

## **Abstract**

This paper brings together data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, National Survey of Unions and TUC focus on recognition survey to investigate influences on union organising effectiveness. Organising effectiveness is defined as the ability of trade unions to recruit and retain members. Results suggest that there are big differences in organising effectiveness between unions, and that national union recruitment policies are an important influence on a union's ability to get new recognition agreements. However local factors are a more important influence on organising effectiveness in workplaces where unions have a membership presence. There are also important differences in organising effectiveness among blue and white-collar employees. These differences suggest that unions will face a strategic dilemma about the best way to appeal to the growing number of white-collar employees.

JEL classification: J51

Key words: Trade union objectives and structures, organising effectiveness

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# **Influences on Trade Union Organising Effectiveness in Great Britain**

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## Introduction

Union membership in Britain fell continuously between 1979 and 1998. This dramatic decline can be attributed to two direct causes. First unions' failure to gain a bargaining presence in newly established workplaces. Second, declining union membership in workplaces where unions were recognised (Machin, 2000 and Millward *et al.*, 2000). The underlying causes of union membership change (and therefore of decline) are conventionally held to be: 1) macro economic conditions; 2) the composition of the workforce; 3) the legal and institutional framework laid down by the state; 4) industrial relations policies pursued by management and 5) the recruitment activity of unions themselves (Metcalf, 1991). In other words, aggregate union membership is dependent upon both the environment that unions face, and the union response to that environment. Empirical evidence from Britain found that unions did not respond adequately to the tough environment of the 1980's (Kelly and Heery, 1989). Evidence from the USA suggests that the organisational configuration and strategies and tactics adopted by trade unions are important influences on aggregate union membership (Fiorito *et al.*, 1995 and Bronfrenbrenner, 1997). The aim of this paper is to investigate whether British unions are any nearer to finding an organisational and policy response that will enable them to boost aggregate membership.


In this paper two sets of measures of union organising effectiveness are proposed. The first is based on a union's ability to recruit workers in workplaces where they have an established presence (internal organising effectiveness). The second is based on a union's ability to organise non-union work places (external organising effectiveness). The relationships between different organisational configurations, different strategies and these measures are examined. This is done using information from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), Heery *et al.*'s National Survey of Unions (NSU, see Heery *et al.* 2000 for full details) and the TUC/Labour Research Department (LRD) survey on union recognition. The use of these data sources to tackle questions of union institutional effectiveness represents a significant methodological development. Previous attempts to measure the institutional effectiveness of trade unions have used case study methods (see for example Undy *et al.* 1981 and Greene *et al.*, 1999). Section One examines concepts and measures of union organising effectiveness. Section Two considers factors likely to influence union organising effectiveness and puts forward some testable hypotheses. Section Three considers the data and results for internal organising effectiveness. Section Four

considers the data and results for external organising effectiveness. Section Five considers the practical implications of the results and Section Six offers some conclusions.

## **1. Organising Effectiveness: Concepts and Measures**

Simply put, union organising effectiveness can be defined as a union's ability to recruit and retain members (Fiorito *et al.* 1995). This rests on two factors. First, a union's ability to get recognition agreements in workplaces currently without a union presence (external organising, or what Kelly and Heery (1989) call distant expansion). Second, a union's ability to recruit and retain members in workplaces where it already has a bargaining presence. Internal organising activity can be further divided between close consolidatory recruitment – mopping up members in bargaining units covered by collective bargaining. Distant consolidatory recruitment – recruiting non-members in weakly organised workplaces covered by recognition agreements and close expansion – recruiting non-members not covered by union recognition in workplaces where some workers are covered by recognition (Kelly and Heery, 1989, p.198). This is in line with Willman's union growth and survival model, which identifies individual recruitment in recognised workplaces and individual recruitment in workplace without recognition of two of the four possible routes to union growth (Willman, 1989). More recently, Willman has argued that 'bargaining units' are important units for analysing trade union behaviour. A workplace can have more than one bargaining unit, bargaining units reflect the different occupational groups in the workplace (Willman, 2001). These theoretical insights can be combined into a model of the dimensions of trade union organising and recruitment activity. This model is set out in Figure 1.

**Figure 1- The dimensions of trade union organising and recruitment**





A union has recognition and membership among the largest occupational group in workplace A. It also has some members, but no recognition agreements in two of the other occupational/workgroups in the workplace. It has a small number of members, but no recognition agreement in workplace B, and no members or recognition in workplace C. The union can therefore organise and recruit in up to three ways: 1) infill recruitment among the non-members currently covered by union recognition in workplace A; 2) recruit and attempt to get recognition among the non-members in non-recognised groups in workplace A; 3) recruitment, with the aim of getting recognition among employees in the core workgroup at workplaces B and C. A fourth way of recruiting in the non-core occupational groups in workplaces B and C is also possible, but unlikely because the union has little experience of organising non-core workgroups. The possible permutations would become more complex if another union was introduced to the model. Willman would predict that the union will focus on infill recruitment in the core workgroup (because to do so would increase bargaining power) and organising the core workgroups in workplaces B and C (because the payoff to organising will be highest, Willman, 2001). However case study evidence suggests that unions tend to be more opportunistic in the selection of organising and recruitment campaign targets so may be more likely to concentrate on areas where they already have members (Kelly and Heery, 1989).

From this model, several measures of internal and external organising effectiveness can be developed. First three measures of internal organising effectiveness: 1) the probability of a worker in a core workgroup covered by recognition being a union member; 2) the probability of any worker in an occupational group with union members being a union member; 3) the probability of any worker in a workplace with a union presence being a union member. External organising effectiveness can be measured by looking at: 1) the number of new recognition agreements won by a particular union, the number of new members recruited through these agreements; 2) the number of workers covered by new agreements. However, it is important to take into account the effect of union size. If a large union and a small union both organise the same number of non-union workers, the smaller union will be the more effective because it has organised the greater number of workers proportionate to its size and resources. If we take this into account, a better measure of external organising effectiveness would be new members divided by current members, or the new number covered by union recognition divided by the number previously covered.

Between 1979 and 2000, a hostile legal and economic environment made it difficult for unions to successfully pursue external organising campaigns without the explicit

endorsement of the employer. The 'climate' of the period ensured that the majority of employers were hostile. The result was that unions failed to get recognition agreements in newly established workplaces. This factor was a key cause of the overall decline in union membership (Machin, 2000). The statutory trade union recognition procedure in the 1999 Employment Relations Act gives trade unions the right to be recognised if they can demonstrate majority support among the workforce (Wood and Goddard, 1999). Despite the new statutory recognition procedure, New Labour has left unchallenged key elements of the 'neo-liberal environment' created by the Conservatives. The state no longer underwrites union survival, and trade unions cannot expect their fortunes to improve with a change in government. Leading managers and the state share the assumption that trade unions will not have a major role in macro-economic management. The trade union role in the workplace is contingent upon the majority support of the workforce and partnership between employers and employees is as legitimate as partnership between unions and employers (Boxall and Haynes, 1997, p.568).

The opportunities for expansion provided by the statutory recognition procedure coupled with the realisation that without new recognition agreements unions will die has led to increased external organising activity (TUC, 2001). Will this new activity prove more successful than previous union recruitment initiatives? Evidence from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey shows that the proportion of workers in unionised workplaces who are union members fell between 1990 and 1998 (Millward *et al.*, 2000). This suggests that internal organising effectiveness is declining. From a policy perspective, the interesting question is: Can unions systematically affect their organising effectiveness, or are environmental factors beyond the union's control more important?

## **2. Influences on Union Organising Effectiveness**

Many factors that influence organising effectiveness are beyond the power of unions to control. However, unions are able to control their responses to the circumstances in which they find themselves. This section will investigate union's responses to their environment – union organisational configuration, policy and strategy at a national and local level, and the way in which these factors might influence union organising effectiveness.

Trade unions are governed by their rulebooks. Most trade union rulebooks set out the industries and occupations that the trade union organises. For example the Communication Workers Union (CWU) rulebook begins with a mission statement, which says that “The CWU exists to protect, advance and serve the interests of its members throughout the communications industry.... In pursuit of its aims, the Union will seek to expand Trade Union membership throughout the Communications Industry” (CWU, 2001). These rules are supplemented by policies passed by union conferences which set more specific targets, for example committing a union to allocate a certain level of resources to organising and recruitment activity, or to targeting particular companies or organisations. The union’s senior full-time officials and elected executive then have to translate these targets and aspirations into action. Empirical research from the late 1980’s suggested that most British unions struggled to turn their organising aspirations into practice because full-time officials were reluctant to devote their time and resources to recruitment activity (Kelly and Heery, 1989). Since then continuing membership decline has forced unions to expend more energy and resources on attempting to improve on their previously dismal performance in this area. Training courses have been developed, recruitment budgets have been increased, and more dedicated organising officials have been hired (TUC, 2000b).

The NSU contains a scale measuring the extent and sophistication of union organising and recruitment policies (the measures used are set out in table 1 below). Fiorito *et al.* applied organisation theory to the concept of trade union organising effectiveness. One of their key predictions was that a union’s efficiency and sophistication in managing organising and recruitment activity should result in increased organising effectiveness<sup>1</sup> (Fiorito *et al.*, 1993). Later empirical work confirmed this prediction (Fiorito *et al.*, 1995). Therefore a higher score on the NSU organising and recruitment policy scale should be associated with increased organising effectiveness.

**Hypothesis 1: Unions that demonstrate their commitment to organising and recruitment through a structure that prioritises these activities will score higher on measures of internal and external organising effectiveness.**

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<sup>1</sup> Fiorito *et al.*’s other hypotheses were that innovation, democracy and decentralisation would be associated with increased organising effectiveness. Innovation is discussed in the following paragraph, but unfortunately data is not available that would allow the democracy and decentralisation hypotheses to be tested among British unions.

Unions that don't innovate are failing to respond to the challenges of a changing environment, consequently they will be less effective at organising (Fiorito *et al.*, 1993). The NSU contains a measure of innovation in organising and recruitment policy only (the details of this measure are set out in Table 2). Following Fiorito *et al.*'s theoretical analysis the NSU innovation measure should be positively associated with organising effectiveness. However while this measure captures some innovation in organising techniques for example sponsorship of TUC Organising Academy trainees it misses others, for example the adoption of US 'organising model' methods like house calls. Neither does it capture the wider dimensions of management and campaigning innovation. So the measure may not be strong enough to cause an effect. Alternatively, we may find that unions with low innovation scores are more effective at organising because they are operating in stable environments so don't need to innovate. If so the relationship with internal organising effectiveness will actually be negative.

**Hypothesis 2 Innovation in organising and recruitment policy and practice will be positively associated with organising effectiveness.**

There are three markets for trade unionism, employees and employers and the state<sup>2</sup>. In the current neo-liberal environment the state is not buying. Therefore a union can seek employer support, the support of the non-union workforce, or both. A union that has the support of neither employers nor employees will die (Boxall and Haynes, 1997). In practice this means that a union can either recruit the majority of the workforce in a non-union plant, then use that support to force the employer to grant recognition. Or reach an agreement with the employer first by persuading them that union recognition is an effective and efficient way of managing personnel issues, then recruiting among the workforce with the employers blessing or acquiescence (Willman, 1989). In the United States, high levels of employer hostility towards unions means that the employer market is closed to unions, so they must rely on the support of employees (Kleiner, 2000).

