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**Productivity, Wages, and Marriage:
The Case of Major League Baseball**

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Abstract

The effect of marriage on productivity and, consequently, wages has been long debated in economics. A primary explanation for the impact of marriage on wages has been through its impact on productivity, however, there has been no direct evidence for this. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by directly measuring the impact of marriage on productivity using a sample of professional baseball players from 1871 - 2007. Our results show that only lower ability men see an increase in productivity, though this result is sensitive to the empirical specification and weakly significant. In addition, despite the lack of any effect on productivity, high ability married players earn roughly 16 - 20 percent more than their single counterparts. We discuss possible reasons why employers may favor married men.

JEL Classifications: J31, J44, J70

Keywords: Productivity, wage gap, marriage, and baseball

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1 Introduction

Are married men more productive? Empirical estimates of the effect of marriage on productivity and wages have been long debated in economics since seminal work by Becker (1973, 1974). The main conclusion in standard cross-sectional log wage regressions is that married men are estimated to earn roughly 10 - 40 percent higher wages than their single counterparts. However, whether or not this increase in wages is due to a causal effect of marriage on productivity has proven difficult to pin down due to the lack of readily available data that contain wages, marital status *and* objective productivity measures. We aim to fill this gap by directly measuring the impact of marriage on both productivity and wages using a unique database that we compiled on professional baseball players.

There are a number of proposed explanations for why married men earn more than their single counterparts. First of all, the positive correlation between marriage and wages may simply be due to selection. In particular, selection may be based on unobserved characteristics that are correlated with both marital status and productivity. Additionally, the positive correlation between marriage and wages may be due to reverse causality where men with high wages or high wage growth tend to be more successful in the marriage market. Alternatively, marriage may afford specialization between household and non-household work. Because men are freer to concentrate on non-household work, they therefore become more productive workers. Finally, employer discrimination is also considered as a possible explanation as married men are often seen as more reliable workers. Ultimately, the effect of marriage on productivity is of particular interest for analyzing gender-based discrimination in labor markets, as the male marital pay premium accounts for about one-third of estimated gender-based wage discrimination in the United States (Neumark, 1988). While the

difference in earnings between men and women has shrunk since the late 1970s, a significant gender gap still remains.¹ However, if the male marital pay premium derives from increased productivity, then the proportion of the gender gap due potentially to discrimination may be overstated.

A notable feature of our analysis is that we use direct objective measures of productivity. Specifically, we consider professional baseball players, making use of data we hand collected from the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum data depositories and merged with a number of official productivity measures in baseball. This rich dataset allows us to directly assess whether there is a relationship between marriage and productivity as opposed to only an indirect linkage via wages. In addition, we are able to make use of these productivity measures, as well as institutional details unique to wage setting in baseball, in testing for dynamic selection.

We find a positive effect of marriage on productivity only for players in the lower third of the ability distribution, though the effect is sensitive to the empirical specification and statistically weak. We find no effect for higher ability men. Moreover, in line with previous studies, our results also show that marriage and wages are positively correlated even after controlling for selection, though, only for certain players. Married men in the top third of the ability distribution earn roughly 16 - 20 percent more than their single counterparts. All of these results hold in the post-1975 era when strict rules governing contracts were overturned and wages became free to respond to market forces. We hypothesize that for higher ability men the impact on wages may be due to a number of non-tangible aspects of marriage that are not necessarily captured by our standard productivity measures such as stability, leadership, negotiation skills and popularity. If such attributes have causal impacts on team revenues then managers may have reasons to “discriminate” in their favor. Thus, it is clear that how broad of a definition of productivity we take determines whether we re-

fer to this positive effect on wages as discriminatory or simply capturing alternative, less quantifiable productivity measures that impact marginal revenue product (MRP). We provide some evidence in support of the latter, where marriage has a negative effect on the variance of our productivity measures for certain players (and a positive effect for others) and a positive effect on the extraction of economic rent. That is, the gap between marginal revenue product and wages is smaller for high ability married players. In addition, we also find that the team level fraction of married players is positively correlated with ballpark attendance and team wins.

2 Literature

Our analysis touches on the literature from a number of different areas. First, there is a vast literature that documents the very robust observation that married men earn more than their single counterparts. All studies, both cross sectional and panel data, typically include a measure of log wages for the dependent variable and a binary indicator for marital status, some variation of marital status (never married, cohabitation, divorced) or length of marriage along with other demographic controls such as age, education, experience and race. Attempts are made to control indirectly for cross-sectional variation in ability but cannot dismiss the interpretation that the results are driven by unobserved individual characteristics and the effect is overstated due to selection into marriage.² In other words, men with high unobserved ability exhibit characteristics that are more likely to be found attractive by both employers and potential spouses (for example, stability, industriousness, physical appearance, etc.)³ Cross-sectional studies (for example, Bellas (1992), Blau and Beller (1988), Blackburn and Korenman (1994), Chun and Lee (2001), Duncan and Holmlund (1983), Hill (1979), Kenny (1983), Korenman and Neumark (1991), Krashinsky

(2004), Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987), Schoeni (1995)) have typically estimated a marriage premium ranging between 10 - 40 percent.⁴ Panel data results have been mixed, some studies find no statistically significant effect of marriage on wages while others find a residual positive effect (see, for Cornwell and Rupert (1995, 1997), Duncan and Holmlund (1983), Ginther and Zavodny (2001), Gray (1997), Hersch and Stratton (2000), Korenman and Neumark (1991), Krashinsky (2004), Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009), Neumark (1988), and Stratton (2002)). Panel data studies with a residual positive effect generally conclude that there is some causal effect of marriage on wages, whether it is on productivity or merely discrimination is not completely resolved.⁵

The causal impact of marriage on productivity has received indirect support in the literature. The aforementioned papers that found a residual effect of marriage on wages, after controlling for individual fixed effects and other controls, generally interpret the effect as arising from specialization. Attempts have been made to test this causal explanation by controlling for hours worked by the wife. Evidence is mixed. Many of the papers that have contributed to this literature, for example, Daniel (1993 and 1995), Gray (1997), and Chun and Lee (2001) find a wage penalty associated with wife's labor hours. On the other hand, Hersch and Stratton (2000), Loh (1996), Jacobsen and Rayack (1996), and Hotchkiss and Moore (1999) find little to no evidence that wives' labor force participation underlies the decrease in the return to marriage for men.

To our knowledge, there are three papers that make use of productivity measures and are therefore particularly relevant for our study. Korenman and Neumark (1991) use data from a personnel file of a large U.S. manufacturing firm from 1976. The data contain supervisor performance ratings that provide a measure of worker productivity aside from the worker's wage. The authors attempt to measure productiv-

ity, albeit somewhat subjectively, and find that nearly all of the return to marriage (from 23 percent to 2 percent) disappears once adding pay grade and performance rating dummies. Mehay and Bowman (2005) use administrative data on male U.S. Naval officers in technical and managerial jobs to explore the effect of marriage on several job performance measures (e.g. promotion outcomes and annual performance reviews). They find that married men receive higher performance ratings and are more likely to be promoted than non married men. In both cases, however, these are subjective measures as it is plausible that supervisors simply perceive married men to be more productive workers and therefore give them higher performance ratings or grant them more frequent promotions.⁶ Finally, Hellerstein et al. (1999) use manufacturing firm level data to estimate relative marginal products of various worker types, in particular married versus single. They then compare these estimates to wages. They find that differences in wages between ever married and never married men reflect a corresponding productivity premium. However, a weakness of their empirical approach is that they cannot distinguish between the causality and selection hypotheses.

The productivity measures we use, alternatively, are objective measures based on exogenous, historical measures of productivity. These objective measures of productivity have been extensively used in the sports economics literature mainly for analyzing the role of labor contracts and more generally for studying the specificities of the baseball labor market (Kahn, 1993; Macdonald and Reynolds, 1994; Rottenberg, 1956; Scully, 1974; Zimbalist, 2003), and the role of strategic management (Porter and Scully, 1982; Smart, Winfree and Wolfe, 2008). Sports data has also been used to address issues of race discrimination (Andresen and La Croix, 1991; Depken and Ford, 2006; Gwartney and Haworth, 1974; Hanssen and Andersen, 1999; Hill and Spellman, 1984; Lanning, 2010; Nardinelli and Simon, 1990; Price and Wolfers, 2010).

The primary advantage for the use of such data is the availability of repeated measures of performance and visible characteristics of the player. The marriage premium is potentially another form of discrimination and whether or not differences in wages between married and single men are due to discrimination cannot be fully addressed unless productivity is also taken into account.⁷ We note however, how one measures productivity is clearly important in this analysis and we address this concern further in Section 9.

3 A Model of Spousal Investment

There was one big glitch: these sorts of calculations could value only past performance. No matter how accurately you value past performance, it was still an uncertain guide to future performance. Johnny Damon (or Terrence Long) might lose a step. Johnny Damon (or Terrence Long) might take to drink or get divorced. (Lewis, 'Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game', p. 136)

It was better than rooming with Joe Page.

Joe DiMaggio's response when asked if his marriage to Marilyn Monroe was good for him.⁸

In this section we sketch a model and provide intuition for the effect that marriage has on spousal productivity and wages.⁹ We assume here that marriage impacts wages through two channels. First, it impacts wages indirectly through its positive causal effect on productivity that occurs because the wife engages in particular actions that impact the productivity of the husband.¹⁰ The main purpose of this involvement is to provide her husband with uncluttered time. For example, a wife may engage in home production such as cooking, cleaning and childcare so that her

husband can focus on his career with fewer distractions. She may also provide career advice and moral support or simply allow him extra sleep. Second, we also allow for marriage to impact wages directly as opposed to indirectly via productivity. These direct influences can take on a number of forms that may lead employers to discriminate in favor of married men. For example, a wife may impact her husband's popularity and visibility through public image (for example, hosting formal dinners, participating in public events, charity events, etc.) or marriage may increase a man's stability, reliability (among other characteristics) that in turn make him a better teammate. Like many high profile professions, a professional athlete's career is accompanied by numerous formal and informal expectations and therefore not only is the management of the athlete's self-image important, but that of their wives is crucial too. The wife represents her husband to the public, providing a visible link between the worlds of work and family (Crute, 1981).¹¹ In sum, through these two channels, the wife is able to take actions that make each unit of her husband's time in the market more effective and/or more profitable. All of these wage-enhancing activities are subsumed under the heading of "augmentation activities."

Thus, a husband's wage is a function of direct augmentation activities and productivity while productivity is, in turn, a function of indirect augmentation activities and innate ability. Both are also functions of other demographic characteristics such as age and race as well as variables such as experience. We assume further that these variables affect men of varying ability levels differently. We can therefore model productivity and wages as follows:

$$P(\rho, t, X) \quad \text{and}$$

$$S = S(P, \tau, X), \tag{1}$$

where P represents productivity, S is yearly salary, τ is the direct and t the indirect activities that impact spousal wages, and X is a vector of other variables that impact productivity and wages, such as age, race, and experience, among others. Ability is captured by ρ , where higher numbers represent higher innate ability.

We focus on the particular case of our model where wives invest solely in augmentation activities and do not work. In addition, leisure is predetermined for both spouses in order to abstract from the labor-leisure decision.¹² Thus, total available time for the wife (T) is divided between the two augmentation activities. There are a number of interesting implications from this simple model. For instance, suppose that two men have different ability but equal productivity, that is, $\rho_1 > \rho_2$ but $P(\rho_1, t_1, X) = P(\rho_2, t_2, X)$. Under the assumption of monotonicity of $P(\cdot)$, $t_1 < t_2$ and therefore $\tau_1 = T - t_1 > T - t_2 = \tau_2$. In words, conditional on equal productivity, the wives of higher ability men spend less time on indirect and more time on direct augmentation than the wives of lower ability men. As a result, $S(P(\rho_1, t_1, X), T - t_1, X) = S(P(\rho_2, t_2, X), T - t_1, X) > S(P(\rho_1, t_1, X), T - t_2, X)$ by monotonicity of $S(\cdot)$. Another way to think about it is as follows: in the case of differing abilities but equal time spent on indirect augmentation, that is $\rho_1 > \rho_2$ and $t_1 = t_2$, we have $P(\rho_1, t_1, X) > P(\rho_2, t_2, X)$. Provided $P(\cdot)$ is quasiconcave, the marginal impact of an increase in t is decreasing in ability.

Families maximize utility subject to standard budget constraints

$$\max_t u(C) \quad \text{subject to}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
C - S(P(\rho^m, t^f, X^m), T - t^f, X^m) + Y &\leq 0, \\
\tau^f + t^f &\leq T, \\
C, \tau^f, t^f &\geq 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where, in addition to the variables described above, C is consumption, and Y is nonwage income. The indexes m and f represent male and female, respectively.

The first order condition with respect to t is as follows:

$$S_1(P, T - t^f, X) \cdot P_2(\rho^m, t^f, X^m) \leq S_2(P, T - t^f, X^m) \tag{3}$$

where equality holds in the case of an interior solution (that is, the spouse does not desire to spend more than T hours on augmentation activities). The left hand side of equation (3) reflects the return to indirect augmentation while the right hand reflects the implied return on direct augmentation. For a given value of ρ , the wife equates the marginal value of one more unit invested in τ_f with the marginal value of one more unit invested in t_f . In this model, both spouses are fully invested in one career. Wives form a work pattern that Papanek (1973, p.90) has labeled the “two person career,” characterized by “...a combination of formal and informal institutional demands ... (are) placed on both members of a married couple of whom only the man is employed by the institution.”

4 A Primer on Baseball

Professional athletes are a subsample of the population where direct measurements of productivity are observable. In contrast to other team sports, such as basketball and soccer, performance in baseball is directly quantifiable and with a number

of measures that are relatively independent of the actions of the player's teammates. Moreover, while there have been changes in the rules over time, relatively speaking, baseball is a fairly stable sport with a long history of uniform player statistics collection. The current typical baseball season is 162 games and runs from early April until early October, followed by the post-season series in October that culminates with the World Series. The regular season is typically divided into 81 "home" games, that is, games played in the team's home stadium and 81 "away" games. There are two main types of players in baseball: pitchers and batters, each with their own productivity measurements.¹³ The role of pitchers is to prevent the other team from scoring runs, while the role of batters is score runs for the team. The overall goal in the game is to score more runs than the opposing team.

4.1 Productivity Measures

As will be discussed in Section 5, we center our analysis on batters. There are numerous measures of productivity for batters, among which experts will disagree as to which is the "best." We focus on a number of well accepted measures, the simplest of which is the "Batting Average" (BA). BA is defined as the number of hits divided by the number of opportunities to bat ("at-bats") in a season. Another conventional measure is "On-Base plus Slugging" (OPS) which combines the "On-Base-Percentage" (OBP) statistic that measures the number of ways a batter can get on base (hits, walks and hit by pitch) with a measurement of the player's ability to hit for power (a weighted average of the number of bases reached per at-bat). We also consider two other measures "Wins Above Replacement" (WAR) and "Performance Evaluation Value" (PEVA). WAR is a measure that is meant to capture the value of a player (in terms of wins) to the team and represents the number of wins a player provides the

team above what a team would win were it to replace the player with an average minor league player off the bench. PEVA, like WAR, is meant to provide an overall player rating. PEVA uses a complex formula to measure the overall statistical performance of the player in a year. The measure compares players against other players' performance in a peer-to-peer era review. PEVA ranges from a minimum of .2 to a theoretical maximum value of 64. A value of 3.5 is considered average and anything above 10 is considered very good. The first two measurements are calculable from Sean Lahman's Baseball Archive (www.baseball1.com). WAR was obtained from Sean Smith (www.baseballprojection.com) and PEVA from *Stat Geek Baseball* (www.baseballevaulation.com). For each case, a higher number represents higher productivity.

4.2 Wage Setting

Wage setting is notoriously complex in baseball with a number of important changes over the past few decades. In 1975, the courts struck down the so called "Reserve Clause." The Reserve Clause, which was standard in all player contracts at this time, stated that upon the contract's expiration, the rights to the player were to be retained by the team with which he had signed. This meant that practically, even though the player's obligations to the team as well as the team's obligations to the player were terminated (at the end of what was generally a six-year contract), the player was not free to enter into another contract with another team. This effectively gave the team market power over the player. Thus, if a player was not happy with his wage or a trade to a particular team the most he could do was refuse to play. Post-1975, players are generally considered to be valued at closer to their true market prices at all stages of their careers.

Figure 1 graphically illustrates the effect of the elimination of the Reserve Clause. Panel (a) of Figure 1 breaks down the sample into players with less than six years of experience and greater than or equal to six years. While, technically, the elimination of the Reserve Clause directly impacted those players with six or more years of experience, the figure shows that the increase in wages was not limited to only those players. Under the expectation that a player would eventually become a free agent, a player is potentially able to extract economic rents earlier in his career. Panel (a) shows that wages for all players began to more steeply increase post-1975 and panel (b) shows in the normalized version of panel (a) that the increase in growth for players with less than six years of experience is even slightly higher than for those players with more than six years of experience. Thus, if marriage has an effect on wages, we would expect that its effect would be stronger post-1975 when wages could more freely respond to market factors.¹⁴

5 Data

The main database we use comes from the Baseball Archive, an extensive database which is copyrighted by Sean Lahman (<http://www.baseball1.com>). It contains detailed yearly performance information on players and teams from 1871 through the current season (2007, at the time of data collection). Since the inception of professional baseball, there have been roughly 16,000 players (and just over 83,000 player-years) that have played in at least one Major League Baseball (MLB) game. Our contribution to the data was the addition of a number of variables (though not always available for every player in every year): marital status, year of marriage, accurate data on wages, and race. While these variables are generally publicly available, there is no standard electronic source, and were therefore hand-collected on site for each

player using the vast archives of the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum (HOF) located in Cooperstown, NY, USA. The main data sources were the National Baseball Library and Archive player questionnaire collection and biographical clippings files, Major League team media guides, *The Sporting News Baseball Register*, 1940 - 1968 and Topps Baseball Cards, 1951 - 1990 (for race data). In addition, these main data sources were supplemented by player contracts, newspaper clippings and internet searches when necessary. Interestingly, obtaining data on players from the early part of the 20th century proved to be no more difficult than more contemporary players and often much easier due to the information available in the questionnaires that were stopped in 1985. Wages for players after 1988 were obtained from *USA Today*, which is regarded to be the most accurate source for more recent player wages. Prior to 1988, wages were not generally collected and made public and were therefore collected from various sources housed at the HOF. In addition, wage data is not at all available prior to 1905. Wages do not include deferred payments, signing bonuses and incentive clauses, nor do they include any income earned by endorsements, or other activities that are not included in the player's contract with the team. This could be of potential concern if we believed that single and married players have different preferences for the makeup of their salaries. While it is quite difficult to verify this concern, a sample of contracts from the 1990s in Section 8.2 does, at a minimum, provide some evidence that married and single players do not sign contracts that systematically differ in length nor do they differ in the composition between base salary, incentive clauses and signing bonuses.¹⁵ While we would have liked to collect data on the universe of players, we were limited by money resources and by the available time of our freelance researchers. We therefore took a simple random sample¹⁶ of 5,000 players (batters and pitchers) that represented 31,000 player-years and ultimately were able to recover data on marital status and/or year of marriage for roughly 27,500 player-

years, wages (roughly 18,600 player-years), and race (roughly 4,800 players).

Table 1 contains summary statistics of the data. Of the 5,000 players for whom we collected data, there are 3404 batters and 1767 pitchers.¹⁷ Because pitchers (a fielding position) are not generally evaluated according to batting productivity measures, we drop them from the analysis and reserve an analysis of pitchers for future research. All forthcoming statistics and empirical analyses apply only to batters. There are differences between the population and sample and these are due, in part, to the fact that while we started with a random sample of players, the final sample that was returned to us was not completely random due to data availability. Some players had very short, uneventful MLB careers and it was more difficult to find the relevant information for these players. Thus, we were slightly biased against finding low skilled players with short careers. Nearly 30 percent of all players played in only one MLB season.¹⁸ Moreover, recall that we stratified on years after 1948. This would affect variables such as wages and career length that have been trending up over time. Thus, because we sampled more heavily from a time period where career lengths are longer, we are more likely to have a higher average value. We are less concerned about differences in our sample that are due to selection on a factor such as time because it is exogenous. We nonetheless note that if our estimation sample is indirectly selected on ability, we may end up with married and single players coming from different ability distributions. This is an important issue and we will return to it throughout the analysis. Provided that marital status has a positive effect on performance or, similarly, career length, this would mean that single players are predicted to come from a distribution with a higher average ability, holding career length fixed. Finally, we additionally lose observations due to a number of reasons. First, for some players we were able to recover marital status but not wages and vice versa. In addition, there are a few missing entries for the covariates from The Baseball Archive, for

example, height, weight, right or left handed. These tend to be slightly concentrated in the early years of the data. Finally, we drop observations where a player switches teams mid season and where we could not find race data.

The top panel of Table 1 contains rookie year demographic information. While the average values of our demographic characteristics for the hand-collected sample of batters are fairly similar to the full population of batters, we reject equality of means in standard t-tests with the exception of the age variable, where we do not reject the null. Race cannot, obviously, be compared to the full sample as this data is missing in the population. Looking at the race variables, we see that 80 percent of batters in our full sample are white, 13 percent are black, 10 percent are Hispanic, and a final category for all other races represents less than one percent of batters. Note that race categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.¹⁹

Our main variable ($married_y$) is defined as a binary indicator equal to one if the player is married in year y , zero otherwise. Sixty-nine percent of our sample observations are married player-years. This reflects a combination of observations from players that are married during their entire careers and some who marry during their careers. More precisely, 39 percent of players marry prior to beginning or in the first year of their MLB careers, while another 36 percent marry at some point during. We also observe players that are single during their entire careers but marry at some point after the career ends (seven percent), and the remaining 18 percent that never marry as of 2007.²⁰ For players who marry, we also attempted to collect the year of marriage. To be clear, depending on when the player was active, we used a number of different data sources to collect the marital status information. For example, for players who had finished their careers by roughly the mid-1980s, our primary source of information was the questionnaires that were typically filled out by the player after the end of the career (or, sometimes by family members if the player was no longer

living) and often provided information on month and year of marriage, sometimes the name of the wife and some detail of the relationship (e.g. high-school sweetheart) if the player married. If there was no information that would suggest that the player later divorced or was widowed, we assumed that the player remained married from that point on and would fill in his marital status accordingly. Alternatively, marital status information for more recent players was typically found in the media guides and would typically report whether the player was married in a particular MLB season. For these cases, we sometimes do not know year of marriage but when looking up the player for *each* year of his career, we can know whether or not he was married or single in that particular season. In some cases this allowed us to back out year of marriage if the player married during the career. That is, if he is reported as single in years $y - 1$ and y and married in year $y + 1$ then we would record his year of marriage as $y + 1$.²¹ However, if a player was always married during the career, there would be no way to back out the year in which he married. We also tried to supplement the questionnaires and media guides with other information in the player's file, such as newspaper clippings. We have no information on cohabitation, though it is certain that some fraction of our single players cohabit without a formal marriage. The extent that cohabiters experience some of the benefits of marriage only strengthens the findings. In a similar vein, we also underestimate divorces due to the nature of the data collection. Player questionnaires were often loath to provide negative information on the player (such as substance abuse or divorce) and so we certainly attribute positive marital status to players who may well be divorced. Again, assuming marriage has an overall positive effect on our outcome variables, misclassifying divorced players as married only strengthens our results. The second panel also reports salary that is adjusted for inflation (1983 base year). The average income across players is quite high at over \$457,000. This is primarily driven by the fairly steep increase in

wage growth that began to occur in the mid-1970s. The standard deviation in wages has also increased over the years, roughly tripling between 1905 and 2007 as baseball began to see its share of “superstar” players.²²

The third panel contains information on the productivity measures and the fourth panel contains a number of other important variables for the analysis. Similar to the demographic characteristics, we reject equality of means between the population and our full hand-collected sample of batters for each of the productivity measures. As expected on the basis of our previous discussion, the productivity measures in the sample are overall slightly higher than the population as a whole.

6 Residual Analysis

Before turning to our econometric models where we control for a number of important covariates, we first present a number of graphs that motivate the main analysis. We plot productivity (BA) and wages against the first 15 years of experience (which covers 93 percent of observations). We restrict our sample to post-1975 (post Reserve Clause, as we will further explain in the next section) and divide our sample based upon initial expected ability. More precisely, we break the sample down into three roughly equal groups based upon the distribution of rookie year plate appearances (what we term “low,” “medium” and “high” expected ability) of the population of players within team. We use plate appearances as a proxy for expected ability and skill - we assume that a player that is expected to perform well will be given more play time, all else equal.²³ Granted, the number of plate appearances in the rookie year is not a perfect measurement of expected ability as, for example, teammate injuries and position in the batting lineup also impact plate appearances. Using an alternative proxy such as rookie year batting average to generate the groups provides overall similar

results.²⁴ In order to keep this section as parsimonious as possible, we discuss overall patterns in the data and defer discussions of statistical significance to Section 7 where we introduce a number of important covariates.

Consider the first column of graphs in Figure 2 where average salary (CPI adjusted) is plotted against experience. Generally speaking, the salary of single players is greater than or equal to that of married players at all levels of experience. The exception to this is for the low ability types at high levels of experience where married players earn more on average. The differences in salary are particularly pronounced for the middle and high ability group at higher levels of experience. Now, consider the right column of the same table where the residuals from a regression of salary on individual fixed effects are plotted against experience. The residuals from this regression contain the elements of salary that are uncorrelated with underlying individual time constant ability (or any other time constant characteristic). The differences in salary for the low ability groups almost completely disappear. The middle and high ability types, in contrast, show a rather interesting pattern. Until six or seven years of experience, both married and single players have negative residuals reflecting that predicted (or average) within individual salaries are higher than current salaries (unsurprising given the upward trend over the career) but what is more interesting here is that married players now have higher residual salaries. Married players now earn more than single players until roughly six years of experience and then the relationship reverses, though the gap between the two groups is lessened. The obvious first thing to check is whether productivity exhibits a similar pattern. Figure 3 presents the analogous graphs where the variable plotted on the vertical axis is now productivity (BA). The left column plots the unconditional variable and the right column the residuals from a regression of BA on individual fixed effects. The left column shows that low ability married players have higher productivity levels than their

single counterparts whereas the reverse relationship holds for the middle and high ability groups. The right column, however, shows that once controlling for individual time constant effects, clear differences in productivities between married and single players disappear. Thus, in general, the relationship between productivity, wages and marriage appears to have a different dynamic for the low ability types as compared to higher ability types. Now revisit subfigure (f) of Figure 2 (and a similar discussion could be made for subfigure (d)). Based upon these graphs, high ability married players do not appear to be markedly more productive than their single counterparts at lower levels of experience, yet, they earn more and the same can be said for single players at higher levels of experience. One possible explanation is that differences in wages and productivity are due to other factors for which we have yet to control (and will do so in the next section). A second explanation is that even after controlling for other relevant variables, differences in wages are due to discrimination on part of the employers where early in the career marriage serves as a positive signal for future productivity. A third and further explanation is that BA (or OPS, WAR, PEVA) does not capture the full productivity and value of the player to the team. Finally, the composition of the sample is changing over time due to attrition (potentially endogenous). Consider the following stylized example. Suppose that all players of a certain ability level last at least six years in the MLB and suppose further that marriage increases career length (due to a more stable lifestyle, for instance) in ways unrelated to innate ability. Thus, when comparing married and single players with more than six years of experience we are comparing single players with higher average ability to married players who have lower average ability and who otherwise would not have had such long careers but for the fact they are married. Thus, while marriage has a positive effect on career length and potentially life time earnings, it would appear that, conditional upon experience, marriage has a negative effect due to fact that single

players with similar levels of experience earn more. We further address these issues in Sections 7 and 8.1.

7 Econometric Specification

As we saw in the previous Section, the extensive data available from The Baseball Archive allows us to follow a large sample of players over the span of their careers. In this section, we present a more formal econometric analysis of the basic observations from Figures 2 and 3. Panel data allows us to hold constant individual-specific factors, essentially identifying the effect of marriage on productivity (and wages) from changes in marital status over a player's career and allows differentiating between the self-selection and causality arguments. Identification in the fixed effects specification will be coming off of the 36 percent of players that switch marital status at least once during their careers while an OLS specification uses variation in marital status across players and time. It is obvious that marital status is not the only factor that potentially affects productivity. Many other factors are well known to affect productivity, such as age and experience. In addition, because our data span well over one hundred years, certain historical events such as World War II, the Korean War, and rule changes that influence our productivity measurements over time should be taken into account. In addition to the aforementioned demographic information, we also include team-ballpark, fielding position, manager, and year fixed effects as well as indicator variables that capture major rule changes that may impact productivity and/or wages.

7.1 The Effect of Marital Status on Productivity

Our baseline specification is:

$$PROD_{iy} = \gamma_0 MAR_{i(y-1)} + x' \gamma_1 + \alpha_i + \tau_t + \pi_p + \delta_y + \mu_m + \varepsilon_{iy} \quad (4)$$

where i and y indicate person and year indexes, respectively. Our main coefficient of interest is γ_0 that captures the mean effect of marital status on productivity (BA, OPS, WAR or PEVA). Marital status is lagged by one year reflecting the fact that the effect of marriage may occur with a delay.²⁵ The vector x includes a number of individual characteristics as described in Table 1. These include binary indicators for race (not mutually exclusive), height and weight in rookie year, binary indicators of right and left-handedness (not mutually exclusive), age and its square, experience and its square, lagged number of games played in the season (as a proxy for injuries) and binary indicators for three or more years experience in MLB and six or more years experience in MLB. Finally, α_i , τ_t , π_p , μ_m and δ_y represent individual, team-ballpark, fielding position, team manager, and year fixed effects.²⁶ The idiosyncratic error term is represented by ε_{iy} and is clustered by player. As previously noted, our preferred estimation is an unobserved effects model that controls for time invariant individual characteristics, particularly ability. Thus, any residual effect of marital status should reflect its causal impact on the productivity measures. In this specification, we include only those control variables that vary nonlinearly over time. These include the squared age and experience terms, the lagged value of games played, three or more years experience in MLB, and six or more years experience. Tables 2 and 3 present estimates of the effect of marriage on productivity pre- and post-1975, respectively.²⁷ Panel A reports the results for BA, panel B for OPS, panel C for WAR, and panel D the results when we consider PEVA as the productivity measure. We estimate the

model initially including only the lagged indicator for marital status (columns 1-2 and 6-7) and then this lagged indicator interacted with the three ability levels (columns 3-5 and 8-10). Finally, we estimate both OLS (columns 1,3,6 and 8) and FE (columns 2,4,5,7,9 and 10) models.

In order to obtain accurate measures of productivity, we restrict our sample to players that have a minimum number of plate appearances. The reason for this is that our productivity measures are yearly averages and if a player did not have a sufficient number of plate appearances (or at-bats) during the course of a season, we possibly obtain productivity measures that while theoretically possible are practically illogical. For example, if a player has only a few plate appearances during a season, it is quite feasible for him to have a batting average of zero (0.000) or even a thousand (1.000). Suppose his batting average is 1.000, it would be foolish to suggest that this player has extremely high productivity – in fact, the opposite is more than likely. This is a statistical problem in the sense that in this instance we do not have enough observation points to accurately calculate a season mean. There is no set rule as to how many observations we need in order to have an accurate measure of productivity. Of course, the more the better but this comes at the cost of losing observations.²⁸ As such, we chose a number of cutoffs to test the robustness of our ad hoc restrictions. Restrictions of 20, 50 and 100 plate appearances in a season provide similar results as does using all the data and weighting by the inverse of plate appearances. For brevity, we present only the results based upon the 100 plate appearances restriction and other restrictions are available upon request.

Consider first Table 2. Pre-1975 results are generally not significant. This is the case also when we separate by ability level, with the single anomalous effect of marriage on productivity for the middle ability players (columns 9 and 10 of Panel D). Results are more interesting, however, when we consider the years after the Reserve

Clause. Looking across the columns in the first row of all panels of Table 3, we see that the simple indicator for the lagged value of marital status is not correlated with standard productivity measures at any conventional level of significance. For example, in column 2 of Panel A, the effect of the lagged value of marital status is an increase in batting average of 0.002 points – an insignificant and small effect given the mean of batting average of 0.249 (std dev of 0.072). It is interesting to observe that the estimated coefficients increase when moving from OLS (columns 1 and 6) to FE (columns 2 and 7) for all productivity measures. This would suggest a negative correlation between ability and marriage.

An interesting pattern is revealed once we divide the sample based upon the initial ability levels. While statistical significance is not consistent, the low ability is the only group to repeatedly show a positive point estimate for the effect of marriage on productivity. Consider Panel A, for example. Married, low-ability, players have batting averages that are five points higher in the OLS specification and seven points higher in the FE specification. These results are significant at ten percent. This finding is also robust to the various restrictions on PA mentioned above. OPS, is consistent in terms of the point estimates but lacks any finding of statistical significance for any of the groups (Panel B). Panels C and D confirm significant correlation in certain specifications between marital status and productivity for players in the low ability group. In particular, in column 5, WAR shows significant correlation at ten percent level, and PEVA (column 9) shows significant correlation at a five percent level where married players score roughly 33 percent higher than single players based on the average post-1975 PEVA of 3.09. An even higher effect is obtained for PEVA when weighting by the inverse of PA (column 10). Across the board, particularly for the WAR and PEVA measures, the point estimates for the low ability group are of many magnitudes larger than for the other two groups. The medium and high

ability groups, in contrast, show relatively small point estimates and signs that flip back and forth between negative and positive estimated effects. Nothing is significant at conventional levels. Thus, in sum, there is no evidence that marriage is correlated with higher productivity for the medium and high ability groups and there is some evidence that players from the low end of the ability distribution see a positive and significant effect, particularly in the FE specifications.²⁹

Finally, we now return briefly to the model from Section 3. One of the predictions from the model is that the wives of low ability men invest more in indirect as opposed to direct augmentation. While we can only use marriage as a rough proxy for investment in augmentation activities, the results from this section lend support to the idea that any potential effect on wages of low ability players is at least partially coming from their increased productivity. Medium and high ability players experience no such impact on productivity and thus, any potential impact on wages would have to come from the direct augmentation activities. Thus, while marriage may overall impact the wages of the different ability groups, the mechanism differs among them.

7.2 The Effect of Marital Status on Wages

The previous section established that we estimate a consistently positive point estimate for marital status for low ability players (again, we acknowledge that these results are sensitive to the particular productivity measure and the empirical model) and no statistically significant robust effect on productivity for any of the other players. We next check whether there is any evidence that marital status impacts log wages. As previously noted, evidence of an impact on wages without a corresponding impact on productivity may be evidence of positive discrimination in favor of married

men.³⁰ As such, we estimate the following equation:

$$\log(wages)_{iy} = \gamma_0 MAR_{i(y-1)} + \gamma_1 PROD_{i(y-1)} + x'\gamma_2 + \alpha_i + \tau_t + \pi_p + \delta_y + \mu_m + \varepsilon_{iy} \quad (5)$$

where the dependent variable represents log wages for player i in year y and the remaining variables are as previously defined. We include among the covariates a measure of productivity thereby allowing for marital status to have a direct impact on wages as opposed to only the indirect impact through productivity.

Broadly speaking, Table 4 shows little evidence of a direct effect of marriage on wages with the exception of the high-ability group post-1975. There are, nonetheless, a number of things to note from this table. First, similar to the productivity results, the pre-1975 subsample shows no effect of marital status on the outcome variable. Second, consider the OLS specification from column 8. The point estimate is negative and significant for the middle ability group and positive and insignificant for the low and high ability groups. Next, when moving from column 8 to column 9 (from OLS to FE), the point estimate for the low ability group falls (though neither is statistically significant) and increases for the medium and high ability groups, though only the high ability group increases both in magnitude and statistical significance, that is from .042 (standard error of .044) to .162 (standard error of .059). This is similar in spirit to what we found in Table 3 and more directly in contrast to the general consensus in past literature that OLS suffers from a positive bias due to unobserved individual characteristics that are found attractive by both potential wives and employers. The increase in the estimated coefficient when moving from OLS to FE would suggest a negative correlation, that is, individual, time constant characteristics that are found attractive to employers are actually *unattractive* to potential spouses. This is not completely without foundation. The type of individual that has the dedication

to the sport that is needed to succeed at such a high level may have little left for time demands outside of the work environment. As before, including additional lags of marital status does not significantly change the results. The results also show that the lagged value of productivity is highly significant across all columns, illustrating that productivity is clearly an important component of wage determination.³¹

Thus, to summarize the findings at this point, we find some evidence (though weak) that marriage has a positive effect on the productivity of low ability players. Using the estimated result from Table 3, where low-ability married players have batting averages that are seven points higher (Table 3, column 4), and combining this with the return to productivity from Table 4, column 9, translates into roughly 1.6 percent higher salary ($2.296 \cdot .007 = .016$). This is a relatively small effect and conceivably not statistically significant. From this same table we see that there is no direct effect of marriage for low ability players. Medium ability players show no consistent patterns in the effect of marriage on productivity nor on wages. Despite finding small point estimates and no statistically significant effect of marriage on productivity for high ability players, there is a direct effect of marriage for this group where married players early approximately 16 - 20 percent more than their single counterparts. In the next section we address some of the threats to identification and then return to address this interesting finding – if it is not higher productivity that is driving the increased wages for high ability players, then what is?³²

Finally, we note that if we instead cluster the standard errors by team, rather than player, our main results are actually strengthened (statistically significant findings either remain at the same level of significance or become more significant and virtually no changes for non-significant findings).

8 Threats to Identification

In this section, we address a number of remaining issues that potentially impact our empirical results.

8.1 Nonrandom Attrition

Parametric and nonparametric hazard models confirm that married players have, on average, longer careers than single players (unreported). Moreover, taking arbitrary career lengths such as three, four or five years, we found that in a cross-section, when regressing binary indicators for having a career length of at least three, four or five years on marital status, productivity and other demographics, we found that marriage always had a positive and significant effect. Both of these results confirm that marriage is somehow correlated with career longevity, though, a priori, do not eliminate the possibility that it is simply time-constant unobserved ability that explains the correlation.³³ In order to more precisely test whether attrition is correlated with our dependent variables we took a simple approach based upon Nijman and Verbeek (1992), where a lead of the selection variable is included as an explanatory variable in our fixed effects regressions. The selection variable equals one in years in which the player is observed and zero in the year he leaves the sample. This lead of the selection variable was consistently statistically significant, suggesting correlation between the dependent variable and attrition.

We take two approaches to addressing this issue: sample restrictions on experience and inverse probability weighting (IPW) [see Moffitt, Fitzgerald, and Gottschalk (1999) and Wooldridge (2000)].³⁴ In the first approach, we cut the sample at various years of experience to test the sensitivity of our results to the attrition problem. We assume that the attrition problem is less severe at lower cutoffs. For brevity, we

present only two of the productivity measures, BA due to its popularity and PEVA due to its superior measure of productivity. Panel A of Table 5 replicates Panel A, column 4 of Table 3, Panel B replicates Panel D, column 4 of Table 3 and, finally, Panel C replicates column 10 of Table 4. Each of the first five columns incrementally restricts from 4 to 20 years of experience. Columns 1 - 5 of Panel A show an increasing point estimate for the low ability group, though, statistically significant only at higher levels of experience. Considering that ability and marriage appear to be negatively correlated from prior results while ability and experience positively so suggests that as years of experience grow the sample of married players that remain perform at a particularly high level and thus have longer careers than what would be expected. Panel B, alternatively, shows a fairly consistent pattern for the low ability group past four years of experience and is significant at a minimum level of ten percent. Panels A and B show no significant results for the other two ability groups, consistent with the main findings.

Panel C, alternatively, shows a slightly increasing and statistically significant result (past four years of experience) for the high ability group and nothing for the lower two ability groups. Again, this is consistent with the main results. Panels A and C do suggest that endogenous attrition may be impacting the main findings as the point estimates increase at different cutoff levels. In this regard, a more conservative estimate would be to use the results from column 2 where the productivity results are somewhat weakened and high ability married players earn closer to 13.4 percent higher wages than their single counterparts (rather than 16 - 20 percent from Table 4).³⁵

The second approach, IPW, involves two steps. First, for $t = 2, \dots, T$, we estimate a probit regression of a binary variable equal to one if the player has not left the sample, zero otherwise, on observables *in the first period* when the sample was chosen

randomly.³⁶ We then calculated fitted probabilities, \hat{p}_{it} and generate weights equal to $1/\hat{p}_{it}$ (for $t = 1$, $\hat{p}_{it} = 1$ for all i).³⁷ Wooldridge (2000) shows that IPW provides a consistent, asymptotically normal estimator. Generally speaking, player observations later in the career receive larger weights reflecting the lower probability of these later years being observed, conditional on observables. The final column of Table 5 reports the IPW results where we again replicated the post-1975 FE specification. The results are very much in line with the main findings.

8.2 Contracts

As alluded to in previous sections, contract setting in baseball is fairly complex. Moreover, historical contract data is, to our knowledge, not available in any public forum. We were, nonetheless, able to obtain three years (1994, 1996 and 1997) of “Joint Exhibit 1,” an official document produced annually by Major League Baseball (the sport’s governing authority) and the Major League Baseball Players Association (the players’ union) pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The Joint Exhibit 1 contains authoritative, comprehensive descriptions of contract terms for all players active on August 31 of the prior season. These data contain contract information for players with at least three years of experience and cover nearly all players who were under such contracts from the mid-1990s to 2001 (roughly 1470 contracts). There are a number of interesting aspects of this data to note. First, fully 64 percent of all contracts are for one year and 90 percent are for three years or less. From our perspective, this is a positive finding. Short-term contracts allow for salary to respond more flexibly to changes in marital status, productivity and other factors.

Once merging this contract data to our dataset, we were able to match nearly 750 contract years for 275 players. A second interesting aspect of the data is that once

controlling for position and experience, we do not reject the null hypothesis that married and single players have similar contract lengths (p-value of 0.48), or have similar preferences for the makeup of their salaries, where total salary in the first year of the contract is comprised of base salary, signing bonuses and incentive clauses (p-values between .31 - .95). Finally, we attempted to re-estimate our baseline log wage results using this matched data and restricted to observations that were not locked into multiyear contracts (roughly 475 observations), under the hypothesis that salaries would not be flexible after a contract was set. The results from this estimation were inconclusive – the point estimates were consistent with our baseline findings but not statistically significant. Even so, under the assumption that the 1990s are rather representative of other decades (at a minimum post-1975), we are more confident that contracts are not severely hampering flexibility in salary setting in our main database nor do there appear to be any obvious differences in preferences in contract setting between married and single players.

8.3 Reverse Causality (Dynamic Selection)

An important issue yet to be fully addressed is that of reverse causality. Increased wages and propensity to marry may be correlated with time variant unobserved characteristics of the player (for example, becoming a more “serious” individual). If changes in these individual characteristics manifest themselves fairly simultaneously with higher productivity and/or increases wages and changes in marital status, the nature of our data would make separating out the direction of causality difficult. While we cannot directly test the impact of changing unobservable characteristics of a player, we rely on correlated observables such as wages, productivity and their growth rates that impact the probability of marriage.³⁸ To our knowledge,

Korenman (1988) is the only paper that attempts some sort of formal test. He finds no evidence for reverse causality when regressing current wages on future marital status. We are able to undertake tests similar to Korenman (1988) where we regress current wages and wage growth on future marital status. We can also make use of the institutional setting unique to baseball that provides exogenous variation in wages but is arguably uncorrelated with marital status. For a sample of players who are not married by their first year in the league, we can test whether they are more likely to get married after their third year post-1973 when the player becomes arbitration eligible or after their sixth year post-1975 when the Reserve Clause is no longer binding. In both cases, wages tend to sharply jump up. Second, we can check how productivity growth impacts the probability of marriage. If a player performs well, there may be increased expectations that he will eventually be compensated with higher wages once he can renegotiate. Thus, while his current wages are not at his full earning potential, high levels of productivity or productivity growth may predict an increased future wage and propensity to marry. The fact that we are able to control for current productivity and its growth greatly improves the ability to test for reverse causality. Table 6 presents the results. In columns 1 - 4, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not the player marries in the subsequent year, $y + 1$, whereas in columns 5 - 8 it is whether or not the player marries in year $y + 2$. As in prior regressions we include all the binary indicator controls (year, team-ballpark, etc) and the individual controls of age, experience and their squared terms, the race indicator variables, height, weight and right/left handed and the lagged value of games played. We estimate all the models using standard OLS so that we even allow for time constant unobservables to partially explain the probability of getting married. Moreover, we interact all of our potential predictors of marriage with the ability indicators. Columns 1 and 5 take a reduced-form type approach - we are interested in

whether players after their third or sixth years are more likely to marry given that wages tend to sharply increase after these milestone years. The results show that players are no more likely to marry. We subsequently include the lagged value of wages (columns 2 and 6), their growth rate (columns 3 and 7) and lagged productivity growth rates (columns 4 and 8). With the exception from column 6 that shows that higher log wages for the low ability group weakly predict a higher probability of marrying two years later, and from column 8 that shows that higher productivity growth rates for the medium ability group weakly predict a lower probability of marrying two years later, none of the specifications show that lags of wages or productivity are statistically significant predictors of future marital status, suggesting that our main findings are not obviously driven by reverse causality. We also note that we checked contemporaneous correlation and longer leads of marriage such as three and four years. None of the specifications showed that our independent variables of interest were good predictors of marriage (unreported but available upon request).

