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Abstract for:
Christos
Genakos,
Tommaso
Valletti,
October 2007
Paper No' CEPDP0827: | Full paper Save Reference as: BibTeX File | EndNote Import File
Keywords: telecommunications; regulation, Waterbed effect, two-sided markets JEL Classification: D21; L51; L96 Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print. This Paper is published under the following series: CEP Discussion Papers Share:
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Abstract:This paper examines the impact of regulatory intervention to cut termination rates of calls from fixed lines to mobile phones. Under quite general conditions of competition, theory suggests that lower termination charges will result in higher prices for mobile subscribers, a phenomenon known as the “waterbed” effect. The waterbed effect has long been hypothesized as a feature of many two-sided markets and especially the mobile network industry. Using a uniquely constructed panel of mobile operators’ prices and profit margins across more than twenty countries over six years, we document empirically the existence and magnitude of this effect. Our results suggest that the waterbed effect is strong, but not full. We also provide evidence that both competition and market saturation, but most importantly their interaction, affect the overall impact of the waterbed effect on prices. |
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