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CEP/DOM Capabilities, Competition and Innovation Seminar


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For further information, please contact

Tajender Sagoo, email: t.sagoo@lse.ac.uk, tel: +44(0)20-7955-6648

This seminar is organised by
Yona Rubinstein, email: y.rubinstein@lse.ac.uk, tel: +44(0)20 7106 1262

Rocco Macchiavello, email: r.macchiavello@lse.ac.uk , tel: +44 (0)207 852 3536
calendar
Thursday  10 May 2018  13:45 - 15:00

Decoding Teams: Team Output and Individual Productivity in Science and Invention

Ben Jones (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern)

32L 1.04, 1st Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  17 May 2018  13:45 - 15:00

Engines of Growth: Railroads, Reallocation, and the Rise of American Manufacturing

Richard Hornbeck (Chicago)

We examine the impacts of market integration on the development of American manufacturing, as railroads expanded through the latter half of the 19th century. Using county-by-industry data from the Census of Manufacturers, we estimate substantial impacts on manufacturing productivity growth from increases in county market access due to expansion of the railroad network. These productivity impacts are driven by increases in ''reallocative efficiency,'' as input usage increased in areas where value marginal product exceeded marginal cost.


32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


Please note new venue
calendar
Thursday  24 May 2018  13:45 - 15:00

Incentives and the Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats

Andrea Prat (Columbia University)

Waste in public spending is an obstacle to the provision of government services, especially in developing countries. We report the results of a year-long randomized control trial among 500+ public bodies in Pakistan. Inspired by some key elements of the debate on the reform of procurement processes and by a model of monitoring with a self-interested agent and a self-interested monitor, we performed two treatments: introducing substantial financial incentives for the purchasing managers of the randomized bodies and granting purchasing managers a greater degree of autonomy in procurement decisions. The incentive treatment has no overall effect, but it decreases prices when the agent is subject to less monitoring and increases them when monitoring is stronger. The autonomy treatment significantly reduces purchasing prices.


32L 1.04, 1st Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH