![]() | |
![]() | Cookies? |
| |||||||
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | |||
![]() |
Abstract:![]()
CEP Discussion Paper
The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices Christos Genakos, Pantelis Koutroumpis and Mario Pagliero October 2014 Paper No' CEPDP1310: Full Paper ![]() Markup regulation is a common yet understudied type of regulation. We analyze the repeal of maximum wholesale and retail markup regulation in an oligopolistic and vertically non-integrated market. By comparing the prices of products affected by regulation before and after the policy change and using unregulated products as a control group, we find that abolishing regulation led to a significant decrease in both retail and wholesale prices. The results provide indirect but consistent evidence that markup ceilings provided a focal point for collusion among wholesalers. |
![]() |
| ||||
Copyright © CEP & LSE 2003 - 2019
| LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE | Tel: +44(0)20 7955 7673 | Email: cep.info@lse.ac.uk | Site updated 08 December 2019
|