1 - \beta)B_i (B\delta - \mu B_i - B_{-i} + 2B\mu) \) \( < 2B_{-i} \) (notice that the LHS is negative). Hence unified education is preferred. Now if \( H^{R_i} > 2 \) then for \( \sigma_{B_i}^U \) \( < \sigma_{B_i}^R \) the bourgeoisie fully finances regional education but only cofinances it under the unified education, which is clearly better than fully financing it, so unified education is preferred.

### D Seccession versus unified education

In order to study the incentives of the elite to choose between secession and unified education we first need to rank the productivity cutoffs under the two systems. This is done in Lemma 5 noting that \( H^{S_i} < H^U \).

**Lemma 5**  
1. For \( 2 > H^U \) then we have either

- \( \sigma_N < \sigma^U_N = \sigma_{B_1}^U = \sigma_{B_1}^S = \sigma_{N_1}^S < \min \left[ \sigma_{N_i}^S, \sigma_{B_i}^U \right] \) or
- \( \sigma_N < \sigma^U_N = \sigma_{B_1}^U < \sigma_{B_1}^S = \sigma_{N_1}^S < \min \left[ \sigma_{N_i}^S, \sigma_{B_1}^U \right] \)

2. For \( H^{S_i} < 2 < H^U \) the ranking of the thresholds is \( \sigma_{B_i}^U < \sigma_N^U = \sigma_{B_i}^U < \sigma_{N_1}^S = \sigma_{B_1}^S \) \( < \min \left[ \sigma_{N_i}^S, \sigma_{B_1}^U \right] \)

3. For \( 2 < H^{S_i} \) all thresholds \( \sigma_{N_i}^S = \sigma_{B_1}^S \) are smaller than \( \sigma_N \).

**Proof.** The three parameter areas follow from Lemma 1 using \( H^{S_i} < H^U \). The ordering of the thresholds is based on the following comparisons which mainly use simple algebra (i). \( \sigma_N^U = \sigma_{N_i}^S \); (ii). \( \sigma_{N_i}^U = \sigma_{B_1}^S = \sigma_{N_i}^S \), always by simple algebra; (iii). \( \sigma_{B_1}^U < \sigma_{B_1}^S \), always holds given that \( \sigma_{B_1}^U < \sigma_{B_1}^S \) \( \iff -(1 - \beta)B B_1 (1 + \delta) < 2B_{-i} \); (iv) \( \sigma_{N_1}^S > \sigma_{B_1}^S \) \( \iff (1 - \beta)N B_1 (\mu - 1) > N - 2\mu B_i \).
(v). \( \sigma_{N_i}^S < \sigma_{B_i}^J \iff (1 - \beta)BN(2\mu - 1 + \delta) < 2N - 4\mu B; \) (vi) \( \sigma_{B_i}^U > \sigma_{N_i}^S \iff 2(N - 2\mu B_{-i}) > (1 - \beta)B ((2\mu - 1 + \delta) (2\mu B_i + N) - 4B_i (\mu - 1) \mu); \) (vii) \( \sigma_{N_i}^S > \sigma_{N_i}^S \) always; (viii) If \( \sigma_{N_i}^S < \sigma_{B_i}^J \) then \( \sigma_{B_i}^U > \sigma_{N_i}^S \) (by point vii).

**D.1 The same group is dominant at the regional and the state level**

**Proof of Proposition 2** Lemma 5 guides us which cases we have to consider:

(i) For \( \sigma > \sigma_{N_i}^S = \sigma_{N_i}^J \), a dominant bourgeoisie gets schooling for free under both systems. Imposing \( I_{B_i}^J = I_{B_i}^S = 0 \) in (22), secession is chosen if \( 0 > (1 - \beta) \delta (1 + \mu \sigma) \frac{M}{2} \), which never holds.

(ii) Next, whenever \( \max(\sigma_{B_i}^J, \kappa_i) < \sigma < \sigma_{N_i}^S = \sigma_{U_i}^J \), there is copayment under both systems. In that case,

\[
\tilde{I}_{B_i}^U - \tilde{I}_{B_i}^S = (2 - N(1 - \beta)(\delta \sigma - 1)) \left( \frac{B_i - B_{-i}}{4BB_i} \right) M.
\]