9 Discussion

The results from Section 7.2 have established that marriage has a direct effect on earnings of the high ability players and no effect on low and medium ability players. This leads to two questions. First, why do employers appear to discriminate in favor of married players given the lack of any improvement in productivity and why only high ability types? We expect high ability men to benefit more from direct augmentation (activities that directly impact wages) because the benefits of indirect augmentation (activities that indirectly impact wages through productivity) are relatively small by this level of skill. These are men who begin their careers already in the upper third of the ability distribution, marginal gains in productivity are difficult to achieve and

are small. Thus, for high ability men, the wife's role has mainly to do with the direct aspects of augmentation activities, such as public image. The benefits of the direct augmentation activities "kick in" once productivity is nearing high levels such that men find other ways in which to compete and set themselves apart from others in their profession. In contrast, the most likely augmentation channel for the low ability player has more to do with ways in which the wife can allow him to improve in his job. Allowing him to dedicate more scarce resources, like time, to his work, can do this. We do find some weak evidence for this in Table 3 and this translates into a fairly negligible 1.6 percent increase in wages. The fact that the pre-1975 results show no consistent patterns or statistical significance, on average, for any of the players for either productivity or wages, leads us to surmise that the role of the wife has changed over time. More recent periods see a much more visible presence of the wife and her role in the husband's career.³⁹ This is true for many high profile professions where the wife is seen as a potential asset in the husband's success. However, it is difficult to parse out the changing role of the wife from the changing rules that impacted salaries. Both are identified over time and our data are not sufficiently nuanced to separate the two.

Thus, if employers discriminate in favor of married high ability players, we hypothesize that there must be some added benefit to teams to having such players that we have not fully captured by considering only the standard productivity measures. This is consistent with a relatively small literature that documents that employees are also rewarded for noncognitive qualities in the workplace. For example, Klein, Spady, and Weiss (1991) find that given equal productivity in a semi-skilled assembly line job, workers with higher education earn more. Education in this case proxies for lower unobserved quit propensities. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) find that noncognitive ability is at least as important, if not more, than cognitive ability

in determining wages. Along these lines, while we find that married players are not necessarily more productive, what is often important from the team's perspective is "the bottom line," the marginal revenue that married players generate may be higher than single players. This may be due to the image and popularity of a player increasing the fan base or perhaps more subtle benefits to the team that are not captured by batting productivity. Marriage may lead to stability, reliability, maturity and leadership skills that single players of the same ability level are less likely to have. This interpretation is in line with the three-factor model of interpersonal trustworthiness (ability, integrity, benevolence) established by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995). All three factors of ability, benevolence, and integrity can contribute to trust in a group or organization. Ability is only one of these determinants, and married men are more likely than single men to score higher on the other two dimensions (i.e. integrity and benevolence). These later characteristics, in turn, contribute to greater team success. There are a number of variables that should be correlated with the positive aspects of image, stability and leadership skills that we can analyze. In the subsequent subsection, we take a number of approaches at both the individual level and team level in order to gain insight into these issues.

9.1 Individual Player Level Approach

First, we look at individual level regressions where we estimate whether married players are more likely to become "all-star" players, where "all-star" is a measure of player popularity and skill, among other factors. We find no statistically significant effect of marriage on the probability of being chosen to be an all-star player (unreported but available upon request). Next, we checked whether marital status has any impact on performance stability. We look at the effect of marital status on the

coefficient of variation of BA using a three year window.⁴⁰ The first two columns of Table 7 present the OLS and FE estimates. To be consistent with previous tables, we continue to use the lagged value of marital status though the double lag may be more appropriate (results are robust to this variation). Both columns show that marriage has a negative and statistically significant effect on the coefficient of variation of BA for low ability players, no effect for middle ability players and a positive effect for high ability players, though statistically significant only in the FE specification. This result is particularly interesting as low ability players have the highest variability in their performance and marriage has an overall net stabilizing effect on this variability. High ability players, however, see an increase in variability. For these players, the “distraction” of marriage may override any stabilizing effect. This is in line with much of the popular anecdotal evidence that marriage interferes periodically with the performance of elite level athletes. Moreover, the finding that high ability players that become more variable in their performance ultimately earn more is consistent with Lazear’s (1998) theoretical model that firms pay a premium for “risky” workers.⁴¹

Next, using a subsample of our data from 1990 - 1993, we checked whether married players have greater “star” power than single players where star power is calculated as the difference between the player’s total marginal revenue product and marginal revenue product based only on performance.⁴² We estimate these models using OLS, as there is not sufficient variation within player in marital status over such a short time period (less than five percent of players switch marital status.) While we do not find that married players have greater star power than their single counterparts, we do find that the highest ability married players are exploited less where “exploited” is defined as the difference between total marginal revenue product (that includes star power) and salary. The third and fourth columns (that differ only by the exclusion of the quadratic terms in experience and age in column 3) of Ta-

ble 7 show that the highest ability married players are underpaid between \$437,700 and \$481,600 less than the highest ability single players, or, approximately, 11 - 12 percent. In other words, married players in this group extract more of their economic rent. Columns 5 and 6 (again, that differ only by the exclusion of the quadratic terms in experience and age in column 5) normalize the underpayment by marginal revenue product so that the dependent variable represents the fraction of exploitation. Here, the point estimates are consistent with the previous finding but the statistical significance is weaker and sensitive to the inclusion of the quadratic terms of experience and age. Column 5 shows that high ability married players are exploited less, that is, they extract about 7.4 percent more of their marginal revenue product. This result may imply that high ability married men are able to negotiate a higher salary for a given marginal revenue product. There are a number of intuitive explanations. Perhaps wives push their husbands' to harder negotiate or perhaps marriage increases the self-worth of the player. Interestingly, we do not see any analogous difference between single and married players of the lower two groups suggesting that a high level of innate ability (and, perhaps, status) is arguably a necessary requirement to give the player market power.

9.2 Team Level Approach

Table 8 presents the results from team-ballpark level FE regressions. In columns 1 - 2, the log of total yearly ballpark attendance is regressed on the fraction of married team members, a binary indicator for having been in the World Series in the previous season, the lagged fraction of wins out of total games, the fraction of home games out of total games, and manager and year indicator variables. In columns 3 - 4 the fraction of wins out of total games is regressed on batter and pitcher produc-

tivity measures (team level batting and earned run averages), the fraction of home games out of total games, and manager and year indicator variables.⁴³ The results show a positive and statistically significant correlation between the average fraction of married players at the team level and ballpark attendance. Increasing the fraction of married players by ten percentage points (from a mean value of 68 percent) is associated with approximately 1.8 percent higher yearly attendance. This represents roughly 21,000 additional attendees. In addition, there is also a positive and significant correlation with the number of team wins, albeit the correlation is a bit weaker at ten percent. An increase in the average number of married players by 10 percentage points is associated with an increase of 0.002 in average team wins. This amounts to just under 1/2 percent increase given the mean value of team wins of 0.50. These latter results support the hypothesis that married players may have positive benefits to teams that manifest themselves in greater team popularity and success and lend some explanation as to why team managers and owners may discriminate in favor of such players.⁴⁴

10 Conclusion

Using a large sample of professional baseball players from 1871 - 2007, this paper aims to investigate the effect of marriage on male productivity. The novel contribution of our approach is that we use historical and exogenous measures of productivity in a panel data setting, allowing us to also directly test the hypothesis that marriage has a causal effect on wages through its impact on productivity. Focusing on the post-1975 era, we find heterogeneity in the effect of marriage on productivity where men in the bottom third of the ability distribution experience a rather large and positive effect (though sensitive to the empirical model and weakly significant) and no effect

for higher ability players. This positive effect for low ability players, however, translates into a fairly negligible effect on wages. Interestingly, players in the top third of the ability distribution see no statistically significant effect of marriage on productivity, on average, but do experience a positive and significant direct marriage effect, that is, they earn approximately 16 - 20 percent more than otherwise comparable single players even when controlling for productivity. These findings are suggestive of the varying roles that marriage plays along the underlying ability distribution. At lower levels of ability, men benefit more from what we term “indirect augmentation” activities – spousal actions that directly impact productivity (and higher productivity positively impacts wages). At higher levels of ability, men benefit more from what we term “direct augmentation” activities – spousal actions that directly impact wages (for example, improving public image). We explore a number of additional outcome variables that may be impacted by marital status and can provide some insight into a fuller picture of the effect of marriage on productivity and wages. We find some evidence that marriage affects the variance of performance and that high ability married players are better at extracting their economic rent (smaller gap between marginal revenue product and wages). In addition, at the team level, ballpark attendance and wins are positively correlated with the fraction of married players. Employers may prefer married players because they lead to overall greater team success that is not necessarily captured by the standard productivity measures.

Because few men are professional athletes, it is natural to question whether the results presented in this paper can be generalized beyond the sports industry. Although professional baseball is a unique occupation, it shares certain features in common with other occupations. Playing professional baseball requires long hours of practice, intense competition and significant travel. As such, we view our project as providing insight into other similarly demanding professions such as CEOs, partners at law

firms, politicians, and other high level corporate executives whose measures of productivity are less straightforward. Moreover, the wife is the closest person to the life of a professional athlete. This is again, however, not unique to professional sport. The wife's accessibility to the husband's work world shares similarities to many of these other professions. We also consider our project to be part of a larger group of papers that use very specific data to analyze basic, yet extremely important labor economics questions. Take, for example, labor supply responses to changes in wages. There have been a number of papers analyzing the labor supply of taxi drivers [Camerer et al. (1997), Farber (2005) and Chou (2000)], stadium vendors [Oettinger (1999)], and bicycle messengers [Fehr and Goette (2007)]. These studies produce results that are convincing in their specific setting and may well be general given sufficient replication in alternative settings. Consequently, we view our project as laying the groundwork for further research, perhaps in other individual sports or demanding professions where more direct productivity measurements are able to be collected by the researcher.

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Notes

¹See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the gender discrimination literature.

²A number of papers have found evidence of sorting (among these Petersen, Penner and Hogsnes (2006) and Korenman and Neumark (1991)). They have found that the marriage premium disappears once controlling for profession. Given that our entire sample is in the same profession, the sorting issue is of significantly less concern, though, it is true that the type of man that selects into professional baseball is not necessarily representative of men in general. We address this concern in Section 10.

³Krashinsky (2004) and Antonovics and Town (2004) have used first differenced data on twins to account for unobserved ability. The first study finds that the marriage premium is statistically indis-

tinguishable from zero among twin pairs while the latter finds that the marriage premium remains positive and significant.

⁴A number of papers [see, for example, Loh (1996)] have also considered cohabitation status as separate from never-married and typically find a cohabitation premium that is less than the marriage premium but nonetheless positive and significant. Stratton (2002) also considered cohabiters but found that once taking into unobservable individual effects, the premium disappears.

⁵See Ribar (2004) for a review of the methodologies.

⁶In a similar vein, Stauffer and Buckley (2005) find that supervisors give lower performance ratings to workers of the opposite race.

⁷Price and Wolfers (2010) argue that productivity measures themselves are potentially affected due to racial biases. We do not believe that this extends to our particular case of comparing married and single players. That is, we do not believe that an umpire, when making a split second call, takes into account marital status, a relatively non-salient characteristic of the player.

⁸Granted, DiMaggio was retired by the time he married Monroe, whom, by any standards, was not a typical ballplayer's wife.

⁹Our model is inspired by Daniel (1993). Without loss of generality, we assume that it is men that potentially benefit from marriage, though, it would be more accurate to state that it is the higher earning spouse that potentially benefits.

¹⁰For now, we take a very strict definition of productivity. Productivity is measured by traditional outcome measures in baseball that will be described in the next section.

¹¹"A wife's look and behavior...can even affect her husband's baseball career. You are part of the package, and if you don't look the part, well, some are going to notice." (Gmelch and San Antonio, 2001).