Research by Kate Bronfenbrenner (1997) suggests that the use of 'organising model' strategy and tactics increases the probability of success in union recognition elections. This finding suggests that British unions that face hostile employers will be more successful if they employ organising model tactics. However, evidence suggests that British employers

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<sup>2</sup> This is an adaptation of Willman's argument that there are two markets for unions, employers and employees.

are generally less hostile to trade unions than American employers (Gall and McKay, 2001). There may therefore be cases where unions are able to persuade employers to grant them recognition and access to recruit the workforce without the union first demonstrating majority support. Evidence collected by the TUC supports this contention (TUC, 2001). Union policies of partnership and co-operation may make employers more willing to grant recognition voluntarily. If unions adopt both the organising model and the partnership model, and are pragmatic in which they apply, they should be more effective at organising than unions that only adopt one of the models, or adopt neither. One major caveat needs to be added to this prediction. The highly decentralised nature of British trade unions means that the formal adoption of either organising or partnership by a union is unlikely to filter down and change behaviour of lay activists in the workplace in the short-term. As both Organising and Partnership are relatively novel innovations, the prediction is unlikely to apply to internal organising effectiveness. At local level lay union activists are more likely to adopt strategies that fit the local circumstances (Fairbrother, 2000).

**Hypothesis 3: Unions that have adopted both the organising and partnership models will be more effective at external organising than unions that have adopted one or neither.**

Local union organisation and strategy is likely to be a very important influence on internal organising effectiveness. National unions can influence local union organisation and strategy through the support and training which they provide to lay reps in the workplace. However the nature of this support is likely to vary within unions as much as it varies between unions, reflecting social relations and work organisation at the point of production (Fairbrother, 2000), the values and attitudes of the full-time officials and union activists involved (Kelly and Heery, 1994), and the strategic value of the bargaining unit to the union (Willman, 2001). Unions will be more effective if they are run democratically because democracy makes the leadership more responsive to the preferences of members. If a union responds to the preferences of members they are more likely to stay in membership than if the union ignores their wishes (Fiorito *et al.*, 1993). The same is likely to be true for unions in the workplace. Indeed proponents of the union renewal hypothesis argue that local leadership accountability to the rank and file is an essential prerequisite for union renewal (Fairbrother, 2000).

**Hypothesis 4 There will be higher levels of internal organising effectiveness in workplaces where the senior union rep is elected compared to workplaces where the rep volunteers, or is chosen by the union or by management.**

A second prerequisite of union renewal is the recruitment of new generations of activists because union activists provide the organisational means to face new challenges (Fairbrother, 2000, p.19). In practical terms this means that union activists recruit new members, and mobilise existing members to resist management demands. The most practical expression of activism is to become a shop steward or union rep. We would therefore expect internal organising effectiveness to be higher in workplaces with a higher number of reps relative to the total workforce. A large number of union reps may also be a practical demonstration of management support for workplace trade unionism and collective bargaining.

**Hypothesis 5 The greater the number of union reps relative to the size of the workforce, the greater will be internal organising effectiveness.**

A fierce debate is currently raging within academic circles on the question of whether militancy or co-operation is the more effective strategy for trade unions. John Kelly has argued that militant workplace trade unionism is the only effective strategy because cooperation will only result in union demobilisation, leading ultimately to marginalisation and collapse (Kelly, 1998). The counter argument is that militancy will lead to fierce employer counter mobilisation, which is likely to be successful given the current economic and political conditions. Instead unions should focus on developing co-operation with management so both can secure 'mutual gains' (Bacon and Storey, 1996). If workers vote with their feet and Kelly is correct, union membership should be higher in workplaces where unions follow policies of militancy. If Bacon and Storey are correct, then membership should be higher in workplaces where unions co-operate with management. The concepts of militancy and cooperation can be operationalised by looking at the role that the workplace union plays in the management of change.<sup>3</sup> If the union has no role, it is indicative of marginalisation of the union by management (although sadly we can't identify whether marginalisation was a result of policies of militancy or co-operation).

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<sup>3</sup> I am indebted to Neil Millward for suggesting this measure.

**Hypothesis 6: Internal organising effectiveness will be higher in workplaces where the union is militant, compared to workplaces where the union is co-operative and workplaces where the union is marginalized.**

### **3. Internal Organising Effectiveness: Data and Results**

Internal organising effectiveness can be measured by looking at the probabilities of union membership for individuals in workplaces with a trade union presence. If the individual has a high probability of membership, the union will be highly effective at internal organising. If the individual's probability of membership is low, the union is ineffective. Once union effectiveness has been established, further information about union organisational configuration and policy can be added in order to test the propositions set out above. To get realistic estimates of the effect of national union organisational configuration and policy on organising effectiveness it is necessary to control for the effect of local union organisation and environmental and individual characteristics. This analysis can be performed using the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey and the National Survey of Unions. The sections below explain how this was done, the limitations of the methodology, and the results.

#### **3.1 Data**

The 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey gives a large sample of individual employees, with information on jobs, individual characteristics and union membership. This information can be linked to detailed information about the individuals' workplaces provided by the manager responsible for employee relations, and in some cases the senior employee representative. The data was split according to the occupation of the individual, separate analyses were performed for individuals in blue-collar occupations (craft and related, operative and assemble and routine unskilled SOC groups) and white-collar occupations (managerial, professional, technical, clerical, sales and personal and protective services occupations). This split reflects the significantly different experiences of the labour process at the point of production of the two broad occupational groups, which leads to different patterns of unionisation. A difference confirmed by previous empirical studies of individual

unionisation (see for example Green, 1990 and Bain and Elias, 1985). Individuals are not asked which union they are or are not a member of. This information can be extrapolated from information provided by management and employee reps. Consequently, problems of measurement arise, particularly in workplaces with more than one union (a full discussion of these problems can be found in the technical appendix).

Six different empirical models were estimated on different sub samples of the data. Selection of sub samples reflected different measures of internal effectiveness and difficulties in identifying the union an individual employee would be eligible to join in multi-union workplaces. Details of the sub samples used in different models are set out in Table 1.

The sample used in models 1 and 3 includes any worker covered by any union representation, so offers a broad measure of internal organising effectiveness. The sample used in models 2 and 4 gives a narrower measure, looking at effectiveness at consolidatory recruitment only. Descriptive statistics in Table A2 give an indication of the differences between single union and multi-union workplaces.

WERS98 does not contain information on national union organisational configuration, policy and strategy. Fortunately this information is available in Heery *et al's* National Survey of Unions. This was a postal questionnaire completed by 67 per cent of British Trade Unions. The results contain information on union structure and policy. Specifically, to what extent does the union have a set of policies, practices and organisational supports for organising and recruitment work? Do these policies and practices represent innovation, or are they of long standing? Does the union follow policies of partnership or organising? For the purposes of this analysis, the NSU commitment to recruitment scale and recruitment innovation scale were added into the WERS98 data. The WERS98 data furnished measures of local union organisation and strategy and controls for environmental and individual characteristics. Details of all the measures used in the analysis are set out in Table 2.

## **Caveats**

First, it is important to note that because the analysis to follow uses cross-section data, it can only reveal statistical associations, not causal relationships. Second, the results only tell us a limited amount about internal organising effectiveness in multi union workplaces. Third, they only cover those unions that appear in both the WERS sample and the NSU. Fourth, the small numbers of observations from workers in workplaces covered by some of the smaller



unions is likely to mean that the results reported for these smaller unions are unlikely to give a fair indication of that union's internal organising effectiveness.

### **3.2 Results and discussion**

Results of multivariate analyses are reported in Table 2. The data was weighted so results are representative of the population from which the sample was drawn. The reported results can be interpreted as the change in an individual's probability of being a union member; the individual's original probability of union membership is approximately equal to the sample mean. Full details of the results, the modelling procedure, descriptive statistics and cross-tabulations can be found in the technical appendix.

At this stage the NSU scales on organising and recruitment policy and innovation were not included in the models. The results show quite clearly that there are large and significant differences in internal organising effectiveness between different unions. These differences are most distinct among blue-collar workers in single union workplaces, and least distinct among blue-collar workers in multi-union workplaces. There are also variations in the size of the differences between the sample covering all occupational groups with union members (models 1 and 4) and the sample covering individuals covered by collective bargaining over pay only (models 2 and 5). This variation may be due to differences in the openness of the union to members from outside of the core occupational groups/ bargaining units. If a union attempts to recruit members outside of its core areas, and membership levels are lower among the non-core groups, then they will appear less effective than a union that recruits among the core groups only. Models 2 and 4 get around this problem by focusing on employees in the unions core areas only, therefore discussion of the results will focus on these models.

#### **Blue-collar union results**

In the model 2 results, using the TGWU as the reference union, a blue-collar employee in a single union workplace organised by the AEEU is 29 per cent less likely to be a union member. The same worker would be 30 per cent less likely to be a member if the workplace was organised by the GMB. The figure for UNISON is 20 per cent, although this result is not statistically significant. It should be noted that the UNISON result is highly sensitive to the inclusion of a control for the public sector. If this control is removed the UNISON result

becomes positive. The reason for this is that all but one of the UNISON workplaces is in the public sector, and organising effectiveness is particularly low in the single private sector workplace. Results are also negative and statistically significant for the RMT, and negative but smaller and not significant for the GPMU, BFAWU and USDAW. Looking at the model 3 results for multi-union workplaces, the differences between the unions are smaller, and not statistically significant. Two possible explanations for the difference between single and multi union workplaces suggest themselves. First, a combination of inter-union co-operation and competition smoothes out the differences between unions. Second, bargaining units in multi-union workplaces may be more strategically important unions than bargaining units in single union workplaces. Multi union workplaces are larger on average than single union workplaces, they are also more likely to be part of multi-site organisations, both factors which would increase the strategic importance of the bargaining unit to the national union. A third possible explanation, that the different results reflect differences between workers in the same occupational group as the senior union rep and the rest of the unionised workforce can be rejected, because the differences endure even if the single union workplaces sample consists of employees in the same occupational group as the senior union rep.

### **White-collar union results**

Although there are some quite large variations between unions' performance in model 5, with one exception (the NUT) these results are not statistically significant. The NUT result, and a similar result in model 6 for both the NUT and the EIS may be due to the occupation of the employees that these unions organise (teachers) rather than union characteristics.

In order to test hypotheses one and two a second set of models were estimated using the union's score on the two NSU scales. The abridged results are set out in Table 4.

