| This centre is a member of The LSE Research Laboratory [RLAB]: CASE | CEE | CEP | FMG | SERC | STICERD | Cookies? |
|
| ||||
Abstract for:
Timothy
Besley,
Torsten
Persson,
Daniel M.
Sturm,
October 2010
Paper No' CEPDP1009: | Full paper Save Reference as: BibTeX File | EndNote Import File
Keywords: political competition; competition, government, US, economic development JEL Classification: D72; H11; H70; N12; O11 Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print. This Paper is published under the following series: CEP Discussion Papers Share:
Google Bookmarks |
Facebook |
Twitter
Abstract:This paper develops a simple model to analyze how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right-to-work laws. We also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth. |
||||
|
Copyright © CEP & LSE 2003 - 2013 | LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE | Tel: +44(0)20 7955 7673 | Email: cep.info@lse.ac.uk | Site updated 18 May 2013
| ||||