Then, as \( (2 - N(1 - \beta)(\delta \sigma - 1)) > 0 \) for \( \sigma < \sigma_{N_i}^S = \sigma_{U_i}^J \) we have that \( \tilde{I}_{B_i}^U - \tilde{I}_{B_i}^S < 0 \) for \( i = 2 \) since \( B_1 > B_2 \) and hence unified schooling is always preferred to region-2 secession as the payoff (resp. the cost) of schooling is higher (resp. lower) under unified schooling. We will now show that condition (22) is also violated with co-payment for region-1 secession. Assume for contradiction that condition (22) holds. This would require:

\[
\frac{(2 - N(1 - \beta)(\delta \sigma - 1))(B_1 - B_2)}{2BB_1} M > (1 + \mu \sigma)(1 - \beta)\delta \frac{M}{2}
\]

which can be rewritten as

\[
\sigma < \sigma_s = \frac{2(B_1 - B_2) + (1 - \beta)(N(B_1 - B_2) - 2\delta BB_1)}{(1 - \beta)\delta(2\mu BB_1 + N(B_1 - B_2))}.
\]

However, as \( \sigma_{N_i}^S > \sigma_s \) by simple algebra this is incompatible with the bourgeoisie being willing to pay for the additional cost of education.

(iii) For \( \sigma < \sigma < \sigma_{N_i} \) (which can only hold for \( H_{N_i} > 2 \)), landowners are not willing to contribute to the cost of education, but it is still profitable for the bourgeoisie under both systems to implement education bearing its full cost. Then, in that case, \( \tilde{I}_{B_i}^U = \frac{M}{M} \) and \( \tilde{I}_{B_i}^S = \frac{M}{2B_i} \) and condition (22) becomes

\[
B_i - B_{-i} > (1 + \mu \sigma)(1 - \beta)\delta BB_i,
\]

40
which can never hold for \( i = 2 \). For \( i = 1 \) the condition is equivalent to
\[
\sigma < \frac{B_1 - B_2 - (1 - \beta)\delta BB_1}{\mu(1 - \beta)\delta BB_1}
\]
and simple calculus reveals that \( \sigma_{ss} < \sigma_{B1}^S \) which is the cutoff that the bourgeoisie is willing to fully pay education under region-1 secession. Hence condition (22) is violated.

(iv) Finally, for lower values of \( \sigma \) (specifically, \( \sigma_B^U < \sigma < \sigma_B^S \) for \( H^{Si} < H^U < 2 \), \( \sigma_B^U < \sigma < \sigma_B^S \) for \( H^{Si} < 2 < H^U \), and \( \sigma_B^U < \sigma < \sigma_B^S \) for \( H^{Si} < H^U < 2 \)) education is implemented only under the unified system, and thus this system is always preferred.

Proof of Proposition 3  We need to show that \( I_N^U \leq I_{N_i}^{Si} \). By lemma 5 dominant landowners either get education for free under both systems for \( \sigma > \sigma_{B_i}^S \) or have to copay under secession but get education for free under the unified system \( 0 = I_N^U \leq I_{N_i}^{Si} \) or have to co-pay under both systems. It remains to prove that \( I_N^U < I_{N_i}^{Si} \) which can be rewritten as \( 2B_{-i} \mu \delta \sigma + B \delta > B_{-i} - B_i \). It is immediate to see that this holds for region-1 secession. For region-2 secession, the required cutoff is \( \sigma > \sigma_{i} = \frac{B_1 - B_2 - B_i \delta}{2B_i \mu \delta} \) but \( \sigma_i < \sigma_N \), hence this is always true.

D.2 The identity of the dominant group differs at the regional and state level

D.2.1 The landowners are dominant at the state level, the bourgeoisie is dominant at the regional level

We exact statement of Proposition 4 is:

The preferences of the bourgeoisie are as follows

1. For 2 < \( H^{Si} \) the bourgeoisie always prefers to be dominated under unified schooling to be dominant under secession. However, for \( \sigma_{B_i}^S < \sigma_N \) unified schooling is not implemented with dominant landowners and the bourgeoisie prefers secession with schooling.

2. For \( H^{Si} < 2 < H^U \) the bourgeoisie always prefers to be dominated under unified schooling to be dominant under secession if \( B_i > \frac{N}{2\rho} \). If
\[ B_i < \frac{N}{2\mu} \] and \[ \max[\sigma_{aa}, \sigma_{Nj}] = \sigma_{Ni} \] then the bourgeoisie prefers secession for \( \sigma_{aa} < \sigma < \sigma_a \).

3. Let \( 2 > H^U \).

(a) If the bourgeoisie of region 2 is dominant, then secession will never occur for \( B_2 > \frac{N}{2\mu} \). If \( B_2 < \frac{N}{2\mu} \) secession might occur for intermediate values of \( \sigma \). In particular, if for \( B_2 < \frac{N}{2\mu} \)

i. \( \sigma_{B_2}^S > \sigma_B^U \) and \( \min[\sigma_{aa}, \sigma_a] = \sigma_a \) secession is never preferred

ii. \( \sigma_{B_2}^S > \sigma_B^U \) and \( \min[\sigma_{aa}, \sigma_a] = \sigma_{aa} \) secession is preferred for \( \sigma_{aa} < \sigma < \sigma_a \).

iii. \( \sigma_{B_2}^S < \sigma_B^U \) secession is preferred for \( \sigma_{B_2}^S < \sigma < \sigma_a \).