¹²The assumption of setting labor hours equal to zero for the wife would also arise endogenously from the model given sufficiently large husband wages relative to wives. With rare exception, MLB players earn wages that are much higher than any wage their wives could earn, which discourages wives' participation in the labor market. Moreover, there is also anecdotal evidence that the demands of a professional baseball career do not facilitate a stable lifestyle where wives could invest in their own careers. The far majority of wives of MLB players do not work outside of the home as they maintain the household. (Source: email correspondence with Denise Schmidt, attorney for the Baseball Wives Charitable Foundation.)

¹³Pitchers are often batters as well but they are judged by their pitching and not by their batting performance. While there have been players that have excelled in both roles (for example, Babe Ruth), generally speaking, pitchers tend to be weak batters.

¹⁴During the first six years in the league, players are under contract (with some exceptions) to a particular team. Beginning in 1974, after three years in the league, a player becomes what is called “arbitration eligible” and can renegotiate wage, presumably for better terms. The best players, called “super-twos,” may be eligible after two years.

¹⁵In addition, signing bonuses and incentive clauses represent relatively small fractions of total compensation – on average less than ten percent.

¹⁶This is generally the case. We provided the freelance researchers will sequential samples of 1000 players. Two of these random subsamples were restricted to more current years (one post-1948 and another post-1988) in order to collect more observations on black players (for a separate project) and increase the probability of finding wage data as it has been publicly available since the late 1980s.

¹⁷Some players perform both roles over their careers, hence, the sum of the two numbers is greater than 5,000.

¹⁸Looking ahead, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that we eventually restrict the actual sample used in the estimation to those players for whom we have at least two observations (due to lagged independent variables and fixed effects estimation).

¹⁹Until 1947, blacks were not allowed in the league until Jackie Robinson famously crossed over the color line. Blacks reached their peak in the early 1980s at around 27 percent of players. Today they stand at roughly 10 percent of all players. Race is notoriously difficult to collect because most data on race is collected by simply looking at pictures of players, for example, baseball cards. At times, particularly with dark-skinned Hispanics or lighter-skinned blacks, it is difficult to determine race. Moreover, it is uncertain with which race the players themselves identify.

²⁰The last category is problematic because until a player has died, we cannot say for certain he never married. Thus, a player who has been single prior to, throughout, and after his career (if finished) as of 2007 is classified as never married. Of course, he may marry during a later year of his career or after his career ends.

²¹A note on timing. If a player married in January through March in year y then we recorded his year of marriage as y . If he married April through December then we recorded his year of marriage as $y + 1$. This is account for the fact that contracts are generally established for the MLB season by April.

Of course, we also consider lags of marital status in our specifications so overall this particular way of defining marital status is robust to variations.

²²There have always been superstar players in terms of ability but the mega wages the current players earn, even when adjusting for inflation, is a relatively modern phenomenon. Babe Ruth earned the top wage in 1927 at \$70,000, by 2007 Jason Giambi, the highest paid player, was earning over \$23 million. In 2010, Alex Rodriguez took home the top wage at \$33 million.

²³We also adjust the measure to take into account players that begin mid season by normalizing by the fraction of the season played.

²⁴We also collected and computerized in spreadsheet format all rookie year draft data going back to 1965 under the assumption that better players are picked in earlier rounds. This proved, somewhat surprisingly, to be rather uncorrelated with any measure of future performance.

²⁵None of the results are sensitive to this particular specification. Contemporaneous values or additional lags of marital status provide similar results.

²⁶It is possible to also consider team an outcome variable as better players may switch to better teams. The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of team fixed effects. Also note that we cannot separately identify the team fixed effect from the ballpark fixed effect because while teams switch ballparks, ballparks do not switch teams. Thus, the τ_t indicators should be interpreted as joint team and ballpark fixed effects. Team-ballpark indicators also control for league effects (i.e., National League or American League).

²⁷Post-1975 is post elimination of the Reserve Clause. Many experts would argue that the elimination of the Reserve Clause in 1975 was a very important break in the dynamics of not only wage setting, but also performance and incentives.

²⁸In order to qualify for league awards, a player needs at least 400 at-bats. This restriction is far too high for our purposes as we simply need enough to claim we have an accurate measure of the mean.

²⁹It is interesting to point out that sport researchers and commentators maintain that marriage is a hindrance to performance in elite/professional sports. Because the sport necessitates complete dedication in terms of time, energy and focus, marriage, and all that comes with it, has been viewed as disruptive to the demands of the sport. While most evidence is rather informal, Farrelly and Nettle (2007) use a matched sample of married and single tennis players and find that male tennis players perform significantly worse in the year after their marriage compared to the year before, whereas there is no such effect for unmarried players of the same age.

³⁰Or, may also be evidence that we have not sufficiently captured productivity. We return to this later.

³¹We include BA as our productivity measure but the overall results are robust to the inclusion of any of the measures that we used in Section 7.1 with slight differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients.

³²Baseball players spend a large fraction of the season “on the road,” that is, away from their spouses and families. In addition, marital infidelity is rumored to be common. At this point, we do not take a stand on exactly what aspect of marriage leads to higher wages. To the extent that being on the road and marital infidelity reduce the benefits of marriage, this would bias us against finding any effect. Thus, finding an effect would mean that the true effect is even stronger.

³³In order to eliminate the mechanical relationship between marital status and longer careers (i.e. it is precisely because certain players have longer careers that we observe them getting married), we repeated the test where we checked whether marital status in the first three years of the career affects the probability of having a career that lasts six years or more and we again confirmed the positive and significant effect of marriage.

³⁴A third approach to dealing with the nonrandom attrition problem could be the use of median regression. The idea here is that we are mostly concerned with correlation of time-varying marital status and exit at the lower end of the distribution. Players with sufficiently high ability may be able to experience negative “shocks” to productivity and not be in danger of exit, whereas this same negative shock to a player with low initial ability may be enough to cause his exit from the sample. Median regression is less impacted by the extremes of the sample and intuitively less impacted by the attrition problem. This approach, however, is proving to be extremely computationally intensive and left for future research.

³⁵The result from column 1 indirectly provides an additional robustness test. Recall in fact that most players are locked in contracts for at least the first three years of their career. Thus, restricting the sample to players with four or less years of experience simply does not provide enough time for salaries to respond to changes in the covariates.

³⁶Because there may be some concern based on Table 1 that our estimation sample is not statistically random, we also calculated the weights using the full population of players and without the marital status or race variables. This had qualitatively little effect on the results.

³⁷General attrition is quite complicated and, following the assumptions of the literature, we therefore

assume that attrition is an absorbing state. This means that we drop all player observations after the first exit. Players temporarily leave MLB for a number of reasons, for instance due to injury or low performance or any other reason that is unobservable to the econometrician. Because partial or one year “breaks” are quite common, we consider a player to have exited only if he is unobserved in the data for more than one year.

³⁸Another take on this issue is that it is less of a problem in our particular setting than it would be with more standard panel data sets. For close to the past 40 or so years, baseball players have been extremely high earning relative to the population. Median wages as well as the MLB minimum wage have increased exponentially in the modern period. Thus, the question is whether players see marginal improvements in their spousal applicant pool and probability of marrying as their careers progress and wages increase from already high levels to even higher levels? Or, does the biggest improvement in the applicant pool and the probability of marrying come when expectations of entering MLB pass a certain threshold? We tend to believe the latter but do not entirely dismiss the former argument and therefore address the concerns raised.

³⁹A major exception to the pre-1975 era comes to mind. There is anecdotal evidence that Lou Gehrig’s wife was instrumental in his salary negotiations.

⁴⁰The coefficient of variation, equal to the standard deviation divided by the mean value of BA for each player, is calculated in rolling windows of three years. For example, the coefficient of variation in year y is calculated from the mean and variance of BA from years $y - 2$, $y - 1$ and y .

⁴¹Employers value risky workers because the worker in the upper tail of the productivity distribution can be retained and the worker in the lower tail of the productivity distribution can be terminated; risk provides option value to the worker. Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003) test Lazear’s hypotheses using baseball data and confirm his main results.


⁴²The data come from Dunn and Mullin (2002) and cover players from 1990 - 1993. Refer to their article for details on how the variables are calculated.

⁴³We would also like to include total team budgets as an explanatory variable as it is clear that teams with larger budgets can afford to attract the most highly skilled players but historical values of total budgets prior to 1988 are extremely difficult to find. Team-ballpark fixed effects should capture overall average level differences in budgets across teams.


⁴⁴We include pitchers in our calculation of the fraction of married players at the team level in order to increase the sample size. Moreover, we do not divide our married players by ability levels due to

lack of sufficient sample size at the team-year level.

Figure 1: Average Salaries Pre- and Post-Reserve Clause (\$000s, CPI adjusted)



(a) Average Salary




(b) Average Salary, normalized

Notes: Pitchers are excluded from the sample. Base year in panel (b) is 1965.

Source: Author calculations from The Baseball Archive and supplemented with author collected data as described in Section 5.


Figure 2: Average Unconditional and Residual Salary by Experience (\$000s, CPI adjusted)



Notes: Years 1975 - 2007. Pitchers are excluded from sample.

Source: Author calculations from The Baseball Archive and supplemented with authors collected data as described in Section 5.

Figure 3: Average Unconditional and Residual Productivity by Experience



Notes: Years 1975 - 2007. Pitchers are excluded from sample.

Source: Author calculations from The Baseball Archive and supplemented with author collected data as described in Section 5.

Table 1: Summary Statistics: Batters 1871 - 2007

Variable	Obs(pop/sample)	Population		Sample		Description
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Rookie Year Demographics						
<i>age</i>	9,236/3,379	24.18	2.84	24.19	2.78	age
<i>right</i>	8,578/3,262	0.70	0.46	0.69	0.46	=1 if the player is right-handed, 0 otherwise
<i>left</i>	8,578/3,262	0.38	0.49	0.40	0.49	=1 if the player is left-handed, 0 otherwise
<i>white</i>	NA/3,3746			0.80	0.40	=1 if the player is white, 0 otherwise
<i>black</i>	NA/3,374			0.13	0.34	=1 if the player is black, 0 otherwise
<i>hispanic</i>	NA/3,374			0.10	0.30	=1 if the player is hispanic, 0 otherwise
<i>otherrace</i>	NA/3,374			0.01	0.07	=1 if other race, 0 otherwise
<i>height</i>	7,782/2,956	71.53	2.37	71.63	2.29	Height in inches
<i>weight</i>	8,727/3,295	180.17	24.24	181.23	18.21	Weight in pounds
Marital Status and Wages						
<i>married</i>	NA/19,294			0.69	0.46	=1 if the player is married, 0 otherwise
<i>yearsmar</i>	NA/14,256			4.30	6.05	= Year - Year of Marriage
<i>wages</i>	NA/13,718			457.43	1036.66	Yearly Wage (\$000s, adjusted for inflation)
Productivity Related Measures						
<i>BA</i>	48,960/22,510	0.241	0.089	0.249	0.072	Batting Average
<i>OPS</i>	46,728/21,779	0.651	0.229	0.674	0.189	On-base plus slugging
<i>WAR</i>	45,961/22,052	.846	1.792	0.986	1.877	Wins Above Replacement
<i>PEVA</i>	50,363/22,388	4.001	5.450	4.635	5.717	Performance Evaluation Value
<i>G</i>	49,356/22,576	72.88	52.26	83.40	50.09	Number of games played
<i>PA</i>	44,774/21,845	270.53	229.43	312.26	225.10	Plate Appearances
Other Variables						
<i>experience</i>	49,357/22,576	5.51	4.40	5.72	4.21	Years in MLB
<i>year</i>	49,357/22,576	1954	38	1957	36	Year [†]
<i>position</i>						Fielding position
<i>team – ballpark</i>						244 Unique ids
<i>manager</i>						513 Unique ids

Fielding positions include first baseman, second baseman, third baseman, catcher, center field, left field, right field, shortstop. Also includes designated hitter and outfielder. Wage equations are limited to 1905 - 2007 due to data availability.