There is a small positive and (just about) statistically significant relationship between a sophisticated recruitment policy and organising effectiveness in models 1a (blue-collar workers in occupational groups with union members, but not necessarily covered by collective bargaining) and 6a (white-collar workers in multi-union workplaces). In model 2a (blue-collar workers covered by collective bargaining), innovation is relatively more important. Innovation is associated with being less effective at internal organising among white-collar workers. This is likely to be because the most effective unions (the teaching unions and the FBU) don't need to innovate because they are well adapted to a fairly static environment. These findings do not provide ringing support for the hypotheses. However

they do suggest that among some groups of workers, specifically blue-collar workers covered by collective bargaining, national union recruitment policy, and innovation in recruitment policy both increase internal organising effectiveness.

### **Local union influences on internal organising effectiveness**

Results looking at the association between local union structure and behaviour are reported in Table 3. The fourth hypothesis was that democratically elected reps would be associated with higher levels of organising effectiveness. Among blue-collar workers in single union workplaces, internal organising effectiveness is positively associated with democratically elected reps, and the association is statistically significant. However among blue-collar workers in multi-union workplaces, there is little difference in organising effectiveness between workplaces where the rep is democratically elected, and where the rep volunteered. The most startling results are found among white-collar employees. Here organising effectiveness is higher in workplaces *where management appoints the union rep*. This suggests that democracy and participation is less important to white-collar workers than the representative and insurance functions that workplace reps provide. It also suggests that there is a significant body of the white-collar workforce who find unions unappealing unless the independence of the union from management is compromised. These results provide a qualified endorsement for hypothesis four; democratic workplace unions do improve organising effectiveness, but only among blue-collar workers in single union workplaces.

The second measure of workplace union organisation, which might be expected to improve internal organising effectiveness, is the number of union reps relative to the size of the workforce. Among blue-collar employees in single union workplaces, a one standard deviation increase in the number of reps relative to the size of the workforce increases an individual workers probability of being a union member by around 7 per cent. In practical terms, among workers who are covered by collective bargaining, this means that an increase in reps from one rep per 44 employees to one rep per 33 employees would increase an individual's probability of union membership from .68 to .72. However an increase in the number of reps is not associated with increased organising effectiveness among blue-collar workers in multi-union workplaces. Among white-collar workers in single union workplaces, an increase in the number of reps did not increase organising effectiveness. Among white-collar employees in multi-union workplaces, an increase in the number of reps from one per 36 workers to one per 34 workers, increases an individuals probability of being a union

member from .71 to .74. Once again there is qualified support for the hypothesis that increasing the number of union reps increases internal organising effectiveness.

The final hypothesis was that union militancy would be associated with increased internal organising effectiveness. The results show that among blue-collar employees, policies of militancy are associated with very high levels of union membership. However the proportion of workplaces pursuing policies of militancy was low (just 10 per cent of blue-collar employees in single union workplace have unions which follow militant policies). Militant behaviour is also associated with increased union membership among white-collar employees, but the size of the effect is less, and the result is only statistically significant for workers in multi-union workplaces. Cooperation with management is also associated with increased organising effectiveness compared to workplaces where unions are marginalised. The effect is largest among blue-collar workers in single union workplaces. Overall these results provide some support for advocates of militancy and advocates of union-management co-operation, although union membership is at its highest among blue-collar workers when unions pursue militant policies.

To conclude this section, there are large differences between the internal organising effectiveness of different trade unions. Some, but by no means all of these differences can be accounted for by variation in recruitment policies and innovation. Unions that score highly on the NSU recruitment policy scale and recruitment policy innovation scale are more effective at organising blue-collar employees in single union workplaces. By far the biggest influences on internal organising effectiveness are what the local union (and management) does in the workplace. Among blue-collar employees in single union workplaces, and white-collar employees in multi-union workplaces, a higher number of reps are associated with increased organising effectiveness. Among blue-collar employees, democratic union organisation is more effective than non-democratic union organisation, but among white-collar employees, democracy makes little difference. If unions are able to engage with management, either militantly or cooperatively membership will be higher than if management marginalises the union.

## 4. External Organising Effectiveness: Data and Results

### 4.1 Data

Data to assess external union effectiveness comes from the publicly available ‘Focus on Union Recognition’ reports published annually by the TUC (TUC 1999a and TUC 2000a). Figures from the 1999 report, which covers the period from February to November 1998, and the 2000 report, which covers the period from January to October 1999 are used. Figures from two years are used because agreements signed in 1999 are likely to reflect organising activity (hence organising effectiveness) in 1998. Also because more unions signed new agreements over the two-year period than in a single year, the 1998 figures alone would not allow multivariate analysis of the results. From this information two measures of organising effectiveness can be developed. First, the number of new recognition agreements signed by each union, second, the number of workers covered by new agreements. The reports do not tell us about the number of new members generated by the recognition campaign and agreement. Organising effectiveness depends on the number organised compared to the number of those currently organised by the union concerned. Unfortunately information on the numbers of workers covered by agreements negotiated by each union is not available. Current union membership is used as a second best proxy for this. Therefore the second measure of external organising effectiveness is the total number covered by new agreements, divided by current union membership, from the 1998 union membership figures published by the TUC.

Information on union organising and recruitment policy, innovation and strategy from the NSU were then added to this data. The measures of organising and recruitment policy and innovation have already been set out in Table 2. Partnership was measured by the presence of a formal union policy in favour of social partnership. Organising was measured by the use of three or more ‘organising model messages’ in recruitment activity<sup>4</sup>. Organising effectiveness also depends on the level of desire for union representation on the part of the workers organised. It is much easier to get new agreements if the level of latent demand for union representation is high. For this reason an estimate of the level of latent demand among

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<sup>4</sup> Organising model messages were 1. worker solidarity, 2. need for members to solve own problems through workplace organisation, 3. Opportunity to participate in union democracy, 4. membership a democratic right, 5. need for justice and respect at work. The organising model dummy variable was positive if a union used 3 or more of these messages. The messages were used in addition to messages about the ‘bread and butter’ issues of better pay, representation and protection, which were used across the board.

the type of workers covered by the new agreements negotiated by each union was added to the data. This measure was based upon responses to the question ‘if there were a trade union at your workplace, how likely or unlikely do you think that you would be to join it?’ in the 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey.

### **Caveats**

First, the usual caveat about cross-section data applies. Second, it would have been desirable to include more detailed controls for the industry and composition of the workforce. This was not possible because the data collected by the TUC is not sufficiently detailed to identify accurately the detailed industry sectors, occupations and personal characteristics of the workforces involved. Third, there are question marks over the comprehensiveness of the ‘survey on recognition’ figures. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some unions may under report the number of agreements signed because their own internal communications systems do not collect the data efficiently. Despite this limitation the survey on recognition is likely to be broadly indicative of the level of activity being undertaken by different unions. Fourth, the measure of partnership is not ideal, anecdotal evidence suggests that the current vogue for partnership means that some unions have adopted partnership policies for mimetic reasons without really putting partnership into practice. Meanwhile other unions, which follow partnership policies in practice, do not have formal policies because the term is politically unacceptable to the activists who make union policy. Finally, the results of the multivariate analysis reported below should be treated with caution because of the low number of observations.

### **4.2 Results and discussion**

Table 5 reports the number of new recognition agreements, the number of workers covered by these agreements, the total reported membership of the union in 1998, and the number covered by new agreements divided by total union membership in 1998. These figures are reported by union for all unions covered by the NSU.

28 unions reported no new agreements in the period covered by our data. Of those unions that did sign new recognition agreements, the union at the bottom of the table is the National Union of Teachers, which signed just one agreement covering five employees. At the top of the table is the Independent Union of Halifax Staff, which organised 6000 workers compared to an existing membership of 25,000, followed by the Bakers Union, organising

2500 workers from an existing membership of around 30,000 and Unison, which organised 55,000 workers from an existing membership of around 1.3 million. Looking at the number of agreements, 56 per cent of agreements were signed by just three unions, the TGWU, the GMB and the GPMU.

Regression models were estimated using the number of agreements (models 8a and 8b) and the number of workers organised divided by the unions existing membership (models 7a and 7b) as the dependent variables. Models 7a and 8a looked at the association between external effectiveness and union recruitment policies and innovation. Models 7b and 8b looked at the association between external effectiveness and union strategy. The results are reported in Table 6 (more information on the modelling procedure, with cross-tabulations and descriptive statistics can be found in the appendix).

First, a one standard deviation increase in the unions score on the organising and recruitment policies scale is associated with increased organising effectiveness using both measures. However innovation is negatively associated with organising effectiveness, although the association is small and not statistically significant. The first finding confirms hypothesis one, unions with higher scores on the NSU organising and recruitment policy scale are more effective at organising than unions with lower scores. However the second finding does not support hypothesis two, there is very little relationship between innovation in recruitment and organising policy as it is measured in the NSU and external organising effectiveness.

Looking now at the impact of union policy, unions that follow a policy of organising or a policy of partnership exclusively, perform worse than unions that have adopted neither policy. Unions that have adopted both policies perform much better than unions that have adopted one policy only (the result is statistically significant when looking at the number of new agreements, but not when looking at numbers organised relative to existing membership). Unions that have adopted both policies perform better than unions that have adopted neither policy, but the difference is not that large, and it is not statistically significant. These results support hypothesis three, but the support is not overwhelming. They suggest that policies of organising and partnership are additive, but the performance gap between unions that have adopted both policies and unions that have adopted neither is not that large, and that the policies are not necessarily the reason for the difference.

## 5. Practical Implications

The most striking finding in these results is that there are large differences in union organising effectiveness among blue-collar employees in occupational groups covered by collective bargaining. Table 7 illustrates this point.

The table shows the probabilities of union membership for an arbitrarily defined ‘typical worker’ if the workplace union is varied, and all other factors are held constant. The differences cannot be explained by the unions’ scores on the NSU recruitment policy and innovation scales alone. There are several possible explanations for the difference. First, the difference in performance may reflect differences in the way that unions manage their recruitment policies, and the leadership and vision with which they are implemented, although why Bill Morris (the TGWU’s general secretary) should be a more visionary and inspiring leader than Sir Ken Jackson (of the AEEU) or John Edmonds (of the GMB) is unclear. Second, the difference may reflect different levels of democracy and decentralisation (Fiorito *et al.* argue that democracy and decentralisation cause greater organising effectiveness).

Applying a rule of thumb to these concepts, the TGWU, has a de-centralised regional and trade group structure with traditions of lay member led bargaining and participative democracy (Undy *et al.*, 1981; Fairbrother, 2000). The GMB has moved from being a full-time official dominated union, to putting greater emphasis on shop stewards, but key officials (particularly the regional secretaries) remain powerful (Fairbrother, 2000). The AEEU (the result of a merger between the AEU and EETPU) has taken on the characteristics of the highly centralised and full-time officer dominated EETPU (Lloyd, 1990). UNISON is also the result of a recent merger, blue-collar workers would have been part of NUPE, which was also a union dominated by full-time officials, although in contrast to the EETPU, NUPE officials led from the left, not the right (Haunch, 2001). Finally, USDAW was and remains a union where command and control from full-time officials is the dominant organisational characteristic.

