Abstract for:

The European Commission versus Microsoft: Competition Policy in High-Tech Industries

Christos  Genakos,  Kai Uwe  Kühn,  John  Van Reenen,  June  2007
Paper No' CEPCP223: | Full paper

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This Paper is published under the following series: CentrePiece Magazine

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Abstract:

The antitrust cases against Microsoft in the United States and Europe have been the most high profile implementation of competition law in the last 20 years. Christos Genakos, Kai Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen look at the key economic issues, notably what they imply for the conduct of competition policy in high-tech industries dominated by rapid innovation.


CentrePiece 12 (1) Summer 2007 pages: 2-7

This paper has been published as:
The Incentives of a Monopolist to Degrade Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from the Personal Computer and Server Market by Christos Genakos, Kai Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen, CEP mimeo
'Some Economics of European Commission versus Microsoft' by Kai Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen, forthcoming in Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis edited by Bruce Lyons (Cambridge University Press).