(b) If the bourgeoisie of region 1 is dominant, then secession might occur for intermediate values of \( \sigma \). More precisely

i. if \( B_1 > \frac{N}{2\mu} \) then secession is never preferred if \( \sigma_{B_1}^S > \sigma_B^U \) but if \( \sigma_{B_1}^S < \sigma_B^U \) secession is preferred for \( \sigma_{B_1} < \sigma < \min[\sigma_a, \sigma_{aa}] \)

ii. if \( B_1 < \frac{N}{2\mu} \) and \( \sigma_{B_1}^S > \sigma_B^U \) and \( \min[\sigma_{aa}, \sigma_a] = \sigma_a \) secession is never preferred

iii. if \( B_1 < \frac{N}{2\mu} \) and \( \sigma_{B_1}^S > \sigma_B^U \) and \( \min[\sigma_{aa}, \sigma_a] = \sigma_{aa} \) secession is preferred for \( \sigma_{aa} < \sigma < \sigma_a \)

iv. if \( B_1 < \frac{N}{2\mu} \) and if \( \sigma_{B_1} < \sigma_B^U \) secession is preferred for \( \sigma_{B_1} < \sigma < \sigma_a \).

where

\[ \sigma_a = \frac{2 - (1 - \beta)\delta B}{(1 - \beta)\mu\delta B} \]

is such that \( \Pi_B^U \left( I_B^U = \frac{M}{2\mu} \right) = \Pi_{B_1}^S \left( I_{B_1}^S = 0 \right) \) while

\[ \sigma_{aa} = \frac{2(B_i - B - \mu - (1 - \beta)B(N + \delta 2B_i))}{(1 - \beta)B\delta(2\mu B_i - \mu)} \]

is such that \( \Pi_B^U \left( I_B^U = \frac{M}{2\mu} \right) = \Pi_{B_1}^S \left( I_{B_1}^S = \tilde{I}_{B_1}^S \right) \).

**Proof of Proposition 4** The bourgeoisie prefers region-\( i \) secession to unified schooling whenever condition (22) holds, namely

\[ I_B^U - I_{B_i}^S > (1 + \mu\sigma)(1 - \beta)\delta \frac{M}{2}. \]
The exact value of $I^U_B$ and $I^S_B$, depends on the identity of the dominant group, the size of the shock, and the underlying parameters.

The following payment constellation may occur.

1. $\sigma > \max \left( \overline{\sigma}_{N_i}^S, \overline{\sigma}_{B}^U \right)$: from Fig. 3 and 4, if education is implemented under $U$, the dominated bourgeoisie pays. $I^U_B = \frac{M}{B}$ and from Fig. 1 and 2, education for the dominant bourgeoisie is free under secession ($I^S_B = 0$). From (22), secession is preferred if and only if:

$$\sigma < \sigma_a = \frac{2 - (1 - \beta)\delta B}{(1 - \beta)\mu B} \tag{31}$$

2. $\min [\overline{\sigma}_{N_i}^S, \overline{\sigma}_{B}^U] < \sigma < \max [\overline{\sigma}_{N_i}^S, \overline{\sigma}_{B}^U]$: we have to distinguish two sub-cases:

   (a) If $\min [\overline{\sigma}_{N_i}^S, \overline{\sigma}_{B}^U] = \overline{\sigma}_{N_i}^S$, then $I^U_B = \overline{I}_B^U$ and $I^S_B = 0$. In this case secession is always preferred because the condition (22) reduces to $\sigma > \overline{\sigma}_{B_i}^S = \frac{1}{\mu \delta}$ which is always satisfied as this is the condition for the bourgeoisie to be willing to implement free education under secession.

   (b) If $\min [\overline{\sigma}_{N_i}^S, \overline{\sigma}_{B}^U] = \overline{\sigma}_{B}^U$, then $I^U_B = \frac{M}{B}$ and $I^S_B = \overline{I}_B^S$. The condition that secession is preferred becomes

$$\sigma < \sigma_{aa1} = \sigma_a = \frac{2(B_i - B_{-i}) - (1 - \beta)B(N + \delta 2B_i)}{(1 - \beta)B\delta(2\mu B_i - N)} \text{ for } 2\mu B_i > N \tag{32}$$

$$\sigma > \sigma_{aa2} = \sigma_a = \frac{(1 - \beta)B(N + \delta 2B_i) - 2(B_i - B_{-i})}{(1 - \beta)B\delta(N - 2\mu B_i)} \text{ for } 2\mu B_i < N \tag{33}$$

3. For $\overline{\sigma}_{B_i}^S < \sigma < \max [\overline{\sigma}_{N_i}^S, \overline{\sigma}_{B}^U]$, $I^U_B = \overline{I}_B^U$ and $I^S_B = \overline{I}_B^S$: Secession is always preferred in this area since the condition (22) reduces to $\sigma > \overline{\sigma}_{B_i}^S$, which is the condition for the bourgeoisie to be willing to go for co-payment under secession.