Greater democracy and decentralisation may explain the exceptional performance of the TGWU<sup>5</sup>, but not the variations in the performance between the GMB and AEEU and USDAW and UNISON. The GMB and AEEU both competed enthusiastically in ‘beauty

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<sup>5</sup> The TGWU have recently reformed its trade group structure, replacing many single industry trade groups with 4 multi-industry trade groups. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may have led to less lay activist control and a greater role for senior full-time officials, the effect of this change on organising effectiveness remains to be seen.



contests' to sign single union recognition agreements with employees in the 1980s and 1990s (Lloyd, 1990, p.654). Critics of these agreements questioned the independence of the unions from management, and case studies found a minimal union role and low levels of membership (Danford, 1998). It is therefore entirely plausible that the enthusiasm of the AEEU and GMB for beauty contests has resulted in lower levels of organising effectiveness.

A second striking finding is the large differences in the variables associated with organising effectiveness for the blue-collar and white-collar samples. Among white-collar workers the returns on militancy and cooperation are comparatively less, and increasing the number of union reps relative to the size of the workforce is only associated with higher levels of organising effectiveness among white-collar workers in multi-union workplaces. Most startling of all is the fact organising effectiveness is higher in workplaces with a management appointed rep than in workplaces with democratically elected reps. This suggests that there is a significant minority of white-collar workers who will only unionise if the union has explicit management approval. It also suggests that for white-collar workers, the protection and insurance function of trade unions is more important than the collective action function. The finding suggests that unions seeking to organise white-collar employees face a strategic dilemma. Should they attempt to import and build on the traditional collective representation model, in the hope that if it works well it will result in higher levels of membership and self-sustaining bargaining units (which appears to be the case in multi-union workplaces)? Or should they accept that this model is not working well in a great number of cases, so seek to develop improved means of providing and selling individual insurance, representation and related services?

Finally, what do these results suggest that unions can do to boost organising effectiveness? The TUC has argued that the key to reviving union membership is for unions to recruit more reps, and to provide better support for existing reps in order to strengthen workplace organisation (TUC, 1999b). These results support the diagnosis that more reps will make a difference, although not in all circumstances. The results also point to the critical importance of local union effectiveness, policies of co-operation and militancy are both likely to lead to increased union membership if the workplace union currently plays a marginal role (although in many circumstances management will define the union role). The results also suggest that the sophistication of trade union organising and recruitment policies make a small positive difference to internal organising effectiveness, and a larger positive difference to external organising effectiveness.

## 6. Conclusions

This paper has investigated the influences on trade union organising effectiveness. The use of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, the National Survey of Unions, and the TUC focus on recognition survey to do this represents a significant methodological development. Concepts of internal and external organising effectiveness were developed. Internal effectiveness looks at the ability of unions to recruit and organise workers in workplaces where unions have a membership presence. External effectiveness looks at the unions' ability to recruit and gain recognition in workplaces that are non-union. Separate sets of analyses were performed to investigate the factors associated with internal and external organising effectiveness. The results of these analyses are summarised in Table 8.

The results suggest that the sophistication of trade union organising and recruitment policies are an important influence on union organising effectiveness, particularly external organising effectiveness. However innovation in organising and recruitment is not associated with increased organising effectiveness. The latter result contrasts with results of Fiorito *et al.*, (1995) who found that innovation was correlated with organising effectiveness among US unions. The difference in the findings may be because the measure of innovation used here is much narrower than that used by the US study. Fiorito *et al.* also found that decentralisation and democracy were associated with increased organising effectiveness. Democratic local union organisation is certainly strongly associated with internal organising effectiveness among blue-collar workers, and the exceptional performance of the TGWU among blue-collar workers covered by collective bargaining may also be down to these factors. However the results point to fundamentally different causes of internal organising effectiveness among white-collar workers. This difference presents unions with a strategic dilemma. Should they seek to apply the principles and practices of blue-collar unionism to white-collar workers, or should they attempt to develop new products and services designed to appeal to the growing white-collar workforce?

Policies of organising and partnership appear to have an additive effect on external organising effectiveness, however union performance is not dramatically improved when compared to unions that have adopted neither policy. Caution is needed when interpreting these results because of doubts about the reliability of the measures. Local union policies of co-operation and militancy both boost organising effectiveness; the membership returns to militancy are higher than the returns to co-operation, but the ability of unions to pursue

militant policies is likely to remain constrained by the neo-liberal environment. Overall, the results suggest that unions can influence their own destiny; what unions do does influence organising effectiveness. However perhaps the largest critical factor is likely to remain the decisions taken by management; whether to support or oppose union recognition, and once recognised, whether to work with unions, or to attempt to marginalise them. This suggests that if union membership is to return to the levels of the 1970s, unions will need to secure a public policy framework which encourages employers to bargain with unions.

**Table 1 - summary of analyses**

Model	Occupation	Union coverage	Structure of workplace unionism
1	Blue-collar employees	Management respondent says union members present among occupational group	Single union
2	Blue-collar employees	Management respondent says occupational group has pay determined by collective bargaining or pay review body	Single union
3	Blue-collar employees	Employees in same occupational group as the senior union rep in workplaces where an interview with the employee rep was completed	Multi union
4	White collar employees	Management respondent says union members present among occupational group	Single union
5	White-collar employees	Management respondent says occupational group has pay determined by collective bargaining or pay review body	Single union
6	White-collar employees	Employees in same occupational group as the senior union rep in workplaces where an interview with the employee rep was completed	Multi union

**Table 2 - Definitions of variables used in the analysis of internal organising effectiveness**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Definition</b>
<b>Union structure</b>	
Commitment to recruitment scale	Standardised scores of union at workplace on the 13 item scale from the NSU (Alpha .86) the items were: Investment 1. Annual recruitment budget 2. Training in organising for FTO's 3. Training in organising for lay activists 4. Sponsorship of a trainee organiser at the TUC's organising academy Specialisation 5. Executive sub-committee that oversees recruitment 6. Senior official whose main responsibility is organising/ recruitment 7. FTO's who specialise in organising/ recruitment 8. Lay representatives who specialise in organising/ recruitment Formal recruitment policy 9. Written national policy 10. National recruitment plan 11. Recruitment plans at intermediate levels 12. Recruitment plans at lowest levels 13. Periodic and quantified review of success
Recruitment innovation scale	Standardised scores of union at workplace on the 13 item scale (alpha .88) items as the recruitment commitment scale, but if practice or policy was introduced in the last three years
Union name	Dummy variable for the union at the workplace, information from manager
	<b>Local union organisation</b>
Militancy	Dummy variable, positive if management respondent says that introduction of changed failed because of union resistance
Co-operation	Dummy variable, positive if management respondent says that union either negotiated or was consulted in the successful introduction of change
Democracy	Dummy variables for senior union rep elected (either by members or other union reps), senior union rep not elected (e.g. appointed, by default etc.) Information on senior rep missing, reference: no union rep. Information from senior rep
Number of reps	The standardised scores of the number of reps divided by the number of employees. Information from manager
	<b>Individual characteristics</b>
Age	Worker's report of age, banded into 20-24, 25-29, 30-39, 40-49 and 50+
Gender	Worker's report of gender, male or female
Ethnicity	Worker's report of ethnic origin, banded white and non-white
Highest educational qualification	Worker's report of highest educational qualification, banded none, GCSE or equivalent, A level or equivalent, Higher education or equivalent, NVQ or equivalent
Job characteristics	
Hours worked	Worker's report of number of hours per week usually worked, banded full-time (30 hours per week or more) and part-time (<30 hours per week)
Temporary or fixed term contract	Worker's report of whether or not they are on a fixed term or temporary contract
Job tenure	Worker's report of time in the present job, banded < 1 year, 1-2 years, 2-5 years, 5-10 years and >10 years
Occupation	Dummy variables for worker's report of 1 digit standard occupational classification
	<b>Workplace characteristics</b>
Workplace size	Manager's report of number of employees at the workplace, banded 10-14, 25-99, 100 – 499 and 500+
Workplace age	Manager's report of the number of years that workplace has been at its current address (plus previous address if it had moved) banded to workplace established before 1970, 1970 – 1980, 1980 – 1990 and post 1990.
Industry	Managers report of 1 digit standard industrial classification of workplace
Public sector	Managers report of whether or not the workplace is in the public sector
Product market competition	Managers report of level of competition – does the organisation of which the workplace is part have no, few or many competitors?

**Table 3 - Estimated marginal effects from probit analyses on individual union membership**

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Blue-collar employees</i>			<i>white collar employees</i>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Sample mean	0.56	.68	.92	0.46	.54	.71
Union (ref: TGWU – models 1 - 3 UNISON – models 4 - 6)						
AEEU	-.18***	-0.29**	.04	.06	.01	
UNISON	-.27***	-.2		-	-	
GMB	-.05	-.3***	.07	.05	.04	.08
TGWU	-			.26*	.08	
GPMU	-.09	-.11		.01	-.19	
BIFU				.26*	.22	
USDAW	-.12	-.14		.11	.23	
RMT	.11	-.29**				
BFAWU	-.01	-.13				
CWU			-.13			
IPMS				0	-.07	
AUT				-.1	-.17	
PCS				0.11*	.09	.24
MSF				.03	-.04	
NUT				.28**	.26**	.28***
NUIW				.24	.09	
EIS						.24***
FBU						.7
NATFHE						.08
<b>Local union behaviour</b>						
Cooperative (ref: neither co-operative or militant)	.17***	.24***	.08*	.09**	.08	.08**
Militant <sup>6</sup>			.13**	.08	.15	.14**
<b>Local union organisation</b>						
Senior union representative is elected (ref: no union representative models 1,2,4 and 5 and rep volunteered models 3 and 6)	.13**	.25***	-.05	.22***	.22***	.07*
Senior union representative chosen by management	.05	-	-	.3***	.38***	.34
Senior rep chosen by union	-.09	-.25	-.06	.17**	.1	.06
Senior rep volunteered	.11	.06		.18***	.17**	-
Ratio of employees to representatives	.08**	.06	-.02	.01	0	-
<b>Individual characteristics</b>						
Age (ref Age under 20)						
Age 20 – 24	-.05	-.14	.09	.04	.05	-.3**
Age 25 – 29	-.01	-.05	.12*	.15***	.18**	-.19
Age 30 – 39	.03	.01	.04	.19***	.21***	-.22*
Age 40 - 49	.01	.003	.05	.21***	.24***	-.23*
Age 50+	.06	.05	.02	.18***	.21**	-.3**
Female (ref: male)	.005	-.01	-.16***	0	.02	-.03
Ethnic minority	.02	-.03	.01	-.02	-.01	-.06
Highest educational qualification (ref: none)						
GCSE's or equivalent	-.01	.05	.05	-.03	.02	-.08
A Levels or equivalent	.04	.03	.01	-.06	0	-.13**
Degree or equivalent	-.17	-.18	-.02	-.06	.02	-.09
<b>Job characteristics</b>						
Part-time (<30 hours/ week)	-.13	-.18**	-.09*	-.12***	-.18***	-.09
Temporary or fixed term contract	.08	.16**	-.15***	-.14**	-.13**	-.15***
Job tenure (ref: <1 year)						
1 – 2 years	.01	-.11	-.07	.02	.05	-.04
2 – 5 years	.15***	0.01	-.01	.12***	.16***	-.07
5 – 10 years	.15***	.07	.1	.17***	.21***	.12***
10+ years	.27***	.11	.11*	.25***	.26***	.2***
Occupation (ref: Craft models 1 – 3) and						

