Abstract for:

The polluter-doesn't-pay principle

Ralf  Martin,  Ulrich J.  Wagner,  Laure B.  de Preux,  May 2012
Paper No' CEPCP369: | Full paper

---

Save Reference as: BibTeX File | EndNote Import File

---

Keywords: Industry compensation; industrial relocation, emissions trading, permit allocation, EU ETS, firm data

JEL Classification: H23; H25; Q52; Q54

Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.

---

This Paper is published under the following series: CentrePiece Magazine

---

Share: Google Bookmarks | Facebook | Twitter

---

Abstract:

By granting discounts on environmental taxes to heavy polluting firms, the government is missing out on significant tax revenues and achieving considerably less in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. That is the central conclusion of research by Ralf Martin and colleagues, which reveals the failings of the UK’s climate change levy. Their study shows that firms that enjoy a discount from the levy, claiming that such measures damage their ability to compete in the global economy, do not in fact face higher risks to their competitiveness. Firms that pay the full climate change levy reduce their energy use and their emissions by more than those that get a tax discount.


CentrePiece 17 (1) Spring2012 pages: 16-19