Source: Multiple sources, see text.

Table 2: The Effect of Marital Status on Productivity – Pre 1975

	OLS	FE	OLS	FE	FE[w/ wghts]	OLS	FE	OLS	FE	FE[w/wghts]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel A: BA</i>						<i>Panel B: OPS</i>				
<i>married</i> _{y-1}	.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)				.003 (.005)	-.007 (.006)			
<i>married</i> _{y-1} × <i>ability</i> ₁			.001 (.004)	-.009 (.007)	-.010 (.008)			.000 (.012)	-.024 (.021)	-.021 (.025)
<i>married</i> _{y-1} × <i>ability</i> ₂			.004 (.003)	-.003 (.004)	-.005 (.004)			.007 (.008)	-.005 (.011)	-.008 (.012)
<i>married</i> _{y-1} × <i>ability</i> ₃			.002 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	.0003 (.003)			.001 (.006)	-.006 (.006)	-.004 (.008)
<i>ability</i> ₁			.431 (.049)***					.557 (.206)***		
<i>ability</i> ₂			.425 (.048)***					.538 (.205)***		
<i>ability</i> ₃			.430 (.049)***					.555 (.205)***		
<i>cons</i>	.427 (.048)***	-.459 (.144)***		-.496 (.148)***	1.001 (.123)***	.617 (.120)***	2.846 (.299)***		2.984 (.303)***	2.808 (.343)***
<i>Obs</i>	5840	5840	5660	5660	5593	5765	5765	5593	5593	5593
<i>R</i> ²	.4	.653	.403	.654	.646	.432	.717	.439	.719	.705
<i>Panel C: WAR</i>						<i>Panel D: PEVA</i>				
<i>married</i> _{y-1}	.109 (.103)	.043 (.120)				.242 (.280)	.069 (.325)			
<i>married</i> _{y-1} × <i>ability</i> ₁			-.003 (.240)	-.267 (.429)	-.116 (.496)			-.141 (.688)	-.262 (1.358)	.051 (1.488)
<i>married</i> _{y-1} × <i>ability</i> ₂			.111 (.150)	.217 (.174)	.108 (.157)			.438 (.436)	.900 (.463)*	.755 (.428)*
<i>married</i> _{y-1} × <i>ability</i> ₃			.116 (.130)	-.024 (.148)	.001 (.146)			.195 (.346)	-.248 (.400)	-.156 (.419)
<i>ability</i> ₁			4.672 (2.623)*					8.944 (8.348)		
<i>ability</i> ₂			4.262 (2.629)					7.733 (8.402)		
<i>ability</i> ₃			4.607 (2.637)*					-.133 (.660)		
<i>cons</i>	4.272 (2.537)*	-50.163 (8.175)***		-52.778 (8.352)***	36.876 (6.732)***	26.453 (8.560)***	-139.140 (25.524)***		-143.535 (26.278)***	118.026 (19.456)***
<i>Obs</i>	5711	5711	5531	5531	5464	5798	5798	5619	5619	5552
<i>R</i> ²	.357	.669	.367	.673	.643	.407	.692	.417	.696	.667

Panel A: Dependent variable is equal to BA (columns 1 - 5). Panel B: Dependent variable is equal to OPS (columns 6 - 10). Panel C: Dependent variable is equal to WAR (columns 1 - 5). Panel D: Dependent variable is equal to PEVA (columns 6 - 10). Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. All models control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year fixed effects. OLS controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. FE controls include: age and experience squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. Columns 5 and 10 are weighted by the inverse of PA. Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances.

*10 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level, ***1 percent significance level.

Table 3: The Effect of Marital Status on Productivity – Post 1975

	OLS	FE	OLS	FE	FE[w/ wghts]	OLS	FE	OLS	FE	FE[w/wghts]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel A: BA</i>						<i>Panel B: OPS</i>				
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1}	-.0005 (.001)	.002 (.002)				-.007 (.005)	.003 (.005)			
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₁			.005 (.003)*	.007 (.004)*	.007 (.005)			.006 (.008)	.011 (.011)	.011 (.014)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₂			-.003 (.002)	-.001 (.004)	-.003 (.004)			-.012 (.008)	-.005 (.011)	-.014 (.012)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₃			-.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.003)			-.009 (.006)	.005 (.006)	.006 (.008)
<i>ability</i> ₁			.298 (.054)***					.411 (.163)***		
<i>ability</i> ₂			.304 (.054)***					.425 (.163)***		
<i>ability</i> ₃			.306 (.054)***					.436 (.162)***		
<i>cons</i>	.336 (.057)***	.565 (.097)***		.572 (.096)***	.576 (.121)***	.556 (.172)***	1.923 (.336)***		1.931 (.331)***	1.901 (.379)***
<i>Obs</i>	5907	5907	5844	5844	5844	5907	5907	5844	5844	5844
<i>R</i> ²	.192	.506	.195	.507	.524	.359	.631	.365	.633	.621
<i>Panel C: WAR</i>						<i>Panel D: PEVA</i>				
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1}	-.043 (.093)	.053 (.107)				-.379 (.271)	.278 (.269)			
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₁			.143 (.153)	.251 (.207)	.365 (.200)*			.259 (.380)	1.042 (.471)**	1.264 (.480)***
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₂			-.125 (.175)	.058 (.205)	.049 (.183)			-.663 (.522)	.638 (.607)	.611 (.542)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₃			-.067 (.120)	.019 (.139)	.002 (.126)			-.487 (.335)	-.035 (.336)	-.023 (.343)
<i>ability</i> ₁			4.474 (3.088)					-1.764 (8.772)		
<i>ability</i> ₂			4.667 (3.084)					-1.073 (8.707)		
<i>ability</i> ₃			4.870 (3.099)					-.584 (8.787)		
<i>cons</i>	6.684 (3.374)**	18.020 (5.753)***		18.152 (5.748)***	17.132 (5.806)***	1.439 (8.913)	69.709 (17.189)***		71.180 (17.283)***	53.402 (16.955)***
<i>Obs</i>	5754	5754	5692	5692	5692	5882	5882	5819	5819	5819
<i>R</i> ²	.275	.588	.280	.588	.557	.363	.642	.368	.642	.618

Panel A: Dependent variable is equal to BA (columns 1 - 5). Panel B: Dependent variable is equal to OPS (columns 6 - 10). Panel C: Dependent variable is equal to WAR (columns 1 - 5). Panel D: Dependent variable is equal to PEVA (columns 6 - 10). Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. All models control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year fixed effects. OLS controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. FE controls include: age and experience squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. Columns 5 and 10 are weighted by the inverse of PA. Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances.

*10 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level, ***1 percent significance level.

Table 4: The Effect of Marital Status on Earnings

	Pre-1975					Post-1975				
	OLS (1)	FE (2)	OLS (3)	FE (4)	FE (5)	OLS (6)	FE (7)	OLS (8)	FE (9)	FE (10)
$married_{y-1}$.015 (.024)	-.004 (.024)				.002 (.034)	.083 (.051)			
$married_{y-1} \times ability_1$.030 (.046)	.032 (.063)	.007 (.083)			.058 (.071)	.013 (.126)	.009 (.132)
$married_{y-1} \times ability_2$.011 (.039)	.015 (.041)	.045 (.044)			-.125 (.057)**	-.083 (.111)	-.161 (.110)
$married_{y-1} \times ability_3$.014 (.032)	-.016 (.030)	-.021 (.033)			.042 (.044)	.162 (.059)***	.209 (.073)***
$ability_1$			2.664 (.938)***					8.175 (1.261)***		
$ability_2$			2.590 (.937)***					8.348 (1.259)***		
$ability_3$			2.686 (.932)***					8.394 (1.256)***		
BA_{y-1}	3.450 (.253)***	2.071 (.180)***	3.406 (.251)***	2.039 (.182)***	1.729 (.205)***	4.494 (.355)***	2.270 (.342)***	4.286 (.347)***	2.296 (.341)***	1.702 (.411)***
$cons$	3.601 (.623)***	-5.786 (1.078)***		-5.223 (1.115)***	-4.279 (1.127)***	8.545 (1.237)***	30.605 (2.653)***		30.145 (2.681)***	29.325 (2.834)***
Obs	3750	3750	3662	3662	3655	5447	5447	5390	5390	5387
R^2	.886	.959	.853	.959	.983	.814	.894	.818	.894	.933

Dependent variable is equal to $\log(salary)_y$. Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. All models control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year effects. OLS controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. FE controls include: age and experience squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances. See Table 9 for expanded results.

*10 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level, ***1 percent significance level.

Table 5: Robustness Test: Endogenous Attrition

	<i>Exper. ≤ 4yrs</i>	<i>Exper. ≤ 8yrs</i>	<i>Exper. ≤ 12yrs</i>	<i>Exper. ≤ 16yrs</i>	<i>Exper. ≤ 20yrs</i>	IPW
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: BA</i>						
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₁	.000 (.014)	.003 (.005)	.005 (.004)	.006 (.004)*	.007 (.004)*	.006 (.004)*
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₂	-.013 (.012)	-.003 (.004)	-.001 (.004)	.000 (.004)	.000 (.004)	-.001 (.004)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₃	.005 (.007)	.000 (.003)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.001 (.002)
<i>cons</i>	2.056 (.949)**	.955 (.149)***	.649 (.098)***	.638 (.096)***	.538 (.090)***	.677 (.094)***
<i>Obs</i>	1783	3854	5138	5695	5840	5676
<i>R</i> ²	.749	.571	.521	.51	.507	.530
<i>Panel B: PEVA</i>						
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₁	1.912 (1.186)	1.003 (.593)*	.909 (.504)*	1.088 (.469)**	1.033 (.471)**	.923 (.471)**
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₂	-.628 (.846)	.254 (.557)	.597 (.583)	.691 (.610)	.701 (.594)	.759 (.619)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₃	.849 (1.356)	.238 (.464)	-.125 (.371)	-.176 (.351)	-.069 (.339)	-.098 (.324)
<i>cons</i>	188.022 (119.084)	144.057 (21.791)***	93.697 (17.160)***	87.612 (18.035)***	74.364 (16.710)***	100.030 (18.424)***
<i>Obs</i>	1765	3829	5113	5670	5815	5651
<i>R</i> ²	.808	.72	.667	.645	.643	.651
<i>Panel C: log(wages)</i>						
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₁	.063 (.395)	.063 (.147)	.092 (.114)	.025 (.113)	.011 (.126)	-.018 (.114)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₂	-.005 (.293)	-.099 (.104)	-.153 (.111)	-.145 (.110)	-.089 (.110)	-.113 (.118)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₃	.034 (.143)	.134 (.063)**	.131 (.061)**	.140 (.062)**	.158 (.060)***	.159 (.058)***
<i>BA</i> _{<i>y</i>-1}	2.762 (.993)***	2.467 (.390)***	1.920 (.333)***	2.183 (.328)***	2.260 (.340)***	2.341 (.348)***
<i>cons</i>	38.918 (22.512)*	43.189 (3.875)***	42.913 (2.690)***	34.180 (2.983)***	31.575 (3.051)***	28.036 (3.217)***
<i>Obs</i>	1344	3339	4650	5229	5382	5238
<i>R</i> ²	.968	.931	.914	.901	.895	.904

Dependent variable is equal to *BA*, *PEVA* or *log(wages)*. Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. All models control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year effects. All models estimated by FE and controls include: age and experience squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances.

* 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.