<sup>6</sup> The militancy variable predicts union membership perfectly (i.e. all employees in workplaces with militant unions were members) so observations with this characteristic were dropped from the regression.

managers models 4 – 6)						
Professional				-.05	-.01	.5***
Associate professional and technical				.09	.12	.67***
Clerical and Administrative				-.07	-.08	.43***
Personal services				.01	.01	.4***
Sales				-.02	.05	.58***
Operative and assembly	-.08*	.01	.14**			
Other unskilled manual	-.13*	.09	.14**			
Workplace characteristics						
Workplace size (ref: 10 – 14 employees)						
25 – 99 employees	-.05	.06	-.04	-.27***	-.2***	.01
100 – 499 employees	.005	.04	-.01	-.36***	-.31***	-.04
500+ employees	-.13	-.35*	.05	-.35***	-.22***	-.04
Workplace age (ref: workplaces open before 1970)						
Workplace opened between 1970 and 1979	.03	.12	-.1	-.01	0	.04
Workplace opened between 1980 and 1989	.03	-.09	-.23	0	-.04	.06
Workplace opened after 1990	.15	.13*	-.02	.06	.08	.1**
Product market competition (ref: many competitors)						
No competitors	-.13	.24*	-.23**	-.05	-.01	.01
Few competitors	-.01	-.17**	0	.16***	.14**	.06
Information on level of competition missing	.13**	.22**	-.05	.04	.03	.1**
Public sector	.45***		.14	.25***	.24***	-.04
1 digit standard industrial classification (ref: manufacturing except model 6 where education is the reference category)						
Electricity generation and supply, water and gas supply	.04	0	.15**	.51**	.38	.1
Construction	.19**	.09	-.11	.3*	.01	
Wholesale and retail	.12*	.09	.12	.32**	.11	.07
Hotels and restaurants	.07	-.3***		.07	-.33*	
Transport and communications	.07	-.15	.04	-.03	-.14	.07
Financial services				.25*	.08	.27
Other business services	-.06	.36*		.22*	.07	-.11
Public administration	-.42	-.07	-.11	.25*	.05	-.22
Health and social services	-.3	0.47		.25*	.11	.04
Other community services	.09	.38***		.13	-.08	-.29***
Education				-.11	-.27	-
n				2149	1432	

Notes

1. \*= significant at the 10% level, \*\*= significant at the 5% level, \*\*\*= significant at the 1% level.
2. Marginal effects calculated from coefficients in table A2.
3. Estimation technique used was Survey probit analysis, which produces robust standard errors and accounts for the clustering of individuals in workplaces.

**Table 4 - Impact of local and national union policies and structure on individual union membership**

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Blue-collar employees</i>			<i>White collar employees</i>		
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 5a	Model 6a
<b>National Union</b>						
Structures and policies for organising and recruitment	.05*	.05	0	.01	.02	.04***
Innovation in organising and recruitment	0	.08	.04	-.06	-.08***	-.07***

Controls: Local union role, mode of shop steward appointment, number of shop stewards relative to workforce, individual; age, occupation, highest educational qualification, gender, ethnicity. Job characteristics; part time, temporary or fixed term contract, job tenure. Workplace; size, date established, product market competition, public sector, industry.



**Table 5 - Information on new recognition agreements 1998 – 1999 by union**

	<i>Number organised / number of members</i>	<i>Number of workers organised 1998 – 1999</i>	<i>Number of agreements 1998 – 1999</i>	<i>Total union members 1998</i>
ALGUS	0	0	0	3068
ANSA	0	0	0	7468
ASLEF*	0	0	0	14721
ATL	0	0	0	113,760
AUT	0	0	0	41,758
BACM*	0	0	0	4289
BALPA*	0	0	0	6555
BOS*	0	0	0	1011
Connect	0	0	0	16747
CSP*	0	0	0	31351
CWU	0	0	0	287732
EQUITY*	0	0	0	36563
EMA	0	0	0	28631
FBU*	0	0	0	57654
FDA	0	0	0	10627
MPO	0	0	0	9627
MU*	0	0	0	30811
NACO*	0	0	0	3012
NATFHE	0	0	0	64153
NLBD*	0	0	0	2200
NUDAGO	0	0	0	2253
NULMW	0	0	0	4021
PFA	0	0	0	2268
RMT	0	0	0	56476
UCATT*	0	0	0	111804
TSSA	0	0	0	28940
SoR*	0	0	0	13725
WISA	0	0	0	5000
NUT	0.000026	5	1	194259
PCS	0.00059	150	1	254350
USDAW	0.00066	200	1	303060
NUJ	0.00113	22	2	19436
NUMAST	0.00159	30	1	188843
EIS	0.002	100	1	49994
BECTU	0.00256	72	3	28128
GPMU	0.00278	563	14	203229
GMB	0.005556	3956	18	712010
IPMS	0.005	370	3	73329
MSF	0.00613	2600	5	423842
TGWU	0.00654	5767	28	881625
AEEU	0.008	5800	6	727977
KFAT	0.0086	280	3	32624
ISTC	0.0252	1260	3	50001
UNISON***	0.0434	55200	8	1272330
BFAWU	0.0834	2500	4	29962
IUHS**	0.234	6000	2	25652

\*= Information missing, so not included in the tobit analysis

\*\*= Outlier – Growth came through corporate takeovers by the parent company (Halifax building society), the company then extended the existing recognition agreements to cover the newly acquired workforce. Consequently the IUHS are not used in the tobit analysis

\*\*\* - 55,000 of these came from a single agreement with Compass Group, a contract catering company with a large number of NHS contracts.

Notes

1. Data on the number of new agreements and number of workers covered comes from the publicly available 'Focus on Recognition' published by the TUC. The data used comes from the 1999 report (covering the period February – November 1998) and the 2000 report (covering the period January – October 1999).

2. Data on union membership comes from the TUC's 1998 membership figures.

**Table 6 - The impact of recruitment policy, innovation and strategy on external organising effectiveness**

<i>Model</i>			<i>coefficient</i>
<b>7A</b>	<b>Dependent variable</b>	<b>Standardised scores of the number of workers organised divided by the total membership</b>	
	Independent variables	Commitment to organising and recruitment scale	0.54**
		Recruitment innovation scale	-0.05
		Latent demand	0.02*
		Constant	-0.128
		_SE	0.57
		Chi2	12
		Prob> Chi2	0.002
		Pseudo R2	.28
		N=33 (16 left censored observations)	
<b>7B</b>	<b>Dependent variable</b>	<b>Standardised scores of the number of workers organised divided by the total membership</b>	
	Independent variables	Organising message	-0.1
		Partnership policy	-0.34
		Organising and Partnership interaction	0.7
		Latent demand	0.02**
		Constant	-1.37
		_SE	0.59
		Chi2	11
		Prob> Chi2	0.02
		Pseudo R2	.2
N=33 (16 left censored observations)			
<b>8A</b>	<b>Dependent variable</b>	<i>Number of new agreements</i>	
	Independent variables	Commitment to organising and recruitment scale	5.5**
		Recruitment innovation scale	-1.4
		Size of union	0.00001***
		Latent demand	.13
		Constant	-9.8
		_SE	6
		Chi2	27
		Prob> Chi2	0.0000
		Pseudo R2	.19
N=33 (18 left censored observations)			
<b>8B</b>	<b>Dependent variable</b>	<b>Number of new agreements</b>	
	Independent variables	Organising message	-4.2
		Partnership policy	-1.8
		Organising and Partnership interaction	10.2*
		Size of union	0.00001***
		Latent demand	0.18*
		Constant	-9.
		_SE	5.5
		Chi2	29
		Prob> Chi2	0.0000
N=33 (18 left censored observations)	.21		

**Table 7 - The national union effect on a typical worker's probability of union membership**

<i>Union</i>	<i>Worker's probability of union membership</i>
AEEU	.73
GMB	.73
TGWU	.98
UNISON	.87
USDAW	.88

Calculated from model 2 results

Worker's characteristics: White male, aged under 30, no formal educational qualifications, works full-time on a permanent contract in a craft occupation. Has been in the job for 2 – 5 years. Workplace characteristics: Manufacturing workplace with 100 – 499 employees, established before 1970. Workplace union characteristics: The union co-operates with management, the senior union rep was democratically elected, and the number of reps relative to the size of the workforce is set to the sample mean.

**Table 8 - Summary of results**

<i>Model</i>	<i>Sample</i>	<i>Variables with statistically significant association with organising effectiveness (direction of association)</i>
		<b>Internal Organising effectiveness</b>
Model 1	Blue collar employees in single union workplaces	National union organising and recruitment policies and structure scale (+) Militancy (+) Cooperation (+) Democratically elected senior union rep (+)
Model 2	Blue collar employees covered by collective bargaining in single union workplaces	Increased number of union reps (+) Militancy (+) Cooperation (+) Democratically elected union rep (+)
Model 3	Blue collar employees in the same occupational group as the senior union rep, multi union workplaces	Union rep chosen by union (-) None
Model 4	White collar employees in single union workplaces	Any on site union representative (+)
Model 5	White collar employees covered by collective bargaining or pay review body in single union workplaces	Innovation in organising and recruitment policies scale (-) Any on site union representative (+)
Model 6	White collar employees in the same occupational group as the senior union rep, multi union workplaces	Organising and recruitment policies and structure scale (+) Innovation in organising and recruitment policies scale (-) Militancy Any on site representation (+) Increased number of union reps (+)
Model 7	<b>External organising effectiveness</b> Unions that responded to the NSU	Organising and recruitment policies and structure scale (+)
Model 8	Unions that responded to the NSU	Organising and recruitment policies and structure scale (+) Use of organising and partnership models together (+)

## **Technical Appendix**

### **Modelling Procedures**

#### **1. Internal Organising Effectiveness**

Because the dependent variable (individual union membership) is categorical the appropriate method of analysis is probit analysis. Both models are run using data weighted by the inverse of the individuals sampling probability. This means that the results can be generalized to the population from which the sample is drawn. It also prevents estimation bias caused by differential sample selection probabilities (Skinner, 1997). The Huber-White robust variance estimator was used; this estimation method produces consistent standard errors in the presence of heteroscedasticity. This procedure uses pseudo-likelihood methods, so the point estimates are from a weighted 'likelihood,' which is not the distribution function from the sample. This means that standard likelihood ratio tests are not valid (STATA manual, release 6, Volume 4, 1999). The model also takes into account the complex survey design of the WERS sample, specifically the clustering of individuals in workplaces (I have yet to be granted access to the restricted data which would allow the samples stratification to be taken into account). This is the correct procedure for analysis of WERS98 employee data, as set out in the WERS98 user guide (Forth and Kirby, 2000). The full results for both models, including coefficients and robust standard errors are set out in table A1.