We need to check under which conditions the cutoffs (31), (32) and (33) are relevant cutoffs. Both $\sigma_a$ and $\sigma_{aa1}$ are upper bounds. Therefore $\sigma_a$ is not relevant if $\sigma_a < \max [\overline{\sigma}_{N_i}^S, \overline{\sigma}_{B}^U]$. Similarly, $\sigma_{aa1}$ is not relevant for $\sigma_{aa1} < \max [\overline{\sigma}_{B_i}^S, \overline{\sigma}_{B}^U]$. Since $\sigma_{aa2}$ is a lower bound it is not relevant.
for \( \sigma_{aa_2} > \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \). Lemma 6 tells us under which conditions these cutoffs are relevant and how the relate to each other and to the different payment areas.

**Lemma 6**

1. \( \sigma_a > \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_1} \) always

2. \( \sigma_a < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_2} \iff \sigma_{aa_2} > \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \iff \sigma_a < \sigma_{aa_2} \)

3. \( \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \iff \sigma_{aa_1} < \sigma_a \iff \sigma_a < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \)

4. \( \frac{\sigma_2}{B_1} > \frac{\sigma_1}{B_1} \iff \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_2}{B_1} \iff \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_1}{B_1} \)

5. For \( 2\mu B_2 > N \), \( \sigma_a < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_2} \) and \( \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \) and \( \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_2}{B_2} \) always

6. \( \sigma_{aa_2} < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \iff \sigma_{aa_2} < \frac{\sigma_1}{B_2} \iff \sigma_{aa_2} < \frac{\sigma_1}{B_2} \)

7. \( \min(\frac{\sigma_2}{N_1}, \frac{\sigma_1}{B_1}) = \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \Rightarrow \sigma_a > \max(\frac{\sigma_2}{N_1}, \frac{\sigma_1}{B_1}) \)

**Proof.**

1. \( \frac{\sigma_1}{B_1} = \frac{2 - (1 - \beta)B(2\mu - 1 + \delta)}{2\mu(1 - \beta)B} + \frac{1}{\delta} < \sigma_a = \frac{2 - (1 - \beta)B(\delta + \mu)}{(1 - \beta)\mu B} + \frac{1}{\delta} \) can be rewritten as \((1 - \beta)B(\delta + 1) < 2 \) which is always true.

2. Simple algebra reveals that \( \sigma_a < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \iff \sigma_{aa_2} > \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \iff \) 

\[ NB(1 - \beta)(\mu + \delta) > 2(N - \mu B) \]  \( (34) \)

3. Simple algebra reveals that \( \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \iff \sigma_{aa_1} < \sigma_a \iff \sigma_a < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \iff \) condition \( (34) \) holds.

4. Simple algebra reveals that \( \frac{\sigma_1}{B_1} > \frac{\sigma_1}{B_1} \iff \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_2}{B_1} \iff \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_1}{B_1} \iff 

\( (1 - \beta)B(N(2\mu - (1 - \delta)) + 2\mu B_i(1 + \delta)) > 2N - 4\mu B_{-i} \) \( (35) \)

5. From the proof of Proposition 4, \( \sigma_{aa_1} \) is the relevant threshold for region-2 secession for \( 2\mu B_2 > N \). It is easy to see that \( (34) \) always holds in this case. Hence by point 3 in this Lemma it follows that \( \sigma_a < \frac{\sigma_2}{N_1} \) always holds for this parameter space. Next \( \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_1}{N_1} = \frac{1}{\delta} \) \( (B_i - B_{-i}) < (1 - \beta)BB_i(\mu + \delta) \) which is always true for \( B_i < B_{-i} \) and hence it is always true for secession in region 2. Similarly, \( 2\mu B_2 > N \iff 2N - 4\mu B_2 < 0 \) and thus also \( 2N - 4\mu B_1 < 0 \) given that \( B_1 > B_2 \). Then, the RHS of \( (35) \) is negative for region-2 secession, which from \( (35) \) implies that \( \sigma_{aa_1} < \frac{\sigma_2}{B_1} \) holds for region-2 secession.
6. Simple algebra reveals that \( \sigma_{a2} < \frac{S_N}{N_i} \Leftrightarrow \frac{S_N}{N_i} < \frac{J}{f} \Leftrightarrow \sigma_{a2} < \frac{U}{f} \Leftrightarrow (1 - \beta)B(N(2\mu - (1 - \delta)) + 2\mu B_i(1 + \delta)) < 2N - 4\mu B_i \) (36)

7. If \( \min[\frac{S_N}{N_i}, \frac{U}{f}] = \frac{S_N}{N_i} \) then \( \sigma_a > \max[\frac{S_N}{N_i}, \frac{U}{f}] \) since by point 1 \( \sigma_a > \frac{U}{f} \).