Table 6: Robustness Test: Dynamic Selection

	Married in $y + 1$				Married in $y + 2$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$experience_{3yrs+} \times ability_1$.012 (.052)				-.038 (.055)			
$experience_{3yrs+} \times ability_2$.028 (.047)				.008 (.055)			
$experience_{3yrs+} \times ability_3$.022 (.036)				.055 (.048)			
$experience_{6yrs+} \times ability_1$.085 (.085)				-.028 (.103)			
$experience_{6yrs+} \times ability_2$	-.022 (.061)				-.032 (.063)			
$experience_{6yrs+} \times ability_3$	-.026 (.052)				.080 (.069)			
$\log(wages)_y \times ability_1$.019 (.025)				.057 (.030)*		
$\log(wages)_y \times ability_2$		-.008 (.019)				-.012 (.023)		
$\log(wages)_y \times ability_3$		-.018 (.016)				.001 (.021)		
$\Delta \log(wages)_y \times ability_1$			-.029 (.075)				-.082 (.062)	
$\Delta \log(wages)_y \times ability_2$.037 (.050)				.001 (.061)	
$\Delta \log(wages)_y \times ability_3$.025 (.037)				-.031 (.035)	
$\Delta \log(BA)_y \times ability_1$				-.072 (.119)				.022 (.154)
$\Delta \log(BA)_y \times ability_2$				-.101 (.072)				-.139 (.081)*
$\Delta \log(BA)_y \times ability_3$				-.040 (.086)				.037 (.116)
$ability_1$	-.808 (.808)	-1.507 (.973)	-1.142 (1.416)	-.592 (1.391)	-2.252 (1.189)*	-3.649 (1.491)**	.589 (1.716)	.586 (1.826)
$ability_2$	-.791 (.808)	-1.178 (.921)	-1.152 (1.414)	-.593 (1.393)	-2.252 (1.189)*	-2.805 (1.464)*	.527 (1.718)	.529 (1.832)
$ability_3$	-.765 (.807)	-1.006 (.918)	-1.120 (1.416)	-.527 (1.393)	-2.208 (1.187)*	-2.932 (1.462)**	.599 (1.718)	.584 (1.830)
Obs	2112	1673	1180	1238	1493	1198	841	897
R^2	.159	.191	.244	.233	.221	.28	.378	.323

Columns 1 - 4: Dependent variable is equal to one if year of marriage occurs in year $y + 1$, zero otherwise. Columns 5 - 8: Dependent variable is equal to one if year of marriage occurs in year $y + 2$, zero otherwise. All models control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year effects and are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. OLS controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, and lagged games played.

* 10 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *** 1 percent significance level.

Table 7: The Effect of Marital Status on Performance Stability and Wage Underpayment

	OLS (1)	FE (2)	OLS (3)	OLS (4)	OLS (5)	OLS (6)
$married_{y-1} \times ability_1$	-.050 (.016)***	-.061 (.025)**	.766 (3.557)	.984 (3.565)	.061 (.107)	.120 (.105)
$married_{y-1} \times ability_2$	-.014 (.015)	.008 (.021)	2.923 (2.658)	3.039 (2.665)	.135 (.095)	.136 (.095)
$married_{y-1} \times ability_3$.010 (.009)	.027 (.010)***	-4.816 (1.789)***	-4.377 (1.884)**	-.074 (.043)*	-.049 (.044)
$ability_1$	-.056 (.212)		46.285 (26.514)*	105.297 (49.751)**	2.392 (.770)***	1.641 (2.002)
$ability_2$	-.109 (.213)		44.613 (26.332)*	103.507 (49.542)**	2.269 (.768)***	1.549 (1.985)
$ability_3$	-.134 (.211)		49.642 (25.992)*	108.311 (49.087)**	2.349 (.761)***	1.619 (1.987)
<i>cons</i>		.009 (.327)				
<i>Obs</i>	6413	6413	647	647	647	647
R^2	.272	.568	.419	.555	.264	.555

Columns 1 - 2: Dependent variable is equal to the coefficient of variance of BA as described in the text. Columns 3 - 4: Dependent variable is equal to exploitation/100,000 (marginal revenue product minus salary). Columns 5 - 6: Dependent variable is equal to exploitation/MRP. Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. Columns 1 - 2 control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year effects. Columns 3 - 6 control for team-ballpark, position and year effects. OLS (columns 1,4,6) controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. OLS (columns 3,5) controls include: age, experience, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. FE (column 2) controls include: age and experience squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. OLS models are estimated without a constant. R^2 in these models are obtained from the equivalent model estimated with a constant.

*10 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level, ***1 percent significance level.

Table 8: The Effect of Marital Status on Ballpark Attendance and Team Wins

	OLS	FE	OLS	FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>married</i>	.172 (.073)**	.175 (.082)**	.026 (.011)**	.020 (.012)*
<i>home</i>	4.089 (.963)***	3.508 (.744)***	.345 (.112)***	.257 (.115)**
<i>worldseries_{y-1}</i>	.047 (.028)*	.056 (.025)**		
<i>wins_{y-1}</i>	1.605 (.160)***	1.160 (.145)***		
<i>BA</i>			3.736 (.125)***	3.624 (.142)***
<i>ERA</i>			-.108 (.002)***	-.107 (.003)***
<i>cons</i>	9.109 (.494)***	12.176 (.465)***	-.254 (.062)***	-.228 (.073)***
<i>Obs</i>	1929	1929	2135	2135
<i>R²</i>	.892	.934	.826	.854

The dependent variable in columns 1 - 2 is equal to the log of ballpark attendance, in columns 3 - 4 it is the number of wins divided by games played (*wins*). The variable *married* is the team level fraction of married players. *home* is the fraction of homegames divided by total games. *worldseries* is a binary indicator equal to one if the team was in the world series. *BA* is the team level batting average over all batters. *ERA* is the team level earned runs average over all pitchers. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by team-ballpark. All columns control for year and manager effects.

*10 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level, ***1 percent significance level.

Table 9: APPENDIX: The Effect of Marital Status on Productivity (BA) and Wages – Post 1975 (Expanded Results)

	BA					log(wages)				
	OLS (1)	FE (2)	OLS (3)	FE (4)	FE (5)	OLS (6)	FE (7)	OLS (8)	FE (9)	FE (10)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1}	^{-0.005} (.001)	^{0.002} (.002)				^{0.002} (.034)	^{0.083} (.051)			
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₁			^{0.005} (.003)*	^{0.007} (.004)*	^{0.007} (.005)			^{0.058} (.071)	^{0.013} (.126)	^{0.009} (.132)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₂			^{-0.003} (.002)	^{-0.001} (.004)	^{-0.003} (.003)			^{-0.125} (.057)**	^{-0.083} (.111)	^{-0.160} (.110)
<i>married</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} × <i>ability</i> ₃			^{-0.001} (.002)	^{-0.001} (.002)	^{-0.001} (.003)			^{0.042} (.044)	^{0.162} (.059)***	^{0.209} (.073)***
<i>age</i> [†]	^{-0.005} (.030)	^{-0.002} (.001)***	^{0.001} (.030)	^{-0.002} (.001)***	^{-0.002} (.001)**	^{0.048} (.064)	^{0.009} (.002)***	^{0.051} (.063)	^{-0.008} (.002)***	^{-0.008} (.002)***
<i>age</i> ²	^{-0.002} (.004)	^{-0.020} (.006)***	^{-0.002} (.004)	^{-0.020} (.006)***	^{-0.020} (.007)**	^{-0.002} (.001)*	^{-0.009} (.002)***	^{-0.002} (.001)*	^{-0.008} (.002)***	^{-0.008} (.002)***
<i>experience</i> [†]	^{0.010} (.010)**	^{-0.001} (.001)	^{0.010} (.010)**	^{-0.001} (.001)	^{-0.001} (.001)	^{0.285} (.028)***	^{0.004} (.002)**	^{0.288} (.029)***	^{0.005} (.002)*	^{0.001} (.002)
<i>experience</i> ²	^{-0.007} (.005)	^{-0.005} (.005)	^{-0.007} (.005)	^{-0.005} (.006)	^{-0.005} (.007)	^{-0.008} (.001)***	^{-0.004} (.002)**	^{-0.008} (.001)***	^{-0.005} (.002)*	^{-0.001} (.002)
<i>G</i> _{<i>y</i>-1} [‡]	^{0.010} (.001)***	^{-0.000} (.001)	^{0.010} (.001)***	^{-0.000} (.001)	^{-0.000} (.002)	^{0.009} (.000)***	^{0.005} (.000)***	^{0.008} (.000)***	^{0.005} (.000)***	^{0.006} (.001)***
<i>left</i>	^{-0.003} (.002)		^{-0.003} (.002)			^{0.019} (.046)		^{0.017} (.047)		
<i>right</i>	^{-0.010} (.002)***		^{-0.011} (.002)***			^{-0.013} (.052)		^{-0.024} (.052)		
<i>black</i>	^{0.007} (.003)**		^{0.007} (.003)**			^{0.055} (.067)		^{0.098} (.070)		
<i>white</i>	^{0.002} (.003)		^{0.002} (.003)			^{0.040} (.069)		^{0.071} (.070)		
<i>hispanic</i>	^{0.004} (.003)		^{0.004} (.003)			^{0.010} (.060)		^{0.008} (.061)		
<i>otherrace</i>	^{0.008} (.012)		^{0.001} (.012)			^{0.445} (.377)		^{0.439} (.359)		
<i>height</i>	^{-0.008} (.0005)		^{-0.008} (.0005)			^{0.009} (.011)		^{0.015} (.010)		
<i>weight</i>	^{0.000} (.000)*		^{0.000} (.000)*			^{0.001} (.001)***		^{0.005} (.001)***		
<i>experience</i> _{3yrs+}	^{0.000} (.002)	^{0.002} (.002)	^{0.000} (.002)	^{0.002} (.002)	^{0.002} (.003)	^{0.360} (.046)***	^{0.480} (.050)***	^{0.378} (.047)***	^{0.478} (.050)***	^{0.449} (.056)***
<i>experience</i> _{6yrs+}	^{0.002} (.002)	^{0.003} (.002)*	^{0.002} (.002)	^{0.003} (.002)*	^{0.003} (.003)	^{0.191} (.040)***	^{0.210} (.042)***	^{0.188} (.040)***	^{0.218} (.042)***	^{0.288} (.051)***
<i>ability</i> ₁			^{0.298} (.054)***					^{0.175} (1.261)***		
<i>ability</i> ₂			^{0.304} (.054)***					^{0.348} (1.259)***		
<i>ability</i> ₃			^{0.306} (.054)***					^{0.394} (1.256)***		
<i>BA</i> _{<i>y</i>-1}						^{4.494} (.355)***	^{2.270} (.342)***	^{4.286} (.347)***	^{2.296} (.341)***	^{1.702} (.411)***
<i>cons</i>	³³⁶ (.057)***	⁵⁶⁵ (.097)***		⁵⁷² (.096)***	⁵⁷⁶ (.121)***	^{8.545} (.172)***	^{30.605} (.336)***	^{30.145} (.331)***	^{30.145} (.331)***	^{29.325} (.379)***
<i>Obs</i>	5907	5907	5844	5844	5844	5447	5447	5390	5390	5387
<i>R</i> ²	.192	.506	.195	.507	.524	.814	.894	.818	.894	.933

Dependent variable is equal to $\log(\text{salary})_y$. Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. All models control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year effects. OLS controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. FE controls include: age and experience squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. R^2 in these models are obtained from the equivalent model estimated with a constant. Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances. †: Age and experience are divided by 10 in columns 1 - 5. ‡: G is divided by 100 in columns 1 - 5.
*10 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level, ***1 percent significance level.

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