#### **2. External Organising Effectiveness**

The estimation technique used was tobit analysis. This reflects the fact that the dependent variable contained a large number of observations at the lower end clustered at 0 (Kennedy, 1998: pp. 250-251).

#### **Measuring Internal organising Effectiveness Using WERS98**

The weakness of using WERS98 for the purposes of this paper is that it does not allow us to link directly the appropriate union with the individual respondent. The survey does ask individuals if they are union members, but it does not ask them of which union. If there is

only one union present at the workplace, then it is highly likely that they will be a member of that union. However, complications arise if there is more than one union present at the workplace. One way around this problem would be to assume that employees in the largest occupational group are members of the largest union. However this method has three faults. First, measurement error arises because the largest union may not organise the largest occupational group. Second, measurement error arises because of difficulties in measuring the largest occupational group – there are two different measures, and results of our analyses differed significantly when each of the different measures was used. The employee may also wrongly identify his or her own occupation, again causing measurement error. Third, a full measure of internal organising effectiveness would include all individuals covered by the union, not just those in the largest occupational group. For this reason, employees in single union workplaces, where these problems do not arise, were analysed separately.

A way of looking at multi-union workplaces that gets around this problem is to use data from the employee representative questionnaire. The employee representative interviewed is the most senior representative of the largest union. We can therefore identify the union through the representative. We can also identify the occupational group of the employee representative, so we can be fairly confident that employees in the same occupational group as the union rep will be eligible to be in the same union. This gives a slightly limited measure of effectiveness in multi-union workplaces, but it is better than nothing.

One major measurement problem remains. Once again it is linked to the fact that only broad 1 digit occupational classifications are used. There may be circumstance where individuals are in the same occupational group for classification purposes, but in practical terms do different occupations, so either are not covered by union membership (in single union workplaces) or are covered by a different union. For example production line workers fall into the operative and assembly occupation, as do drivers. The production line workers may be covered by collective bargaining, while the drivers are not. However, this problem is likely to be randomly distributed, so the results should not be systematically biased.

## Key to Union Acronyms

AEU – Amalgamated Engineering Union (now merged to form AEEU)  
AEEU – Amalgamated Electrical and Engineering Union  
ALGUS – Alliance and Leicester Group Union of Staff  
ANSA – Abbey National Staff Association  
ASLEF – Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen  
ATL – Association of Teachers and Lecturers  
AUT – Association of University Teachers  
BACM – British Association of Colliery Management  
BALPA – British Airline Pilots Association  
BECTU – Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematography and Theatre Union  
BFAWU – Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union  
BOS – British Orthoptic Society  
CSP – Chartered Society of Physiotherapy  
CWU – Communication Workers Union  
Connect – Formerly the Society of Telecom Executives  
EETPU – Electrical, electronic, telecommunications and plumbing union (now merged to form AEEU)  
EIS – Educational Institute of Scotland  
EMA – Engineers and Managers Association  
Equity – The Actors union  
FBU – Fire Brigades Union  
FDA – First Division Association (senior civil servants)  
GMB – Britain’s General Union  
GPMU – Graphical, Paper and Media Union  
IPMS – Institute of Professionals, Managers and Specialists  
ISTC – Iron and Steel Trades Confederation  
IUHS – Independent Union of Halifax Staffs  
KFAT – Knitwear, Footwear and Allied Trades  
MPO – Managerial and Professional Officers  
MSF – Manufacturing, Science and Finance  
MU – Musicians Union  
NACO – National Association of Co-operative Officials  
NATFHE – National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education  
NLBD – National League of Blind and Disabled  
NUDAGO – National Union of Domestic Appliances and General Operatives  
NUJ – National Union of Journalists  
NULMW – National Union of Lock and Metal Workers  
NUMAST – National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers  
NUPE – National Union of Public Employees (now merged to form UNISON)  
NUT – National Union of Teachers  
PCS – Public and Commercial Services Union  
PFA – Professional Footballers Association  
RMT – Rail, Maritime and Transport  
SoR – Society of Radiographers  
TGWU – Transport and General Workers Union  
TSSA – Transport Salaried Staffs Association  
UCATT – Union Constructors, Allied Trades and Technicians  
UNIFI – The Finance Union

UNISON – The Public Services Union  
USDAW – Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers  
WISA - Woolwich Independent Staff Association



**Table A1 - Proportion of employees who are union members by union, workplace, individual and job characteristics**

<i>Independent Variable</i>	Cell percentages					
	<i>Blue-collar employees</i>			<i>White collar employees</i>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<b>Union</b>						
AEEU	46.6	57.1	93	45.8	46.8	-
UNISON	66.2	65.2	68.8	59.4	59.9	63
TGWU	59.1	74.8	94.2	40.7	38.1	45.3
GMB	52.7	67.8	91.8	30.4	48.3	78
GPMU	52.7	83.1	85.5	28.9	34.3	-
BIFU	-	-	-	48.6	43.1	100
USDAW	32.5	30.6	94.8	35.2	49.1	75.6
RMT	87.1	87.7	79.9	-	-	-
BFAWU	70.5	87.9	29.4	-	-	-
CWU	-	-	90.3	-	-	-
ISTC	-	-	100	-	-	-
IPMS	-	-	-	63.8	62.8	45
AUT	-	-	-	26.3	25.8	57.8
PCS	-	-	-	76.5	79.9	54.3
MSF	-	-	-	34.2	37.6	46
NUT	-	-	-	64.7	64.3	92.2
NUIW	-	-	-	71.2	58.8	-
EIS	-	-	-	-	-	87.6
FBU	-	-	-	-	-	96.2
NATFHE	-	-	-	-	-	56
<b>Local union behaviour</b>						
Militant	96	96	92.9	53.5	58.2	73.4
Cooperative	72.6	78.5	93	58.3	61.4	71
<b>Local union organisation</b>						
Senior union representative is elected	68	71.2	91.8	55.7	61	71.2
Senior union rep is appointed by management	59	0	-	63.9	77.7	92.4
Senior union rep is chosen by union	51.3	49.4	88.7	58.5	53	61.2
Senior rep volunteered	56.6	74	81.2	47.7	55.8	71.1
No union representative	33.8	42.3	-	32.6	40.4	-
Information on senior representatives mode of appointment missing	68.9	50.2	-	49.8	51.3	-
<b>National union policy and structure</b>						
Union's score on NSU recruitment policy scale (no unions scored less than 5)						
5	-	-	-	-	-	80.7
6	-	-	-	-	-	56
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
7	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	71.2	58.8	-
9	-	-	-	26.3	25.8	63.3
10	92.7	64.6	50.9	45.8	46.8	100
11	94.8	30.6	32.5	35.6	46.9	89.8
12	91.2	71.3	60	52.5	58.5	62.7

13	85.5	83.1	70	60.8	59.7	56.7
Union score on recruitment policy innovation scale						
0	71	38.2	42.7	37.9	48.4	90.9
1	-	-	-	63.8	62.8	92.5
2	-	-	-	-	-	59.5
3	90.8	67.8	52.7	30.4	48.3	74.9
4	-	-	-	71.2	58.8	-
5	-	-	-	-	-	83.6
6	-	-	-	75.2	77.5	54.6
7	85.5	83.1	70	28.9	34.4	73.3
8	94.2	73.8	59.1	40.7	37.2	45.3
9	79.9	87.7	87.1	-	-	-
10	93.3	57.1	46.6	34.9	38.5	46
11	-	-	-	-	-	87.6
12	68.8	65.2	66.2	59.4	59.9	63
<b>Individual characteristics</b>						
Age 16 - 20	24.8	35.9	63	11.3	14.4	87.8
Age 20 – 24	37.5	22.4	87.4	21.6	30	50
Age 25 – 29	52.2	63.9	94.8	40	46.1	71.9
Age 30 – 39	56	71	92.2	51	56.6	72
Age 40 - 49	55.4	71.9	94.1	59.2	66.3	77.2
Age 50+	65.4	73.4	91.2	55.3	61.3	62.8
Female	48.2	48.1	79.9	44.6	50.9	67.3
Ethnic minority	57.2	59.8	97	43.4	50.5	61.4
Highest educational qualification						
None	58.9	68.6	91.5	53.5	59.3	69.8
GCSE's or equivalent	52.8	67.8	93.5	43.5	49.3	71.3
A Levels or equivalent	48.3	57.6	84.6	42.7	54.2	60.5
Degree or equivalent	55.1	48.2	75.2	50	57.5	74.7
<b>Job characteristics</b>						
Part-time (<30 hours/ week)	33.4	18.2	93	35.5	42.5	57.9
Temporary or fixed term contract	41.6	64.6	61	21.2	25	40.7
<b>Job tenure</b>						
< 1 year	28.1	45.5	75.3	25.3	30.3	52
1 – 2 years	33.9	41.8	92	27.9	36.7	52.2
2 – 5 years	52.7	58.1	86.5	42.2	47.7	64.5
5 – 10 years	60.9	74.1	95.4	56.4	64.7	77.9
10+ years	73.7	83	96.2	70	73.5	84.1
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<b>Occupation</b>						
Managerial and senior administrative	-	-	-	59.4	67.4	75.8
Professional	-	-	-	55.5	59.5	75.1
Associate professional and technical	-	-	-	58	65.4	82.3
Clerical and Administrative	-	-	-	51.2	49	57
Craft and related	66.1	74.7	90.6			
Personal services	-	-	-	56.4	63.6	79.3
Sales	-	-	-	34.4	48.4	76
Operative and assembly	55.6	70.4	92.6	-	-	-

Other unskilled manual	41.7	40.6	89.8	-	-	-
<b>Workplace characteristics</b>						
<b>Workplace size</b>						
10 – 24 employees	63.5	86.3	84.7	62.6	61.4	72.9
25 – 99 employees	52.6	62	90.8	44.6	53.7	77.7
100 – 499 employees	58.5	71.4	91.7	38.5	45.9	71.5
500+ employees	40.2	44.5	92.6	49.8	57.1	61.9
<b>Workplace age</b>						
Workplace opened before 1970	62	67.7	93.5	47.3	56	73.5
Workplace opened between 1970 and 1979	44.7	70.3	88.8	51	59.4	67.1
Workplace opened between 1980 and 1989	55.1	75.1	90.2	48	49.2	67.4
Workplace opened after 1990	52.8	64.2	85.8	37	42.7	71.1
<b>Product market competition</b>						
No competitors	54.6	72.8	89.6	58.8	65.8	78.3
Few competitors	48.3	57	91.6	46.7	61.3	76.7
Many competitors	51.9	62.8	92.3	40.6	49.5	64.6
Information on level of competition missing	68	82.6	92.4	55.8	58.1	70.2
<b>Public sector</b>	78.9	82.4	89.2	64.8	64.3	71.4
<b>Industry</b>						
Manufacturing	54.3	61.9	92.8	27	36.7	-
Electricity generation and supply, water and gas supply	50	48.6	95.8	61.9	66.1	64
Construction	57.5	57.7	84.9	46.4	45.3	100
Wholesale and retail	43.7	52.6	89.1	35.6	49.4	75.6
Hotels and restaurants	67	50	-	18.6	10.5	-
Transport and communications	79.8	89.6	90.6	28.2	45.3	73.3
Financial services	-	-	-	43.8	40.3	77.2
Other business services	39.9	83.7		47.7	60.1	55
Public administration	33.8	34.3	80	72	72.7	67.8
Health and social services	45.5	54		61.1	64.1	77.6
Other community services	69.3	80.1		43	42.7	32.4
Education	-	-	-	47.8	45	73.2
Weighted base	1061	565	687	2304	1528	1404

