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CEP discussion paper

Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets


When will a monopolist have incentives to leverage his market power in a primary market to foreclose competition in a complementary market by degrading compatibility/interoperability of his products with those of her rivals? We develop a framework where leveraging extracts more rents from the monopoly market by .restoring. second degree price discrimination. In a random coefficient model with complements we derive a policy test for when incentives to reduce rival quality will hold. Our application is to Microsoft’s alleged strategic incentives to leverage market power from personal computer to server operating systems. We estimate a structural random coefficients demand system which allows for complements (PCs and servers). Our estimates suggest that there were incentives to reduce interoperability which were particularly strong at the turn of the 21st Century.


Christos Genakos, Kai Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen

1 July 2011     Paper Number CEPDP1060

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This CEP discussion paper is published under the centre's Growth programme.