We are now set to prove proposition 4. In general, the results follow by combining the parameter restriction and the resulting ranking of the cutoffs with the insights derived from Lemma 6. Here are the details.

1. We look at the parameter area where \( 2 > H^U \). Given \( \frac{U}{f} < \frac{S_N}{N_i} \), it follows immediately that unified schooling is preferred for low \( \sigma \), namely \( \frac{U}{f} = \frac{U}{f} < \sigma < \frac{S_N}{N_i} = \frac{S_N}{N_i} \).

(a) Let \( B_i > \frac{N_i}{f} \). For \( i = 2 \) by point 5 of Lemma 6 neither \( \sigma_{a1} \) nor \( \sigma_a \) are relevant cutoffs and therefore secession is never preferred. In turn, for \( i = 1 \) we have to distinguish two further cases: (i) if \( \frac{S_N}{N_i} > \frac{U}{f} \) by point 4 of Lemma 6 \( \sigma_{a1} < \frac{S_N}{N_i} \) and therefore \( \sigma_{a1} \) is not a relevant cutoff. Moreover, since \( \frac{S_N}{N_i} < \frac{S_N}{N_i} \) always by point 3 of Lemma 6 \( \sigma_a \) is not a relevant cutoff either and secession is never preferred; (ii) if \( \frac{S_N}{N_i} < \frac{U}{f} \) by point 4 of Lemma 6 \( \sigma_{a1} \) might be a relevant cutoff. By point 3 of Lemma 6 the relevant cutoff is \( \min[\sigma_{a1}, \sigma_a] \). Notice that \( \sigma_a \) is always relevant by point 7 of Lemma 6 if \( \min[\frac{S_N}{N_i}, \frac{U}{f}] = \frac{S_N}{N_i} \).

(b) Let \( B_i < \frac{N_i}{f} \). Again we need to distinguish two cases: (i) If \( \frac{S_N}{N_i} > \frac{U}{f} \) by point 6 of Lemma 6 \( \sigma_{a2} > \frac{U}{f} \). By point 2 of Lemma 6 if \( \min[\sigma_{a2}, \sigma_a] = \sigma_a \) secession is never preferred, but if \( \min[\sigma_{a2}, \sigma_a] = \sigma_{a2} \) then both cutoffs are relevant and secession is preferred for \( \sigma_{a2} < \sigma < \sigma_a \). In turn, (ii) if \( \frac{S_N}{N_i} < \frac{U}{f} \) by point 6 of Lemma 6 \( \sigma_{a2} < \frac{S_N}{N_i} \) and hence the lower bound for secession becomes \( \frac{S_N}{N_i} \). Also \( \sigma_{a2} < \frac{U}{f} \) and by point 2 of Lemma 6 \( \sigma_{a2} < \frac{S_N}{N_i} \), so \( \sigma_a \) is the relevant upper bound for secession.

2. We now look at the parameter area where \( H^S_i < 2 > H^U \). In this parameter constellation under the unified system the bourgeoisie always fully finances education. Since \( \frac{U}{f} < \frac{S_N}{N_i} \) by point 4 of lemma
6 the cutoff \( \sigma_{aa1} \) is never relevant given that \( \sigma_{aa1} < \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{S} \). From point 4, we also know that \( \sigma_{aa1} < \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{U} \) holds. For \( 2 \mu B_i > N, \bar{\sigma}_{N_i}^{S} > \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{S} \), as \( \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{S} > \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{U} \), then \( \bar{\sigma}_{N_i}^{S} > \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{U} \). Combining this with \( \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{U} > \sigma_{aa1} \), we get that \( \bar{\sigma}_{N_i}^{S} > \sigma_{aa1} \) and thus from point 3, \( \bar{\sigma}_{N_i}^{S} > \sigma_a \), and hence \( \sigma_a \) is not a relevant cutoff and the unified system is always preferred. Consider instead now the case with \( 2 \mu B_i < N \). As \( \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{S} > \sigma_{aa1} \) and \( \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{U} = \sigma_{N_i}^{S} \), from point 6 of lemma 6, we know that \( \bar{\sigma}_{aa2}^{S} > \sigma_{aa1} \) and \( \bar{\sigma}_{aa2}^{S} > \sigma_{B_i}^{S} \). Thus secession with the bourgeoisie pays part of the cost of education is possible if and only if \( \bar{\sigma}_{aa2}^{S} < d - \sigma_{aa2}^{S} \). Note that \( \sigma_a \) is defined as the point of intersection of

\[
\Pi_{B_i}^{U}(I_B^{U}) = \frac{M}{B} (1 - (1 - \beta) \delta B) + M (1 - \beta) \delta \mu \sigma \tag{37}
\]

\[
\Pi_{B_i}^{S}(I_B^{S} = 0) = \delta (1 - \beta) \frac{M}{2} + (1 - \beta) \frac{M}{2} \mu \sigma. \tag{38}
\]