**Table A2 - Mean values of variables used in the analysis of internal organising effectiveness**

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Blue-collar employees</i>			<i>White collar employees</i>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<b>Union</b>						
AEEU	0.114	0.092	0.279	0.006	0.009	-
UNISON	0.066	0.066	0.003	0.308	0.406	0.154
TGWU	0.291	0.313	0.36	0.032	0.017	0.015
GMB	0.265	0.212	0.098	0.081	0.026	0.026
GPMU	0.094	0.128	0.015	0.004	0.003	-
BIFU	-	-	-	0.066	0.778	0.009
USDAW	0.114	0.138	0.025	0.335	0.271	0.013
RMT	0.014	0.03	0.013	-	-	-
BFAWU	0.042	0.021	0.014	-	-	-
CWU	-	-	0.189	-	-	0.034
ISTC	-	-	0.003	-	-	-
IPMS	-	-	-	0.005	0.008	-
AUT	-	-	-	0.002	0.003	0.013
PCS	-	-	-	0.06	0.068	0.174
MSF	-	-	-	0.085	0.094	0.015
NUT	-	-	-	0.009	0.014	0.181
NUIW	-	-	-	0.007	0.003	-
EIS	-	-	-	-	-	0.072
FBU	-	-	-	-	-	0.097
NATFHE	-	-	-	-	-	0.168
<b>Local union behaviour</b>						
Militant	0.044	0.097	0.183	0.017	0.021	0.071
Cooperative	0.331	0.393	0.598	0.296	0.367	0.459
<b>Local union organisation</b>						
Senior union representative is elected	0.447	0.667	0.957	0.429	0.468	0.662
Senior union representative appointed by management	0.038	0.02	-	0.02	0.023	0.043
Senior union rep chosen by union	0.04	0.038	0.036	0.041	0.051	0.079
Senior union rep volunteered	0.12	0.147	0.007	0.134	0.16	0.205
No union representative	0.297	0.083	-	0.341	0.258	-
Information on senior representatives mode of appointment missing	0.058	0.045	-	0.035	0.04	-
<b>Individual characteristics</b>						
Age 16 - 20	0.051	0.055	0.03	0.086	0.05	0.004
Age 20 – 24	0.067	0.056	0.042	0.082	0.065	0.041
Age 25 – 29	0.097	0.107	0.101	0.13	0.128	0.11
Age 30 – 39	0.286	0.314	0.308	0.296	0.312	0.305
Age 40 - 49	0.217	0.216	0.267	0.238	0.246	0.345
Age 50+	0.282	0.252	0.252	0.168	0.185	0.194
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Female	0.302	0.211	0.114	0.707	0.677	0.623
Ethnic minority	0.031	0.025	0.037	0.035	0.041	0.043

<b>Highest educational qualification</b>						
None	0.454	0.403	0.515	0.169	0.153	0.063
GCSE's or equivalent	0.455	0.477	0.43	0.416	0.387	0.264
A Levels or equivalent	0.074	0.083	0.074	0.211	0.203	0.147
Degree or equivalent	0.017	0.017	0.011	0.204	0.257	0.516
<b>Job characteristics</b>						
Part-time (<30 hours/week)	0.163	0.134	0.054	0.436	0.379	0.3470.
Temporary or fixed term contract	0.066	0.056	0.045	0.057	0.061	0.151
<b>Job tenure</b>						
< 1 year	0.159	0.141	0.085	0.162	0.159	0.115
1 – 2 years	0.092	0.091	0.081	0.154	0.132	0.1
2 – 5 years	0.214	0.217	0.14	0.246	0.219	0.228
5 – 10 years	0.247	0.262	0.196	0.227	0.243	0.238
10+ years	0.288	0.289	0.498	0.211	0.247	0.319
<b>Occupation</b>						
Managerial and senior administrative				0.065	0.062	0.003
Professional				0.118	0.168	0.487
Associate professional and technical				0.07	0.095	0.792
Clerical and Administrative				0.3	0.35	0.267
Craft and related	0.279	0.335	0.086	-	-	-
Personal services				0.054	0.043	0.146
Sales				0.392	0.283	0.017
Operative and assembly	0.488	0.482	0.609	-	-	-
Other unskilled manual	0.233	0.183	0.205	-	-	-
<b>Workplace characteristics</b>						
<b>Workplace size</b>						
10 – 24 employees	0.106	0.079	0.055	0.167	0.231	0.034
25 – 99 employees	0.204	0.227	0.047	0.3	0.258	0.316
100 – 499 employees	0.548	0.546	0.461	0.355	0.284	0.423
500+ employees	0.142	0.148	0.437	0.178	0.227	0.227
<b>Workplace age</b>						
Workplace opened before 1970	0.601	0.583	0.658	0.212	0.232	0.598
Workplace opened between 1970 and 1979	0.204	0.152	0.229	0.323	0.387	0.208
Workplace opened between 1980 and 1989	0.273	0.294	0.025	0.225	0.215	0.105
Workplace opened after 1990	0.122	0.137	0.088	0.24	0.166	0.089
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<b>Product market competition</b>						
No competitors	0.056	0.077	0.095	0.135	0.167	-
Few competitors	0.337	0.388	0.372	0.199	0.17	-
Many competitors	0.474	0.421	0.261	0.44	0.618	-
Information on level of	0.133	0.114	0.272	0.226	0.245	-

competition missing						
<b>Public sector</b>	0.085	0.116	0.247	0.356	0.467	0.92
<b>Industry</b>						
Manufacturing	0.537	0.467	0.649	0.013	0.006	-
Electricity generation and supply, water and gas supply	0.002	0.003	0.017	0.004	0.006	0.017
Construction	0.025	0.038	0.052	0.018	0.029	0.002
Wholesale and retail	0.178	0.209	0.012	0.417	0.307	0.013
Hotels and restaurants	0.038	0.001	-	0.102	0.006	-
Transport and communications	0.109	0.182	0.254	0.012	0.006	0.017
Financial services	-	-	-	0.143	0.169	0.019
Other business services	0.045	0.005	-	0.055	0.066	0.019
Public administration	0.006	0.013	0.016	0.156	0.187	0.3
Health and social services	0.025	0.025	-	0.107	0.132	0.105
Other community services	0.035	0.057	-	0.04	0.051	0.007
Education	-	-	-	0.024	0.035	0.502
<b>Weighted base</b>						

**Table A3 - Descriptive statistics for the NSU recruitment and organising policy and innovation scales**

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>
Recruitment policy scale				
Model 1	11.7	0.8	10	13
Model 2	11.7	0.83	10	13
Model 3	11.4	0.93	10	13
Model 4	11.66	0.77	8	13
Model 5	11.73	0.77	8	13
Model 6	10.44	2.54	5	13
Recruitment innovation scale				
Model 1	5.84	3.68	0	12
Model 2	6.03	3.63	0	12
Model 3	6.83	3.08	0	12
Model 4	5.54	5.3	0	12
Model 5	6.59	5.4	0	12
Model 6	4.7	4.4	0	12
Ratio of reps to employees				
Model 1	0.0153	0.0235	0	0.2
Model 2	0.023	0.03	0	0.2
Model 3	0.0264	0.0137	0.0033	0.1428
Model 4	0.0104	0.0139	0	0.0714
Model 5	0.0119	0.0145	0	0.0714
Model 6	0.0282	0.0293	0	0.214

**Table A4 - full regression results**

<i>Independent variable</i>	<i>Blue collar</i>			<i>White collar</i>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Union (ref: TGWU – models 1 - 3 and UNISON – models 4 - 6)						
AEEU	-0.760 (0.29) ***	-1.3759 (0.66)**	0.226 (0.36)	0.212 (0.56)	0.0315 (0.55)	-
UNISON	-1.146 (0.42) ***	-0.9473 (0.6)	-	-	-	-
GMB	-0.193 (0.23)	-1.446 (0.42)***	0.3807 (0.39)	0.1726 (0.43)	0.1264 (0.54)	0.3334 (0.54)
TGWU	-	-	-	0.8804 (0.51)*	0.2719 (0.37)	-
GPMU	-0.363 (0.33)	-0.5424 (0.61)		0.043 (0.43)	-0.6433 (0.43)	-
BIFU	-	-		0.8869 (0.46)*	0.7432 (0.64)	-
USDAW	-0.488 (0.48)	-0.6802 (0.62)		0.371 (0.46)	0.7686 (0.61)	-
RMT	0.469 (0.67)	-1.4036 (0.8)				-
BFAWU	-0.037 (0.41)	-0.615 (0.72)				-
CWU			-1.176 (1.05)			-
IPMS	-	-		0.0029 (0.56)	-0.2253 (0.57)	-
AUT	-	-		-0.3469 (0.27)	-0.5806 (0.41)	-
PCS	-	-		0.3665 (0.21)*	0.3059 (0.2)	1.029 (0.34)***
MSF	-	-		0.0941 (0.39)	-0.1387 (0.56)	-
NUT	-	-		0.9559 (0.37)**	0.8509 (0.38)**	1.1866 (0.32)***
NUIW	-	-		0.7931 (0.56)	0.2889 (0.76)	-
EIS						0.9932 (0.33)***
NATFHE						0.3298 (0.34)