It is easy to check that the intercept of (38) is higher and its slope with respect to \( \sigma \) half of the slope of (37). In turn, \( \sigma_{aa1} \) and \( \sigma_{aa2} \) give the point of intersection of \( \Pi_{B_i}^{U}(I_B^{U} = \frac{M}{2}) \) with

\[
\Pi_{B_i}^{S}(I_B^{S} = \bar{I}_{B_i}^{S}) = - \frac{M}{4B_i} (2 - (1 - \beta) (2B_i \delta - N)) + \frac{(1 - \beta) (2 \mu B_i + N) \delta M}{4B_i} \sigma \tag{39}
\]

for respectively \( 2 \mu B_i > N \) and \( 2 \mu B_i < N \). In addition, the slope of (39) is smaller than the slope of (37) if and only if \( 2 \mu B_i > N \). The intercept of (39) is always smaller than the intercept of (37) for secession of region 2. This is also true as long as \( \sigma_{aa2} \) is positive for secession in region 1.\(^{27}\) Therefore we have \( \sigma_{aa2} < \sigma_a \) for \( 2 \mu B_2 < N \). Then, from point 2, we also have that \( \sigma_{aa2} < \bar{\sigma}_{N_i}^{S} \) and \( \bar{\sigma}_{N_i}^{S} < \sigma_a \), which implies that region-2 secession is chosen by the bourgeoisie for \( 2 \mu B_2 < N \) if \( \sigma_{aa2} < \sigma < \sigma_a \).

3. Finally we study the parameter area \( H_{Si} > 2 \). In this case we always have \( \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{U} < \bar{\sigma}_N < \bar{\sigma}_{N_i}^{S} \) hence the bourgeoisie always fully finances education under unified schooling. We also have \( \bar{\sigma}_{B_i}^{S} < \bar{\sigma}_N \), so that the bourgeoisie is always willing to go for co-payment for \( \bar{\sigma}_N < \sigma < \bar{\sigma}_{N_i}^{S} \) and will get education for free for \( \sigma > \bar{\sigma}_{N_i}^{S} \).

\(^{27}\)But the opposite holds if \( \sigma_{aa2} \) is negative.
In this parameter area, \( \bar{\sigma}_{S_{B1}} > \bar{\sigma}_{B1} \) always holds. Then by point 4 (rep. point 3) of lemma 6 \( \sigma_{a1} < \bar{\sigma}_{B1} \) (resp. \( \sigma_a < \bar{\sigma}_{S_{B1}} \)) which implies that \( \sigma_{a1} \) (resp. \( \sigma_a \)) is never a relevant cutoff and that unified schooling is always preferred. Now, by point 6 of lemma 6 \( \bar{\sigma}_{a2} > \bar{\sigma}_{B1} \). Can it be the case that secession is preferred for \( \bar{\sigma}_{a2} \)? From (33), the cutoff \( \bar{\sigma}_{a2} \) might only be relevant if \( 2\mu B_i < N \). Note that this can be rewritten as \( 2\mu B_i + B < 1 \). The parameter area we are studying requires \( \bar{\sigma}_{S_{B1}} = 2(1 - \beta)(\mu - 1)B_i > 2 \). Combining both conditions requires \( 2\mu B_i + B < (1 - \beta)(\mu - 1)B_i \) which is equivalent to \( (2\mu - (1 - \beta)(\mu - 1))B_i + B < 0 \) which is clearly false. Hence \( \sigma_{a2} \) cannot be a relevant cutoff when \( \bar{\sigma}_{S_{B1}} > 2 \). So unified schooling is always preferred when it is implementable.

However, education under secession of region \( i \) is implemented by the bourgeoisie before unified schooling is implemented by the dominant landowners, namely for \( \bar{\sigma}_{S_{B1}} < \sigma < \sigma_{N_i} \). For these parameter values, the dominant bourgeoisie in region \( i \) prefers secession of region \( i \) to be dominated by landowners with no schooling.