FBU	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
						2.9455 (0.65)
Other miscellaneous unions <sup>7</sup>			-1.16 (0.54)**			0.3114 (0.3)
Local union behaviour (ref: No evidence of either co-operation or militancy)						
Militancy <sup>8</sup>	-	-	0.7326 (0.33)**	0.2793 (0.33)	0.5157 (0.34)	0.6074 (0.24)**
Co-operation	0.703 6 (0.19) ***	1.1475 (0.27)***	0.4317 (0.23)*	0.3161 (0.15)**	0.2552 (0.19)	0.3461 (0.14)**
Local union organisation						
Senior union representative is elected (ref: no union representative models 1,2,4 and 5, ref: rep volunteered, models 3 and 6))	0.538 5 (0.22) **	1.2039 (0.47)**	-0.311 (0.65)	0.7318 (0.14)***	0.7195 (0.15)***	0.324 (0.2)*
Senior union representative appointed by management	0.215 5 (0.36)	-	-	1.001 (0.32)***	1.271 (0.47)***	1.4371 (0.59)**
Senior union rep is chosen by union	- 0.385 1 (0.44)	-1.2031 (0.99)	-0.3475 (0.82)	0.585 (0.26)**	0.3257 (0.26)	0.2427 (0.27)
Senior union rep volunteered	0.447 7 (0.29)	0.2877 (0.64)	-	0.6113 (0.21)***	0.5636 (0.23)**	-
Information on senior representatives mode of selection missing	0.531 3 (0.27) *	2.5038 (0.81)***	-	-0.196 (0.4)	-0.3602 (0.25)	-
Ratio of employees to representatives	0.321 9 (0.14) **	0.2879 (0.17)*	-0.1376 (0.22)	0.0176 (0.09)	-0.0047 (0.08)	0.1257 (0.07)*
Individual characteristics						
Age (ref Age under 20)						
Age 20 – 24	- 0.223 9 (0.31)	-0.6763 (0.41)*	0.4936 (0.43)	0.1198 (0.2)	0.1752 (0.3)	-1.284 (0.55)**
Age 25 – 29	- 0.048 9 (0.29)	-0.2405 (0.38)	0.7194 (0.39)*	0.4906 (0.16)***	0.5901 (0.24)**	-0.8117 (0.52)
Age 30 – 39	0.129 3 (0.28)	0.0472 (0.40)	0.2491 (0.43)	0.6296 (0.16)***	0.6837 (0.24)***	-0.9307 (0.53)*
Age 40 - 49	0.056 2 (0.27)	0.0141 (0.46)	0.2196 (0.48)	0.7202 (0.17)***	0.8008 (0.25)***	-0.9646 (0.53)*
Age 50+	0.271 1 (0.31)	0.2182 (0.45)	0.131 (0.485)	0.607 (0.18)***	0.6946 (0.26)**	-1.1287 (0.53)**

<sup>7</sup> In model 3 this includes: In model 6 this includes:

<sup>8</sup> In models 1 and 2 militancy predicts success perfectly, in other words all employees in workplace where the union is militant are union members.

Female (ref: male)	-0.021 9 (0.11)	-0.0695 (0.19)	-0.9324 (0.26)***	-0.0101 (0.09)	0.058 (0.12)	-0.1587 (0.12)
Ethnic minority	0.075 7 (0.26)	-0.1513 (0.62)	0.0406 (0.5)	-0.0515 (0.29)	-0.0265 (0.35)	-0.2378 (0.16)
Highest educational qualification (ref: none) GCSE's or equivalent	-0.029 2 (0.14)	0.2475 (0.21)**	0.2999 (0.25)	-0.0867 (0.12)	0.0599 (0.16)	-0.3188 (0.22)
A Levels or equivalent	0.153 2 (0.25)	0.138 (0.38)	0.0334 (0.28)	-0.2115 (0.13)	0.0022 (0.17)	-0.5573 (0.23)
Degree or equivalent	-0.700 2 (0.38) *	-0.8861 (0.59)	-0.0927 (0.37)	-0.216 (0.16)	0.0499 (0.21)	-0.3778 (0.23)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Job characteristics Part-time (<30 hours/ week)	-0.558 4 (0.2)* **	-0.8673 (0.35)**	-0.528 (0.31)*	-0.3944 (0.1)***	-0.5835 (0.13)***	-0.397 (0.12)***
Temporary or fixed term contract	0.336 5 (0.18) *	0.7625 (0.34)**	-0.8714 (0.28)***	-0.4745 (0.19)**	-0.4232 (0.21)**	-0.6478 (0.15)***
Job tenure (ref: <1 year)						
1 – 2 years	0.052 5 (0.3)	-0.5185 (0.34)	-0.4087 (0.29)	0.0692 (0.14)	0.1633 (0.16)	-0.1536 (0.21)
2 – 5 years	0.626 (0.18) ***	0.0559 (0.28)	-0.0499 (0.46)	0.4136 (0.15)***	0.5409 (0.15)***	0.2767 (0.18)
5 – 10 years	0.651 7 (0.18) ***	0.3413 (0.23)	0.5966 (0.38)	0.5731 (0.17)***	0.6956 (0.14)***	0.5087 (0.19)***
10+ years	1.137 (0.21) ***	0.5103 (0.33)	0.6456 (0.34)*	0.8325 (0.18)***	0.86 (0.21)***	0.8501 (0.18)***
Occupation (ref: craft for models 1 – 3 and managers for models 4 – 6)						
Professional	-	-	-	-0.1533 (0.22)	-0.0456 (0.31)	2.1 (0.62)***
Associate professional and technical	-	-	-	0.3014 (0.2)	0.4091 (0.27)	2.81 (0.62)***
Clerical and Administrative	-	-	-	-0.2251 (0.2)	-0.2527 (0.29)	1.8 (0.67)***
Personal services	-	-	-	0.0485 (0.29)	0.031 (0.41)	1.7118 (0.55)***
Sales	-	-	-	-0.0753 (0.29)	0.16 (0.5)	2.4682 (0.76)***
Operative and assembly	-	0.0553	0.8434			

	0.332 6 (0.19) *	(0.28)	(0.39)**			
Other unskilled manual	- 0.558 7 (0.27) **	-0.4111 (0.33)	1.5985 (0.78)**			
Workplace characteristics						
Workplace size (ref: 10 – 24 employees)						
25 – 99 employees	- 0.194 8 (0.27)	0.2931 (0.69)	-0.219 (0.81)	-0.9153 (0.19)***	-0.6745 (0.2)	0.0509 (0.38)
100 – 499 employees	0.021 3 (0.27)	0.1799 (0.77)	-0.0613 (0.62)	-1.21 (0.19)***	-1.0268 (0.2)***	-0.1512 (0.4)
500+ employees	- 0.526 4 (0.34)	-1.6614 (0.91)*	0.306 (0.67)	-1.1832 (0.2)***	-0.7438 (0.22)***	-0.1894 (0.45)
Workplace age (ref: workplaces open before 1970)						
Workplace opened between 1970 and 1979	0.143 6 (0.22)	0.596 (0.4)	-0.5809 (0.34)*	-0.0425 (0.14)	0.0014 (0.17)	0.1497 (0.15)
Workplace opened between 1980 and 1989	0.131 (0.19)	-0.4218 (0.34)	-1.32 (0.49)***	-0.0084 (0.15)	-0.1374 (0.18)	0.2566 (0.19)
Workplace opened after 1990	0.614 (0.23) ***	0.6228 (0.34)*	-0.1418 (0.41)	0.2069 (0.19)	0.274 (0.22)	0.4256 (0.2)**
Product market competition (ref: many competitors)						
No competitors	- 0.552 2 (0.52)	1.1728 (0.6)*	-1.3245 (0.56)**	-0.1729 (0.19)	-0.0323 (0.22)	0.0477 (0.26)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Few competitors	- 0.030 2 (0.18)	-0.804 (0.38)**	-0.0019 (0.28)	0.5315 (0.16)***	0.474 (0.21)**	0.2664 (0.21)
Information on level of competition missing	0.528 6 (0.238 )	1.064 (0.48)**	-0.2849 (0.34)	0.1198 (0.17)	0.1078 (0.19)	0.4422 (0.21)**
Public sector <sup>9</sup>	2.527 3 (0.67) ***	-	0.9829 (0.62)	0.0828 (0.25)***	0.7947 (0.23)***	-0.1765 (0.23)
1 digit standard industrial classification (ref: manufacturing except model 6 where education is the reference)						
Electricity generation and supply, water and gas supply	- 0.175 4 (0.43)	0.0046 (0.97)	1.9166 (0.91)**	1.7057 (0.67)**	1.268 (0.85)	0.4426 (0.57)
Construction	0.812 8 (0.38)	0.4161 (0.74)	-0.6215 (0.68)	0.9981 (0.52)*	0.034 (0.61)	

<sup>9</sup> Public sector dummy is missing in model 3 because of collinearity with the Unison dummy.

	**					
Wholesale and retail	0.502 1 (0.29) *	0.44 (0.55)	0.6708 (0.56)	1.0669 (0.5)**	0.3556 (0.62)	0.928 (0.52)
Hotels and restaurants	0.292 6 (0.43)	-1.4589 (0.48)***	-	0.2376 (0.63)	-1.099 (0.62)*	
Transport and communications	0.299 (0.27)	-0.6994 (0.53)	0.2507 (0.44)	-0.0968 (0.59)	-0.4711 (0.74)	0.3008 (0.47)
Financial Services				0.8526 (0.47)*	0.2765 (0.54)	1.154 (0.74)
Other business services	- 0.271 4 (0.32)	1.7247 (0.87)**	-	0.7316 (0.44)*	0.2379 (0.56)	-0.505 (0.32)
Public administration	- 1.779 7 (0.82) **	-0.3125 (1.03)	-0.6392 (0.77)	0.854 (0.47)*	0.173 (0.59)	-0.9437 (0.41)**
Health and social services	- 1.124 6 (0.75) *	0.2268 (0.99)	-	0.854 (0.46)*	0.38 (0.59)	0.1856 (0.33)
Other community services	0.358 6 (0.35)	1.8338 (0.54)***	-	0.4446 (0.5)	-0.2538 (0.67)	-1.218 (0.3)***
Education	-	-	-	-0.3756 (0.52)	0.915 (0.69)	
Constant	- 0.753 5 (0.47)	-0.225 (0.99)	0.4715 (1.11)	-1.8706 (0.59)	-1.7797 (0.78)	-1.2236 (0.89)
F	10.65	6.37	34.44	9.7	65.17	5.53
Prob > F	0.000 0	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
N	936 (147)	463 (76)	654 (81)	2149 (214)	1432 (134)	1301 (139)

**Table A5 - new workers organised and number of new agreements by union organisational configuration and policy**

<i>Organisational configuration</i>	<i>Mean number organised/ number of members</i>	<i>Mean number of agreements</i>
Commitment to recruitment scale		
0	0	0
1	-	-
2	0	0
3	0	0
4	0	0
5	0	0
6	0	0
7	0.00032	0.2
8	0.0029	1
9	0.0005	0.6
10	0.0069	1.8
11	-	-
12	0.054	9
13	0.0013	6.67
Recruitment innovation scale		
0	0.0096	1
1	0.0025	1.5
2	0.0003	0.167
3	0.0012	3.5
4	0.0086	3
5	0	0
6	0.0002	1
7	0.059	4
8	0.002	9.3
9	0	0
10	0.01	3.5
11	0	0
12	0.043	8
13	-	-
Union policy		
Partnership	0.0069	4.78
Organising	0.0066	3.13
Organising and partnership	0.009	5.92
Neither	0.0235 (0.0002)	0.3 (0.11) <sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Figures in parentheses are discounting the IUHS, which is an outlier.

**Table A6 - Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis regression analysis of external organising effectiveness**

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>n</i>
Number of agreements	3.06	6	0	28	33
Total organised divided by existing membership	0.008	0.161	0	0.083	33
Organising and recruitment scale	9.26	2.9	2	13	33
Innovation in organising and recruitment scale	4.5	3.8	0	12	33
Partnership	0.47	0.5	0	1	33
Organising	0.75	0.44	0	1	33
Interaction of partnership and organising	0.33	0.47	0	1	33
Size of union	180,502	296,116	2253	1,272,330	33
Latent demand	35.8	15.47	0	60	33

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