D.2.2 Regionally dominant but nationally dominated landowners

Proof of Proposition 5  If landowners are dominant in region \( i \) but dominated at the state level, they prefer secession whenever \( I_N^U > I_{N_i}^S \). The following educational costs are possible

- For \( 2 > H_i^U \) there are two possible rankings of the cutoffs:

  1. \( \bar{\sigma}_{N_i} < \sigma_{N_i} < \bar{\sigma}_{N_i} < \sigma_{B1} \) (Lemma 5). For \( \sigma > \bar{\sigma}_{B1} \) education is free under secession but has to be paid fully under unified schooling, so secession is preferred. For \( \bar{\sigma}_{N_i} < \sigma < \sigma_{B1} \), under unified schooling, \( N \) landowners pay full education costs for \( M \) mass members, while under secession there is co-payment and thus \( N/2 \) landowners pay less than the full cost for \( M/2 \) mass members implying that \( I_{N_i}^S < I_N^U \) and thus secession is preferred. Next, for \( \bar{\sigma}_{N_i} < \sigma < \bar{\sigma}_{N_i} \) landowners pay their maximum willingness under unified schooling \( I_N^S = \frac{(\delta - \sigma - 1)(1 - \beta)M}{2N} \) and copay under secession \( I_{N_i}^S = \frac{1 - B_i(1 - \beta)(\delta \sigma - 1)}{N}M \) and it can be shown \( I_N^U > I_{N_i}^S \Leftrightarrow \sigma > \sigma_{N_i} \), so secession is also preferred by the landowners whenever
\[ \sigma > \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S, \text{ i.e., whenever it is implementable. For } \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^U < \sigma < \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S, \text{ education is only implemented under unified schooling, and thus the landowners prefer unified schooling in that case.} \]

2. \( \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^U < \sigma < \tilde{\sigma}_{B_i}^S < \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S \) (Lemma 5). For \( \sigma > \tilde{\sigma}_{B_i}^S \) education is free under secession but the landowners either pay their maximal willingness or the entire education under unified schooling, so secession is preferred. For \( \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S < \sigma < \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^U \), landowners pay their maximum willingness under the unified schooling \( \tilde{T}_{N_i}^U = \frac{(\delta \sigma - \alpha - 1)(1 - \beta - \gamma)M}{2} \) and copay under secession \( \tilde{T}_{N_i}^S = \frac{1 - \alpha - \gamma}{N} \tilde{B}_i (1 - \beta - \gamma)(\delta \sigma - 1)M \) and \( \tilde{T}_{N_i}^S > \tilde{T}_{N_i}^U \) whenever \( \sigma > \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S \). Finally, for \( \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^U < \sigma < \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S \), education is only implemented under unified schooling, and thus the landowners prefer unified schooling in that case.

- For \( H^S_i < 2 < H^U \) the cutoffs rank as follows \( \tilde{T}_{N_i}^S < \sigma < \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S < \min[\tilde{T}_{N_i}^U, \tilde{T}_{B_i}^S] \) (Lemma 5). If \( \min[\tilde{T}_{N_i}^U, \tilde{T}_{B_i}^S] = \tilde{T}_{N_i}^U \), then we have the same cases as for \( 2 > H^U \) and secession is always preferred (for \( \sigma > \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S \)) when it is implementable. If \( \min[\tilde{T}_{N_i}^U, \tilde{T}_{B_i}^S] = \tilde{T}_{B_i}^S \), then for \( \sigma > \tilde{\sigma}_{B_i}^S \) education is free under secession and the landowners have to pay their maximal willingness (and later even the entire education) under unified schooling, so secession is preferred. For \( \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S < \sigma < \tilde{\sigma}_{B_i}^S \) there is copayment under secession while the landowners have to pay their maximal willingness under unified schooling, and we have shown that secession is preferred for \( \sigma > \tilde{\sigma}_{N_i}^S \). Hence also here secession is always preferred when it is implementable.

- For \( H^S_i > 2 \) landowners get education under secession for free, so it is always preferred when it is implementable.

### E Welfare analysis

#### E.1 Proof of Proposition 6

Regional schooling is preferred to unified schooling by social planner if and only if \( 1 + B_2 + \frac{N}{2} + \delta \left( 1 + \sigma \left( \mu B_1 + \frac{N}{2} \right) \right) > 2 \delta \left( 1 + \sigma \right) \frac{N}{2} + (1 + \mu \sigma)B \), which is equivalent to \( \sigma < \sigma_z = \frac{1 + \left( \frac{N}{2} + B_2 \right) - \delta B}{\delta \left( \frac{N}{2} + \mu (B_2 + B) \right)} \). However, it is easy to show that \( \sigma_z < \sigma_{W_{R_i}^S} \) which means that region-1 schooling is preferred.
to unified schooling only when the social planner prefers no education to region-1 schooling, and thus regional schooling is never preferred over unified schooling. The same applies to region-2 schooling as $\sigma_{W}^{R_{1}S_{1}} < \sigma_{W}^{R_{2}S_{2}}$. Finally, regional schooling with schooling in both regions is dominated by unified schooling given that the cost of both systems is the same and only unified schooling generates cross-regional matches.

E.2 Proof of Proposition 7

We first show that when $H^{U} < 2$, there is too little nation building from a social point of view for $\sigma_{W}^{U} < \sigma \leq \sigma_{W}^{U}$. For $H^{U} < 2$, the threshold for unified schooling is always $\sigma_{W}^{U}$ no matter the identity of the dominant group, and it is easy to show that $\sigma_{W}^{U} < \sigma_{W}^{U}$ always holds.

Next we consider the case where $H^{U} > 2$. When the landowners are dominant, the relevant cutoff for education is $\sigma_{N}$. We need to show that here is too little nation building from a social point of view for $\sigma_{W}^{U} < \sigma \leq \sigma_{N}$. It can be shown that $\sigma_{W}^{U} < \frac{1}{B} = \sigma_{N} \Leftrightarrow 2 < B(2\mu + \delta - 1)$ and thus for $H^{U} \equiv (1 - \beta) B(2\mu + \delta - 1) > 2$, $\sigma_{W}^{U} < \sigma_{N}$ holds. If the bourgeoisie is dominant, the relevant cutoff is $\sigma_{B}^{U}$. It is easy to show that $\sigma_{W}^{U} > \sigma_{B}^{U} \Leftrightarrow H^{U} > 2 + \frac{4\beta B \delta}{N}$. Thus, for $H^{U} < 2 + \frac{4\beta B \delta}{N}$, $\sigma_{W}^{U} < \sigma_{B}^{U}$ and there is undereducation for $\sigma_{W}^{U} < \sigma < \sigma_{B}^{U}$, and instead for $H^{U} < 2 + \frac{4\beta B \delta}{N}$, $\sigma_{W}^{U} > \sigma_{B}^{U}$ holds and there is overeducation for $\sigma_{B}^{U} < \sigma < \sigma_{W}^{U}$.

E.3 Efficiency of Region-1 Secession

Figure A1 studies the optimality of schooling under region-1 secession when the bourgeoisie is dominant and $\beta = 0.1$, $\delta = 0.95$, $B_{1} = 0.45$, $B = 0.5$, and $M = 2$. The dashed line represents the threshold for the implementation of education under region-1 secession for a dominant bourgeoisie (given by $\sigma_{B}^{R_{1}}$ as for these parameter values $H^{S_{1}} > 2$), while the solid line represents the socially-efficient productivity threshold ($\sigma_{W}^{R_{1}S_{1}}$).
As for unified schooling, the efficient no-education (resp. education) decision is taken in region I (resp. region IV), while there is undereducation in region II and overeducation in region III.

E.4 Proof of Proposition 8

From Proposition 4, unified schooling cannot be implemented but secession can for $H_{S_i} > 2$ and $\hat{\sigma}_{B_i}^{S_i} < \sigma < \sigma_N$. As $H_{S_i} > 2 \iff \hat{\sigma}_{B_i}^{S_i} < \sigma_N \iff (1 - \beta)(\mu - 1)B_i > 1$, then we know that $\sigma_{W_i}^{R_i S_i} < \sigma_N \iff (\mu - 1)B_i > 1$ necessarily holds here. As secession is preferred to no education whenever $\sigma > \sigma_{W_i}^{R_i S_i}$, secession is optimal and implementable for $\max[\sigma_{W_i}^{R_i S_i}, \sigma_{B_i}^{S_i}] < \sigma < \sigma_N$.

E.5 Numerical examples of overprovision and underprovision of secession by a regional dominant but nationwide dominated bourgeoisie

Example 1 For $\beta = 0.1$, $N = 0.3$, $B_1 = 0.5$, $\delta = 0.9$ and $\mu = 3.5$ we have $\sigma_{W_i}^{R_i S_i} = 0.964912 < \sigma_{B_i}^{S_i} = 1.02293 < \sigma_N = 1.1111$. Implemented secession
is socially optimal for $\sigma_{B_1}^S < \sigma < \sigma_N$ but there is too little secession for $\sigma_{W}^{R,S_i} < \sigma < \sigma_{B_1}^S$.

**Example 2** For $\beta = 0.05$, $N = 0.45$, $B_1 = 0.5$, $\delta = 0.95$ and $\mu = 5$ we have $\sigma_{B_1}^S = 0.65374 < \sigma_{W}^{R,S_i} = 0.666345 < \sigma_N = 1.05263$. Implemented secession is socially optimal for $\sigma_{W}^{R,S_i} < \sigma < \sigma_N$ but there is too much secession for $\sigma_{B_1}^S < \sigma < \sigma_{W}^{R,S_i}$.

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